| title | execd |
|---|---|
| description | The in-sandbox execution daemon providing HTTP APIs for code execution, shell commands, filesystem operations, PTY sessions, and metrics. |
execd is the runtime daemon used inside OpenSandbox sandboxes.
It is built on Gin and exposes HTTP APIs for code execution, shell commands, filesystem operations, PTY sessions, and metrics.
cd components/execd
make buildOn Linux, make build uses the native C compiler and static libc to produce
bin/opensandbox-session-gate. The published execd image already installs
this helper. If you run execd from a source build and need isolated sessions,
install it at the fixed trusted runtime path first:
make build-session-gate
sudo make install-session-gate
# /opt/opensandbox/opensandbox-session-gate (mode 0555)Compilation runs before privilege escalation; the install target only copies
the built helper. Keep /opt/opensandbox and the helper root-owned and not
group- or world-writable. Other execd APIs still work without it, but
isolated-session capability probing and creation fail closed.
./tests/jupyter.sh./bin/execd \
--jupyter-host=http://127.0.0.1:54321 \
--jupyter-token=your-jupyter-token \
--port=44772curl -v http://localhost:44772/ping- OpenAPI spec: execd-api.yaml
- Common capability groups:
- Code execution (
/code, SSE stream) - Session and command execution (
/session,/command) - Filesystem operations (
/files,/directories) - Isolated sessions (
/v1/isolated/session, bubblewrap namespaces) - PTY over WebSocket (
/pty) - Local metrics endpoints (
/metrics,/metrics/watch)
- Code execution (
Shell-backed sessions use Bash when it is available and fall back to sh on
minimal images that do not include Bash. This applies to PTY sessions, the
Bash session API (which keeps its existing name for compatibility), and
isolated sessions. Commands submitted to a fallback session must use syntax
supported by that image's sh implementation.
The first WebSocket attached to /pty/{session_id}/ws is the exclusive
read/write holder. A second read/write connection receives 409 Conflict
unless it uses ?takeover=1 to replace that holder.
After the read/write holder has started the shell, any number of read-only clients can attach with:
ws://localhost:44772/pty/{session_id}/ws?mode=viewer&since=0
Viewer connections receive the retained replay followed by live output, but
they never acquire or evict the read/write holder. The JSON connected frame
sets role to viewer (holders receive role: "holder") so clients can use
the appropriate binary-frame decoder. Holders receive 0x01 stdout and, in
pipe mode, 0x02 stderr frames. Viewers receive 0x03 replay frames for both
retained and live output: an 8-byte big-endian offset followed by raw bytes.
Binary stdin and JSON stdin, signal, or resize frames are rejected with
a READ_ONLY error; ping remains available. The server closes a viewer after
five rejected mutating frames to bound error traffic from a misbehaving client.
WebSocket backpressure from a slow or disconnected viewer does not block the
interactive holder's live output pipe. In pipe mode, viewer output uses the
combined replay stream because replay does not preserve stdout/stderr channel
boundaries.
A viewer can attach only while the shell is running. When the shell exits,
viewers receive the exit frame and close. If a holder later starts the same
session again, its bounded replay buffer is retained, so a viewer reconnecting
with since=0 can receive retained output from the preceding shell lifetime.
Isolated sessions run a shell inside a per-execution
bubblewrap (bwrap) namespace,
created via POST /v1/isolated/session. Bash is preferred, with sh used as a
fallback. Beyond the workspace, callers can expose additional host paths into
the namespace.
The optional uid_mode request field selects how identity is established:
setpriv(the default) uses the container's existing user namespace and drops to the requested UID/GID withsetpriv.usernscreates a new user namespace and maps the requested UID/GID inside it, which can work in environments where the capabilities required bysetprivmode are unavailable.
At startup, execd probes both modes independently. GET /v1/isolated/capabilities reports setpriv_available and
userns_available; the overall available field is true when either mode is
usable. Creating a session returns 503 NOT_SUPPORTED only when the selected
mode is unavailable. The probes exercise the same identity path used at
runtime: the public setpriv_available flag covers execd's default UID/GID
path (so a root session that keeps UID/GID 0 does not require the setpriv
binary), while userns applies the UID/GID mapping and the setuid-aware
--disable-userns policy. A setpriv request that selects IDs different from
execd's own is checked against a separate startup identity-switch probe and
returns 503 NOT_SUPPORTED before session side effects when that switch is not
available.
For a private-network Session (share_net: false), execd fixes the
authenticated network namespace and its owning user namespace before the
native workload gate is released. The two namespace bind mounts use an
execd-owned, unpredictable directory below /run/execd/namespaces and stay
owned by the Session until synchronous teardown. This applies to both UID
modes; shared-network Sessions do not create namespace pins.
Two request fields control extra host paths:
extra_writable: a list of paths bind-mounted read-write at the same path inside the namespace (source == destination).binds: explicitsource→destmappings, each optionally read-only.source(required): host path to bind. It must already exist and is resolved (symlinks followed) before use.dest: mount destination inside the namespace; defaults tosourcewhen omitted. It must be an existing mount point —bwrapcannot create a destination under the read-only root, so create the directory first.readonly(defaultfalse): mount read-only (--ro-bind) whentrue, read-write (--bind) otherwise.
Example:
{
"workspace": { "path": "/workspace", "mode": "rw" },
"binds": [
{ "source": "/data/in", "dest": "/mnt/in", "readonly": true },
{ "source": "/data/out", "dest": "/mnt/out" }
]
}The source path of every extra_writable entry and every binds entry must
fall within the allowed_writable allowlist (see the isolation config file
below). The allowlist is enforced against the fully symlink-resolved real
path, so a symlink cannot redirect a bind outside the allowlist. An empty
allowlist rejects all extra_writable/binds requests.
The built-in default allowlist is /workspace, /mnt, /media, /data
(subpaths included). Set allowed_writable in the isolation config to
override it.
| Flag | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
--jupyter-host |
"" |
Jupyter server URL reachable by execd. |
--jupyter-token |
"" |
Jupyter token for HTTP/WebSocket auth. |
--port |
44772 |
HTTP listen port. |
--log-level |
6 |
Log level (0=Emergency, 7=Debug). |
--access-token |
"" |
Optional shared API access token. |
--graceful-shutdown-timeout |
1s |
SSE tail-drain wait window before closing. |
--jupyter-idle-poll-interval |
100ms |
Poll interval after Jupyter reports idle. |
--isolation-config |
"" |
Path to the isolation TOML config (see below). |
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
JUPYTER_HOST |
Same as --jupyter-host (overridden by explicit flag). |
JUPYTER_TOKEN |
Same as --jupyter-token (overridden by explicit flag). |
EXECD_ACCESS_TOKEN |
Same as --access-token (overridden by explicit flag). |
EXECD_API_GRACE_SHUTDOWN |
Same as --graceful-shutdown-timeout. |
EXECD_JUPYTER_IDLE_POLL_INTERVAL |
Same as --jupyter-idle-poll-interval. |
EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG |
Same as --isolation-config. |
EXECD_CLONE3_COMPAT |
Linux clone3 compatibility switch (see below). |
EXECD_LOG_FILE |
Optional log output file path; default is stdout. |
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_METRICS_ENDPOINT |
Preferred OTLP metrics endpoint. |
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT |
Fallback OTLP endpoint when metrics-specific endpoint is unset. |
OPENSANDBOX_ID |
Optional sandbox_id metric/resource attribute. |
OPENSANDBOX_EXECD_METRICS_EXTRA_ATTRS |
Optional extra metric attrs (k=v,k2=v2). |
Isolated sessions read an optional TOML file given by --isolation-config
(or EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG). All fields are optional; omitted fields use
built-in defaults.
# Parent directory for per-session overlay upper directories.
upper_root = "/var/lib/execd/isolation"
# Host paths callers may request via extra_writable / binds.
# Enforced against the fully symlink-resolved real path; subpaths are allowed.
# Default: ["/workspace", "/mnt", "/media", "/data"]. Empty = reject all.
allowed_writable = ["/workspace", "/mnt", "/media", "/data"]OTLP metrics export is enabled when either endpoint is set:
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_METRICS_ENDPOINTOTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT
GET /metrics: point-in-time host metrics snapshotGET /metrics/watch: SSE stream (1s cadence)
Some sandbox environments fail on clone3(2).
Set EXECD_CLONE3_COMPAT in sandbox env to force fallback behavior:
1/true/yes/on: enable seccomp fallbackreexec: enable fallback and re-exec binary
execd is part of OpenSandbox. See the LICENSE.