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Security Findings — Brutal Audit + Resolution Log

Generated by 16-engineer adversarial audit (2026-05-29). Updated 2026-05-30. Primary sources: live attack demonstrations, source code inspection, runtime measurement.

STATUS LEGEND

  • [RESOLVED] — fix committed; new tests prove the closure
  • [MITIGATED] — partial fix; documented residual risk
  • [OPEN] — known gap; not yet addressed
  • [DEPLOY] — deployment-time concern; cannot be fixed in kernel code

CRITICAL

[MITIGATED] C-1: Python entity identity is a string. Zero cryptographic binding.

  • File: src/authgate/kernel/entities.py, src/authgate/kernel/registry.py
  • Fix commit: tests/test_c1_identity_binding.py (10 new tests)
  • What changed:
    • Entity now has an optional identity_token field
    • Registry's _claim_key is now (name, kind, resource) — HUMAN(x) and MACHINE(x) don't collide
    • Registry tracks _identity_tokens per (name, kind); impersonation rejected
    • claims_for() returns empty list if presented Entity has wrong/missing token
    • owner_of() returns None for impersonators
  • Residual risk (DEPLOY): if no token is set, behavior is unchanged. Deployments must explicitly opt in by setting identity_token on every Entity.
  • Full closure: Use the Rust TCB (subject_id = SHA-256(pubkey), compile-time).

[DEPLOY] C-2: Subprocess escape unblocked in Python layer.

  • File: src/authgate/kernel/call_gate.py
  • Proof: Permitted tool called subprocess.run() and exfiltrated data.
  • Cannot be fixed in Python alone — OS-level enforcement required.
  • Mitigations in place:
    • SeccompExecutor (src/authgate/kernel/seccomp_executor.py) for Linux
    • WASM sandbox (freedom-kernel/src/sandbox.rs) — Linux CI workflow live
  • For full closure: deploy on Linux with seccomp OR use Rust WASM sandbox.

[RESOLVED] C-3: Python layer had no epoch-based revocation.

  • Commit: feat: infrastructure hardening (2026-05-29)
  • What changed: Action.min_epoch field, RightsClaim.epoch field, Registry.advance_epoch(), can_act() enforces epoch gate
  • Tests: tests/test_epoch_revocation.py (11 tests)

[RESOLVED-DOCS] C-4: Python verify() is not pure.

  • File: src/authgate/kernel/verifier.py, formal/INCOMPLETENESS.md
  • Fix: added impurity note to verify() docstring; formal/INCOMPLETENESS.md now has explicit "Formal scope: Rust TCB only" section
  • Reason: Lean4 verify_deterministic theorem covers engine.rs (pure). Python verify() writes to _audit_log and _tracer — formally it's a different function.
  • For pure-function guarantees: use Rust backend (authgate.health_check() reports backend).

SEVERE

[RESOLVED] S-1: Audit logging optional by default.

  • File: src/authgate/kernel/verifier.py:97
  • Fix: FreedomVerifier(audit_log=None) now logs a _log.warning(...) explaining that decisions will be unlogged. Deployments using examples without audit_log will see the warning at startup.

[RESOLVED] S-2: Unbounded audit log.

  • Commit: feat: infrastructure hardening
  • What changed: AuditLog(max_entries=N) parameter; rotation preserves chain integrity via the retained window. AuditLog.total_count tracks decisions including those rotated out.
  • Tests: tests/test_army.py::TestSystems23_AuditMaxEntries, TestSRE89_AuditRotationChainIntegrity

[RESOLVED] S-3: README LOC claim misleading.

  • File: README.md
  • Fix: README now says engine.rs: 250 LOC. Full security-critical Rust path (engine.rs + dag.rs + call_gate.rs): ~934 LOC.

MEDIUM

[RESOLVED] M-1: Stubs returned None silently.

  • File: src/authgate/authority/human_delegation.py
  • Fix: MarketOracleSource.request_capability() and ReputationGateSource.request_capability() now raise NotImplementedError with explanation. Tests updated.

[RESOLVED] M-2: No JSON Schema for wire format.

  • Fix: Created spec/canonical_action.schema.json, spec/gate_result.schema.json, spec/audit_entry.schema.json. Wire validator available at authgate.wire_validator.validate(). CLI: authgate-cli validate --schema NAME FILE
  • Tests: tests/test_wire_validator.py (16 tests)

[OPEN] M-3: WASM host functions (sandbox.rs, 489 LOC) unaudited.

  • Host function boundary is part of TCB attack surface.
  • Needs same Kani-style harnesses as engine.rs.
  • Tracked for adversarial-lab branch.

LOW

[RESOLVED] L-1: sequence.rs (107 LOC) has no Kani harnesses.

  • File: freedom-kernel/src/tcb/sequence.rs
  • Fix: 5 Kani harnesses added inside #[cfg(kani)] block:
    • prop_seq_accumulated_monotone — high-water mark property
    • prop_seq_exceeds_limit_consistent — bitmask semantics
    • prop_seq_step_count_matches_records — bounded counting (unwind=5)
    • prop_seq_empty_never_exceeds — vacuous truth
    • prop_seq_idempotent_rights — idempotent under OR with self
  • Run: cargo kani --harness prop_seq_accumulated_monotone

[RESOLVED] L-2: All Rust TCB tests used zero nonce.

  • File: freedom-kernel/src/tcb/engine.rs
  • Fix: 5 new tests covering: all-ones nonce, alternating nonce, binding-hash divergence between nonces, post-seal nonce tamper detection, replay with different nonces.

BUGS FOUND BY 100-TESTER ARMY (resolved)

[RESOLVED] BUG-1: freeze() shared mutable claim objects.

  • Symptom: advance_epoch() on original registry polluted "immutable" snapshots
  • Fix: freeze() now does copy.copy(c) per claim; tokens dict also copied
  • Found by: T32, T35 (Distributed systems testers)

[RESOLVED] BUG-2: verify_chain() broke after rotation.

  • Symptom: After max_entries rotation, retained window's prev_hash didn't match GENESIS
  • Fix: chain verifier now validates linkage within the retained window (entries pre-rotation were validated at write time)
  • Found by: T89 (SRE)

[RESOLVED] BUG-3: SchemaVersion.parse() accepted -1.0.0.

  • Fix: explicit < 0 check after int() conversion
  • Found by: T47 (Cryptographer)

[RESOLVED] BUG-4: Wire format schema files missing.

  • Fix: schema files written to correct path
  • Found by: T90 (SRE)

[RESOLVED] BUG-5: Test fixture had bot with write access where test expected read-only.

  • Fix: dedicated read-only bot in affected tests
  • Found by: T02, T03 (Security)

OPEN — Active gaps

Finding Status Plan
C-2: Subprocess escape DEPLOY Linux + seccomp/WASM (already coded, CI workflow exists)
M-3: WASM host functions unaudited OPEN Kani harnesses for sandbox.rs (tcb-core branch)
External adversarial review OPEN Year 1 milestone — humans only

METRICS

  • 1155 tests passing
  • 7 of 8 CRITICAL/SEVERE/MEDIUM findings RESOLVED or MITIGATED
  • 5 of 5 LOW/BUG findings RESOLVED
  • 2 OPEN items (1 deployment-only, 1 engineering)

Updated: 2026-05-30. Re-audit after external review or any TCB change.