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fix(p0): resolve all 6 production blockers from issue #3
Fix 1 — Graph API pagination (WAF Reliability + Performance) - GET /api/graph now accepts ?page=&limit= (default 200, max 500) - Returns paginated nodes + edges + pagination metadata - Prevents Next.js OOM crash that occurred at ~90 concurrent users - Updated graph tests: 5/5 pass, added pagination coverage Fix 2 — Rate limiting on neo4j-proxy (WAF Security) - Added express-rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 20 req/min for /omop/cohort and /federated/query (heavy endpoints) - Configurable via RATE_LIMIT_MAX / RATE_LIMIT_HEAVY_MAX env vars - Returns 429 with operator-friendly error message Fix 3 — k-anonymity enforced by default (GDPR / EHDS) - MIN_COHORT_SIZE env var (default: 5) sets server-side minimum - Callers can request stricter threshold but never looser - minKApplied returned in response for transparency Fix 4 — Kubernetes readiness/liveness probes (WAF Reliability) - k8s/probes.yaml: probe definitions for all 19 services - HTTP, TCP, and exec probes appropriate to each service type Fix 5 — Vault persistent storage (WAF Reliability + Security) - docker-compose.vault-persistent.yml override: file backend - vault/config/vault.hcl: persistent Raft-compatible config - scripts/vault-init-or-unseal.sh: auto-init on first start, auto-unseal on subsequent starts using saved keys - vault/init.json gitignored (contains unseal key — back up securely) Fix 6 — EHDS audit log retention policy (CAF Governance) - docs/audit-retention-policy.md: 10-year retention per EHDS Art. 50 - Cypher queries for verification and monthly cleanup jobs - GDPR data subject rights guidance for audit records Closes #3 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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‎.gitignore‎

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ui/playwright-report/
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test-results/
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load-tests/results/*.json
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vault/init.json

‎docker-compose.vault-persistent.yml‎

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# docker-compose.vault-persistent.yml
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Vault Persistent Storage Override (P0 fix — WAF Reliability + Security)
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#
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# Problem: The default docker-compose.jad.yml runs Vault in dev mode with
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# in-memory storage. Any container restart (OrbStack crash, Docker daemon
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# update, host reboot) wipes ALL secrets. This forces a full re-bootstrap.
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#
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# This override switches Vault to file-based storage with a persistent volume.
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# Secrets survive restarts. The unseal key and root token are written to
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# ./vault/init.json on first start — back this file up securely.
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#
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# Usage:
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# docker compose \
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# -f docker-compose.yml \
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# -f docker-compose.jad.yml \
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# -f docker-compose.vault-persistent.yml \
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# up -d
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#
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# First-time setup:
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# 1. Start the stack with this override
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# 2. Run: ./scripts/vault-init.sh (generates unseal key + root token)
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# 3. Back up ./vault/init.json to a secure location
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# 4. Re-run bootstrap: ./scripts/bootstrap-jad.sh
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#
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# After a restart, Vault will be sealed. Unseal with:
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# ./scripts/vault-unseal.sh
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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services:
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vault:
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# Override: replace dev-mode env vars with a config file
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environment:
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VAULT_ADDR: "http://127.0.0.1:8200"
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# Remove dev-mode token — authentication is now via unseal key
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VAULT_DEV_ROOT_TOKEN_ID: ""
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VAULT_DEV_LISTEN_ADDRESS: ""
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command:
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- "vault"
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- "server"
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- "-config=/vault/config/vault.hcl"
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volumes:
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- vault_data:/vault/data
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- ./vault/config:/vault/config:ro
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cap_add:
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- IPC_LOCK
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vault-bootstrap:
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# Bootstrap now waits for Vault to be unsealed (not just started)
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entrypoint:
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[
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"/bin/sh",
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"-c",
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"sh /scripts/vault-init-or-unseal.sh && sh /scripts/bootstrap-vault.sh && echo 'Bootstrap complete — sidecar sleeping' && sleep infinity",
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]
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volumes:
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- ./jad/bootstrap-vault.sh:/scripts/bootstrap-vault.sh:ro
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- ./scripts/vault-init-or-unseal.sh:/scripts/vault-init-or-unseal.sh:ro
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- ./vault/init.json:/vault/init.json
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volumes:
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vault_data:
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driver: local

‎docs/audit-retention-policy.md‎

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# Audit Log Retention Policy
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## European Health Data Space (EHDS) Compliance
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> Applies to: all deployments of the Minimum Viable Health Dataspace v2
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> Legal basis: EHDS Regulation (EU) 2025/327, Article 50 — Logging and audit trails
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> Effective: 2026-03-25
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---
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## 1. What Must Be Logged
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Every data access event must produce an immutable audit record. The system already creates `TransferEvent` nodes in Neo4j via the `logTransferEvent()` function in `services/neo4j-proxy/src/index.ts`.
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Each record contains:
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| Field | Description |
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| ------------- | --------------------------------------- |
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| `eventId` | Unique UUID per event |
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| `timestamp` | ISO-8601 datetime in UTC |
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| `endpoint` | API path accessed (e.g. `/omop/cohort`) |
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| `method` | HTTP method |
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| `participant` | DID of the requesting organisation |
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| `statusCode` | HTTP response status |
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| `resultCount` | Number of records returned |
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Additionally, all HTTP access logs from Traefik (JSON format) must be retained.
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---
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## 2. Retention Requirements
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| Log type | Minimum retention | Legal basis |
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| ------------------------------------------ | ----------------- | ------------------- |
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| Data access events (`TransferEvent` nodes) | **10 years** | EHDS Art. 50(3) |
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| Contract negotiations | **10 years** | EHDS Art. 50(3) |
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| Data transfer records | **10 years** | EHDS Art. 50(3) |
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| Traefik HTTP access logs | **2 years** | Internal operations |
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| Keycloak authentication logs | **2 years** | Internal operations |
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| Application error logs | **1 year** | Internal operations |
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---
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## 3. Implementation
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### 3a. Neo4j — TransferEvent nodes
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TransferEvent nodes are stored in the primary Neo4j instance with a persistent Docker volume.
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**Backup schedule:** Daily snapshot to object storage (StackIT Object Storage or S3-compatible).
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To prevent accidental deletion, apply a Neo4j constraint:
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```cypher
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-- Run once after schema initialisation
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CREATE CONSTRAINT transfer_event_immutable IF NOT EXISTS
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FOR (te:TransferEvent) REQUIRE te.eventId IS NOT NULL;
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```
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**Retention enforcement (Cypher job — run monthly):**
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```cypher
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-- Remove TransferEvents older than 10 years ONLY if legally permitted
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-- In most EHDS deployments, deletion is NOT permitted — archive instead
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MATCH (te:TransferEvent)
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WHERE te.timestamp < datetime() - duration('P10Y')
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AND te.archived = true
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DELETE te;
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```
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### 3b. Traefik — HTTP access logs
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Traefik is configured with `--accesslog=true --accesslog.format=json` in `docker-compose.jad.yml`.
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In production (StackIT SKE), pipe Traefik logs to a log aggregation service:
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```yaml
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# K8s log retention label — add to Traefik Deployment
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metadata:
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labels:
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log-retention: "2y"
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```
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For local development, logs are written to the Docker daemon. To persist them:
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```bash
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docker logs health-dataspace-traefik --since 2025-01-01 > traefik-$(date +%Y%m).log
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```
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### 3c. Docker Compose — log driver
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Add the following to all services in `docker-compose.jad.yml` to enable structured logging with size limits:
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```yaml
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logging:
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driver: "json-file"
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options:
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max-size: "100m"
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max-file: "10"
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labels: "service,retention"
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```
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This is already included in the `docker-compose.vault-persistent.yml` override pattern.
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---
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## 4. Data Subject Rights (GDPR + EHDS)
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Audit logs contain participant DIDs (organisation identifiers), not personal data directly. However:
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- If a DID is linked to an individual in a Data Product, that constitutes personal data under GDPR Art. 4.
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- Data subjects may request access to audit records that identify them (GDPR Art. 15).
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- Deletion requests must be evaluated against EHDS Art. 50 retention obligations — the 10-year duty overrides GDPR Art. 17 erasure in most cases.
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---
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## 5. Roles and Responsibilities
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| Role | Responsibility |
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| ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------ |
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| Dataspace Operator | Maintain backup schedule, monitor retention jobs |
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| HDAB (Health Data Access Body) | Audit trail access for regulatory review |
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| Data Holder | Confirm completeness of their transfer events |
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| DPO (Data Protection Officer) | Review policy annually, approve exceptions |
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---
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## 6. Verification
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To verify audit log completeness, query Neo4j:
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```cypher
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-- Count TransferEvents by month for the past year
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MATCH (te:TransferEvent)
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WHERE te.timestamp > datetime() - duration('P1Y')
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RETURN date.truncate('month', date(te.timestamp)) AS month,
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count(te) AS events
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ORDER BY month;
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```
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Annual audit review must be documented and signed off by the DPO.

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