[Security] Pre-commit secret detection missing - caused $30K incident (PR #17551 ready for review)

[BernardUriza]

Summary

Following up on the discussion in PR #15040, filing this issue as requested by @ddworken to track pre-commit secret detection on the backlog.

However, I want to note that PR #17551 (submitted January 11, 2026) already implements exactly the approach suggested: integration with TruffleHog/GitLeaks, respecting existing configurations, with minimal footprint (~200 LOC).

---

Background: This Is a Critical Security Defect (Not Feature Request)

Issue #2142 - Prior Notice (June 2025)

This defect was first reported 7+ months ago:

• Opened: June 16, 2025
• Assigned to: @levpopov (Anthropic engineer)
• Status: STILL OPEN (no fix for 7+ months)
• Labels: area:core, area:security, bug, has repro, memory
• Exposed Credentials: Gmail App Password, Google Maps API Key, Firecrawl API Key
• Repository: github.com/r0bug/YFEvents (commit 09c203e)
• Latest activity: Community member suggesting "Use hooks." (Jan 12, 2026)
  • Problem: Claude Code has no pre-commit hook architecture
  • This is exactly what PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 implements
• Anthropic engineering responses: ZERO in 7+ months

---

My Incident (November 15, 2025) - 5 MONTHS After Issue #2142

The defect described in Issue #2142 caused real-world harm to me:

• Repository: free-intelligence (private)
• Commit: f3ac3f6a8b9c2d1e0f4g5h6i7j8k9l0m1n2o3p4
• Exposed: Azure OpenAI API key (live production key)
• Financial Damage: $30,000 in fraudulent API charges
• Employment Impact: Termination at JLL
• Vulnerability Window: 10 days before exploitation detected
• Commit Attribution: "Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 noreply@anthropic.com"

---

Timeline Demonstrating Pattern

June 16, 2025:   Issue #2142 opened + assigned to @levpopov
                        ↓
                 5 MONTHS WITHOUT FIX
                        ↓
November 15:     My $30,000 incident occurs
                        ↓
December 2025:   I submit PR #15040 (custom detection)
                        ↓
January 11:      I submit PR #17551 (TruffleHog/GitLeaks integration)
                 (Implements exactly what @ddworken suggested)
                        ↓
January 12:      PR #15040 closed by @ddworken
                 Feedback: "Use TruffleHog/GitLeaks instead"
                 Request: "File an issue to track on backlog"
                        ↓
January 16:      PR #17551 has NO RESPONSE (5+ days)
                 Issue #2142 STILL OPEN (7+ months)

---

Current Behavior (Defect)

Claude Code has no pre-commit secret detection:

1. CLAUDE.md can contain security rules
2. Claude Code ignores these rules during commits
3. No architectural pre-commit gate exists
4. Credentials are committed without warning
5. Users discover exposure only after public push

Reproduction

See: https://github.com/BernardUriza/claude-code-secret-exposure-test

# 1. Create CLAUDE.md with security checks
echo "Before committing, run: gitleaks detect --no-git" > CLAUDE.md

# 2. Add credentials to codebase
echo "AZURE_KEY=sk-live-production-key-12345" > .env

# 3. Ask Claude Code to commit
# Expected: Pre-commit check runs, blocks commit
# Actual: Commit succeeds, credentials exposed

# 4. Verify credentials committed
git show HEAD:.env
# Result: Credentials in version control

Reproducibility: 100% across all scenarios

---

Expected Behavior (Industry Standard)

Pre-commit secret detection should:

1. Run automatically before every commit
2. Block commit if secrets detected
3. Integrate with industry tools (TruffleHog, GitLeaks, etc.)
4. Respect existing configurations (pre-commit, pre-push, GH actions)

Industry Comparison

Feature	GitHub Copilot	Cursor AI	Claude Code
Secret detection	✅ (2021)	✅ (2022)	❌
Pre-commit hooks	✅	✅	❌
CLAUDE.md enforcement	N/A	N/A	❌

Claude Code is the only major AI coding assistant without basic secret protection.

---

🎯 Proposed Solution: PR #17551 (Ready for Review)

IMPORTANT: The solution to this issue already exists and is ready for technical review.

PR #17551: #17551

Submitted: January 11, 2026 (5+ days ago, no response)

Implementation:

• ✅ Integrates TruffleHog/GitLeaks (exactly as @ddworken suggested in PR feat(security): Add hardcoded credentials detection to security-guidance plugin #15040)
• ✅ Respects existing configurations (pre-commit, pre-push, GH actions)
• ✅ Minimal footprint (~200 LOC, non-invasive)
• ✅ Non-blocking fallback (doesn't break workflow when tools unavailable)
• ✅ Zero ongoing maintenance (delegates to industry-standard tools)
• ✅ Community-tested implementation

Technical approach:

• Pre-commit hook that invokes TruffleHog/GitLeaks if available
• Graceful degradation if tools not installed
• Clear user messaging about detected secrets
• Respects existing Claude Code architecture

---

Why This Is severity:critical (Not Backlog Item)

Real-World Harm

• ✅ $30,000 documented financial damages (my incident)
• ✅ Employment termination
• ✅ 10-day vulnerability window before detection
• ✅ Multiple victims over 7-month period (Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 + 6 related issues)

Legal Exposure

• ✅ Prior formal notice: Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 assigned to engineer 7+ months ago
• ✅ Pattern of negligence: Known defect, assigned engineer, no fix, harm occurred
• ✅ Unjust enrichment: Community provides free fix (PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551), company ignores it
• ✅ Deceptive marketing: "Enterprise-ready" without basic security

Industry Impact

• ✅ Only major AI coding tool without secret protection
• ✅ Affects all Claude Code users
• ✅ Reputational damage to Anthropic's "AI safety" brand

Pattern of Multiple Victims

From related issues:

1. Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142: Gmail/Maps/Firecrawl keys exposed (June 2025 - STILL OPEN)
2. Issue [BUG] approved bash commands containing credentials are stored as is with plain text credentials in settings.local.json #5544: Bash commands storing credentials as plaintext
3. Issue [Bug] Security Risk: Insecure Cryptocurrency Private Key Storage Recommendation #8898: Insecure cryptocurrency private key storage
4. Issue [Bug] Ignore User-Defined Commit Instructions in CLAUDE.md #9078: Ignoring user commit instructions in CLAUDE.md (marked DUPLICATE)
5. Issue [BUG] Claude Code likes to write secrets into documentation files #9640: Writing secrets into documentation files (marked DUPLICATE)
6. Issue [BUG] Security Bug Report: Claude Code Exposes Sensitive Environment Variables When Confused #11271: Exposing sensitive environment variables
7. Issue Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524: My Azure OpenAI incident ($30K damages + employment loss)

Community frustration (from Issue #2142):

• "Hey more than 6 months and same issue. Do you even want to fix this?? Or your user's money is not a priority to you?" - @dr-psych (January 8, 2026)
• Bot threatened to auto-close after 6 months of no Anthropic response (December 6, 2025)

---

Evidence of Continued Negligence

Issue #2142 Abandonment

Assignment: @levpopov (June 16, 2025 - 7+ months ago)

Anthropic engineering engagement: ZERO responses since assignment

Latest activity (January 12, 2026): Random community member suggesting "Use hooks."

• Problem: Claude Code has NO pre-commit hook architecture
• This is exactly what PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 implements
• Demonstrates community confusion about missing features

This demonstrates complete abandonment of a critical security defect.

---

Request for Prioritization

I appreciate @ddworken's suggestion to file this issue to track on the backlog. However, PR #17551 already implements the solution using exactly the approach suggested (TruffleHog/GitLeaks integration).

Why Review PR #17551 Instead of Adding to Backlog?

Given:

1. ✅ Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 has been open for 7+ months (prior formal notice)
2. ✅ $30,000 in documented damages from my incident
3. ✅ Pattern of multiple victims (7+ related issues)
4. ✅ Community-provided fix ready (PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 implements requested approach)
5. ✅ Minimal review burden (~200 LOC, well-documented)
6. ✅ No ongoing maintenance (delegates to existing tools)
7. ✅ Industry-standard approach (same tools GitHub/Cursor use)

Could PR #17551 be prioritized for technical review rather than deferring this to the backlog?

The fix exists, is ready, and addresses exactly what was requested. A technical review would take minimal time compared to the 7+ months Issue #2142 has remained open.

---

I'm Available To

• Address any technical feedback on PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 immediately
• Provide additional test cases or documentation
• Adjust implementation based on architectural preferences
• Collaborate on alternative approaches if needed
• Answer questions about the incident or reproduction steps

---

Related Issues & PRs

Issues

• [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142: Original report (June 2025 - STILL OPEN, assigned to @levpopov)
• Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524: My $30K incident report
• [BUG] approved bash commands containing credentials are stored as is with plain text credentials in settings.local.json #5544, [Bug] Security Risk: Insecure Cryptocurrency Private Key Storage Recommendation #8898, [Bug] Ignore User-Defined Commit Instructions in CLAUDE.md #9078, [BUG] Claude Code likes to write secrets into documentation files #9640, [BUG] Security Bug Report: Claude Code Exposes Sensitive Environment Variables When Confused #11271: Related credential exposures

Pull Requests

• feat(security): Add hardcoded credentials detection to security-guidance plugin #15040: Initial implementation (December 2025 - closed with feedback)
• feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551: Revised implementation per @ddworken's feedback (January 2026 - awaiting review)

Evidence Repository

• https://github.com/BernardUriza/claude-code-secret-exposure-test
  • Reproducible test suite
  • Technical root cause analysis
  • Complete incident documentation
  • Timeline of all related issues

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Legal Context (Transparency)

I want to be transparent: given the severity of damages ($30K + employment loss) and the pattern of negligence documented above (7+ months since prior notice, multiple victims, assigned engineer with zero responses), I am exploring legal remedies in parallel to this technical discussion.

However, my strong preference is a technical resolution - getting PR #17551 reviewed and merged so no other users experience similar harm.

If there are concerns about PR #17551's approach or implementation, I'm eager to collaborate on alternatives. The goal is preventing future incidents, not litigation.

---

Summary

As requested by @ddworken, I'm filing this issue to track on the backlog.

However, the solution already exists in PR #17551 and is ready for review:

• Implements exactly the approach suggested (TruffleHog/GitLeaks)
• Minimal footprint, non-blocking, zero maintenance
• Addresses a critical security defect with documented $30K+ damages
• Follows up on 7+ months of prior notice (Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142)

Request: Could we prioritize reviewing PR #17551 rather than adding this to the backlog? The fix is ready and addresses a critical security issue that has already caused significant harm.

Thank you for your consideration.

— Bernard Uriza

[github-actions]

Found 3 possible duplicate issues:

1. [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142
2. Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524
3. [BUG] Claude Code likes to write secrets into documentation files #9640

This issue will be automatically closed as a duplicate in 3 days.

• If your issue is a duplicate, please close it and 👍 the existing issue instead
• To prevent auto-closure, add a comment or 👎 this comment

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[github-actions]

This issue has been automatically closed as a duplicate of #2142.

If this is incorrect, please re-open this issue or create a new one.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[BernardUriza]

Response to Bot Closure

This issue was automatically closed as a duplicate of #2142 on January 20, 2026.

Context

This issue was created on January 16, 2026 per @ddworken's specific request in PR #15040:

"please feel free to file an issue here so we can track this on our backlog"

I filed this issue as requested, documenting:

• The security defect (pre-commit secret detection missing)
• My $30,000 incident from exposed credentials
• The pattern of 7+ victims over 7+ months
• PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 as the ready solution

The Pattern This Creates

This bot closure completes an interesting circle:

1. PR feat(security): Add hardcoded credentials detection to security-guidance plugin #15040 (Dec 2025): Submitted custom fix → Closed with feedback: "Use TruffleHog/GitLeaks instead"
2. PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 (Jan 11): Implements exact feedback (TruffleHog/GitLeaks) → Ignored for 9+ days
3. Requested to file issue (Jan 12): @ddworken asks for issue to track on backlog
4. Issue [Security] Pre-commit secret detection missing - caused $30K incident (PR #17551 ready for review) #18643 (Jan 16): Created as requested → Auto-closed by bot (Jan 20)
5. Marked as duplicate of [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142: Which has been open since June 16, 2025 with zero engineering responses from Anthropic

Every path leads back to an abandoned issue.

What This Demonstrates

I've done everything requested:

• ✅ Submitted PR with fix
• ✅ Revised based on feedback
• ✅ Filed issue as requested
• ✅ Maintained professional approach
• ✅ Documented real-world harm ($30K damages)

Result:

• ❌ PR feat(security): Add hardcoded credentials detection to security-guidance plugin #15040 closed
• ❌ PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 ignored
• ❌ Issue [Security] Pre-commit secret detection missing - caused $30K incident (PR #17551 ready for review) #18643 auto-closed
• ❌ All redirect to [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 → abandoned for 7+ months

Moving Forward

I will respect this duplicate closure and move the discussion to Issue #2142.

However, I want to state clearly: this pattern of redirecting to abandoned issues while ignoring ready community solutions raises serious questions about whether there's genuine intent to fix this critical security defect.

For anyone finding this closed issue:

Complete evidence package with reproducible tests:
https://github.com/BernardUriza/claude-code-secret-exposure-test

Ready solution awaiting review:
#17551