diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index a55a02cb..fd5bc1f0 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ jobs:
   frontend-e2e:
     name: Frontend E2E Tests (Playwright)
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container:
+      image: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.40.0-jammy
     timeout-minutes: 20
     container:
       image: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.59.1-jammy
@@ -256,6 +258,8 @@ jobs:
   frontend-schema-e2e:
     name: Frontend Schema Rendering E2E
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container:
+      image: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.40.0-jammy
     timeout-minutes: 20
     container:
       image: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.59.1-jammy
diff --git a/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml b/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9e7c4241
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+name: Fuzz testing
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 0 * * 0' # Run weekly on Sunday at midnight
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+jobs:
+  fuzz:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      
+      - name: Install Rust nightly
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@nightly
+      
+      - name: Install cargo-fuzz
+        run: cargo install cargo-fuzz
+        
+      - name: Run fuzzing for 10 minutes
+        working-directory: tooling/sanctifier-core
+        run: cargo +nightly fuzz run fuzz_parser -- -max_total_time=600
diff --git a/docs/SECURITY-CHECKLIST.md b/docs/SECURITY-CHECKLIST.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b8758bab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/SECURITY-CHECKLIST.md
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# Soroban Smart Contract Security Self-Assessment Checklist
+
+This checklist is designed to help Soroban contract developers self-assess their code before submitting it for a formal audit. 
+
+## 1. Access Control & Authorization
+- [ ] Are sensitive functions protected against unauthorized access? *(Sanctifier: S001 - Auth Gap)*
+- [ ] Is `env.storage().instance().has()` used properly to check for initialization? *(Sanctifier: S008)*
+- [ ] Are administrative roles well-defined and least-privileged? *(Manual Review)*
+- [ ] Is `Address::require_auth()` called on the correct invoker for critical actions? *(Sanctifier: S001)*
+- [ ] Is `Address::require_auth_for_args()` used when argument validation is required? *(Sanctifier: S001)*
+- [ ] Are contract-to-contract authorization boundaries correctly handled? *(Sanctifier: S006)*
+- [ ] Does the contract prevent arbitrary address impersonation? *(Sanctifier: S001)*
+
+## 2. Arithmetic & Math Operations
+- [ ] Are all mathematical operations safe from integer overflows and underflows? *(Sanctifier: S002)*
+- [ ] Are divisions performed after multiplications to avoid precision loss? *(Sanctifier: S002)*
+- [ ] Are checked math operations (`checked_add`, `checked_mul`) utilized where applicable? *(Sanctifier: S002)*
+- [ ] Is zero-division explicitly checked and handled? *(Sanctifier: S002)*
+- [ ] Are rounding directions correctly chosen for financial math (round in favor of protocol)? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 3. State & Data Validation
+- [ ] Are all inputs from users validated against expected bounds and types? *(Sanctifier: S004)*
+- [ ] Is `env.storage().persistent()` used for data that must outlive the contract? *(Sanctifier: S009)*
+- [ ] Are keys for storage well-structured to avoid collisions? *(Sanctifier: S004)*
+- [ ] Does the contract validate the length of input vectors/arrays? *(Sanctifier: S004)*
+- [ ] Are time-based conditions (e.g., locks, expirations) securely validating the ledger time? *(Sanctifier: S009)*
+- [ ] Is the data read from external contracts validated before use? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 4. Cryptography & Randomness
+- [ ] Does the contract avoid using ledger sequence as a source of secure randomness? *(Sanctifier: S003)*
+- [ ] Are cryptographic primitives implemented securely using Soroban's built-in functions? *(Sanctifier: S003)*
+- [ ] Is signature verification done through `env.crypto().ed25519_verify()` correctly? *(Sanctifier: S003)*
+- [ ] Are nonces used to prevent replay attacks if custom signature schemes are built? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 5. Denial of Service (DoS) & Resource Limits
+- [ ] Are iteration loops bounded to prevent exceeding CPU limits? *(Sanctifier: S005)*
+- [ ] Is memory allocation bounded for input data types to avoid memory exhaustion? *(Sanctifier: S005)*
+- [ ] Are large structures avoided in local scope/stack? *(Sanctifier: S005)*
+- [ ] Does the contract prevent griefing attacks where malicious users lock shared resources? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 6. Cross-Contract Calls & Reentrancy
+- [ ] Is reentrancy mitigated natively or logically (Soroban handles some, but logical reentrancy exists)? *(Sanctifier: S006)*
+- [ ] Are state changes written to storage before calling external contracts (Checks-Effects-Interactions)? *(Sanctifier: S006)*
+- [ ] Are errors from cross-contract calls handled securely without panicking the parent unless intended? *(Sanctifier: S006)*
+- [ ] Are external contract IDs validated before invoking them? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 7. Business Logic & Edge Cases
+- [ ] Are all token transfers verifying balance before transferring? *(Sanctifier: S007)*
+- [ ] Are edge cases like 0-value transfers explicitly handled? *(Sanctifier: S007)*
+- [ ] Is fee calculation logic correct and immune to manipulation? *(Manual Review)*
+- [ ] Can the contract handle a paused or deprecated state if implemented? *(Manual Review)*
+- [ ] Are staking/reward logic distributions tested for edge cases (e.g., 0 stakers)? *(Manual Review)*
+- [ ] Is order-of-execution dependence minimized in Defi constructs? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 8. Initialization & Upgradability
+- [ ] Is the initialization function protected against being called twice? *(Sanctifier: S008)*
+- [ ] Is the upgrade mechanism protected by a secure multisig or DAO? *(Sanctifier: S008)*
+- [ ] Does the upgraded contract validate the existing storage schema? *(Manual Review)*
+- [ ] Is `env.deployer()` used securely if deploying child contracts? *(Sanctifier: S008)*
+- [ ] Is the WASM hash verified before upgrading? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 9. Environment & Soroban APIs
+- [ ] Are deprecated Soroban environment functions avoided? *(Sanctifier: S009)*
+- [ ] Is the correct storage type (`persistent`, `temporary`, `instance`) chosen for the data lifecycle? *(Sanctifier: S009)*
+- [ ] Are `require_auth` boundaries spanning across contract calls managed safely? *(Sanctifier: S009)*
+- [ ] Is ledger sequence `env.ledger().sequence()` used appropriately without expecting exact time synchronization? *(Sanctifier: S009)*
+
+## 10. Error Handling & Panics
+- [ ] Does the contract use explicit `Error` enums instead of native `panic!`? *(Sanctifier: S010)*
+- [ ] Are internal logic panics avoided during user operations? *(Sanctifier: S010)*
+- [ ] Do errors expose sensitive internal state information? *(Sanctifier: S010)*
+- [ ] Are `unwrap()` and `expect()` calls justified and safe from crashing on user input? *(Sanctifier: S010)*
+
+## 11. Event Emission
+- [ ] Are all critical state changes emitting events? *(Sanctifier: S011)*
+- [ ] Do events avoid logging sensitive data or private keys? *(Sanctifier: S011)*
+- [ ] Are event topics properly structured for efficient indexing? *(Manual Review)*
+
+## 12. Rust/Wasm Specifics
+- [ ] Is the WASM binary optimized for size to meet network constraints? *(Manual Review)*
+- [ ] Does the code avoid unsafe Rust blocks? *(Sanctifier: S012)*
+- [ ] Are all Rust warnings and clippy lints addressed? *(Sanctifier: S012)*
+- [ ] Is the `no_std` environment strictly adhered to? *(Sanctifier: S012)*
diff --git a/frontend/tests/e2e/full-scan-flow.spec.ts b/frontend/tests/e2e/full-scan-flow.spec.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a5d916bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frontend/tests/e2e/full-scan-flow.spec.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import { test, expect } from '@playwright/test';
+import * as path from 'path';
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+
+test.describe('Full Scan Flow', () => {
+  test('upload contract, view findings, and download SARIF', async ({ page }) => {
+    await page.goto('/');
+
+    // Upload contract
+    const contractPath = path.join(__dirname, '../../../../contracts/fixtures/auth_gap_contract.rs');
+    // Ensure the fixture exists
+    expect(fs.existsSync(contractPath)).toBeTruthy();
+    
+    // Upload the file
+    const fileChooserPromise = page.waitForEvent('filechooser');
+    await page.click('text=Upload Contract'); // Replace with actual selector if different
+    const fileChooser = await fileChooserPromise;
+    await fileChooser.setFiles(contractPath);
+
+    // Wait for findings to appear
+    await expect(page.locator('text=S001')).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15000 });
+    
+    // Download SARIF
+    const downloadPromise = page.waitForEvent('download');
+    await page.click('text=Download SARIF'); // Replace with actual selector if different
+    const download = await downloadPromise;
+    
+    // Wait for the download process to complete and save the downloaded file somewhere
+    const downloadPath = await download.path();
+    expect(downloadPath).toBeTruthy();
+    
+    if (downloadPath) {
+      const sarifContent = fs.readFileSync(downloadPath, 'utf8');
+      const sarifData = JSON.parse(sarifContent);
+      
+      // Verify S001 finding is in SARIF
+      const hasS001 = sarifData.runs.some((run: any) => 
+        run.results.some((result: any) => result.ruleId === 'S001')
+      );
+      expect(hasS001).toBeTruthy();
+    }
+  });
+});
diff --git a/tooling/sanctifier-core/fuzz/Cargo.toml b/tooling/sanctifier-core/fuzz/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4b9d029c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tooling/sanctifier-core/fuzz/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[package]
+name = "sanctifier-core-fuzz"
+version = "0.0.0"
+publish = false
+edition = "2021"
+
+[package.metadata]
+cargo-fuzz = true
+
+[dependencies]
+libfuzzer-sys = "0.4"
+
+[dependencies.sanctifier-core]
+path = ".."
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "fuzz_parser"
+path = "fuzz_targets/fuzz_parser.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
diff --git a/tooling/sanctifier-core/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_parser.rs b/tooling/sanctifier-core/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_parser.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c48801cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tooling/sanctifier-core/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_parser.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+use sanctifier_core::parser;
+
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+    if let Ok(source) = std::str::from_utf8(data) {
+        // We only care that it doesn't panic.
+        let _ = parser::parse_source(source);
+    }
+});