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feat: Trust Center for Cross-Provider Pseudonym Resolution (EHDS Art. 50/51) #1

@ma3u

Description

@ma3u

Summary

Implement a Trust Center for cross-provider pseudonym resolution, enabling longitudinal patient linkage across multiple data holders without revealing real patient identities to the researcher. This is the critical missing piece for full EHDS Art. 50 (Secure Processing Environment) compliance.

Context — Community Feedback

This feature was inspired by feedback from Thomas Berlage (Fraunhofer FIT) in community discussion on the LinkedIn article:

  • PPMQ solves the wrong threat model — In EHDS secondary use, the distrusted party is the researcher/CRO, not the data providers. Providers publishing to the same SPE are already under HDAB governance.
  • Trust Center is the missing piece — A federated identity mediation layer under HDAB authority that maps provider-specific pseudonyms to a shared research pseudonym.
  • German precedent — RKI (Robert Koch Institute) is designated as the national trust centre. The MII (Medical Informatics Initiative) community is evaluating integration with their brokerage service.
  • Fraunhofer FIT has implemented a simple pseudonym resolution protocol.

Proposed Solution

Phase 18a — Trust Center Graph Schema

  • New (:TrustCenter) node type in Neo4j Layer 1
  • Relationships: GOVERNED_BY -> HDABApproval, RESOLVES_PSEUDONYMS_FOR -> HealthDataset
  • Seed data for 2 trust centres (DE: RKI, NL: RIVM)

Phase 18b — Pseudonym Resolution Protocol

  • POST /trust-center/resolve — Map provider pseudonyms to research pseudonym (HDAB-auth only)
  • Two modes: stateless (HMAC-based) and key-managed (stored with revocation)
  • Data users never interact with the Trust Center directly

Phase 18c — SPE Security Model Refinement

  • Replace mock SPE with TEE attestation model
  • Enforce aggregate-only output (k-anonymity >= 5)
  • SPE session audit trail

Phase 18d — Trust Center UI

  • Trust Center section on /compliance page
  • Trust Center nodes in graph explorer
  • Cross-border mutual recognition status

Security Model

Threat Mitigation
Researcher accesses raw data SPE + TEE enforce aggregate-only output
Provider re-identification Provider-specific pseudonyms (local key)
Cross-provider linkage leak Trust Center under HDAB authority only
Trust Center collusion Stateless or key-split design; audit trail
Pseudonym reversal One-way mapping; revocable by HDAB

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