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security: comprehensive codebase audit with 67 actionable findings
10 parallel security scans across the entire NemoClaw codebase (~9,600 LoC) identified 3 CRITICAL, 25 HIGH, 28 MEDIUM, and 16 LOW severity findings. Critical findings (fixed in companion PRs): - C-2: CHAT_UI_URL Python code injection in Dockerfile - C-3: Telegram/Discord always-on in baseline policy (exfil channels) - C-4: Snapshot manifest path traversal (arbitrary host write) - C-1: Migration credential exposure (tracked by PR NVIDIA#156) Also adds DRAFT-*.md to .gitignore to prevent accidental disclosure.
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DRAFT-*.md

‎SECURITY-AUDIT-2026-03-22.md‎

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# NemoClaw Comprehensive Security Audit — 2026-03-22
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Automated security audit of the full NemoClaw codebase (~9,600 LoC) across 10 parallel scan scopes.
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Conducted against commit `1dbf82f` (upstream main, synced 2026-03-22).
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## Executive Summary
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| Severity | Count |
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|----------|-------|
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| CRITICAL | 3 (+1 tracked) |
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| HIGH | 25 |
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| MEDIUM | 28 |
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| LOW | 16 |
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| INFO | 14 |
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| **Total** | **87** |
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After deduplication of findings reported by multiple agents, **67 unique actionable findings** remain.
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---
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## CRITICAL Findings (3 new + 1 tracked)
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### C-1: Migration copies ALL host credentials into sandbox — TRACKED BY PR #156
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- **Location**: `nemoclaw/src/commands/migration-state.ts:587`
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- **Description**: `createSnapshotBundle()` copies the entire `~/.openclaw` directory — including `auth-profiles.json` with live API keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens — verbatim into the sandbox. The fix (`sanitizeCredentialsInBundle()`) exists in PR #156, rebased and ready for review.
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- **Status**: **Already addressed** — fix is in PR #156 (`security/sandbox-credential-exposure-and-blueprint-bypass`), pending merge.
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### C-2: CHAT_UI_URL Python code injection in Dockerfile
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- **Location**: `Dockerfile:97-98`
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- **Description**: Docker build-arg `CHAT_UI_URL` interpolated directly into `RUN python3 -c "..."` string. A crafted URL like `http://x'; import subprocess; subprocess.run(['id'])#` injects arbitrary Python.
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- **Impact**: Arbitrary code execution at image build time; can exfiltrate `NVIDIA_API_KEY`.
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- **Fix**: Use `ENV` + `os.environ.get()` inside Python instead of build-arg interpolation.
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### C-3: Telegram & Discord enabled in baseline sandbox policy (data exfiltration channels)
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- **Location**: `nemoclaw-blueprint/policies/openclaw-sandbox.yaml:161-200`
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- **Description**: Both messaging APIs are always-on with no `binaries:` restriction. Any process in the sandbox can POST arbitrary data to attacker-controlled Telegram bots or Discord webhooks.
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- **Impact**: Unconditional data exfiltration from every sandbox.
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- **Fix**: Remove `telegram` and `discord` from baseline; they already exist as opt-in presets.
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### C-4: Snapshot manifest path traversal — arbitrary host filesystem write
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- **Location**: `migration-state.ts:662-692`
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- **Description**: `restoreSnapshotToHost()` reads `manifest.stateDir` from `snapshot.json` (no validation) and uses it as a write target. A tampered manifest can overwrite arbitrary files.
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- **Impact**: Arbitrary host filesystem write; potential privilege escalation.
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- **Fix**: Validate `manifest.stateDir` and `manifest.configPath` are within `~/.nemoclaw/` before write operations.
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---
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## HIGH Findings (25) — Top Priority
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### Network Policy & Sandbox
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| # | Finding | Location | Fix |
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|---|---------|----------|-----|
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| H-1 | `github` baseline uses `access: full` — write access to all repos | `openclaw-sandbox.yaml:89-100` | Replace with explicit read-only `rules:` |
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| H-2 | `npm_registry` baseline allows `PUT` (publish) | `openclaw-sandbox.yaml:149-158` | Restrict to `GET` only |
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| H-3 | Telegram path `/bot*/**` — any bot token usable as exfil channel | `openclaw-sandbox.yaml:172` | Remove from baseline; restrict in preset |
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| H-4 | Jira preset uses `*.atlassian.net` wildcard — cross-tenant | `presets/jira.yaml:12` | Require tenant-specific subdomain |
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| H-5 | HuggingFace preset allows `POST /**` with no binary restriction | `presets/huggingface.yaml:18-34` | Add `binaries:` and split read/write |
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| H-6 | Interactive onboard "list" path skips preset allowlist check | `onboard.js:896-902` | Apply `knownPresets.has(name)` validation |
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### Command Injection & Shell Safety
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| # | Finding | Location | Fix |
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|---|---------|----------|-----|
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| H-7 | `NEMOCLAW_GPU` env var — newline bypasses `shellQuote()` | `nemoclaw.js:107,131` | Validate against `^[a-z0-9:._-]+$` |
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| H-8 | `sandboxName` uses double-quotes instead of `shellQuote()` | `onboard.js:190,420,439,497,515` | Replace with `shellQuote()` |
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| H-9 | `runCapture()` uses `execSync` (no argv-safe variant) | `runner.js:48` | Add `spawnCapture()` with argv array |
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| H-10 | `isRepoPrivate()` interpolates param into `execSync` shell string | `credentials.js:86` | Use `execFileSync("gh", [...])` |
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| H-11 | Preset name not validated against allowlist before `applyPreset()` | `nemoclaw.js:331-337` | Check `allPresets` before calling |
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| H-12 | `walkthrough.sh` — `$NVIDIA_API_KEY` unquoted in tmux command | `walkthrough.sh:88` | Export into tmux session env |
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### Credential Exposure
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| # | Finding | Location | Fix |
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|---|---------|----------|-----|
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| H-13 | API key visible in `/proc`/`ps aux` via CLI argument | `onboard.js:718`, `nemoclaw.js:87` | Pass via `opts.env` to `spawnSync` |
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| H-14 | Error logging can echo credential-containing command prefix | `runner.js:25,40` | Redact `--credential` in log output |
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| H-15 | Telegram bridge exports `NVIDIA_API_KEY` into agent env | `telegram-bridge.js:109` | Use credential file or proxy |
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| H-16 | Telegram bridge open by default without `ALLOWED_CHAT_IDS` | `telegram-bridge.js:35-37` | Make `ALLOWED_CHAT_IDS` mandatory |
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### Container & Supply Chain
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| # | Finding | Location | Fix |
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|---|---------|----------|-----|
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| H-17 | NIM container bound to `0.0.0.0:8000` — LAN-exposed, no auth | `nim.js:141-143` | Bind to `127.0.0.1` only; add `--cap-drop ALL` |
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| H-18 | NIM images pinned by `:latest` tag — no digest verification | `nim-images.json` | Pin by `@sha256:<digest>` |
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| H-19 | All GitHub Actions pinned to mutable tags, not SHAs | All 6 workflow files | Pin to full commit SHA |
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| H-20 | `npm install` instead of `npm ci` in PR workflow | `pr.yaml:44,63,68` | Replace with `npm ci` |
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| H-21 | `docs-preview-pr.yaml` has `contents: write` on PR-triggered workflow | `docs-preview-pr.yaml:21-23` | Scope to deploy job only |
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| H-22 | `DOCKER_HOST` env var trusted unconditionally — daemon redirection | `platform.js:71-74` | Validate `unix://` or `tcp://127.0.0.1` only |
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### Migration & Snapshot
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| # | Finding | Location | Fix |
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|---|---------|----------|-----|
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| H-23 | `cpSync` preserves symlinks — sandbox escape vector | `migration-state.ts:476` | Add symlink target validation or `dereference: true` |
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| H-24 | Python `shutil.copytree` follows symlinks — captures host files | `snapshot.py:39,98` | Pass `symlinks=True` |
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| H-25 | `--run-id` path traversal in `runner.py` | `runner.py:261,277` | Validate against strict regex |
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---
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## MEDIUM Findings (28)
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| # | Finding | Location |
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|---|---------|----------|
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| M-1 | Sentry.io: `method: "*"` with unclear binary restriction | `openclaw-sandbox.yaml:61-64` |
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| M-2 | Landlock `best_effort` — silent no-op on older kernels | `openclaw-sandbox.yaml:39-40` |
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| M-3 | YAML policy merge is text-based — duplicate keys shadow baseline | `policies.js:124-170` |
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| M-4 | Docker preset allows `POST` to registries — push without restriction | `presets/docker.yaml:17-35` |
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| M-5 | Outlook preset `POST /**` to Graph API — full M365 access | `presets/outlook.yaml:17-19` |
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| M-6 | Slack preset `hooks.slack.com` — unrestricted webhook posting | `presets/slack.yaml:28-35` |
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| M-7 | Credentials stored in plaintext JSON — no encryption at rest | `credentials.js:21-26` |
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| M-8 | `HOME` fallback to `/tmp` creates world-readable credential path | `credentials.js:9` |
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| M-9 | GitHub token stored from `gh auth` without user consent | `credentials.js:100-105` |
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| M-10 | `write-auth-profile.py` TOCTOU — file created before `chmod` | `write-auth-profile.py:4,13` |
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| M-11 | Deploy `.env` persists on remote VM with all secrets | `nemoclaw.js:156-173` |
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| M-12 | `--no-verify` disables TLS for cloud inference endpoint | `onboard.js:723,742,762` |
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| M-13 | `shellQuote()` does not protect against newline injection | `runner.js:65-67` |
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| M-14 | `.env` on remote host — no `chmod 600`, not deleted after setup | `nemoclaw.js:169` |
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| M-15 | `setup.sh` passes API key unquoted in double-quoted string | `setup.sh:136` |
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| M-16 | Health-check endpoint polled without authentication | `nim.js:155,189` |
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| M-17 | `sudo -E` inherits entire env (including secrets) to root | `nemoclaw.js:87` |
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| M-18 | `blueprint.yaml` digest field is empty — no integrity check | `blueprint.yaml:7` |
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| M-19 | `pr-limit.yaml` user-controlled `AUTHOR` in `::error::` directive | `pr-limit.yaml:26,38` |
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| M-20 | `docs-to-skills.py` output path not bounded — directory traversal | `docs-to-skills.py:824,837` |
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| M-21 | Snapshot directories created world-readable (default umask) | `migration-state.ts:585`, `snapshot.py:35` |
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| M-22 | `CREDENTIAL_FIELDS` set is incomplete — misses OAuth fields | unmerged PR #156 |
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| M-23 | `removeAuthProfileFiles` scoped only to `agents/` subtree | unmerged PR #156 |
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| M-24 | `sandboxes.json` registry deserialized without schema validation | `registry.js:14,26` |
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| M-25 | `resolveOpenshell` trusts binary on execute-permission only | `resolve-openshell.js:19-46` |
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| M-26 | `StrictHostKeyChecking=no` on all deploy SSH/SCP operations | `nemoclaw.js:141-186` |
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| M-27 | Telegram bridge — no rate limiting, sequential DoS | `telegram-bridge.js:160-224` |
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| M-28 | SSH key material left in `/tmp` on unclean shutdown | `telegram-bridge.js:101-103` |
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---
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## Immediate Actions Taken
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1. **`.gitignore` updated**: Added `DRAFT-*.md` pattern to prevent accidental commit of the Intigriti disclosure draft (`DRAFT-intigriti-migration-cred.md`) found on disk.
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---
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## Recommended PR Sequence
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### PR 1: Critical — Baseline policy hardening (C-3)
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Remove `telegram` and `discord` from baseline `openclaw-sandbox.yaml`. Restrict `github` and `npm_registry` to read-only.
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### PR 2: Critical — Dockerfile injection fix (C-2)
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Replace build-arg interpolation with `ENV` + `os.environ.get()`.
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### PR 3: Critical — Snapshot manifest validation (C-4)
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Add `isWithinRoot` checks on manifest paths. Create snapshot dirs with `mode: 0o700`.
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### PR 4: High — Shell safety hardening (H-7 through H-12)
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Replace double-quote interpolation with `shellQuote()`. Validate env vars. Add `spawnCapture()`.
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### PR 5: High — Credential exposure fixes (H-13 through H-16)
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Pass credentials via `opts.env`. Redact in error logs. Make `ALLOWED_CHAT_IDS` mandatory.
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### PR 6: High — Container security (H-17, H-18, H-22)
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Bind NIM to loopback. Pin images by digest. Validate `DOCKER_HOST`.
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### PR 7: High — CI/CD supply chain (H-19 through H-21)
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Pin Actions to SHA. Replace `npm install` with `npm ci`. Scope workflow permissions.
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### PR 8: High — Symlink and path traversal (H-23 through H-25)
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Validate symlink targets. Fix Python copytree. Guard `--run-id`.
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---
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## Methodology
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10 parallel security audit agents scanned the following scopes:
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| Scope | Files | Findings |
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|-------|-------|----------|
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| CLI entry & runner | `bin/nemoclaw.js`, `bin/lib/runner.js` | 15 |
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| Credential handling | `credentials.js`, `onboard.js`, `write-auth-profile.py` | 13 |
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| Network policies | `policies.js`, sandbox YAML, all presets | 19 |
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| Install scripts | `install.sh`, all `scripts/*.sh` | 24 |
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| Migration & snapshot | `migration-state.ts`, `state.ts`, `snapshot.py` | 15 |
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| Inference & NIM | `inference-config.js`, `local-inference.js`, `nim.js` | 14 |
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| Telegram bridge | `telegram-bridge.js`, `slash.ts` | 10 |
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| Platform & registry | `platform.js`, `preflight.js`, `registry.js` | 15 |
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| Test coverage gaps | All `test/*.test.js`, e2e tests | 14 |
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| CI/CD & config | All workflows, `blueprint.yaml`, `docs-to-skills.py` | 16 |

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