docs(policy): correct tutorial log samples and GitHub push policy steps

The first policy tutorial said the 403 body begins with error, policy, and
rule, but the proxy serializes the body with sorted keys. Its log samples also
showed the wrong CONNECT deny reason for a sandbox without network rules, and
the L7 deny sample omitted the :443 authority, the `l7` engine, and the reason
tag that the shorthand formatter emits.

The GitHub tutorial filtered denials with `--level warn`, which hides the INFO
level OCSF policy events, and showed the retired key=value log format. Its
hand-written policy also omitted /bin from the restrictive default, so
`policy set` would reject the file for removing a filesystem path on a live
sandbox. Start from `policy get --base` and add only the network rules.

Signed-off-by: Johnny Greco <jogreco@nvidia.com>

Author: johnnygreco

docs/get-started/tutorials/first-network-policy.mdx

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ openshell logs demo --since 5m --source sandbox
 You see a line like:
 
 ```text
-[1775014132.690] [sandbox] [OCSF ] [ocsf] NET:OPEN [MED] DENIED /usr/bin/curl(64) -> api.github.com:443 [policy:- engine:opa] [reason:no matching policy]
+[1775014132.690] [sandbox] [OCSF ] [ocsf] NET:OPEN [MED] DENIED /usr/bin/curl(64) -> api.github.com:443 [policy:- engine:opa] [reason:network connections not allowed by policy]
 ```
 
 Every denied connection is logged with the destination, the binary that attempted it, and the reason. Nothing gets out silently.
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ curl -s -X POST https://api.github.com/repos/octocat/hello-world/issues \
     -d '{"title":"oops"}'
 ```
 
-The proxy returns a `403` response with a JSON body. The body begins with fields like these, followed by details about the denied request:
+The proxy returns a `403` response with a JSON body that includes fields like these, along with details about the denied request:
 
 ```text
-{"error":"policy_denied","policy":"github_api","rule":"POST /repos/octocat/hello-world/issues",...}
+{...,"error":"policy_denied",...,"policy":"github_api",...,"rule":"POST /repos/octocat/hello-world/issues",...}
 ```
 
 The connection succeeded because `api.github.com` is allowed, but the proxy inspected the HTTP method and returned `403`. `POST` is not in the `read-only` preset. An agent with this policy can read code from GitHub but cannot create issues, push commits, or modify anything.
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ openshell logs demo --since 5m --source sandbox
 ```
 
 ```text
-[1775014140.412] [sandbox] [OCSF ] [ocsf] HTTP:POST [MED] DENIED POST http://api.github.com/repos/octocat/hello-world/issues [policy:github_api engine:opa]
+[1775014140.412] [sandbox] [OCSF ] [ocsf] HTTP:POST [MED] DENIED POST http://api.github.com:443/repos/octocat/hello-world/issues [policy:github_api engine:l7] [reason:L7_REQUEST deny POST api.github.com:443/repos/octocat/hello-world/issues reason=POST /repos/octocat/hello-world/issues not permitted by policy]
 ```
 
 Policy events are INFO-level log records regardless of their severity, so do not filter them out with `--level warn`. In production, export these events to your SIEM for a complete audit trail of every request your agent makes. Refer to [Logging](/observability/logging) for the event format.

docs/get-started/tutorials/github-sandbox.mdx

@@ -107,34 +107,41 @@ not grant the missing network authority.
 In terminal 2, inspect recent sandbox logs:
 
 ```shell
-openshell logs github-demo --level warn --since 5m
+openshell logs github-demo --since 5m --source sandbox
 ```
 
 You should see a denial for a request resembling this one:
 
 ```text
-action=deny dst_host=github.com dst_port=443 binary=/usr/bin/git l7_action=POST l7_target=/<org>/<repo>.git/git-receive-pack
+[1775014140.412] [sandbox] [OCSF ] [ocsf] HTTP:POST [MED] DENIED POST http://github.com:443/<org>/<repo>.git/git-receive-pack [policy:_provider_my_github engine:l7] [reason:L7_REQUEST deny POST github.com:443/<org>/<repo>.git/git-receive-pack reason=POST /<org>/<repo>.git/git-receive-pack not permitted by policy]
 ```
 
+`_provider_my_github` is the rule that OpenShell composes from the attached
+`my-github` provider. Policy events are INFO-level log records, so do not filter
+them out with `--level warn`.
+
 You can also run `openshell term` to inspect policy decisions in the terminal
 dashboard.
 
 ## Create a Repository-Scoped Policy
 
-Create `github-push.yaml`. Replace `<org>` and `<repo>`, and adjust `binaries`
-to match your image:
+`policy set` replaces the complete base policy, so start from the sandbox's
+current one. In terminal 2, print it:
 
-```yaml
-version: 1
+```shell
+openshell policy get github-demo --base
+```
 
-filesystem_policy:
-  include_workdir: true
-  read_only: [/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /etc, /var/log]
-  read_write: [/tmp, /dev/null]
+The command prints revision details followed by the policy. Save only the policy
+YAML as `github-push.yaml`. Keep its filesystem, Landlock, and process settings
+unchanged, because OpenShell rejects removed filesystem paths and changed
+Landlock or process settings on a running sandbox.
 
-landlock:
-  compatibility: best_effort
+Add these entries under `network_policies`, creating the section if it is
+missing. Replace `<org>` and `<repo>`, and adjust `binaries` to match your
+image:
 
+```yaml
 network_policies:
   github_repository_push:
     name: github-repository-push
@@ -178,10 +185,6 @@ repository. The second lets `gh` use REST operations scoped to the same
 repository. The attached GitHub provider continues to supply credential
 placement and its broader read-only rules.
 
-The filesystem and Landlock sections preserve the fallback policy's static
-settings because `policy set` replaces the complete user-authored base policy.
-Process identity remains omitted so the compute driver can select it.
-
 ## Apply the Policy
 
 Apply the policy and wait for the new revision to load: