The ateapi PostgreSQL store can run against
Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL. The
supported, most secure configuration uses the
Cloud SQL Auth Proxy
(source) as a
sidecar on ate-api-server with automatic IAM database
authentication:
- Transport security — the proxy establishes a TLS 1.3 tunnel to the instance using ephemeral certificates and verifies the instance's identity. No server CA files to download, mount, or rotate. ateapi connects to the proxy over pod-local loopback; that traffic never leaves the pod's network namespace.
- Authentication — establishing the tunnel requires the IAM permission
cloudsql.instances.connect, and the database session itself is authenticated with a short-lived OAuth token for the pod's Workload Identity (--auto-iam-authn). No database password exists anywhere — nothing to store, leak, or rotate; access is revoked in IAM. - Cloud-agnostic code — ateapi itself knows nothing about Cloud SQL. The
sidecar is a deployment-time patch
(
manifests/ate-install/cloudsql/proxy-sidecar-patch.yaml) applied byhack/install-ate.shonly when a Cloud SQL instance is configured.
The cluster must have Workload Identity enabled (clusters created by
setup-gcp create cluster do), and the VPC needs private services
access
(one-time per VPC; the tool prints the two gcloud commands if it is
missing). Then:
export PROJECT_ID=<project>
go run ./tools/setup-gcp create cloudsql --region=<cluster region>
# other flags: --instance, --tier, --edition, --storage-size, --gsa-name, --networkThis idempotently creates:
| Resource | Value |
|---|---|
| Cloud SQL instance | PostgreSQL 18, Enterprise edition, private IP only, cloudsql.iam_authentication=on, automated backups + point-in-time recovery, deletion protection |
| Database | atepg |
| Google service account | ate-api-server@<project>.iam.gserviceaccount.com |
| Project IAM roles | roles/cloudsql.client, roles/cloudsql.instanceUser on the GSA |
| Workload Identity binding | roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser for <project>.svc.id.goog[ate-system/ate-api-server] on the GSA |
| IAM database user | the GSA, type CLOUD_IAM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT |
Note: The repo otherwise uses WIF-direct
principal://bindings, but Cloud SQL IAM database users must be service accounts — federated Kubernetes principals cannot log into the database. The KSA is therefore annotated withiam.gke.io/gcp-service-accountso the proxy's ambient credentials resolve to the GSA.
Deletion protection means an instance cannot be deleted until it is cleared:
gcloud sql instances patch <instance> --no-deletion-protection
gcloud sql instances delete <instance>Backups, point-in-time recovery, and the shape of an existing instance are
never reconciled — the settings above apply at creation. Change them later
with gcloud sql instances patch.
IAM database users
are created with no privileges, and PostgreSQL 15+ removed
PUBLIC's CREATE on the public schema. Before serving, ateapi runs versioned
migrations to create its tables. The connecting user needs DDL rights to do this.
Grant them once as the built-in postgres user (note the database username is
the GSA email without .gserviceaccount.com):
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE atepg TO "ate-api-server@<project>.iam";
GRANT USAGE, CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO "ate-api-server@<project>.iam";Getting that postgres session on a private-IP-only instance takes two
steps: give postgres a temporary password (fresh instances have none), and
run psql from inside the cluster, which is the only place with a network
path to the instance:
gcloud sql users set-password postgres --instance=<instance> --password='<temp-pw>'
IP=$(gcloud sql instances describe <instance> --format="value(ipAddresses[0].ipAddress)")
kubectl run psql-grant --rm -i --restart=Never --image=postgres:18-alpine -- \
psql "postgresql://postgres:<temp-pw>@${IP}:5432/atepg?sslmode=require" \
-c 'GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE atepg TO "ate-api-server@<project>.iam"; GRANT USAGE, CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO "ate-api-server@<project>.iam";'Nothing deployed ever uses this password — afterwards you can scramble it
(gcloud sql users set-password postgres --instance=<instance> --password="$(openssl rand -hex 16)") or keep it for admin access such as
Cloud SQL Studio. Note that postgres is not a superuser on Cloud SQL: it
can list the IAM user's tables but needs explicit GRANT SELECT from that
user to read them.
If the atepg tables already exist from a previous password-based user,
transfer ownership instead (future in-place DDL requires it):
GRANT "ate-api-server@<project>.iam" TO "<olduser>";
REASSIGN OWNED BY "<olduser>" TO "ate-api-server@<project>.iam"; -- run inside atepgexport ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_INSTANCE=<project>:<region>:<instance>
export ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_GSA=ate-api-server@<project>.iam.gserviceaccount.com
./hack/install-ate.sh --deploy-ate-system
# Existing installation: --deploy-ate-apiserver instead of --deploy-ate-systemWhat this does differently from a plain install:
- Skips the bundled PostgreSQL StatefulSet (a configured Cloud SQL instance
counts as an external database, exactly like an explicit
ATE_API_POSTGRES_CONNECTION_STRING); the install logs the skip and the database it deferred to. - Writes the proxy's configuration (
CSQL_PROXY_*) into theate-api-server-envvarsConfigMap and synthesizes a passwordless DSN (user=<gsa-user> host=127.0.0.1 ... sslmode=disable) into theate-api-server-secret-envvarsSecret. - Annotates the
ate-api-serverKSA with the GSA and patches thecloud-sql-proxynative sidecar (initContainer withrestartPolicy: Always; requires Kubernetes 1.29+) into the deployment. The sidecar's/startupprobe gates ateapi, so ateapi never races the tunnel. LeavingATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_INSTANCEunset on later redeploys keeps the current Cloud SQL configuration (it is adopted from the cluster's record); to remove the sidecar and annotation, set it to the empty string explicitly:ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_INSTANCE="".
Optional environment variables:
ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_IP_TYPE—private(default),public,psc. Selects which of the instance's addresses the proxy dials, for connecting to instances provisioned outside this tool:setup-gcp create cloudsqlitself only creates private-services-access (private IP) instances —publicandpscrequire an instance configured accordingly out-of-band.ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_IAM_AUTH— setfalseto fall back to password authentication through the proxy (still encrypted and identity-verified); you must then provideATE_API_POSTGRES_CONNECTION_STRINGwith the password yourself (the install script rejectsfalsewithout an explicit connection string — a synthesized passwordless DSN cannot log in once the proxy stops injecting IAM tokens).ATE_API_POSTGRES_SCHEMA— the schema holding the store's tables (defaultpublic). If using a custom schema, the one-time schema grant in §2 (GRANT USAGE, CREATE ON SCHEMA ...) must target your custom schema instead ofpublic.ATE_API_POSTGRES_POOL_MAX_CONNS— pgxpool connections per ateapi replica (default:max(4, NumCPU)); appended aspool_max_connsto whichever DSN is in effect (synthesized, in-cluster default, or explicitly provided — apool_max_connsalready present in an explicit DSN wins).
Changing any of these on a running installation takes effect immediately:
the install script stamps a hash of the rendered configuration into the
pod template (ate.dev/env-hash), so a config change rolls ate-api-server
and an unchanged config triggers nothing.
kubectl rollout status deployment/ate-api-server -n ate-system
kubectl logs deployment/ate-api-server -n ate-system -c cloud-sql-proxy | head
# expect: "The proxy has started successfully and is ready for new connections"
kubectl logs deployment/ate-api-server -n ate-system | head -5
# expect the startup flag dump and no store connection errors
kubectl get secret ate-api-server-secret-envvars -n ate-system \
-o jsonpath='{.data.ATE_API_POSTGRES_CONNECTION_STRING}' | base64 -d
# expect: no password in the DSNCommon failure modes:
| Symptom | Cause |
|---|---|
proxy: PERMISSION_DENIED on startup |
GSA missing roles/cloudsql.client, or the Workload Identity annotation/binding is absent |
FATAL: Cloud SQL IAM service account authentication failed |
GSA missing roles/cloudsql.instanceUser, or the IAM database user was not created |
ateapi: permission denied for schema public |
the one-time schema GRANT (section 2) was not run |
| proxy: instance connection errors mentioning IAM | cloudsql.iam_authentication flag is off on the instance |
The provisioning defaults (db-custom-2-8192, 10 GB disk) suit development
and modest fleets. For sizing at large actor counts and high request rates —
instance shape and the data cache, storage/IOPS, connection-pool math,
proxy sidecar resources, and Managed Connection Pooling — see
docs/dev/cloud-sql-scaling-guide.md.
For a non-Cloud-SQL database, provide a DSN directly; password lives in a Secret and the server certificate is verified against a mounted CA. (This is also the shape of a direct connection to Cloud SQL without the proxy, if you ever need one — you then manage the server CA and credentials yourself.)
export ATE_API_POSTGRES_CONNECTION_STRING='postgresql://<user>:<pw>@<host>:5432/atepg?sslmode=verify-ca&sslrootcert=/run/postgres-server-ca/server-ca.pem'
export ATE_API_POSTGRES_SERVER_CA_FILE=/path/to/server-ca.pem
./hack/install-ate.sh --deploy-ate-system