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| 1 | +# OPCM Bytecode Verification: Design Doc |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | + |
| 4 | +| | | |
| 5 | +| -------------------- | ------------ | |
| 6 | +| Author | Maurelian | |
| 7 | +| Created at | 2025-06-04 | |
| 8 | +| Initial Reviewers | TBD | |
| 9 | +| Need Approval From | TBD | |
| 10 | +| Status | Draft | |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | +## Purpose |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +Ensure that the contracts referenced in `OPContractsManager` (OPCM) are verifiably built from trusted source code by introducing a bytecode verification step into the release process. |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +## Summary |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +We propose integrating the `VerifyOPCM.s.sol` Foundry script into the release process via `op-deployer` to validate that deployed contract bytecode matches locally built artifacts. This prevents accidental or malicious mismatches and establishes trust in deployments originating from a known commit. The step will be automated in CI, and become part of the documented SDLC. |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +## Problem Statement + Context |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +Currently, there is no enforced mechanism to ensure that the OPCM used in an upgrade is built |
| 23 | +from a trusted commit, which should be one labelled as an `op-contracts/vX.Y.Z` tag, and approved |
| 24 | +by governance. |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +This creates a risk of human error or maliciousness leading to an upgrade performed by an incorrect |
| 27 | +version of the OPCM (or the implementation contracts it sets). It also presents a risk of a failed upgrade |
| 28 | +resulting from a misconfigured OPCM (ie. if any [constructor vars](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/a10fd5259a3af9a465955b035e16f516327d51d5/packages/contracts-bedrock/src/L1/OPContractsManager.sol#L266-L269) are set incorrectly). |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | +We want to eliminate this risk by automating the [Contract's Release Verification](https://www.notion.so/oplabs/Contracts-Release-Checklist-1f8f153ee162805e8236f022ebb8c868?source=copy_linkhttps:/) process, making it |
| 31 | +easy to demonstrate that an OPCM at a given address corresponds to a trusted commit. |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +The solution should be: |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +- contained within the release commit in the monorepo |
| 36 | +- easily runnable locally with a single command accepting only an RPC URL and the address of the OPCM |
| 37 | +- runnable in CI in the `superchain-registry` repo |
| 38 | +- incorporated into the upgrade process in a way that ensures it is run by multiple people |
| 39 | + |
| 40 | +## Proposed Solution |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +### Bytecode verification against the local source |
| 43 | + |
| 44 | +A new command should be added to `op-deployer`. |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | +``` |
| 47 | +op-deployer verify-bytecode <opcm-address> |
| 48 | +
|
| 49 | +``` |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +This command will invoke the `VerifyOPCM.s.sol` script's [default entrypoint](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/158e990b76a85acbb018577bd4079190b2d97281/packages/contracts-bedrock/scripts/deploy/VerifyOPCM.s.sol#L126-L129) to verify the OPCM. |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +``` |
| 54 | +op-deployer verify-bytecode --single-contract <contract-name> <contract-address> |
| 55 | +``` |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +This command will invoke the `VerifyOPCM.s.sol` script's [runSingle entrypoint](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/158e990b76a85acbb018577bd4079190b2d97281/packages/contracts-bedrock/scripts/deploy/VerifyOPCM.s.sol#L135) in order to verify any contracts involved in the upgrade which are not included in the OPCM (ie. |
| 58 | +the new `DeputyPauseModule` introduced in upgrade 16. |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | +### Artifacts source |
| 61 | + |
| 62 | +By default, `op-deployer verify-bytecode` will use locally build forge-artifacts to check bytecode. |
| 63 | +In order to facilitate quickly running in CI, without having to checkout and rebuild different commits, the command will also accept a tag locator, with the following invocation: |
| 64 | + |
| 65 | +``` |
| 66 | +op-deployer verify-bytecode --dangerously-use-remote-artifacts --artifacts-locator tag://op-contracts/vX.Y.Z |
| 67 | +
|
| 68 | +``` |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | +The flag `--dangerously-use-remote-artifacts` is intended to discourge the use of remote artifacts when running locally. |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +### OPCM config verification |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +Both of the commands above will accept the following arguments to confirm the configuration of |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +``` |
| 77 | +--upgrade-controller 0x... \ |
| 78 | + --superchain-config 0x... \ |
| 79 | + --protocol-versions 0x... \ |
| 80 | + --superchain-proxy-admin 0x... |
| 81 | +``` |
| 82 | + |
| 83 | +### |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | +### Integration points |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +This script will: |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +- Build contract artifacts at the trusted commit. |
| 90 | +- Retrieve deployed bytecode via the OPCM. |
| 91 | +- Compare local vs deployed bytecode, including support for implementation, blueprint, and linked contracts. |
| 92 | +- Generate a verification artifact (e.g. JSON) that is checked into the monorepo and diffed in code review. |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +This step will be: |
| 95 | + |
| 96 | +- Automated in CI (run in SCR or release-management repo). |
| 97 | +- Expected to be verified/redundantly run by multiple reviewers. |
| 98 | + |
| 99 | +### Resource Usage |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | +- Minimal: Only requires compilation and comparison of bytecode. |
| 102 | +- Optional Etherscan calls for constructor bytecode fetches (bounded network cost). |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +### Single Point of Failure and Multi Client Considerations |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +- No direct impact on clients like `op-geth` or `op-reth`. |
| 107 | +- Ensures that bytecode is consistent regardless of which client or deployer is used. |
| 108 | + |
| 109 | +## Impact on Developer Experience |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | +- No impact on app developers. |
| 112 | +- Protocol developers and release managers will have one additional verification step that is largely automated. |
| 113 | + |
| 114 | +## Alternatives Considered |
| 115 | + |
| 116 | +- A new op-deployer command. This approach would need to download artifacts and thus does not meet |
| 117 | + the requirement of building locally. |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | +## Risks & Uncertainties |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | +- Build non-determinism could cause false negatives. |
| 122 | +- Reliance on Etherscan APIs (when used). |
| 123 | +- Risk of CI misconfiguration allowing bypass of the check. |
| 124 | +- Trust assumption that the build system and commit used for verification are secure. |
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