diff --git a/.github/workflows/detect-changes.yml b/.github/workflows/detect-changes.yml index 159423efa..1405a7042 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/detect-changes.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/detect-changes.yml @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ jobs: path === "scripts/python-k8s-execd-init-e2e.sh" || path === "tests/python/tests/test_execd_init_e2e.py" || path === "tests/python/tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py" || + path === "tests/python/tests/test_execd_k8s_restart_recycle_e2e.py" || path === "server/opensandbox_server/examples/e2e.batchsandbox-template.yaml" || path.startsWith("components/execd/") || path.startsWith("kubernetes/charts/"), @@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ jobs: execd: (path) => workflowChanged(path, "execd-test.yml") || path.startsWith("components/execd/") || - path.startsWith("components/internal/"), + path.startsWith("components/internal/") || + path === "scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh", nodeagent: (path) => workflowChanged(path, "nodeagent-test.yml") || path.startsWith("components/nodeagent/") || diff --git a/.github/workflows/execd-test.yml b/.github/workflows/execd-test.yml index 37a3649bb..89cbbf89e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/execd-test.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/execd-test.yml @@ -58,8 +58,20 @@ jobs: - name: Run execd-ebpf variant tests working-directory: components/execd run: | + # Regenerate the per-arch bytecode first: the generated files are + # build artifacts (not committed), so local tests need them too. + sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq clang >/dev/null + make generate-ebpf ARCH=$(go env GOARCH) CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -tags ebpf -count=1 ./pkg/ebpf/ + - name: Upload per-arch vmlinux.h (for bytecode regeneration) + if: runner.os == 'Linux' && always() + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7 + with: + name: vmlinux-${{ runner.arch }} + path: /tmp/ebpf-dump/vmlinux.h + if-no-files-found: ignore + - name: Calculate coverage and generate summary working-directory: components/execd id: coverage @@ -84,7 +96,7 @@ jobs: strategy: fail-fast: false matrix: - os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest] + os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest, self-hosted] runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} defaults: run: @@ -135,7 +147,7 @@ jobs: chmod +x components/execd/tests/smoke_bwrap.sh bash components/execd/tests/smoke_bwrap.sh - - name: Init-mode container regression (OSEP-0018) + - name: Init-mode container regression if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' shell: bash timeout-minutes: 30 @@ -143,6 +155,19 @@ jobs: chmod +x components/execd/tests/init_container.sh bash components/execd/tests/init_container.sh + - name: Execd eBPF bare-container smoke + if: matrix.os != 'windows-latest' + shell: bash + timeout-minutes: 30 + run: | + # Runs the execd-ebpf variant in a bare container against THIS + # runner's kernel and asserts exec/connect/privilege events land in + # the JSONL audit file. GitHub-hosted ubuntu validates the stock CI + # kernel; the self-hosted leg is the 5.10 empirical validation + # (inline-filename exec-hook fallback). Host prerequisites (BTF, + # cgroup v2, tracefs) are prechecked by the script. + bash scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh --build + - name: Show logs if: always() run: | @@ -240,9 +265,9 @@ jobs: - name: Run isolated session init-mode reaper integration test working-directory: components/execd run: | - # bwrap lifecycle under init-mode reaper dispatch (OSEP-0018 R-o): - # the pre-reap barrier must serialize process-group teardown with - # the reaper's observe/consume while execd owns wait4. + # bwrap lifecycle under init-mode reaper dispatch: the pre-reap + # barrier must serialize process-group teardown with the reaper's + # observe/consume while execd owns wait4. sudo -E env "PATH=$PATH" go test \ -tags="linux,bwrap" -v -count=1 -timeout=3m \ -run '^TestIsolatedSessionWithInitReaper$' \ diff --git a/components/execd/Dockerfile b/components/execd/Dockerfile index 97e7d1ebb..e630448f3 100644 --- a/components/execd/Dockerfile +++ b/components/execd/Dockerfile @@ -102,10 +102,17 @@ RUN rm /usr/lib/libcap.so /usr/lib/libcap.so.2 && \ # defaulting to /opt/opensandbox/execd). The variant attaches # exec/connect/privilege audit hooks and needs CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON in the # container ceiling. +# +# The CO-RE audit bytecode is REGENERATED here at image build time with +# bpf2go. prog/audit_types.h declares only the kernel members the programs +# touch (resolved by name against the target kernel BTF at load time), so +# no per-arch vmlinux.h or host kernel BTF is needed — this stage is fully +# hermetic and cross-compiles for every TARGETARCH. FROM golang:1.25.9 AS ebpf-builder ARG VERSION=dev ARG GIT_COMMIT=unknown ARG BUILD_TIME=unknown +ARG TARGETARCH RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends clang WORKDIR /build COPY components/internal/go.mod components/internal/go.sum ./components/internal/ @@ -115,6 +122,15 @@ RUN cd components/execd && go mod download COPY components/internal ./components/internal COPY components/execd ./components/execd WORKDIR /build/components/execd +# Generate the CO-RE bytecode for this TARGETARCH (bpf2go embeds it into +# audit_bpf_.go, picked up by the Go build tags). clang's bpf target +# only — no host kernel BTF. +RUN go run github.com/cilium/ebpf/cmd/bpf2go@v0.16.0 \ + -cc clang -no-strip \ + -cflags "-Ipkg/ebpf/prog" \ + -target "${TARGETARCH}" \ + -go-package ebpf -output-dir pkg/ebpf \ + audit pkg/ebpf/prog/audit.bpf.c # cilium/ebpf is pure Go, so the variant builds fully static. RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags ebpf -trimpath -buildvcs=false \ -ldflags "-buildid= -B none \ diff --git a/components/execd/Makefile b/components/execd/Makefile index ebbcf3dac..8a7cdc06c 100644 --- a/components/execd/Makefile +++ b/components/execd/Makefile @@ -155,9 +155,35 @@ build-ebpf: ## Build the execd-ebpf observation variant (CGO + cilium/ebpf). exit 1; \ fi @mkdir -p bin + $(MAKE) generate-ebpf ARCH=$(shell go env GOARCH) CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -tags ebpf $(GO_BUILD_FLAGS) -ldflags "$(GO_LDFLAGS)" -o bin/execd-ebpf main.go @echo "built bin/execd-ebpf" +# Regenerate the CO-RE audit bytecode for one architecture from +# prog/audit.bpf.c + prog/audit_types.h. The types header declares only the +# kernel members the programs touch (resolved by name against the target +# kernel BTF at load time), so no vmlinux.h is needed and the bytecode is +# hermetic across architectures (issue #1563). +# +# make generate-ebpf ARCH=amd64 # or arm64; defaults to GOARCH +# +# Requires clang with the bpf target. bpf2go writes audit_bpf_.{go,o}; +# the Go build picks the right one via build tags. +.PHONY: generate-ebpf +ARCH ?= $(shell go env GOARCH) +generate-ebpf: + @case "$(ARCH)" in \ + amd64|arm64) ;; \ + *) echo "generate-ebpf: unsupported ARCH=$(ARCH) (amd64|arm64)" >&2; exit 1 ;; \ + esac + go run github.com/cilium/ebpf/cmd/bpf2go@v0.16.0 \ + -cc clang -no-strip \ + -cflags "-Ipkg/ebpf/prog" \ + -target $(ARCH) \ + -go-package ebpf -output-dir pkg/ebpf \ + audit pkg/ebpf/prog/audit.bpf.c + @echo "regenerated pkg/ebpf/audit_bpf_$(ARCH).{go,o}" + .PHONY: test-integration test-integration: ## Run integration tests (Linux + bwrap required). go test -v -tags="linux,bwrap" -run Integration ./pkg/runtime/bwrap_test/ diff --git a/components/execd/configs/isolation.custom.toml b/components/execd/configs/isolation.custom.toml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..697dc22c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/configs/isolation.custom.toml @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# Custom-policy hardening configuration for the execd-as-init e2e: a +# [seccomp] deny override (which REPLACES the built-in denylist) plus +# keep_capabilities. Proves both overrides reach the workload: +# - the denied syscall family (chmod/fchmodat/fchmodat2; glibc coreutils +# chmod uses fchmodat, busybox uses chmod) fails with EACCES in /command +# - CAP_NET_RAW (bit 13) is raised in the ambient set and survives execve, +# so the workload reports CapEff=0x2000 +# Landlock stays off: this variant is about the seccomp/caps overrides only. + +[hardening] +enabled = true +keep_capabilities = ["CAP_NET_RAW"] + +[seccomp] +deny = ["chmod", "fchmodat", "fchmodat2"] diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit.go b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit.go index a6338f586..32c4a6b2b 100644 --- a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit.go +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit.go @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ type Observer struct { sandboxID string kinds map[string]bool reader *ringbuf.Reader - objs *auditObjects + events *ebpf.Map + progs []*ebpf.Program links []link.Link closed chan struct{} closeOnce sync.Once @@ -127,31 +128,35 @@ func Init(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string) (state, message string) { return "degraded", fmt.Sprintf("eBPF observation cannot scope to the sandbox cgroup: %v", err) } - observer, err := newObserver(cfg, sandboxID, cgroupID) + observer, missing, err := newObserver(cfg, sandboxID, cgroupID) if err != nil { return "degraded", fmt.Sprintf("eBPF observation failed to start: %v", err) } observer.start() - return "active", fmt.Sprintf("eBPF observation active (cgroup %d, audit file %s)", cgroupID, observer.logger.Filename) + msg := fmt.Sprintf("eBPF observation active (cgroup %d, audit file %s)", cgroupID, observer.logger.Filename) + if len(missing) > 0 { + // Fail-open per layer: hooks the kernel could not load/attach are + // skipped, the remaining ones keep auditing — but report the layer + // as degraded (spec: "configured but a prerequisite is missing") + // so callers do not mistake partial coverage for fully active + // auditing. + return "degraded", msg + fmt.Sprintf("; hooks not active: %v", missing) + } + return "active", msg } -func newObserver(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string, cgroupID uint64) (*Observer, error) { +func newObserver(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string, cgroupID uint64) (*Observer, []string, error) { _ = rlimit.RemoveMemlock() spec, err := loadAudit() if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("load audit programs: %w", err) + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load audit programs: %w", err) } // Pin the cgroup filter; events outside the sandbox are dropped. if err := spec.RewriteConstants(map[string]interface{}{ "target_cgroup": cgroupID, }); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("set audit cgroup filter: %w", err) - } - - var objs auditObjects - if err := spec.LoadAndAssign(&objs, nil); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("assign audit programs: %w", err) + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("set audit cgroup filter: %w", err) } auditFile := cfg.AuditFile @@ -159,8 +164,7 @@ func newObserver(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string, cgroupID uint64) ( auditFile = defaultAuditFile } if err := os.MkdirAll(dirOf(auditFile), 0o755); err != nil { - objs.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("create audit dir: %w", err) + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("create audit dir: %w", err) } logger := &lumberjack.Logger{ Filename: auditFile, @@ -169,37 +173,64 @@ func newObserver(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string, cgroupID uint64) ( MaxAge: 7, // days } - var links []link.Link - attached := map[string]bool{} - attach := func(kind string, prog *ebpf.Program, attachFn func() (link.Link, error)) { - if prog == nil { - return - } - l, err := attachFn() - if err != nil { - log.Warn("ebpf: attach %s: %v", kind, err) - return - } - links = append(links, l) - attached[kind] = true - } - attach("exec", objs.OnExec, func() (link.Link, error) { - return link.Tracepoint("sched", "sched_process_exec", objs.OnExec, nil) - }) - attach("connect", objs.OnConnect, func() (link.Link, error) { - return link.Tracepoint("sock", "inet_sock_set_state", objs.OnConnect, nil) - }) - attach("privilege", objs.OnCommitCreds, func() (link.Link, error) { - return link.Kprobe("commit_creds", objs.OnCommitCreds, nil) - }) - - reader, err := ringbuf.NewReader(objs.Events) + // Load the shared ringbuf map once; every hook writes into it. + eventsMap, err := ebpf.NewMap(spec.Maps["events"]) if err != nil { - for _, l := range links { - _ = l.Close() + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("create events ringbuf: %w", err) + } + + // Each hook is loaded and attached independently (fail-open per layer, + // OSEP-0018 §6): a kernel that cannot load one program (e.g. a kprobe + // CO-RE relocation on an old kernel) only degrades that hook; the rest + // keep auditing. + type hookDef struct { + kind string + prog string + load func(*ebpf.CollectionSpec) (*ebpf.Program, error) + attach func(*ebpf.Program) (link.Link, error) + } + withSharedEvents := func(target any) func(*ebpf.CollectionSpec) (*ebpf.Program, error) { + return func(sub *ebpf.CollectionSpec) (*ebpf.Program, error) { + if err := sub.LoadAndAssign(target, &ebpf.CollectionOptions{ + MapReplacements: map[string]*ebpf.Map{"events": eventsMap}, + }); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + prog := programFromTarget(target) + return prog, nil } - objs.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ringbuf reader: %w", err) + } + hooks := []hookDef{ + { + kind: "exec", + prog: "on_exec", + load: withSharedEvents(&struct { + OnExec *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_exec"` + }{}), + attach: func(p *ebpf.Program) (link.Link, error) { + return link.Tracepoint("sched", "sched_process_exec", p, nil) + }, + }, + { + kind: "connect", + prog: "on_connect", + load: withSharedEvents(&struct { + OnConnect *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_connect"` + }{}), + attach: func(p *ebpf.Program) (link.Link, error) { + return link.Tracepoint("sock", "inet_sock_set_state", p, nil) + }, + }, + { + kind: "privilege", + prog: "on_commit_creds", + load: withSharedEvents(&struct { + OnCommitCreds *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_commit_creds"` + }{}), + attach: func(p *ebpf.Program) (link.Link, error) { + return link.Kprobe("commit_creds", p, nil) + }, + }, } kinds := map[string]bool{} @@ -211,18 +242,55 @@ func newObserver(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string, cgroupID uint64) ( kinds[kind] = true } } - for kind := range kinds { - if !attached[kind] { - // Release every already-attached hook and the ringbuf reader so - // partially attached programs do not stay live after the - // degraded report. - for _, l := range links { - _ = l.Close() + + var links []link.Link + var progs []*ebpf.Program + var missing []string + for _, h := range hooks { + if !kinds[h.kind] { + continue + } + sub := spec.Copy() + for name := range sub.Programs { + if name != h.prog { + delete(sub.Programs, name) } - reader.Close() - objs.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("requested observer hook %q could not be attached", kind) } + prog, err := h.load(sub) + if err != nil { + log.Warn("ebpf: load %s hook: %v", h.kind, err) + missing = append(missing, h.kind) + continue + } + progs = append(progs, prog) + l, err := h.attach(prog) + if err != nil { + log.Warn("ebpf: attach %s: %v", h.kind, err) + _ = prog.Close() + missing = append(missing, h.kind) + continue + } + links = append(links, l) + } + + if len(links) == 0 { + eventsMap.Close() + for _, p := range progs { + _ = p.Close() + } + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no observer hooks could be loaded/attached (missing: %v)", missing) + } + + reader, err := ringbuf.NewReader(eventsMap) + if err != nil { + for _, l := range links { + _ = l.Close() + } + for _, p := range progs { + _ = p.Close() + } + eventsMap.Close() + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ringbuf reader: %w", err) } return &Observer{ @@ -230,10 +298,32 @@ func newObserver(cfg *isolation.EbpfConfig, sandboxID string, cgroupID uint64) ( sandboxID: sandboxID, kinds: kinds, reader: reader, - objs: &objs, + events: eventsMap, + progs: progs, links: links, closed: make(chan struct{}), - }, nil + }, missing, nil +} + +// programFromTarget extracts the loaded *ebpf.Program from a single-field +// load target (the anonymous structs in newObserver). +func programFromTarget(target any) *ebpf.Program { + switch v := target.(type) { + case *struct { + OnExec *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_exec"` + }: + return v.OnExec + case *struct { + OnConnect *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_connect"` + }: + return v.OnConnect + case *struct { + OnCommitCreds *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_commit_creds"` + }: + return v.OnCommitCreds + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected load target %T", target)) + } } func (o *Observer) start() { @@ -261,8 +351,11 @@ func (o *Observer) Close() { for _, l := range o.links { _ = l.Close() } - if o.objs != nil { - o.objs.Close() + for _, p := range o.progs { + _ = p.Close() + } + if o.events != nil { + _ = o.events.Close() } _ = o.logger.Close() }) diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfeb.go b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfeb.go deleted file mode 100644 index 8bdb46ca5..000000000 --- a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfeb.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ -// Code generated by bpf2go; DO NOT EDIT. -//go:build ebpf && (mips || mips64 || ppc64 || s390x) - -package ebpf - -import ( - "bytes" - _ "embed" - "fmt" - "io" - - "github.com/cilium/ebpf" -) - -// loadAudit returns the embedded CollectionSpec for audit. -func loadAudit() (*ebpf.CollectionSpec, error) { - reader := bytes.NewReader(_AuditBytes) - spec, err := ebpf.LoadCollectionSpecFromReader(reader) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("can't load audit: %w", err) - } - - return spec, err -} - -// loadAuditObjects loads audit and converts it into a struct. -// -// The following types are suitable as obj argument: -// -// *auditObjects -// *auditPrograms -// *auditMaps -// -// See ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign documentation for details. -func loadAuditObjects(obj interface{}, opts *ebpf.CollectionOptions) error { - spec, err := loadAudit() - if err != nil { - return err - } - - return spec.LoadAndAssign(obj, opts) -} - -// auditSpecs contains maps and programs before they are loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed ebpf.CollectionSpec.Assign. -type auditSpecs struct { - auditProgramSpecs - auditMapSpecs -} - -// auditSpecs contains programs before they are loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed ebpf.CollectionSpec.Assign. -type auditProgramSpecs struct { - OnCommitCreds *ebpf.ProgramSpec `ebpf:"on_commit_creds"` - OnConnect *ebpf.ProgramSpec `ebpf:"on_connect"` - OnExec *ebpf.ProgramSpec `ebpf:"on_exec"` -} - -// auditMapSpecs contains maps before they are loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed ebpf.CollectionSpec.Assign. -type auditMapSpecs struct { - Events *ebpf.MapSpec `ebpf:"events"` -} - -// auditObjects contains all objects after they have been loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed to loadAuditObjects or ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign. -type auditObjects struct { - auditPrograms - auditMaps -} - -func (o *auditObjects) Close() error { - return _AuditClose( - &o.auditPrograms, - &o.auditMaps, - ) -} - -// auditMaps contains all maps after they have been loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed to loadAuditObjects or ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign. -type auditMaps struct { - Events *ebpf.Map `ebpf:"events"` -} - -func (m *auditMaps) Close() error { - return _AuditClose( - m.Events, - ) -} - -// auditPrograms contains all programs after they have been loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed to loadAuditObjects or ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign. -type auditPrograms struct { - OnCommitCreds *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_commit_creds"` - OnConnect *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_connect"` - OnExec *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_exec"` -} - -func (p *auditPrograms) Close() error { - return _AuditClose( - p.OnCommitCreds, - p.OnConnect, - p.OnExec, - ) -} - -func _AuditClose(closers ...io.Closer) error { - for _, closer := range closers { - if err := closer.Close(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - return nil -} - -// Do not access this directly. -// -//go:embed audit_bpfeb.o -var _AuditBytes []byte diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfeb.o b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfeb.o deleted file mode 100644 index 8a62674b7..000000000 Binary files a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfeb.o and /dev/null differ diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfel.go b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfel.go deleted file mode 100644 index b750c5b0a..000000000 --- a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfel.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ -// Code generated by bpf2go; DO NOT EDIT. -//go:build ebpf && (386 || amd64 || arm || arm64 || loong64 || mips64le || mipsle || ppc64le || riscv64) - -package ebpf - -import ( - "bytes" - _ "embed" - "fmt" - "io" - - "github.com/cilium/ebpf" -) - -// loadAudit returns the embedded CollectionSpec for audit. -func loadAudit() (*ebpf.CollectionSpec, error) { - reader := bytes.NewReader(_AuditBytes) - spec, err := ebpf.LoadCollectionSpecFromReader(reader) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("can't load audit: %w", err) - } - - return spec, err -} - -// loadAuditObjects loads audit and converts it into a struct. -// -// The following types are suitable as obj argument: -// -// *auditObjects -// *auditPrograms -// *auditMaps -// -// See ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign documentation for details. -func loadAuditObjects(obj interface{}, opts *ebpf.CollectionOptions) error { - spec, err := loadAudit() - if err != nil { - return err - } - - return spec.LoadAndAssign(obj, opts) -} - -// auditSpecs contains maps and programs before they are loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed ebpf.CollectionSpec.Assign. -type auditSpecs struct { - auditProgramSpecs - auditMapSpecs -} - -// auditSpecs contains programs before they are loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed ebpf.CollectionSpec.Assign. -type auditProgramSpecs struct { - OnCommitCreds *ebpf.ProgramSpec `ebpf:"on_commit_creds"` - OnConnect *ebpf.ProgramSpec `ebpf:"on_connect"` - OnExec *ebpf.ProgramSpec `ebpf:"on_exec"` -} - -// auditMapSpecs contains maps before they are loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed ebpf.CollectionSpec.Assign. -type auditMapSpecs struct { - Events *ebpf.MapSpec `ebpf:"events"` -} - -// auditObjects contains all objects after they have been loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed to loadAuditObjects or ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign. -type auditObjects struct { - auditPrograms - auditMaps -} - -func (o *auditObjects) Close() error { - return _AuditClose( - &o.auditPrograms, - &o.auditMaps, - ) -} - -// auditMaps contains all maps after they have been loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed to loadAuditObjects or ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign. -type auditMaps struct { - Events *ebpf.Map `ebpf:"events"` -} - -func (m *auditMaps) Close() error { - return _AuditClose( - m.Events, - ) -} - -// auditPrograms contains all programs after they have been loaded into the kernel. -// -// It can be passed to loadAuditObjects or ebpf.CollectionSpec.LoadAndAssign. -type auditPrograms struct { - OnCommitCreds *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_commit_creds"` - OnConnect *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_connect"` - OnExec *ebpf.Program `ebpf:"on_exec"` -} - -func (p *auditPrograms) Close() error { - return _AuditClose( - p.OnCommitCreds, - p.OnConnect, - p.OnExec, - ) -} - -func _AuditClose(closers ...io.Closer) error { - for _, closer := range closers { - if err := closer.Close(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - return nil -} - -// Do not access this directly. -// -//go:embed audit_bpfel.o -var _AuditBytes []byte diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfel.o b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfel.o deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5836bae..000000000 Binary files a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/audit_bpfel.o and /dev/null differ diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit.bpf.c b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit.bpf.c index 2ce37d5c9..9c670408b 100644 --- a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit.bpf.c +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit.bpf.c @@ -17,13 +17,12 @@ // (CO-RE); the generated bytecode is embedded in the execd-ebpf build // variant only. -// vmlinux.h provides every kernel type used below (including __u32/__u64), -// so it must be included before the libbpf helper headers. It is a -// build-time-only artifact — a kernel BTF dump for CO-RE — regenerated with -// `bpftool btf dump file /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux format c > vmlinux.h` on a -// target kernel before running bpf2go, and is NOT committed (the generated -// bytecode embedded in the audit_bpf*.go bindings is what ships). -#include "vmlinux.h" +// vmlinux.h is intentionally NOT used: CO-RE resolves every accessor by +// member name against the target kernel's BTF at load time, so the compile +// time layout does not need to match any kernel. audit_types.h declares the +// handful of kernel structures/members these programs touch (by name), which +// keeps the build hermetic, per-arch-vmlinux-free and small. See the header. +#include "audit_types.h" #include #include #include diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit_types.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit_types.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..483d6049f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/audit_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Minimal kernel type definitions for the audit BPF programs (CO-RE). + * + * This REPLACES vmlinux.h: CO-RE resolves every accessor by FIELD NAME + * against the target kernel's BTF at load time, so the compile-time type + * layout here does not need to match any real kernel. We only need the + * handful of structures and members the programs touch, declared with the + * same member NAMES (types/offsets are irrelevant). Keeping this header + * small (vs. the ~150k-line per-arch vmlinux.h) makes the build hermetic + * and architecture-independent. + * + * If a member below is renamed/removed in a future kernel, the CO-RE + * relocation fails open (the hook degrades) — extend this header to match. + * + * Members used: + * - task_struct: real_parent, pid, real_cred + * - cred: uid.val, gid.val, cap_effective + * - trace_event_raw_sched_process_exec: __data_loc_filename + * - trace_event_raw_inet_sock_set_state: newstate, skaddr + * - sock: __sk_common + * - sock_common: skc_family, skc_daddr, skc_v6_daddr.in6_u.u6_addr32, + * skc_dport + */ + +#ifndef __AUDIT_TYPES_H +#define __AUDIT_TYPES_H + +typedef unsigned char __u8; +typedef unsigned int __u32; +typedef unsigned long long __u64; +typedef unsigned short __u16; +typedef int __s32; +typedef long long __s64; +typedef __u32 __be32; +typedef __u16 __be16; +typedef __u32 __wsum; + +typedef __u32 uint32_t; +typedef __u64 uint64_t; +typedef __u16 uint16_t; + +/* Forward declarations used by bpf_helper_defs.h helper prototypes. */ +struct __sk_buff; + +/* Map type used by the events ring buffer (bpf_helpers.h). */ +#define BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF 27 + +struct task_struct { + void *real_parent; + unsigned int pid; + void *real_cred; +}; + +struct kuid_t { + __u32 val; +}; +struct kgid_t { + __u32 val; +}; +struct kernel_cap_t { + __u64 val; +}; + +struct cred { + struct kuid_t uid; + struct kgid_t gid; + struct kernel_cap_t cap_effective; +}; + +/* trace_event_raw_sched_process_exec (5.16+ shape; field_exists probes + * older kernels via the inline-filename fallback in audit.bpf.c). */ +struct trace_event_raw_sched_process_exec { + void *ent; + __u32 pid; + __u32 old_pid; + __u32 __data_loc_filename; +}; + +struct trace_event_raw_inet_sock_set_state { + void *ent; + void *skaddr; + int oldstate; + int newstate; +}; + +struct in6_addr { + union { + __u8 u6_addr8[16]; + __be32 u6_addr32[4]; + } in6_u; +}; + +struct sock_common { + __u16 skc_dport; + __u32 skc_daddr; + struct in6_addr skc_v6_daddr; + unsigned short skc_family; +}; + +struct sock { + struct sock_common __sk_common; +}; + +/* pt_regs: only the member BPF_KPROBE's PT_REGS_PARM1 reads is needed; + * the arch macro (__TARGET_ARCH_x86/arm64) is set by bpf2go/clang. */ +struct pt_regs; + +#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64) +/* arm64: BPF_KPROBE uses PT_REGS_ARM64 = struct user_pt_regs, PARM1 = regs[0] */ +struct user_pt_regs { + __u64 regs[31]; + __u64 sp; + __u64 pc; + __u64 pstate; +}; +struct pt_regs { + struct user_pt_regs user_regs; +}; +#else +/* x86-64: PT_REGS_PARM1(x) = (x)->rdi (bpf_tracing.h, non-__VMLINUX_H__ path) */ +struct pt_regs { + __u64 r15, r14, r13, r12, bp, bx, r11, r10; + __u64 r9, r8, rax, rcx, rdx, rsi, rdi, orig_rax, rip; + __u64 cs, eflags, rsp, ss; +}; +#endif + +#endif /* __AUDIT_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_core_read.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_core_read.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9b26f1e3d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_core_read.h @@ -0,0 +1,456 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) */ +#ifndef __BPF_CORE_READ_H__ +#define __BPF_CORE_READ_H__ + +/* + * enum bpf_field_info_kind is passed as a second argument into + * __builtin_preserve_field_info() built-in to get a specific aspect of + * a field, captured as a first argument. __builtin_preserve_field_info(field, + * info_kind) returns __u32 integer and produces BTF field relocation, which + * is understood and processed by libbpf during BPF object loading. See + * selftests/bpf for examples. + */ +enum bpf_field_info_kind { + BPF_FIELD_BYTE_OFFSET = 0, /* field byte offset */ + BPF_FIELD_BYTE_SIZE = 1, + BPF_FIELD_EXISTS = 2, /* field existence in target kernel */ + BPF_FIELD_SIGNED = 3, + BPF_FIELD_LSHIFT_U64 = 4, + BPF_FIELD_RSHIFT_U64 = 5, +}; + +/* second argument to __builtin_btf_type_id() built-in */ +enum bpf_type_id_kind { + BPF_TYPE_ID_LOCAL = 0, /* BTF type ID in local program */ + BPF_TYPE_ID_TARGET = 1, /* BTF type ID in target kernel */ +}; + +/* second argument to __builtin_preserve_type_info() built-in */ +enum bpf_type_info_kind { + BPF_TYPE_EXISTS = 0, /* type existence in target kernel */ + BPF_TYPE_SIZE = 1, /* type size in target kernel */ + BPF_TYPE_MATCHES = 2, /* type match in target kernel */ +}; + +/* second argument to __builtin_preserve_enum_value() built-in */ +enum bpf_enum_value_kind { + BPF_ENUMVAL_EXISTS = 0, /* enum value existence in kernel */ + BPF_ENUMVAL_VALUE = 1, /* enum value value relocation */ +}; + +#define __CORE_RELO(src, field, info) \ + __builtin_preserve_field_info((src)->field, BPF_FIELD_##info) + +#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN +#define __CORE_BITFIELD_PROBE_READ(dst, src, fld) \ + bpf_probe_read_kernel( \ + (void *)dst, \ + __CORE_RELO(src, fld, BYTE_SIZE), \ + (const void *)src + __CORE_RELO(src, fld, BYTE_OFFSET)) +#else +/* semantics of LSHIFT_64 assumes loading values into low-ordered bytes, so + * for big-endian we need to adjust destination pointer accordingly, based on + * field byte size + */ +#define __CORE_BITFIELD_PROBE_READ(dst, src, fld) \ + bpf_probe_read_kernel( \ + (void *)dst + (8 - __CORE_RELO(src, fld, BYTE_SIZE)), \ + __CORE_RELO(src, fld, BYTE_SIZE), \ + (const void *)src + __CORE_RELO(src, fld, BYTE_OFFSET)) +#endif + +/* + * Extract bitfield, identified by s->field, and return its value as u64. + * All this is done in relocatable manner, so bitfield changes such as + * signedness, bit size, offset changes, this will be handled automatically. + * This version of macro is using bpf_probe_read_kernel() to read underlying + * integer storage. Macro functions as an expression and its return type is + * bpf_probe_read_kernel()'s return value: 0, on success, <0 on error. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_BITFIELD_PROBED(s, field) ({ \ + unsigned long long val = 0; \ + \ + __CORE_BITFIELD_PROBE_READ(&val, s, field); \ + val <<= __CORE_RELO(s, field, LSHIFT_U64); \ + if (__CORE_RELO(s, field, SIGNED)) \ + val = ((long long)val) >> __CORE_RELO(s, field, RSHIFT_U64); \ + else \ + val = val >> __CORE_RELO(s, field, RSHIFT_U64); \ + val; \ +}) + +/* + * Extract bitfield, identified by s->field, and return its value as u64. + * This version of macro is using direct memory reads and should be used from + * BPF program types that support such functionality (e.g., typed raw + * tracepoints). + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_BITFIELD(s, field) ({ \ + const void *p = (const void *)s + __CORE_RELO(s, field, BYTE_OFFSET); \ + unsigned long long val; \ + \ + /* This is a so-called barrier_var() operation that makes specified \ + * variable "a black box" for optimizing compiler. \ + * It forces compiler to perform BYTE_OFFSET relocation on p and use \ + * its calculated value in the switch below, instead of applying \ + * the same relocation 4 times for each individual memory load. \ + */ \ + asm volatile("" : "=r"(p) : "0"(p)); \ + \ + switch (__CORE_RELO(s, field, BYTE_SIZE)) { \ + case 1: val = *(const unsigned char *)p; break; \ + case 2: val = *(const unsigned short *)p; break; \ + case 4: val = *(const unsigned int *)p; break; \ + case 8: val = *(const unsigned long long *)p; break; \ + } \ + val <<= __CORE_RELO(s, field, LSHIFT_U64); \ + if (__CORE_RELO(s, field, SIGNED)) \ + val = ((long long)val) >> __CORE_RELO(s, field, RSHIFT_U64); \ + else \ + val = val >> __CORE_RELO(s, field, RSHIFT_U64); \ + val; \ +}) + +/* + * Convenience macro to check that field actually exists in target kernel's. + * Returns: + * 1, if matching field is present in target kernel; + * 0, if no matching field found. + */ +#define bpf_core_field_exists(field) \ + __builtin_preserve_field_info(field, BPF_FIELD_EXISTS) + +/* + * Convenience macro to get the byte size of a field. Works for integers, + * struct/unions, pointers, arrays, and enums. + */ +#define bpf_core_field_size(field) \ + __builtin_preserve_field_info(field, BPF_FIELD_BYTE_SIZE) + +/* + * Convenience macro to get BTF type ID of a specified type, using a local BTF + * information. Return 32-bit unsigned integer with type ID from program's own + * BTF. Always succeeds. + */ +#define bpf_core_type_id_local(type) \ + __builtin_btf_type_id(*(typeof(type) *)0, BPF_TYPE_ID_LOCAL) + +/* + * Convenience macro to get BTF type ID of a target kernel's type that matches + * specified local type. + * Returns: + * - valid 32-bit unsigned type ID in kernel BTF; + * - 0, if no matching type was found in a target kernel BTF. + */ +#define bpf_core_type_id_kernel(type) \ + __builtin_btf_type_id(*(typeof(type) *)0, BPF_TYPE_ID_TARGET) + +/* + * Convenience macro to check that provided named type + * (struct/union/enum/typedef) exists in a target kernel. + * Returns: + * 1, if such type is present in target kernel's BTF; + * 0, if no matching type is found. + */ +#define bpf_core_type_exists(type) \ + __builtin_preserve_type_info(*(typeof(type) *)0, BPF_TYPE_EXISTS) + +/* + * Convenience macro to check that provided named type + * (struct/union/enum/typedef) "matches" that in a target kernel. + * Returns: + * 1, if the type matches in the target kernel's BTF; + * 0, if the type does not match any in the target kernel + */ +#define bpf_core_type_matches(type) \ + __builtin_preserve_type_info(*(typeof(type) *)0, BPF_TYPE_MATCHES) + + +/* + * Convenience macro to get the byte size of a provided named type + * (struct/union/enum/typedef) in a target kernel. + * Returns: + * >= 0 size (in bytes), if type is present in target kernel's BTF; + * 0, if no matching type is found. + */ +#define bpf_core_type_size(type) \ + __builtin_preserve_type_info(*(typeof(type) *)0, BPF_TYPE_SIZE) + +/* + * Convenience macro to check that provided enumerator value is defined in + * a target kernel. + * Returns: + * 1, if specified enum type and its enumerator value are present in target + * kernel's BTF; + * 0, if no matching enum and/or enum value within that enum is found. + */ +#define bpf_core_enum_value_exists(enum_type, enum_value) \ + __builtin_preserve_enum_value(*(typeof(enum_type) *)enum_value, BPF_ENUMVAL_EXISTS) + +/* + * Convenience macro to get the integer value of an enumerator value in + * a target kernel. + * Returns: + * 64-bit value, if specified enum type and its enumerator value are + * present in target kernel's BTF; + * 0, if no matching enum and/or enum value within that enum is found. + */ +#define bpf_core_enum_value(enum_type, enum_value) \ + __builtin_preserve_enum_value(*(typeof(enum_type) *)enum_value, BPF_ENUMVAL_VALUE) + +/* + * bpf_core_read() abstracts away bpf_probe_read_kernel() call and captures + * offset relocation for source address using __builtin_preserve_access_index() + * built-in, provided by Clang. + * + * __builtin_preserve_access_index() takes as an argument an expression of + * taking an address of a field within struct/union. It makes compiler emit + * a relocation, which records BTF type ID describing root struct/union and an + * accessor string which describes exact embedded field that was used to take + * an address. See detailed description of this relocation format and + * semantics in comments to struct bpf_field_reloc in libbpf_internal.h. + * + * This relocation allows libbpf to adjust BPF instruction to use correct + * actual field offset, based on target kernel BTF type that matches original + * (local) BTF, used to record relocation. + */ +#define bpf_core_read(dst, sz, src) \ + bpf_probe_read_kernel(dst, sz, (const void *)__builtin_preserve_access_index(src)) + +/* NOTE: see comments for BPF_CORE_READ_USER() about the proper types use. */ +#define bpf_core_read_user(dst, sz, src) \ + bpf_probe_read_user(dst, sz, (const void *)__builtin_preserve_access_index(src)) +/* + * bpf_core_read_str() is a thin wrapper around bpf_probe_read_str() + * additionally emitting BPF CO-RE field relocation for specified source + * argument. + */ +#define bpf_core_read_str(dst, sz, src) \ + bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(dst, sz, (const void *)__builtin_preserve_access_index(src)) + +/* NOTE: see comments for BPF_CORE_READ_USER() about the proper types use. */ +#define bpf_core_read_user_str(dst, sz, src) \ + bpf_probe_read_user_str(dst, sz, (const void *)__builtin_preserve_access_index(src)) + +#define ___concat(a, b) a ## b +#define ___apply(fn, n) ___concat(fn, n) +#define ___nth(_1, _2, _3, _4, _5, _6, _7, _8, _9, _10, __11, N, ...) N + +/* + * return number of provided arguments; used for switch-based variadic macro + * definitions (see ___last, ___arrow, etc below) + */ +#define ___narg(...) ___nth(_, ##__VA_ARGS__, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) +/* + * return 0 if no arguments are passed, N - otherwise; used for + * recursively-defined macros to specify termination (0) case, and generic + * (N) case (e.g., ___read_ptrs, ___core_read) + */ +#define ___empty(...) ___nth(_, ##__VA_ARGS__, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, 0) + +#define ___last1(x) x +#define ___last2(a, x) x +#define ___last3(a, b, x) x +#define ___last4(a, b, c, x) x +#define ___last5(a, b, c, d, x) x +#define ___last6(a, b, c, d, e, x) x +#define ___last7(a, b, c, d, e, f, x) x +#define ___last8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, x) x +#define ___last9(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, x) x +#define ___last10(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, x) x +#define ___last(...) ___apply(___last, ___narg(__VA_ARGS__))(__VA_ARGS__) + +#define ___nolast2(a, _) a +#define ___nolast3(a, b, _) a, b +#define ___nolast4(a, b, c, _) a, b, c +#define ___nolast5(a, b, c, d, _) a, b, c, d +#define ___nolast6(a, b, c, d, e, _) a, b, c, d, e +#define ___nolast7(a, b, c, d, e, f, _) a, b, c, d, e, f +#define ___nolast8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, _) a, b, c, d, e, f, g +#define ___nolast9(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, _) a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h +#define ___nolast10(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, _) a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i +#define ___nolast(...) ___apply(___nolast, ___narg(__VA_ARGS__))(__VA_ARGS__) + +#define ___arrow1(a) a +#define ___arrow2(a, b) a->b +#define ___arrow3(a, b, c) a->b->c +#define ___arrow4(a, b, c, d) a->b->c->d +#define ___arrow5(a, b, c, d, e) a->b->c->d->e +#define ___arrow6(a, b, c, d, e, f) a->b->c->d->e->f +#define ___arrow7(a, b, c, d, e, f, g) a->b->c->d->e->f->g +#define ___arrow8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) a->b->c->d->e->f->g->h +#define ___arrow9(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i) a->b->c->d->e->f->g->h->i +#define ___arrow10(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j) a->b->c->d->e->f->g->h->i->j +#define ___arrow(...) ___apply(___arrow, ___narg(__VA_ARGS__))(__VA_ARGS__) + +#define ___type(...) typeof(___arrow(__VA_ARGS__)) + +#define ___read(read_fn, dst, src_type, src, accessor) \ + read_fn((void *)(dst), sizeof(*(dst)), &((src_type)(src))->accessor) + +/* "recursively" read a sequence of inner pointers using local __t var */ +#define ___rd_first(fn, src, a) ___read(fn, &__t, ___type(src), src, a); +#define ___rd_last(fn, ...) \ + ___read(fn, &__t, ___type(___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)), __t, ___last(__VA_ARGS__)); +#define ___rd_p1(fn, ...) const void *__t; ___rd_first(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p2(fn, ...) ___rd_p1(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p3(fn, ...) ___rd_p2(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p4(fn, ...) ___rd_p3(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p5(fn, ...) ___rd_p4(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p6(fn, ...) ___rd_p5(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p7(fn, ...) ___rd_p6(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p8(fn, ...) ___rd_p7(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___rd_p9(fn, ...) ___rd_p8(fn, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) ___rd_last(fn, __VA_ARGS__) +#define ___read_ptrs(fn, src, ...) \ + ___apply(___rd_p, ___narg(__VA_ARGS__))(fn, src, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define ___core_read0(fn, fn_ptr, dst, src, a) \ + ___read(fn, dst, ___type(src), src, a); +#define ___core_readN(fn, fn_ptr, dst, src, ...) \ + ___read_ptrs(fn_ptr, src, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)) \ + ___read(fn, dst, ___type(src, ___nolast(__VA_ARGS__)), __t, \ + ___last(__VA_ARGS__)); +#define ___core_read(fn, fn_ptr, dst, src, a, ...) \ + ___apply(___core_read, ___empty(__VA_ARGS__))(fn, fn_ptr, dst, \ + src, a, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +/* + * BPF_CORE_READ_INTO() is a more performance-conscious variant of + * BPF_CORE_READ(), in which final field is read into user-provided storage. + * See BPF_CORE_READ() below for more details on general usage. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_core_read, bpf_core_read, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* + * Variant of BPF_CORE_READ_INTO() for reading from user-space memory. + * + * NOTE: see comments for BPF_CORE_READ_USER() about the proper types use. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_USER_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_core_read_user, bpf_core_read_user, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* Non-CO-RE variant of BPF_CORE_READ_INTO() */ +#define BPF_PROBE_READ_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_read, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* Non-CO-RE variant of BPF_CORE_READ_USER_INTO(). + * + * As no CO-RE relocations are emitted, source types can be arbitrary and are + * not restricted to kernel types only. + */ +#define BPF_PROBE_READ_USER_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_probe_read_user, bpf_probe_read_user, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* + * BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO() does same "pointer chasing" as + * BPF_CORE_READ() for intermediate pointers, but then executes (and returns + * corresponding error code) bpf_core_read_str() for final string read. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_core_read_str, bpf_core_read, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* + * Variant of BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO() for reading from user-space memory. + * + * NOTE: see comments for BPF_CORE_READ_USER() about the proper types use. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_USER_STR_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_core_read_user_str, bpf_core_read_user, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* Non-CO-RE variant of BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO() */ +#define BPF_PROBE_READ_STR_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_probe_read_str, bpf_probe_read, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* + * Non-CO-RE variant of BPF_CORE_READ_USER_STR_INTO(). + * + * As no CO-RE relocations are emitted, source types can be arbitrary and are + * not restricted to kernel types only. + */ +#define BPF_PROBE_READ_USER_STR_INTO(dst, src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___core_read(bpf_probe_read_user_str, bpf_probe_read_user, \ + dst, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) \ +}) + +/* + * BPF_CORE_READ() is used to simplify BPF CO-RE relocatable read, especially + * when there are few pointer chasing steps. + * E.g., what in non-BPF world (or in BPF w/ BCC) would be something like: + * int x = s->a.b.c->d.e->f->g; + * can be succinctly achieved using BPF_CORE_READ as: + * int x = BPF_CORE_READ(s, a.b.c, d.e, f, g); + * + * BPF_CORE_READ will decompose above statement into 4 bpf_core_read (BPF + * CO-RE relocatable bpf_probe_read_kernel() wrapper) calls, logically + * equivalent to: + * 1. const void *__t = s->a.b.c; + * 2. __t = __t->d.e; + * 3. __t = __t->f; + * 4. return __t->g; + * + * Equivalence is logical, because there is a heavy type casting/preservation + * involved, as well as all the reads are happening through + * bpf_probe_read_kernel() calls using __builtin_preserve_access_index() to + * emit CO-RE relocations. + * + * N.B. Only up to 9 "field accessors" are supported, which should be more + * than enough for any practical purpose. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ(src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___type((src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) __r; \ + BPF_CORE_READ_INTO(&__r, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + __r; \ +}) + +/* + * Variant of BPF_CORE_READ() for reading from user-space memory. + * + * NOTE: all the source types involved are still *kernel types* and need to + * exist in kernel (or kernel module) BTF, otherwise CO-RE relocation will + * fail. Custom user types are not relocatable with CO-RE. + * The typical situation in which BPF_CORE_READ_USER() might be used is to + * read kernel UAPI types from the user-space memory passed in as a syscall + * input argument. + */ +#define BPF_CORE_READ_USER(src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___type((src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) __r; \ + BPF_CORE_READ_USER_INTO(&__r, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + __r; \ +}) + +/* Non-CO-RE variant of BPF_CORE_READ() */ +#define BPF_PROBE_READ(src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___type((src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) __r; \ + BPF_PROBE_READ_INTO(&__r, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + __r; \ +}) + +/* + * Non-CO-RE variant of BPF_CORE_READ_USER(). + * + * As no CO-RE relocations are emitted, source types can be arbitrary and are + * not restricted to kernel types only. + */ +#define BPF_PROBE_READ_USER(src, a, ...) ({ \ + ___type((src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__) __r; \ + BPF_PROBE_READ_USER_INTO(&__r, (src), a, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + __r; \ +}) + +#endif + diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_endian.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_endian.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec9db4fec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_endian.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) */ +#ifndef __BPF_ENDIAN__ +#define __BPF_ENDIAN__ + +/* + * Isolate byte #n and put it into byte #m, for __u##b type. + * E.g., moving byte #6 (nnnnnnnn) into byte #1 (mmmmmmmm) for __u64: + * 1) xxxxxxxx nnnnnnnn xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx mmmmmmmm xxxxxxxx + * 2) nnnnnnnn xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx mmmmmmmm xxxxxxxx 00000000 + * 3) 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 nnnnnnnn + * 4) 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 nnnnnnnn 00000000 + */ +#define ___bpf_mvb(x, b, n, m) ((__u##b)(x) << (b-(n+1)*8) >> (b-8) << (m*8)) + +#define ___bpf_swab16(x) ((__u16)( \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 16, 0, 1) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 16, 1, 0))) + +#define ___bpf_swab32(x) ((__u32)( \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 32, 0, 3) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 32, 1, 2) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 32, 2, 1) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 32, 3, 0))) + +#define ___bpf_swab64(x) ((__u64)( \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 0, 7) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 1, 6) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 2, 5) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 3, 4) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 4, 3) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 5, 2) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 6, 1) | \ + ___bpf_mvb(x, 64, 7, 0))) + +/* LLVM's BPF target selects the endianness of the CPU + * it compiles on, or the user specifies (bpfel/bpfeb), + * respectively. The used __BYTE_ORDER__ is defined by + * the compiler, we cannot rely on __BYTE_ORDER from + * libc headers, since it doesn't reflect the actual + * requested byte order. + * + * Note, LLVM's BPF target has different __builtin_bswapX() + * semantics. It does map to BPF_ALU | BPF_END | BPF_TO_BE + * in bpfel and bpfeb case, which means below, that we map + * to cpu_to_be16(). We could use it unconditionally in BPF + * case, but better not rely on it, so that this header here + * can be used from application and BPF program side, which + * use different targets. + */ +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ +# define __bpf_ntohs(x) __builtin_bswap16(x) +# define __bpf_htons(x) __builtin_bswap16(x) +# define __bpf_constant_ntohs(x) ___bpf_swab16(x) +# define __bpf_constant_htons(x) ___bpf_swab16(x) +# define __bpf_ntohl(x) __builtin_bswap32(x) +# define __bpf_htonl(x) __builtin_bswap32(x) +# define __bpf_constant_ntohl(x) ___bpf_swab32(x) +# define __bpf_constant_htonl(x) ___bpf_swab32(x) +# define __bpf_be64_to_cpu(x) __builtin_bswap64(x) +# define __bpf_cpu_to_be64(x) __builtin_bswap64(x) +# define __bpf_constant_be64_to_cpu(x) ___bpf_swab64(x) +# define __bpf_constant_cpu_to_be64(x) ___bpf_swab64(x) +#elif __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ +# define __bpf_ntohs(x) (x) +# define __bpf_htons(x) (x) +# define __bpf_constant_ntohs(x) (x) +# define __bpf_constant_htons(x) (x) +# define __bpf_ntohl(x) (x) +# define __bpf_htonl(x) (x) +# define __bpf_constant_ntohl(x) (x) +# define __bpf_constant_htonl(x) (x) +# define __bpf_be64_to_cpu(x) (x) +# define __bpf_cpu_to_be64(x) (x) +# define __bpf_constant_be64_to_cpu(x) (x) +# define __bpf_constant_cpu_to_be64(x) (x) +#else +# error "Fix your compiler's __BYTE_ORDER__?!" +#endif + +#define bpf_htons(x) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? \ + __bpf_constant_htons(x) : __bpf_htons(x)) +#define bpf_ntohs(x) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? \ + __bpf_constant_ntohs(x) : __bpf_ntohs(x)) +#define bpf_htonl(x) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? \ + __bpf_constant_htonl(x) : __bpf_htonl(x)) +#define bpf_ntohl(x) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? \ + __bpf_constant_ntohl(x) : __bpf_ntohl(x)) +#define bpf_cpu_to_be64(x) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? \ + __bpf_constant_cpu_to_be64(x) : __bpf_cpu_to_be64(x)) +#define bpf_be64_to_cpu(x) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? \ + __bpf_constant_be64_to_cpu(x) : __bpf_be64_to_cpu(x)) + +#endif /* __BPF_ENDIAN__ */ diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_helper_defs.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_helper_defs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3fbe7ff2a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_helper_defs.h @@ -0,0 +1,4139 @@ +/* This is auto-generated file. See bpf_doc.py for details. */ + +/* Forward declarations of BPF structs */ +struct bpf_fib_lookup; +struct bpf_sk_lookup; +struct bpf_perf_event_data; +struct bpf_perf_event_value; +struct bpf_pidns_info; +struct bpf_redir_neigh; +struct bpf_sock; +struct bpf_sock_addr; +struct bpf_sock_ops; +struct bpf_sock_tuple; +struct bpf_spin_lock; +struct bpf_sysctl; +struct bpf_tcp_sock; +struct bpf_tunnel_key; +struct bpf_xfrm_state; +struct linux_binprm; +struct pt_regs; +struct sk_reuseport_md; +struct sockaddr; +struct tcphdr; +struct seq_file; +struct tcp6_sock; +struct tcp_sock; +struct tcp_timewait_sock; +struct tcp_request_sock; +struct udp6_sock; +struct unix_sock; +struct task_struct; +struct __sk_buff; +struct sk_msg_md; +struct xdp_md; +struct path; +struct btf_ptr; +struct inode; +struct socket; +struct file; +struct bpf_timer; + +/* + * bpf_map_lookup_elem + * + * Perform a lookup in *map* for an entry associated to *key*. + * + * Returns + * Map value associated to *key*, or **NULL** if no entry was + * found. + */ +static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, const void *key) = (void *) 1; + +/* + * bpf_map_update_elem + * + * Add or update the value of the entry associated to *key* in + * *map* with *value*. *flags* is one of: + * + * **BPF_NOEXIST** + * The entry for *key* must not exist in the map. + * **BPF_EXIST** + * The entry for *key* must already exist in the map. + * **BPF_ANY** + * No condition on the existence of the entry for *key*. + * + * Flag value **BPF_NOEXIST** cannot be used for maps of types + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY** or **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY** (all + * elements always exist), the helper would return an error. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_map_update_elem)(void *map, const void *key, const void *value, __u64 flags) = (void *) 2; + +/* + * bpf_map_delete_elem + * + * Delete entry with *key* from *map*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_map_delete_elem)(void *map, const void *key) = (void *) 3; + +/* + * bpf_probe_read + * + * For tracing programs, safely attempt to read *size* bytes from + * kernel space address *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * + * Generally, use **bpf_probe_read_user**\ () or + * **bpf_probe_read_kernel**\ () instead. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_read)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) = (void *) 4; + +/* + * bpf_ktime_get_ns + * + * Return the time elapsed since system boot, in nanoseconds. + * Does not include time the system was suspended. + * See: **clock_gettime**\ (**CLOCK_MONOTONIC**) + * + * Returns + * Current *ktime*. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_ktime_get_ns)(void) = (void *) 5; + +/* + * bpf_trace_printk + * + * This helper is a "printk()-like" facility for debugging. It + * prints a message defined by format *fmt* (of size *fmt_size*) + * to file *\/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace* from DebugFS, if + * available. It can take up to three additional **u64** + * arguments (as an eBPF helpers, the total number of arguments is + * limited to five). + * + * Each time the helper is called, it appends a line to the trace. + * Lines are discarded while *\/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace* is + * open, use *\/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_pipe* to avoid this. + * The format of the trace is customizable, and the exact output + * one will get depends on the options set in + * *\/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_options* (see also the + * *README* file under the same directory). However, it usually + * defaults to something like: + * + * :: + * + * telnet-470 [001] .N.. 419421.045894: 0x00000001: + * + * In the above: + * + * * ``telnet`` is the name of the current task. + * * ``470`` is the PID of the current task. + * * ``001`` is the CPU number on which the task is + * running. + * * In ``.N..``, each character refers to a set of + * options (whether irqs are enabled, scheduling + * options, whether hard/softirqs are running, level of + * preempt_disabled respectively). **N** means that + * **TIF_NEED_RESCHED** and **PREEMPT_NEED_RESCHED** + * are set. + * * ``419421.045894`` is a timestamp. + * * ``0x00000001`` is a fake value used by BPF for the + * instruction pointer register. + * * ```` is the message formatted with + * *fmt*. + * + * The conversion specifiers supported by *fmt* are similar, but + * more limited than for printk(). They are **%d**, **%i**, + * **%u**, **%x**, **%ld**, **%li**, **%lu**, **%lx**, **%lld**, + * **%lli**, **%llu**, **%llx**, **%p**, **%s**. No modifier (size + * of field, padding with zeroes, etc.) is available, and the + * helper will return **-EINVAL** (but print nothing) if it + * encounters an unknown specifier. + * + * Also, note that **bpf_trace_printk**\ () is slow, and should + * only be used for debugging purposes. For this reason, a notice + * block (spanning several lines) is printed to kernel logs and + * states that the helper should not be used "for production use" + * the first time this helper is used (or more precisely, when + * **trace_printk**\ () buffers are allocated). For passing values + * to user space, perf events should be preferred. + * + * Returns + * The number of bytes written to the buffer, or a negative error + * in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_trace_printk)(const char *fmt, __u32 fmt_size, ...) = (void *) 6; + +/* + * bpf_get_prandom_u32 + * + * Get a pseudo-random number. + * + * From a security point of view, this helper uses its own + * pseudo-random internal state, and cannot be used to infer the + * seed of other random functions in the kernel. However, it is + * essential to note that the generator used by the helper is not + * cryptographically secure. + * + * Returns + * A random 32-bit unsigned value. + */ +static __u32 (*bpf_get_prandom_u32)(void) = (void *) 7; + +/* + * bpf_get_smp_processor_id + * + * Get the SMP (symmetric multiprocessing) processor id. Note that + * all programs run with migration disabled, which means that the + * SMP processor id is stable during all the execution of the + * program. + * + * Returns + * The SMP id of the processor running the program. + */ +static __u32 (*bpf_get_smp_processor_id)(void) = (void *) 8; + +/* + * bpf_skb_store_bytes + * + * Store *len* bytes from address *from* into the packet + * associated to *skb*, at *offset*. *flags* are a combination of + * **BPF_F_RECOMPUTE_CSUM** (automatically recompute the + * checksum for the packet after storing the bytes) and + * **BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH** (set *skb*\ **->hash**, *skb*\ + * **->swhash** and *skb*\ **->l4hash** to 0). + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_store_bytes)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 offset, const void *from, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 9; + +/* + * bpf_l3_csum_replace + * + * Recompute the layer 3 (e.g. IP) checksum for the packet + * associated to *skb*. Computation is incremental, so the helper + * must know the former value of the header field that was + * modified (*from*), the new value of this field (*to*), and the + * number of bytes (2 or 4) for this field, stored in *size*. + * Alternatively, it is possible to store the difference between + * the previous and the new values of the header field in *to*, by + * setting *from* and *size* to 0. For both methods, *offset* + * indicates the location of the IP checksum within the packet. + * + * This helper works in combination with **bpf_csum_diff**\ (), + * which does not update the checksum in-place, but offers more + * flexibility and can handle sizes larger than 2 or 4 for the + * checksum to update. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_l3_csum_replace)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 offset, __u64 from, __u64 to, __u64 size) = (void *) 10; + +/* + * bpf_l4_csum_replace + * + * Recompute the layer 4 (e.g. TCP, UDP or ICMP) checksum for the + * packet associated to *skb*. Computation is incremental, so the + * helper must know the former value of the header field that was + * modified (*from*), the new value of this field (*to*), and the + * number of bytes (2 or 4) for this field, stored on the lowest + * four bits of *flags*. Alternatively, it is possible to store + * the difference between the previous and the new values of the + * header field in *to*, by setting *from* and the four lowest + * bits of *flags* to 0. For both methods, *offset* indicates the + * location of the IP checksum within the packet. In addition to + * the size of the field, *flags* can be added (bitwise OR) actual + * flags. With **BPF_F_MARK_MANGLED_0**, a null checksum is left + * untouched (unless **BPF_F_MARK_ENFORCE** is added as well), and + * for updates resulting in a null checksum the value is set to + * **CSUM_MANGLED_0** instead. Flag **BPF_F_PSEUDO_HDR** indicates + * the checksum is to be computed against a pseudo-header. + * + * This helper works in combination with **bpf_csum_diff**\ (), + * which does not update the checksum in-place, but offers more + * flexibility and can handle sizes larger than 2 or 4 for the + * checksum to update. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_l4_csum_replace)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 offset, __u64 from, __u64 to, __u64 flags) = (void *) 11; + +/* + * bpf_tail_call + * + * This special helper is used to trigger a "tail call", or in + * other words, to jump into another eBPF program. The same stack + * frame is used (but values on stack and in registers for the + * caller are not accessible to the callee). This mechanism allows + * for program chaining, either for raising the maximum number of + * available eBPF instructions, or to execute given programs in + * conditional blocks. For security reasons, there is an upper + * limit to the number of successive tail calls that can be + * performed. + * + * Upon call of this helper, the program attempts to jump into a + * program referenced at index *index* in *prog_array_map*, a + * special map of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY**, and passes + * *ctx*, a pointer to the context. + * + * If the call succeeds, the kernel immediately runs the first + * instruction of the new program. This is not a function call, + * and it never returns to the previous program. If the call + * fails, then the helper has no effect, and the caller continues + * to run its subsequent instructions. A call can fail if the + * destination program for the jump does not exist (i.e. *index* + * is superior to the number of entries in *prog_array_map*), or + * if the maximum number of tail calls has been reached for this + * chain of programs. This limit is defined in the kernel by the + * macro **MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT** (not accessible to user space), + * which is currently set to 33. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_tail_call)(void *ctx, void *prog_array_map, __u32 index) = (void *) 12; + +/* + * bpf_clone_redirect + * + * Clone and redirect the packet associated to *skb* to another + * net device of index *ifindex*. Both ingress and egress + * interfaces can be used for redirection. The **BPF_F_INGRESS** + * value in *flags* is used to make the distinction (ingress path + * is selected if the flag is present, egress path otherwise). + * This is the only flag supported for now. + * + * In comparison with **bpf_redirect**\ () helper, + * **bpf_clone_redirect**\ () has the associated cost of + * duplicating the packet buffer, but this can be executed out of + * the eBPF program. Conversely, **bpf_redirect**\ () is more + * efficient, but it is handled through an action code where the + * redirection happens only after the eBPF program has returned. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_clone_redirect)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 ifindex, __u64 flags) = (void *) 13; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_pid_tgid + * + * + * Returns + * A 64-bit integer containing the current tgid and pid, and + * created as such: + * *current_task*\ **->tgid << 32 \|** + * *current_task*\ **->pid**. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_current_pid_tgid)(void) = (void *) 14; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_uid_gid + * + * + * Returns + * A 64-bit integer containing the current GID and UID, and + * created as such: *current_gid* **<< 32 \|** *current_uid*. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_current_uid_gid)(void) = (void *) 15; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_comm + * + * Copy the **comm** attribute of the current task into *buf* of + * *size_of_buf*. The **comm** attribute contains the name of + * the executable (excluding the path) for the current task. The + * *size_of_buf* must be strictly positive. On success, the + * helper makes sure that the *buf* is NUL-terminated. On failure, + * it is filled with zeroes. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_current_comm)(void *buf, __u32 size_of_buf) = (void *) 16; + +/* + * bpf_get_cgroup_classid + * + * Retrieve the classid for the current task, i.e. for the net_cls + * cgroup to which *skb* belongs. + * + * This helper can be used on TC egress path, but not on ingress. + * + * The net_cls cgroup provides an interface to tag network packets + * based on a user-provided identifier for all traffic coming from + * the tasks belonging to the related cgroup. See also the related + * kernel documentation, available from the Linux sources in file + * *Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/net_cls.rst*. + * + * The Linux kernel has two versions for cgroups: there are + * cgroups v1 and cgroups v2. Both are available to users, who can + * use a mixture of them, but note that the net_cls cgroup is for + * cgroup v1 only. This makes it incompatible with BPF programs + * run on cgroups, which is a cgroup-v2-only feature (a socket can + * only hold data for one version of cgroups at a time). + * + * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID** configuration option set to + * "**y**" or to "**m**". + * + * Returns + * The classid, or 0 for the default unconfigured classid. + */ +static __u32 (*bpf_get_cgroup_classid)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 17; + +/* + * bpf_skb_vlan_push + * + * Push a *vlan_tci* (VLAN tag control information) of protocol + * *vlan_proto* to the packet associated to *skb*, then update + * the checksum. Note that if *vlan_proto* is different from + * **ETH_P_8021Q** and **ETH_P_8021AD**, it is considered to + * be **ETH_P_8021Q**. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_vlan_push)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __be16 vlan_proto, __u16 vlan_tci) = (void *) 18; + +/* + * bpf_skb_vlan_pop + * + * Pop a VLAN header from the packet associated to *skb*. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_vlan_pop)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 19; + +/* + * bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key + * + * Get tunnel metadata. This helper takes a pointer *key* to an + * empty **struct bpf_tunnel_key** of **size**, that will be + * filled with tunnel metadata for the packet associated to *skb*. + * The *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_TUNINFO_IPV6**, which + * indicates that the tunnel is based on IPv6 protocol instead of + * IPv4. + * + * The **struct bpf_tunnel_key** is an object that generalizes the + * principal parameters used by various tunneling protocols into a + * single struct. This way, it can be used to easily make a + * decision based on the contents of the encapsulation header, + * "summarized" in this struct. In particular, it holds the IP + * address of the remote end (IPv4 or IPv6, depending on the case) + * in *key*\ **->remote_ipv4** or *key*\ **->remote_ipv6**. Also, + * this struct exposes the *key*\ **->tunnel_id**, which is + * generally mapped to a VNI (Virtual Network Identifier), making + * it programmable together with the **bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key**\ + * () helper. + * + * Let's imagine that the following code is part of a program + * attached to the TC ingress interface, on one end of a GRE + * tunnel, and is supposed to filter out all messages coming from + * remote ends with IPv4 address other than 10.0.0.1: + * + * :: + * + * int ret; + * struct bpf_tunnel_key key = {}; + * + * ret = bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key(skb, &key, sizeof(key), 0); + * if (ret < 0) + * return TC_ACT_SHOT; // drop packet + * + * if (key.remote_ipv4 != 0x0a000001) + * return TC_ACT_SHOT; // drop packet + * + * return TC_ACT_OK; // accept packet + * + * This interface can also be used with all encapsulation devices + * that can operate in "collect metadata" mode: instead of having + * one network device per specific configuration, the "collect + * metadata" mode only requires a single device where the + * configuration can be extracted from this helper. + * + * This can be used together with various tunnels such as VXLan, + * Geneve, GRE or IP in IP (IPIP). + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key)(struct __sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_tunnel_key *key, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 20; + +/* + * bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key + * + * Populate tunnel metadata for packet associated to *skb.* The + * tunnel metadata is set to the contents of *key*, of *size*. The + * *flags* can be set to a combination of the following values: + * + * **BPF_F_TUNINFO_IPV6** + * Indicate that the tunnel is based on IPv6 protocol + * instead of IPv4. + * **BPF_F_ZERO_CSUM_TX** + * For IPv4 packets, add a flag to tunnel metadata + * indicating that checksum computation should be skipped + * and checksum set to zeroes. + * **BPF_F_DONT_FRAGMENT** + * Add a flag to tunnel metadata indicating that the + * packet should not be fragmented. + * **BPF_F_SEQ_NUMBER** + * Add a flag to tunnel metadata indicating that a + * sequence number should be added to tunnel header before + * sending the packet. This flag was added for GRE + * encapsulation, but might be used with other protocols + * as well in the future. + * + * Here is a typical usage on the transmit path: + * + * :: + * + * struct bpf_tunnel_key key; + * populate key ... + * bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key(skb, &key, sizeof(key), 0); + * bpf_clone_redirect(skb, vxlan_dev_ifindex, 0); + * + * See also the description of the **bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key**\ () + * helper for additional information. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key)(struct __sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_tunnel_key *key, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 21; + +/* + * bpf_perf_event_read + * + * Read the value of a perf event counter. This helper relies on a + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. The nature of + * the perf event counter is selected when *map* is updated with + * perf event file descriptors. The *map* is an array whose size + * is the number of available CPUs, and each cell contains a value + * relative to one CPU. The value to retrieve is indicated by + * *flags*, that contains the index of the CPU to look up, masked + * with **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. Alternatively, *flags* can be set to + * **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** to indicate that the value for the + * current CPU should be retrieved. + * + * Note that before Linux 4.13, only hardware perf event can be + * retrieved. + * + * Also, be aware that the newer helper + * **bpf_perf_event_read_value**\ () is recommended over + * **bpf_perf_event_read**\ () in general. The latter has some ABI + * quirks where error and counter value are used as a return code + * (which is wrong to do since ranges may overlap). This issue is + * fixed with **bpf_perf_event_read_value**\ (), which at the same + * time provides more features over the **bpf_perf_event_read**\ + * () interface. Please refer to the description of + * **bpf_perf_event_read_value**\ () for details. + * + * Returns + * The value of the perf event counter read from the map, or a + * negative error code in case of failure. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_perf_event_read)(void *map, __u64 flags) = (void *) 22; + +/* + * bpf_redirect + * + * Redirect the packet to another net device of index *ifindex*. + * This helper is somewhat similar to **bpf_clone_redirect**\ + * (), except that the packet is not cloned, which provides + * increased performance. + * + * Except for XDP, both ingress and egress interfaces can be used + * for redirection. The **BPF_F_INGRESS** value in *flags* is used + * to make the distinction (ingress path is selected if the flag + * is present, egress path otherwise). Currently, XDP only + * supports redirection to the egress interface, and accepts no + * flag at all. + * + * The same effect can also be attained with the more generic + * **bpf_redirect_map**\ (), which uses a BPF map to store the + * redirect target instead of providing it directly to the helper. + * + * Returns + * For XDP, the helper returns **XDP_REDIRECT** on success or + * **XDP_ABORTED** on error. For other program types, the values + * are **TC_ACT_REDIRECT** on success or **TC_ACT_SHOT** on + * error. + */ +static long (*bpf_redirect)(__u32 ifindex, __u64 flags) = (void *) 23; + +/* + * bpf_get_route_realm + * + * Retrieve the realm or the route, that is to say the + * **tclassid** field of the destination for the *skb*. The + * identifier retrieved is a user-provided tag, similar to the + * one used with the net_cls cgroup (see description for + * **bpf_get_cgroup_classid**\ () helper), but here this tag is + * held by a route (a destination entry), not by a task. + * + * Retrieving this identifier works with the clsact TC egress hook + * (see also **tc-bpf(8)**), or alternatively on conventional + * classful egress qdiscs, but not on TC ingress path. In case of + * clsact TC egress hook, this has the advantage that, internally, + * the destination entry has not been dropped yet in the transmit + * path. Therefore, the destination entry does not need to be + * artificially held via **netif_keep_dst**\ () for a classful + * qdisc until the *skb* is freed. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * The realm of the route for the packet associated to *skb*, or 0 + * if none was found. + */ +static __u32 (*bpf_get_route_realm)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 24; + +/* + * bpf_perf_event_output + * + * Write raw *data* blob into a special BPF perf event held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. This perf + * event must have the following attributes: **PERF_SAMPLE_RAW** + * as **sample_type**, **PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE** as **type**, and + * **PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUTPUT** as **config**. + * + * The *flags* are used to indicate the index in *map* for which + * the value must be put, masked with **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. + * Alternatively, *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** + * to indicate that the index of the current CPU core should be + * used. + * + * The value to write, of *size*, is passed through eBPF stack and + * pointed by *data*. + * + * The context of the program *ctx* needs also be passed to the + * helper. + * + * On user space, a program willing to read the values needs to + * call **perf_event_open**\ () on the perf event (either for + * one or for all CPUs) and to store the file descriptor into the + * *map*. This must be done before the eBPF program can send data + * into it. An example is available in file + * *samples/bpf/trace_output_user.c* in the Linux kernel source + * tree (the eBPF program counterpart is in + * *samples/bpf/trace_output_kern.c*). + * + * **bpf_perf_event_output**\ () achieves better performance + * than **bpf_trace_printk**\ () for sharing data with user + * space, and is much better suitable for streaming data from eBPF + * programs. + * + * Note that this helper is not restricted to tracing use cases + * and can be used with programs attached to TC or XDP as well, + * where it allows for passing data to user space listeners. Data + * can be: + * + * * Only custom structs, + * * Only the packet payload, or + * * A combination of both. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_perf_event_output)(void *ctx, void *map, __u64 flags, void *data, __u64 size) = (void *) 25; + +/* + * bpf_skb_load_bytes + * + * This helper was provided as an easy way to load data from a + * packet. It can be used to load *len* bytes from *offset* from + * the packet associated to *skb*, into the buffer pointed by + * *to*. + * + * Since Linux 4.7, usage of this helper has mostly been replaced + * by "direct packet access", enabling packet data to be + * manipulated with *skb*\ **->data** and *skb*\ **->data_end** + * pointing respectively to the first byte of packet data and to + * the byte after the last byte of packet data. However, it + * remains useful if one wishes to read large quantities of data + * at once from a packet into the eBPF stack. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_load_bytes)(const void *skb, __u32 offset, void *to, __u32 len) = (void *) 26; + +/* + * bpf_get_stackid + * + * Walk a user or a kernel stack and return its id. To achieve + * this, the helper needs *ctx*, which is a pointer to the context + * on which the tracing program is executed, and a pointer to a + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE**. + * + * The last argument, *flags*, holds the number of stack frames to + * skip (from 0 to 255), masked with + * **BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK**. The next bits can be used to set + * a combination of the following flags: + * + * **BPF_F_USER_STACK** + * Collect a user space stack instead of a kernel stack. + * **BPF_F_FAST_STACK_CMP** + * Compare stacks by hash only. + * **BPF_F_REUSE_STACKID** + * If two different stacks hash into the same *stackid*, + * discard the old one. + * + * The stack id retrieved is a 32 bit long integer handle which + * can be further combined with other data (including other stack + * ids) and used as a key into maps. This can be useful for + * generating a variety of graphs (such as flame graphs or off-cpu + * graphs). + * + * For walking a stack, this helper is an improvement over + * **bpf_probe_read**\ (), which can be used with unrolled loops + * but is not efficient and consumes a lot of eBPF instructions. + * Instead, **bpf_get_stackid**\ () can collect up to + * **PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH** both kernel and user frames. Note that + * this limit can be controlled with the **sysctl** program, and + * that it should be manually increased in order to profile long + * user stacks (such as stacks for Java programs). To do so, use: + * + * :: + * + * # sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_stack= + * + * Returns + * The positive or null stack id on success, or a negative error + * in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_stackid)(void *ctx, void *map, __u64 flags) = (void *) 27; + +/* + * bpf_csum_diff + * + * Compute a checksum difference, from the raw buffer pointed by + * *from*, of length *from_size* (that must be a multiple of 4), + * towards the raw buffer pointed by *to*, of size *to_size* + * (same remark). An optional *seed* can be added to the value + * (this can be cascaded, the seed may come from a previous call + * to the helper). + * + * This is flexible enough to be used in several ways: + * + * * With *from_size* == 0, *to_size* > 0 and *seed* set to + * checksum, it can be used when pushing new data. + * * With *from_size* > 0, *to_size* == 0 and *seed* set to + * checksum, it can be used when removing data from a packet. + * * With *from_size* > 0, *to_size* > 0 and *seed* set to 0, it + * can be used to compute a diff. Note that *from_size* and + * *to_size* do not need to be equal. + * + * This helper can be used in combination with + * **bpf_l3_csum_replace**\ () and **bpf_l4_csum_replace**\ (), to + * which one can feed in the difference computed with + * **bpf_csum_diff**\ (). + * + * Returns + * The checksum result, or a negative error code in case of + * failure. + */ +static __s64 (*bpf_csum_diff)(__be32 *from, __u32 from_size, __be32 *to, __u32 to_size, __wsum seed) = (void *) 28; + +/* + * bpf_skb_get_tunnel_opt + * + * Retrieve tunnel options metadata for the packet associated to + * *skb*, and store the raw tunnel option data to the buffer *opt* + * of *size*. + * + * This helper can be used with encapsulation devices that can + * operate in "collect metadata" mode (please refer to the related + * note in the description of **bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key**\ () for + * more details). A particular example where this can be used is + * in combination with the Geneve encapsulation protocol, where it + * allows for pushing (with **bpf_skb_get_tunnel_opt**\ () helper) + * and retrieving arbitrary TLVs (Type-Length-Value headers) from + * the eBPF program. This allows for full customization of these + * headers. + * + * Returns + * The size of the option data retrieved. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_get_tunnel_opt)(struct __sk_buff *skb, void *opt, __u32 size) = (void *) 29; + +/* + * bpf_skb_set_tunnel_opt + * + * Set tunnel options metadata for the packet associated to *skb* + * to the option data contained in the raw buffer *opt* of *size*. + * + * See also the description of the **bpf_skb_get_tunnel_opt**\ () + * helper for additional information. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_set_tunnel_opt)(struct __sk_buff *skb, void *opt, __u32 size) = (void *) 30; + +/* + * bpf_skb_change_proto + * + * Change the protocol of the *skb* to *proto*. Currently + * supported are transition from IPv4 to IPv6, and from IPv6 to + * IPv4. The helper takes care of the groundwork for the + * transition, including resizing the socket buffer. The eBPF + * program is expected to fill the new headers, if any, via + * **skb_store_bytes**\ () and to recompute the checksums with + * **bpf_l3_csum_replace**\ () and **bpf_l4_csum_replace**\ + * (). The main case for this helper is to perform NAT64 + * operations out of an eBPF program. + * + * Internally, the GSO type is marked as dodgy so that headers are + * checked and segments are recalculated by the GSO/GRO engine. + * The size for GSO target is adapted as well. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_change_proto)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __be16 proto, __u64 flags) = (void *) 31; + +/* + * bpf_skb_change_type + * + * Change the packet type for the packet associated to *skb*. This + * comes down to setting *skb*\ **->pkt_type** to *type*, except + * the eBPF program does not have a write access to *skb*\ + * **->pkt_type** beside this helper. Using a helper here allows + * for graceful handling of errors. + * + * The major use case is to change incoming *skb*s to + * **PACKET_HOST** in a programmatic way instead of having to + * recirculate via **redirect**\ (..., **BPF_F_INGRESS**), for + * example. + * + * Note that *type* only allows certain values. At this time, they + * are: + * + * **PACKET_HOST** + * Packet is for us. + * **PACKET_BROADCAST** + * Send packet to all. + * **PACKET_MULTICAST** + * Send packet to group. + * **PACKET_OTHERHOST** + * Send packet to someone else. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_change_type)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 type) = (void *) 32; + +/* + * bpf_skb_under_cgroup + * + * Check whether *skb* is a descendant of the cgroup2 held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY**, at *index*. + * + * Returns + * The return value depends on the result of the test, and can be: + * + * * 0, if the *skb* failed the cgroup2 descendant test. + * * 1, if the *skb* succeeded the cgroup2 descendant test. + * * A negative error code, if an error occurred. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_under_cgroup)(struct __sk_buff *skb, void *map, __u32 index) = (void *) 33; + +/* + * bpf_get_hash_recalc + * + * Retrieve the hash of the packet, *skb*\ **->hash**. If it is + * not set, in particular if the hash was cleared due to mangling, + * recompute this hash. Later accesses to the hash can be done + * directly with *skb*\ **->hash**. + * + * Calling **bpf_set_hash_invalid**\ (), changing a packet + * prototype with **bpf_skb_change_proto**\ (), or calling + * **bpf_skb_store_bytes**\ () with the + * **BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH** are actions susceptible to clear + * the hash and to trigger a new computation for the next call to + * **bpf_get_hash_recalc**\ (). + * + * Returns + * The 32-bit hash. + */ +static __u32 (*bpf_get_hash_recalc)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 34; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_task + * + * + * Returns + * A pointer to the current task struct. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_current_task)(void) = (void *) 35; + +/* + * bpf_probe_write_user + * + * Attempt in a safe way to write *len* bytes from the buffer + * *src* to *dst* in memory. It only works for threads that are in + * user context, and *dst* must be a valid user space address. + * + * This helper should not be used to implement any kind of + * security mechanism because of TOC-TOU attacks, but rather to + * debug, divert, and manipulate execution of semi-cooperative + * processes. + * + * Keep in mind that this feature is meant for experiments, and it + * has a risk of crashing the system and running programs. + * Therefore, when an eBPF program using this helper is attached, + * a warning including PID and process name is printed to kernel + * logs. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_write_user)(void *dst, const void *src, __u32 len) = (void *) 36; + +/* + * bpf_current_task_under_cgroup + * + * Check whether the probe is being run is the context of a given + * subset of the cgroup2 hierarchy. The cgroup2 to test is held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY**, at *index*. + * + * Returns + * The return value depends on the result of the test, and can be: + * + * * 0, if current task belongs to the cgroup2. + * * 1, if current task does not belong to the cgroup2. + * * A negative error code, if an error occurred. + */ +static long (*bpf_current_task_under_cgroup)(void *map, __u32 index) = (void *) 37; + +/* + * bpf_skb_change_tail + * + * Resize (trim or grow) the packet associated to *skb* to the + * new *len*. The *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * The basic idea is that the helper performs the needed work to + * change the size of the packet, then the eBPF program rewrites + * the rest via helpers like **bpf_skb_store_bytes**\ (), + * **bpf_l3_csum_replace**\ (), **bpf_l3_csum_replace**\ () + * and others. This helper is a slow path utility intended for + * replies with control messages. And because it is targeted for + * slow path, the helper itself can afford to be slow: it + * implicitly linearizes, unclones and drops offloads from the + * *skb*. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_change_tail)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 38; + +/* + * bpf_skb_pull_data + * + * Pull in non-linear data in case the *skb* is non-linear and not + * all of *len* are part of the linear section. Make *len* bytes + * from *skb* readable and writable. If a zero value is passed for + * *len*, then the whole length of the *skb* is pulled. + * + * This helper is only needed for reading and writing with direct + * packet access. + * + * For direct packet access, testing that offsets to access + * are within packet boundaries (test on *skb*\ **->data_end**) is + * susceptible to fail if offsets are invalid, or if the requested + * data is in non-linear parts of the *skb*. On failure the + * program can just bail out, or in the case of a non-linear + * buffer, use a helper to make the data available. The + * **bpf_skb_load_bytes**\ () helper is a first solution to access + * the data. Another one consists in using **bpf_skb_pull_data** + * to pull in once the non-linear parts, then retesting and + * eventually access the data. + * + * At the same time, this also makes sure the *skb* is uncloned, + * which is a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs + * to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier + * detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling + * **bpf_skb_pull_data()** to effectively unclone the *skb* from + * the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_pull_data)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 len) = (void *) 39; + +/* + * bpf_csum_update + * + * Add the checksum *csum* into *skb*\ **->csum** in case the + * driver has supplied a checksum for the entire packet into that + * field. Return an error otherwise. This helper is intended to be + * used in combination with **bpf_csum_diff**\ (), in particular + * when the checksum needs to be updated after data has been + * written into the packet through direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * The checksum on success, or a negative error code in case of + * failure. + */ +static __s64 (*bpf_csum_update)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __wsum csum) = (void *) 40; + +/* + * bpf_set_hash_invalid + * + * Invalidate the current *skb*\ **->hash**. It can be used after + * mangling on headers through direct packet access, in order to + * indicate that the hash is outdated and to trigger a + * recalculation the next time the kernel tries to access this + * hash or when the **bpf_get_hash_recalc**\ () helper is called. + * + */ +static void (*bpf_set_hash_invalid)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 41; + +/* + * bpf_get_numa_node_id + * + * Return the id of the current NUMA node. The primary use case + * for this helper is the selection of sockets for the local NUMA + * node, when the program is attached to sockets using the + * **SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF** option (see also **socket(7)**), + * but the helper is also available to other eBPF program types, + * similarly to **bpf_get_smp_processor_id**\ (). + * + * Returns + * The id of current NUMA node. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_numa_node_id)(void) = (void *) 42; + +/* + * bpf_skb_change_head + * + * Grows headroom of packet associated to *skb* and adjusts the + * offset of the MAC header accordingly, adding *len* bytes of + * space. It automatically extends and reallocates memory as + * required. + * + * This helper can be used on a layer 3 *skb* to push a MAC header + * for redirection into a layer 2 device. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_change_head)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 43; + +/* + * bpf_xdp_adjust_head + * + * Adjust (move) *xdp_md*\ **->data** by *delta* bytes. Note that + * it is possible to use a negative value for *delta*. This helper + * can be used to prepare the packet for pushing or popping + * headers. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_xdp_adjust_head)(struct xdp_md *xdp_md, int delta) = (void *) 44; + +/* + * bpf_probe_read_str + * + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address + * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. See **bpf_probe_read_kernel_str**\ () for + * more details. + * + * Generally, use **bpf_probe_read_user_str**\ () or + * **bpf_probe_read_kernel_str**\ () instead. + * + * Returns + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, + * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative + * value. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_read_str)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) = (void *) 45; + +/* + * bpf_get_socket_cookie + * + * If the **struct sk_buff** pointed by *skb* has a known socket, + * retrieve the cookie (generated by the kernel) of this socket. + * If no cookie has been set yet, generate a new cookie. Once + * generated, the socket cookie remains stable for the life of the + * socket. This helper can be useful for monitoring per socket + * networking traffic statistics as it provides a global socket + * identifier that can be assumed unique. + * + * Returns + * A 8-byte long unique number on success, or 0 if the socket + * field is missing inside *skb*. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_socket_cookie)(void *ctx) = (void *) 46; + +/* + * bpf_get_socket_uid + * + * + * Returns + * The owner UID of the socket associated to *skb*. If the socket + * is **NULL**, or if it is not a full socket (i.e. if it is a + * time-wait or a request socket instead), **overflowuid** value + * is returned (note that **overflowuid** might also be the actual + * UID value for the socket). + */ +static __u32 (*bpf_get_socket_uid)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 47; + +/* + * bpf_set_hash + * + * Set the full hash for *skb* (set the field *skb*\ **->hash**) + * to value *hash*. + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_set_hash)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 hash) = (void *) 48; + +/* + * bpf_setsockopt + * + * Emulate a call to **setsockopt()** on the socket associated to + * *bpf_socket*, which must be a full socket. The *level* at + * which the option resides and the name *optname* of the option + * must be specified, see **setsockopt(2)** for more information. + * The option value of length *optlen* is pointed by *optval*. + * + * *bpf_socket* should be one of the following: + * + * * **struct bpf_sock_ops** for **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS**. + * * **struct bpf_sock_addr** for **BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT** + * and **BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT**. + * + * This helper actually implements a subset of **setsockopt()**. + * It supports the following *level*\ s: + * + * * **SOL_SOCKET**, which supports the following *optname*\ s: + * **SO_RCVBUF**, **SO_SNDBUF**, **SO_MAX_PACING_RATE**, + * **SO_PRIORITY**, **SO_RCVLOWAT**, **SO_MARK**, + * **SO_BINDTODEVICE**, **SO_KEEPALIVE**. + * * **IPPROTO_TCP**, which supports the following *optname*\ s: + * **TCP_CONGESTION**, **TCP_BPF_IW**, + * **TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP**, **TCP_SAVE_SYN**, + * **TCP_KEEPIDLE**, **TCP_KEEPINTVL**, **TCP_KEEPCNT**, + * **TCP_SYNCNT**, **TCP_USER_TIMEOUT**, **TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT**. + * * **IPPROTO_IP**, which supports *optname* **IP_TOS**. + * * **IPPROTO_IPV6**, which supports *optname* **IPV6_TCLASS**. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_setsockopt)(void *bpf_socket, int level, int optname, void *optval, int optlen) = (void *) 49; + +/* + * bpf_skb_adjust_room + * + * Grow or shrink the room for data in the packet associated to + * *skb* by *len_diff*, and according to the selected *mode*. + * + * By default, the helper will reset any offloaded checksum + * indicator of the skb to CHECKSUM_NONE. This can be avoided + * by the following flag: + * + * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_NO_CSUM_RESET**: Do not reset offloaded + * checksum data of the skb to CHECKSUM_NONE. + * + * There are two supported modes at this time: + * + * * **BPF_ADJ_ROOM_MAC**: Adjust room at the mac layer + * (room space is added or removed below the layer 2 header). + * + * * **BPF_ADJ_ROOM_NET**: Adjust room at the network layer + * (room space is added or removed below the layer 3 header). + * + * The following flags are supported at this time: + * + * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO**: Do not adjust gso_size. + * Adjusting mss in this way is not allowed for datagrams. + * + * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L3_IPV4**, + * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L3_IPV6**: + * Any new space is reserved to hold a tunnel header. + * Configure skb offsets and other fields accordingly. + * + * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L4_GRE**, + * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L4_UDP**: + * Use with ENCAP_L3 flags to further specify the tunnel type. + * + * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L2**\ (*len*): + * Use with ENCAP_L3/L4 flags to further specify the tunnel + * type; *len* is the length of the inner MAC header. + * + * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L2_ETH**: + * Use with BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L2 flag to further specify the + * L2 type as Ethernet. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_adjust_room)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __s32 len_diff, __u32 mode, __u64 flags) = (void *) 50; + +/* + * bpf_redirect_map + * + * Redirect the packet to the endpoint referenced by *map* at + * index *key*. Depending on its type, this *map* can contain + * references to net devices (for forwarding packets through other + * ports), or to CPUs (for redirecting XDP frames to another CPU; + * but this is only implemented for native XDP (with driver + * support) as of this writing). + * + * The lower two bits of *flags* are used as the return code if + * the map lookup fails. This is so that the return value can be + * one of the XDP program return codes up to **XDP_TX**, as chosen + * by the caller. The higher bits of *flags* can be set to + * BPF_F_BROADCAST or BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS as defined below. + * + * With BPF_F_BROADCAST the packet will be broadcasted to all the + * interfaces in the map, with BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS the ingress + * interface will be excluded when do broadcasting. + * + * See also **bpf_redirect**\ (), which only supports redirecting + * to an ifindex, but doesn't require a map to do so. + * + * Returns + * **XDP_REDIRECT** on success, or the value of the two lower bits + * of the *flags* argument on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_redirect_map)(void *map, __u32 key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 51; + +/* + * bpf_sk_redirect_map + * + * Redirect the packet to the socket referenced by *map* (of type + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP**) at index *key*. Both ingress and + * egress interfaces can be used for redirection. The + * **BPF_F_INGRESS** value in *flags* is used to make the + * distinction (ingress path is selected if the flag is present, + * egress path otherwise). This is the only flag supported for now. + * + * Returns + * **SK_PASS** on success, or **SK_DROP** on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_sk_redirect_map)(struct __sk_buff *skb, void *map, __u32 key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 52; + +/* + * bpf_sock_map_update + * + * Add an entry to, or update a *map* referencing sockets. The + * *skops* is used as a new value for the entry associated to + * *key*. *flags* is one of: + * + * **BPF_NOEXIST** + * The entry for *key* must not exist in the map. + * **BPF_EXIST** + * The entry for *key* must already exist in the map. + * **BPF_ANY** + * No condition on the existence of the entry for *key*. + * + * If the *map* has eBPF programs (parser and verdict), those will + * be inherited by the socket being added. If the socket is + * already attached to eBPF programs, this results in an error. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_sock_map_update)(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops, void *map, void *key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 53; + +/* + * bpf_xdp_adjust_meta + * + * Adjust the address pointed by *xdp_md*\ **->data_meta** by + * *delta* (which can be positive or negative). Note that this + * operation modifies the address stored in *xdp_md*\ **->data**, + * so the latter must be loaded only after the helper has been + * called. + * + * The use of *xdp_md*\ **->data_meta** is optional and programs + * are not required to use it. The rationale is that when the + * packet is processed with XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), it is + * possible to push further meta data along with it before passing + * to the stack, and to give the guarantee that an ingress eBPF + * program attached as a TC classifier on the same device can pick + * this up for further post-processing. Since TC works with socket + * buffers, it remains possible to set from XDP the **mark** or + * **priority** pointers, or other pointers for the socket buffer. + * Having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for + * more flexibility as the user is free to store whatever meta + * data they need. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_xdp_adjust_meta)(struct xdp_md *xdp_md, int delta) = (void *) 54; + +/* + * bpf_perf_event_read_value + * + * Read the value of a perf event counter, and store it into *buf* + * of size *buf_size*. This helper relies on a *map* of type + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. The nature of the perf event + * counter is selected when *map* is updated with perf event file + * descriptors. The *map* is an array whose size is the number of + * available CPUs, and each cell contains a value relative to one + * CPU. The value to retrieve is indicated by *flags*, that + * contains the index of the CPU to look up, masked with + * **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. Alternatively, *flags* can be set to + * **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** to indicate that the value for the + * current CPU should be retrieved. + * + * This helper behaves in a way close to + * **bpf_perf_event_read**\ () helper, save that instead of + * just returning the value observed, it fills the *buf* + * structure. This allows for additional data to be retrieved: in + * particular, the enabled and running times (in *buf*\ + * **->enabled** and *buf*\ **->running**, respectively) are + * copied. In general, **bpf_perf_event_read_value**\ () is + * recommended over **bpf_perf_event_read**\ (), which has some + * ABI issues and provides fewer functionalities. + * + * These values are interesting, because hardware PMU (Performance + * Monitoring Unit) counters are limited resources. When there are + * more PMU based perf events opened than available counters, + * kernel will multiplex these events so each event gets certain + * percentage (but not all) of the PMU time. In case that + * multiplexing happens, the number of samples or counter value + * will not reflect the case compared to when no multiplexing + * occurs. This makes comparison between different runs difficult. + * Typically, the counter value should be normalized before + * comparing to other experiments. The usual normalization is done + * as follows. + * + * :: + * + * normalized_counter = counter * t_enabled / t_running + * + * Where t_enabled is the time enabled for event and t_running is + * the time running for event since last normalization. The + * enabled and running times are accumulated since the perf event + * open. To achieve scaling factor between two invocations of an + * eBPF program, users can use CPU id as the key (which is + * typical for perf array usage model) to remember the previous + * value and do the calculation inside the eBPF program. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_perf_event_read_value)(void *map, __u64 flags, struct bpf_perf_event_value *buf, __u32 buf_size) = (void *) 55; + +/* + * bpf_perf_prog_read_value + * + * For en eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the + * value of the event counter associated to *ctx* and store it in + * the structure pointed by *buf* and of size *buf_size*. Enabled + * and running times are also stored in the structure (see + * description of helper **bpf_perf_event_read_value**\ () for + * more details). + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_perf_prog_read_value)(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, struct bpf_perf_event_value *buf, __u32 buf_size) = (void *) 56; + +/* + * bpf_getsockopt + * + * Emulate a call to **getsockopt()** on the socket associated to + * *bpf_socket*, which must be a full socket. The *level* at + * which the option resides and the name *optname* of the option + * must be specified, see **getsockopt(2)** for more information. + * The retrieved value is stored in the structure pointed by + * *opval* and of length *optlen*. + * + * *bpf_socket* should be one of the following: + * + * * **struct bpf_sock_ops** for **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS**. + * * **struct bpf_sock_addr** for **BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT** + * and **BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT**. + * + * This helper actually implements a subset of **getsockopt()**. + * It supports the following *level*\ s: + * + * * **IPPROTO_TCP**, which supports *optname* + * **TCP_CONGESTION**. + * * **IPPROTO_IP**, which supports *optname* **IP_TOS**. + * * **IPPROTO_IPV6**, which supports *optname* **IPV6_TCLASS**. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_getsockopt)(void *bpf_socket, int level, int optname, void *optval, int optlen) = (void *) 57; + +/* + * bpf_override_return + * + * Used for error injection, this helper uses kprobes to override + * the return value of the probed function, and to set it to *rc*. + * The first argument is the context *regs* on which the kprobe + * works. + * + * This helper works by setting the PC (program counter) + * to an override function which is run in place of the original + * probed function. This means the probed function is not run at + * all. The replacement function just returns with the required + * value. + * + * This helper has security implications, and thus is subject to + * restrictions. It is only available if the kernel was compiled + * with the **CONFIG_BPF_KPROBE_OVERRIDE** configuration + * option, and in this case it only works on functions tagged with + * **ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION** in the kernel code. + * + * Also, the helper is only available for the architectures having + * the CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION option. As of this writing, + * x86 architecture is the only one to support this feature. + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_override_return)(struct pt_regs *regs, __u64 rc) = (void *) 58; + +/* + * bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags_set + * + * Attempt to set the value of the **bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags** field + * for the full TCP socket associated to *bpf_sock_ops* to + * *argval*. + * + * The primary use of this field is to determine if there should + * be calls to eBPF programs of type + * **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS** at various points in the TCP + * code. A program of the same type can change its value, per + * connection and as necessary, when the connection is + * established. This field is directly accessible for reading, but + * this helper must be used for updates in order to return an + * error if an eBPF program tries to set a callback that is not + * supported in the current kernel. + * + * *argval* is a flag array which can combine these flags: + * + * * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_RTO_CB_FLAG** (retransmission time out) + * * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_RETRANS_CB_FLAG** (retransmission) + * * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_STATE_CB_FLAG** (TCP state change) + * * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_RTT_CB_FLAG** (every RTT) + * + * Therefore, this function can be used to clear a callback flag by + * setting the appropriate bit to zero. e.g. to disable the RTO + * callback: + * + * **bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags_set(bpf_sock,** + * **bpf_sock->bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags & ~BPF_SOCK_OPS_RTO_CB_FLAG)** + * + * Here are some examples of where one could call such eBPF + * program: + * + * * When RTO fires. + * * When a packet is retransmitted. + * * When the connection terminates. + * * When a packet is sent. + * * When a packet is received. + * + * Returns + * Code **-EINVAL** if the socket is not a full TCP socket; + * otherwise, a positive number containing the bits that could not + * be set is returned (which comes down to 0 if all bits were set + * as required). + */ +static long (*bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags_set)(struct bpf_sock_ops *bpf_sock, int argval) = (void *) 59; + +/* + * bpf_msg_redirect_map + * + * This helper is used in programs implementing policies at the + * socket level. If the message *msg* is allowed to pass (i.e. if + * the verdict eBPF program returns **SK_PASS**), redirect it to + * the socket referenced by *map* (of type + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP**) at index *key*. Both ingress and + * egress interfaces can be used for redirection. The + * **BPF_F_INGRESS** value in *flags* is used to make the + * distinction (ingress path is selected if the flag is present, + * egress path otherwise). This is the only flag supported for now. + * + * Returns + * **SK_PASS** on success, or **SK_DROP** on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_redirect_map)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, void *map, __u32 key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 60; + +/* + * bpf_msg_apply_bytes + * + * For socket policies, apply the verdict of the eBPF program to + * the next *bytes* (number of bytes) of message *msg*. + * + * For example, this helper can be used in the following cases: + * + * * A single **sendmsg**\ () or **sendfile**\ () system call + * contains multiple logical messages that the eBPF program is + * supposed to read and for which it should apply a verdict. + * * An eBPF program only cares to read the first *bytes* of a + * *msg*. If the message has a large payload, then setting up + * and calling the eBPF program repeatedly for all bytes, even + * though the verdict is already known, would create unnecessary + * overhead. + * + * When called from within an eBPF program, the helper sets a + * counter internal to the BPF infrastructure, that is used to + * apply the last verdict to the next *bytes*. If *bytes* is + * smaller than the current data being processed from a + * **sendmsg**\ () or **sendfile**\ () system call, the first + * *bytes* will be sent and the eBPF program will be re-run with + * the pointer for start of data pointing to byte number *bytes* + * **+ 1**. If *bytes* is larger than the current data being + * processed, then the eBPF verdict will be applied to multiple + * **sendmsg**\ () or **sendfile**\ () calls until *bytes* are + * consumed. + * + * Note that if a socket closes with the internal counter holding + * a non-zero value, this is not a problem because data is not + * being buffered for *bytes* and is sent as it is received. + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_apply_bytes)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, __u32 bytes) = (void *) 61; + +/* + * bpf_msg_cork_bytes + * + * For socket policies, prevent the execution of the verdict eBPF + * program for message *msg* until *bytes* (byte number) have been + * accumulated. + * + * This can be used when one needs a specific number of bytes + * before a verdict can be assigned, even if the data spans + * multiple **sendmsg**\ () or **sendfile**\ () calls. The extreme + * case would be a user calling **sendmsg**\ () repeatedly with + * 1-byte long message segments. Obviously, this is bad for + * performance, but it is still valid. If the eBPF program needs + * *bytes* bytes to validate a header, this helper can be used to + * prevent the eBPF program to be called again until *bytes* have + * been accumulated. + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_cork_bytes)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, __u32 bytes) = (void *) 62; + +/* + * bpf_msg_pull_data + * + * For socket policies, pull in non-linear data from user space + * for *msg* and set pointers *msg*\ **->data** and *msg*\ + * **->data_end** to *start* and *end* bytes offsets into *msg*, + * respectively. + * + * If a program of type **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG** is run on a + * *msg* it can only parse data that the (**data**, **data_end**) + * pointers have already consumed. For **sendmsg**\ () hooks this + * is likely the first scatterlist element. But for calls relying + * on the **sendpage** handler (e.g. **sendfile**\ ()) this will + * be the range (**0**, **0**) because the data is shared with + * user space and by default the objective is to avoid allowing + * user space to modify data while (or after) eBPF verdict is + * being decided. This helper can be used to pull in data and to + * set the start and end pointer to given values. Data will be + * copied if necessary (i.e. if data was not linear and if start + * and end pointers do not point to the same chunk). + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_pull_data)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, __u32 start, __u32 end, __u64 flags) = (void *) 63; + +/* + * bpf_bind + * + * Bind the socket associated to *ctx* to the address pointed by + * *addr*, of length *addr_len*. This allows for making outgoing + * connection from the desired IP address, which can be useful for + * example when all processes inside a cgroup should use one + * single IP address on a host that has multiple IP configured. + * + * This helper works for IPv4 and IPv6, TCP and UDP sockets. The + * domain (*addr*\ **->sa_family**) must be **AF_INET** (or + * **AF_INET6**). It's advised to pass zero port (**sin_port** + * or **sin6_port**) which triggers IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT-like + * behavior and lets the kernel efficiently pick up an unused + * port as long as 4-tuple is unique. Passing non-zero port might + * lead to degraded performance. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_bind)(struct bpf_sock_addr *ctx, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len) = (void *) 64; + +/* + * bpf_xdp_adjust_tail + * + * Adjust (move) *xdp_md*\ **->data_end** by *delta* bytes. It is + * possible to both shrink and grow the packet tail. + * Shrink done via *delta* being a negative integer. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_xdp_adjust_tail)(struct xdp_md *xdp_md, int delta) = (void *) 65; + +/* + * bpf_skb_get_xfrm_state + * + * Retrieve the XFRM state (IP transform framework, see also + * **ip-xfrm(8)**) at *index* in XFRM "security path" for *skb*. + * + * The retrieved value is stored in the **struct bpf_xfrm_state** + * pointed by *xfrm_state* and of length *size*. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_XFRM** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_get_xfrm_state)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 index, struct bpf_xfrm_state *xfrm_state, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 66; + +/* + * bpf_get_stack + * + * Return a user or a kernel stack in bpf program provided buffer. + * To achieve this, the helper needs *ctx*, which is a pointer + * to the context on which the tracing program is executed. + * To store the stacktrace, the bpf program provides *buf* with + * a nonnegative *size*. + * + * The last argument, *flags*, holds the number of stack frames to + * skip (from 0 to 255), masked with + * **BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK**. The next bits can be used to set + * the following flags: + * + * **BPF_F_USER_STACK** + * Collect a user space stack instead of a kernel stack. + * **BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID** + * Collect buildid+offset instead of ips for user stack, + * only valid if **BPF_F_USER_STACK** is also specified. + * + * **bpf_get_stack**\ () can collect up to + * **PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH** both kernel and user frames, subject + * to sufficient large buffer size. Note that + * this limit can be controlled with the **sysctl** program, and + * that it should be manually increased in order to profile long + * user stacks (such as stacks for Java programs). To do so, use: + * + * :: + * + * # sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_stack= + * + * Returns + * A non-negative value equal to or less than *size* on success, + * or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_stack)(void *ctx, void *buf, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 67; + +/* + * bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative + * + * This helper is similar to **bpf_skb_load_bytes**\ () in that + * it provides an easy way to load *len* bytes from *offset* + * from the packet associated to *skb*, into the buffer pointed + * by *to*. The difference to **bpf_skb_load_bytes**\ () is that + * a fifth argument *start_header* exists in order to select a + * base offset to start from. *start_header* can be one of: + * + * **BPF_HDR_START_MAC** + * Base offset to load data from is *skb*'s mac header. + * **BPF_HDR_START_NET** + * Base offset to load data from is *skb*'s network header. + * + * In general, "direct packet access" is the preferred method to + * access packet data, however, this helper is in particular useful + * in socket filters where *skb*\ **->data** does not always point + * to the start of the mac header and where "direct packet access" + * is not available. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative)(const void *skb, __u32 offset, void *to, __u32 len, __u32 start_header) = (void *) 68; + +/* + * bpf_fib_lookup + * + * Do FIB lookup in kernel tables using parameters in *params*. + * If lookup is successful and result shows packet is to be + * forwarded, the neighbor tables are searched for the nexthop. + * If successful (ie., FIB lookup shows forwarding and nexthop + * is resolved), the nexthop address is returned in ipv4_dst + * or ipv6_dst based on family, smac is set to mac address of + * egress device, dmac is set to nexthop mac address, rt_metric + * is set to metric from route (IPv4/IPv6 only), and ifindex + * is set to the device index of the nexthop from the FIB lookup. + * + * *plen* argument is the size of the passed in struct. + * *flags* argument can be a combination of one or more of the + * following values: + * + * **BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_DIRECT** + * Do a direct table lookup vs full lookup using FIB + * rules. + * **BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_OUTPUT** + * Perform lookup from an egress perspective (default is + * ingress). + * + * *ctx* is either **struct xdp_md** for XDP programs or + * **struct sk_buff** tc cls_act programs. + * + * Returns + * * < 0 if any input argument is invalid + * * 0 on success (packet is forwarded, nexthop neighbor exists) + * * > 0 one of **BPF_FIB_LKUP_RET_** codes explaining why the + * packet is not forwarded or needs assist from full stack + * + * If lookup fails with BPF_FIB_LKUP_RET_FRAG_NEEDED, then the MTU + * was exceeded and output params->mtu_result contains the MTU. + */ +static long (*bpf_fib_lookup)(void *ctx, struct bpf_fib_lookup *params, int plen, __u32 flags) = (void *) 69; + +/* + * bpf_sock_hash_update + * + * Add an entry to, or update a sockhash *map* referencing sockets. + * The *skops* is used as a new value for the entry associated to + * *key*. *flags* is one of: + * + * **BPF_NOEXIST** + * The entry for *key* must not exist in the map. + * **BPF_EXIST** + * The entry for *key* must already exist in the map. + * **BPF_ANY** + * No condition on the existence of the entry for *key*. + * + * If the *map* has eBPF programs (parser and verdict), those will + * be inherited by the socket being added. If the socket is + * already attached to eBPF programs, this results in an error. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_sock_hash_update)(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops, void *map, void *key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 70; + +/* + * bpf_msg_redirect_hash + * + * This helper is used in programs implementing policies at the + * socket level. If the message *msg* is allowed to pass (i.e. if + * the verdict eBPF program returns **SK_PASS**), redirect it to + * the socket referenced by *map* (of type + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH**) using hash *key*. Both ingress and + * egress interfaces can be used for redirection. The + * **BPF_F_INGRESS** value in *flags* is used to make the + * distinction (ingress path is selected if the flag is present, + * egress path otherwise). This is the only flag supported for now. + * + * Returns + * **SK_PASS** on success, or **SK_DROP** on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_redirect_hash)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, void *map, void *key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 71; + +/* + * bpf_sk_redirect_hash + * + * This helper is used in programs implementing policies at the + * skb socket level. If the sk_buff *skb* is allowed to pass (i.e. + * if the verdict eBPF program returns **SK_PASS**), redirect it + * to the socket referenced by *map* (of type + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH**) using hash *key*. Both ingress and + * egress interfaces can be used for redirection. The + * **BPF_F_INGRESS** value in *flags* is used to make the + * distinction (ingress path is selected if the flag is present, + * egress otherwise). This is the only flag supported for now. + * + * Returns + * **SK_PASS** on success, or **SK_DROP** on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_sk_redirect_hash)(struct __sk_buff *skb, void *map, void *key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 72; + +/* + * bpf_lwt_push_encap + * + * Encapsulate the packet associated to *skb* within a Layer 3 + * protocol header. This header is provided in the buffer at + * address *hdr*, with *len* its size in bytes. *type* indicates + * the protocol of the header and can be one of: + * + * **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_SEG6** + * IPv6 encapsulation with Segment Routing Header + * (**struct ipv6_sr_hdr**). *hdr* only contains the SRH, + * the IPv6 header is computed by the kernel. + * **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_SEG6_INLINE** + * Only works if *skb* contains an IPv6 packet. Insert a + * Segment Routing Header (**struct ipv6_sr_hdr**) inside + * the IPv6 header. + * **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_IP** + * IP encapsulation (GRE/GUE/IPIP/etc). The outer header + * must be IPv4 or IPv6, followed by zero or more + * additional headers, up to **LWT_BPF_MAX_HEADROOM** + * total bytes in all prepended headers. Please note that + * if **skb_is_gso**\ (*skb*) is true, no more than two + * headers can be prepended, and the inner header, if + * present, should be either GRE or UDP/GUE. + * + * **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_SEG6**\ \* types can be called by BPF programs + * of type **BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN**; **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_IP** type can + * be called by bpf programs of types **BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN** and + * **BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT**. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_lwt_push_encap)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 type, void *hdr, __u32 len) = (void *) 73; + +/* + * bpf_lwt_seg6_store_bytes + * + * Store *len* bytes from address *from* into the packet + * associated to *skb*, at *offset*. Only the flags, tag and TLVs + * inside the outermost IPv6 Segment Routing Header can be + * modified through this helper. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_lwt_seg6_store_bytes)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 offset, const void *from, __u32 len) = (void *) 74; + +/* + * bpf_lwt_seg6_adjust_srh + * + * Adjust the size allocated to TLVs in the outermost IPv6 + * Segment Routing Header contained in the packet associated to + * *skb*, at position *offset* by *delta* bytes. Only offsets + * after the segments are accepted. *delta* can be as well + * positive (growing) as negative (shrinking). + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_lwt_seg6_adjust_srh)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 offset, __s32 delta) = (void *) 75; + +/* + * bpf_lwt_seg6_action + * + * Apply an IPv6 Segment Routing action of type *action* to the + * packet associated to *skb*. Each action takes a parameter + * contained at address *param*, and of length *param_len* bytes. + * *action* can be one of: + * + * **SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_X** + * End.X action: Endpoint with Layer-3 cross-connect. + * Type of *param*: **struct in6_addr**. + * **SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_T** + * End.T action: Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup. + * Type of *param*: **int**. + * **SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_B6** + * End.B6 action: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 policy. + * Type of *param*: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**. + * **SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_B6_ENCAP** + * End.B6.Encap action: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 + * encapsulation policy. + * Type of *param*: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**. + * + * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying + * packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers + * previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be + * performed again, if the helper is used in combination with + * direct packet access. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_lwt_seg6_action)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 action, void *param, __u32 param_len) = (void *) 76; + +/* + * bpf_rc_repeat + * + * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to + * report a successfully decoded repeat key message. This delays + * the generation of a key up event for previously generated + * key down event. + * + * Some IR protocols like NEC have a special IR message for + * repeating last button, for when a button is held down. + * + * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into + * the program. + * + * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to + * "**y**". + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_rc_repeat)(void *ctx) = (void *) 77; + +/* + * bpf_rc_keydown + * + * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to + * report a successfully decoded key press with *scancode*, + * *toggle* value in the given *protocol*. The scancode will be + * translated to a keycode using the rc keymap, and reported as + * an input key down event. After a period a key up event is + * generated. This period can be extended by calling either + * **bpf_rc_keydown**\ () again with the same values, or calling + * **bpf_rc_repeat**\ (). + * + * Some protocols include a toggle bit, in case the button was + * released and pressed again between consecutive scancodes. + * + * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into + * the program. + * + * The *protocol* is the decoded protocol number (see + * **enum rc_proto** for some predefined values). + * + * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to + * "**y**". + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_rc_keydown)(void *ctx, __u32 protocol, __u64 scancode, __u32 toggle) = (void *) 78; + +/* + * bpf_skb_cgroup_id + * + * Return the cgroup v2 id of the socket associated with the *skb*. + * This is roughly similar to the **bpf_get_cgroup_classid**\ () + * helper for cgroup v1 by providing a tag resp. identifier that + * can be matched on or used for map lookups e.g. to implement + * policy. The cgroup v2 id of a given path in the hierarchy is + * exposed in user space through the f_handle API in order to get + * to the same 64-bit id. + * + * This helper can be used on TC egress path, but not on ingress, + * and is available only if the kernel was compiled with the + * **CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_skb_cgroup_id)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 79; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_cgroup_id + * + * + * Returns + * A 64-bit integer containing the current cgroup id based + * on the cgroup within which the current task is running. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_current_cgroup_id)(void) = (void *) 80; + +/* + * bpf_get_local_storage + * + * Get the pointer to the local storage area. + * The type and the size of the local storage is defined + * by the *map* argument. + * The *flags* meaning is specific for each map type, + * and has to be 0 for cgroup local storage. + * + * Depending on the BPF program type, a local storage area + * can be shared between multiple instances of the BPF program, + * running simultaneously. + * + * A user should care about the synchronization by himself. + * For example, by using the **BPF_ATOMIC** instructions to alter + * the shared data. + * + * Returns + * A pointer to the local storage area. + */ +static void *(*bpf_get_local_storage)(void *map, __u64 flags) = (void *) 81; + +/* + * bpf_sk_select_reuseport + * + * Select a **SO_REUSEPORT** socket from a + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY** *map*. + * It checks the selected socket is matching the incoming + * request in the socket buffer. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_sk_select_reuseport)(struct sk_reuseport_md *reuse, void *map, void *key, __u64 flags) = (void *) 82; + +/* + * bpf_skb_ancestor_cgroup_id + * + * Return id of cgroup v2 that is ancestor of cgroup associated + * with the *skb* at the *ancestor_level*. The root cgroup is at + * *ancestor_level* zero and each step down the hierarchy + * increments the level. If *ancestor_level* == level of cgroup + * associated with *skb*, then return value will be same as that + * of **bpf_skb_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * The helper is useful to implement policies based on cgroups + * that are upper in hierarchy than immediate cgroup associated + * with *skb*. + * + * The format of returned id and helper limitations are same as in + * **bpf_skb_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * Returns + * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_skb_ancestor_cgroup_id)(struct __sk_buff *skb, int ancestor_level) = (void *) 83; + +/* + * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp + * + * Look for TCP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * The *ctx* should point to the context of the program, such as + * the skb or socket (depending on the hook in use). This is used + * to determine the base network namespace for the lookup. + * + * *tuple_size* must be one of: + * + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv4**) + * Look for an IPv4 socket. + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv6**) + * Look for an IPv6 socket. + * + * If the *netns* is a negative signed 32-bit integer, then the + * socket lookup table in the netns associated with the *ctx* + * will be used. For the TC hooks, this is the netns of the device + * in the skb. For socket hooks, this is the netns of the socket. + * If *netns* is any other signed 32-bit value greater than or + * equal to zero then it specifies the ID of the netns relative to + * the netns associated with the *ctx*. *netns* values beyond the + * range of 32-bit integers are reserved for future use. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + */ +static struct bpf_sock *(*bpf_sk_lookup_tcp)(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, __u32 tuple_size, __u64 netns, __u64 flags) = (void *) 84; + +/* + * bpf_sk_lookup_udp + * + * Look for UDP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * The *ctx* should point to the context of the program, such as + * the skb or socket (depending on the hook in use). This is used + * to determine the base network namespace for the lookup. + * + * *tuple_size* must be one of: + * + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv4**) + * Look for an IPv4 socket. + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv6**) + * Look for an IPv6 socket. + * + * If the *netns* is a negative signed 32-bit integer, then the + * socket lookup table in the netns associated with the *ctx* + * will be used. For the TC hooks, this is the netns of the device + * in the skb. For socket hooks, this is the netns of the socket. + * If *netns* is any other signed 32-bit value greater than or + * equal to zero then it specifies the ID of the netns relative to + * the netns associated with the *ctx*. *netns* values beyond the + * range of 32-bit integers are reserved for future use. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + */ +static struct bpf_sock *(*bpf_sk_lookup_udp)(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, __u32 tuple_size, __u64 netns, __u64 flags) = (void *) 85; + +/* + * bpf_sk_release + * + * Release the reference held by *sock*. *sock* must be a + * non-**NULL** pointer that was returned from + * **bpf_sk_lookup_xxx**\ (). + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_sk_release)(void *sock) = (void *) 86; + +/* + * bpf_map_push_elem + * + * Push an element *value* in *map*. *flags* is one of: + * + * **BPF_EXIST** + * If the queue/stack is full, the oldest element is + * removed to make room for this. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_map_push_elem)(void *map, const void *value, __u64 flags) = (void *) 87; + +/* + * bpf_map_pop_elem + * + * Pop an element from *map*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_map_pop_elem)(void *map, void *value) = (void *) 88; + +/* + * bpf_map_peek_elem + * + * Get an element from *map* without removing it. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_map_peek_elem)(void *map, void *value) = (void *) 89; + +/* + * bpf_msg_push_data + * + * For socket policies, insert *len* bytes into *msg* at offset + * *start*. + * + * If a program of type **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG** is run on a + * *msg* it may want to insert metadata or options into the *msg*. + * This can later be read and used by any of the lower layer BPF + * hooks. + * + * This helper may fail if under memory pressure (a malloc + * fails) in these cases BPF programs will get an appropriate + * error and BPF programs will need to handle them. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_push_data)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, __u32 start, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 90; + +/* + * bpf_msg_pop_data + * + * Will remove *len* bytes from a *msg* starting at byte *start*. + * This may result in **ENOMEM** errors under certain situations if + * an allocation and copy are required due to a full ring buffer. + * However, the helper will try to avoid doing the allocation + * if possible. Other errors can occur if input parameters are + * invalid either due to *start* byte not being valid part of *msg* + * payload and/or *pop* value being to large. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_msg_pop_data)(struct sk_msg_md *msg, __u32 start, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 91; + +/* + * bpf_rc_pointer_rel + * + * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to + * report a successfully decoded pointer movement. + * + * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into + * the program. + * + * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to + * "**y**". + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_rc_pointer_rel)(void *ctx, __s32 rel_x, __s32 rel_y) = (void *) 92; + +/* + * bpf_spin_lock + * + * Acquire a spinlock represented by the pointer *lock*, which is + * stored as part of a value of a map. Taking the lock allows to + * safely update the rest of the fields in that value. The + * spinlock can (and must) later be released with a call to + * **bpf_spin_unlock**\ (\ *lock*\ ). + * + * Spinlocks in BPF programs come with a number of restrictions + * and constraints: + * + * * **bpf_spin_lock** objects are only allowed inside maps of + * types **BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH** and **BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY** (this + * list could be extended in the future). + * * BTF description of the map is mandatory. + * * The BPF program can take ONE lock at a time, since taking two + * or more could cause dead locks. + * * Only one **struct bpf_spin_lock** is allowed per map element. + * * When the lock is taken, calls (either BPF to BPF or helpers) + * are not allowed. + * * The **BPF_LD_ABS** and **BPF_LD_IND** instructions are not + * allowed inside a spinlock-ed region. + * * The BPF program MUST call **bpf_spin_unlock**\ () to release + * the lock, on all execution paths, before it returns. + * * The BPF program can access **struct bpf_spin_lock** only via + * the **bpf_spin_lock**\ () and **bpf_spin_unlock**\ () + * helpers. Loading or storing data into the **struct + * bpf_spin_lock** *lock*\ **;** field of a map is not allowed. + * * To use the **bpf_spin_lock**\ () helper, the BTF description + * of the map value must be a struct and have **struct + * bpf_spin_lock** *anyname*\ **;** field at the top level. + * Nested lock inside another struct is not allowed. + * * The **struct bpf_spin_lock** *lock* field in a map value must + * be aligned on a multiple of 4 bytes in that value. + * * Syscall with command **BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM** does not copy + * the **bpf_spin_lock** field to user space. + * * Syscall with command **BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM**, or update from + * a BPF program, do not update the **bpf_spin_lock** field. + * * **bpf_spin_lock** cannot be on the stack or inside a + * networking packet (it can only be inside of a map values). + * * **bpf_spin_lock** is available to root only. + * * Tracing programs and socket filter programs cannot use + * **bpf_spin_lock**\ () due to insufficient preemption checks + * (but this may change in the future). + * * **bpf_spin_lock** is not allowed in inner maps of map-in-map. + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_spin_lock)(struct bpf_spin_lock *lock) = (void *) 93; + +/* + * bpf_spin_unlock + * + * Release the *lock* previously locked by a call to + * **bpf_spin_lock**\ (\ *lock*\ ). + * + * Returns + * 0 + */ +static long (*bpf_spin_unlock)(struct bpf_spin_lock *lock) = (void *) 94; + +/* + * bpf_sk_fullsock + * + * This helper gets a **struct bpf_sock** pointer such + * that all the fields in this **bpf_sock** can be accessed. + * + * Returns + * A **struct bpf_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + */ +static struct bpf_sock *(*bpf_sk_fullsock)(struct bpf_sock *sk) = (void *) 95; + +/* + * bpf_tcp_sock + * + * This helper gets a **struct bpf_tcp_sock** pointer from a + * **struct bpf_sock** pointer. + * + * Returns + * A **struct bpf_tcp_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + */ +static struct bpf_tcp_sock *(*bpf_tcp_sock)(struct bpf_sock *sk) = (void *) 96; + +/* + * bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce + * + * Set ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) field of IP header + * to **CE** (Congestion Encountered) if current value is **ECT** + * (ECN Capable Transport). Otherwise, do nothing. Works with IPv6 + * and IPv4. + * + * Returns + * 1 if the **CE** flag is set (either by the current helper call + * or because it was already present), 0 if it is not set. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 97; + +/* + * bpf_get_listener_sock + * + * Return a **struct bpf_sock** pointer in **TCP_LISTEN** state. + * **bpf_sk_release**\ () is unnecessary and not allowed. + * + * Returns + * A **struct bpf_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + */ +static struct bpf_sock *(*bpf_get_listener_sock)(struct bpf_sock *sk) = (void *) 98; + +/* + * bpf_skc_lookup_tcp + * + * Look for TCP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * This function is identical to **bpf_sk_lookup_tcp**\ (), except + * that it also returns timewait or request sockets. Use + * **bpf_sk_fullsock**\ () or **bpf_tcp_sock**\ () to access the + * full structure. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + */ +static struct bpf_sock *(*bpf_skc_lookup_tcp)(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, __u32 tuple_size, __u64 netns, __u64 flags) = (void *) 99; + +/* + * bpf_tcp_check_syncookie + * + * Check whether *iph* and *th* contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for + * the listening socket in *sk*. + * + * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while + * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or + * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**). + * + * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len* + * contains **sizeof**\ (**struct tcphdr**). + * + * Returns + * 0 if *iph* and *th* are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative + * error otherwise. + */ +static long (*bpf_tcp_check_syncookie)(void *sk, void *iph, __u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, __u32 th_len) = (void *) 100; + +/* + * bpf_sysctl_get_name + * + * Get name of sysctl in /proc/sys/ and copy it into provided by + * program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * + * If *flags* is zero, full name (e.g. "net/ipv4/tcp_mem") is + * copied. Use **BPF_F_SYSCTL_BASE_NAME** flag to copy base name + * only (e.g. "tcp_mem"). + * + * Returns + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + */ +static long (*bpf_sysctl_get_name)(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, unsigned long buf_len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 101; + +/* + * bpf_sysctl_get_current_value + * + * Get current value of sysctl as it is presented in /proc/sys + * (incl. newline, etc), and copy it as a string into provided + * by program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * The whole value is copied, no matter what file position user + * space issued e.g. sys_read at. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * + * Returns + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * **-EINVAL** if current value was unavailable, e.g. because + * sysctl is uninitialized and read returns -EIO for it. + */ +static long (*bpf_sysctl_get_current_value)(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, unsigned long buf_len) = (void *) 102; + +/* + * bpf_sysctl_get_new_value + * + * Get new value being written by user space to sysctl (before + * the actual write happens) and copy it as a string into + * provided by program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * User space may write new value at file position > 0. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * + * Returns + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * **-EINVAL** if sysctl is being read. + */ +static long (*bpf_sysctl_get_new_value)(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, unsigned long buf_len) = (void *) 103; + +/* + * bpf_sysctl_set_new_value + * + * Override new value being written by user space to sysctl with + * value provided by program in buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * *buf* should contain a string in same form as provided by user + * space on sysctl write. + * + * User space may write new value at file position > 0. To override + * the whole sysctl value file position should be set to zero. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * + * **-E2BIG** if the *buf_len* is too big. + * + * **-EINVAL** if sysctl is being read. + */ +static long (*bpf_sysctl_set_new_value)(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, const char *buf, unsigned long buf_len) = (void *) 104; + +/* + * bpf_strtol + * + * Convert the initial part of the string from buffer *buf* of + * size *buf_len* to a long integer according to the given base + * and save the result in *res*. + * + * The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space + * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)) followed by a single + * optional '**-**' sign. + * + * Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits + * are currently unused. + * + * Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically + * similar to user space **strtol**\ (3). + * + * Returns + * Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but + * no more than *buf_len*. + * + * **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base + * was provided. + * + * **-ERANGE** if resulting value was out of range. + */ +static long (*bpf_strtol)(const char *buf, unsigned long buf_len, __u64 flags, long *res) = (void *) 105; + +/* + * bpf_strtoul + * + * Convert the initial part of the string from buffer *buf* of + * size *buf_len* to an unsigned long integer according to the + * given base and save the result in *res*. + * + * The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space + * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)). + * + * Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits + * are currently unused. + * + * Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically + * similar to user space **strtoul**\ (3). + * + * Returns + * Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but + * no more than *buf_len*. + * + * **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base + * was provided. + * + * **-ERANGE** if resulting value was out of range. + */ +static long (*bpf_strtoul)(const char *buf, unsigned long buf_len, __u64 flags, unsigned long *res) = (void *) 106; + +/* + * bpf_sk_storage_get + * + * Get a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*. + * + * Logically, it could be thought of getting the value from + * a *map* with *sk* as the **key**. From this + * perspective, the usage is not much different from + * **bpf_map_lookup_elem**\ (*map*, **&**\ *sk*) except this + * helper enforces the key must be a full socket and the map must + * be a **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE** also. + * + * Underneath, the value is stored locally at *sk* instead of + * the *map*. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage + * "type". The bpf-local-storage "type" (i.e. the *map*) is + * searched against all bpf-local-storages residing at *sk*. + * + * *sk* is a kernel **struct sock** pointer for LSM program. + * *sk* is a **struct bpf_sock** pointer for other program types. + * + * An optional *flags* (**BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE**) can be + * used such that a new bpf-local-storage will be + * created if one does not exist. *value* can be used + * together with **BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE** to specify + * the initial value of a bpf-local-storage. If *value* is + * **NULL**, the new bpf-local-storage will be zero initialized. + * + * Returns + * A bpf-local-storage pointer is returned on success. + * + * **NULL** if not found or there was an error in adding + * a new bpf-local-storage. + */ +static void *(*bpf_sk_storage_get)(void *map, void *sk, void *value, __u64 flags) = (void *) 107; + +/* + * bpf_sk_storage_delete + * + * Delete a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * + * **-ENOENT** if the bpf-local-storage cannot be found. + * **-EINVAL** if sk is not a fullsock (e.g. a request_sock). + */ +static long (*bpf_sk_storage_delete)(void *map, void *sk) = (void *) 108; + +/* + * bpf_send_signal + * + * Send signal *sig* to the process of the current task. + * The signal may be delivered to any of this process's threads. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success or successfully queued. + * + * **-EBUSY** if work queue under nmi is full. + * + * **-EINVAL** if *sig* is invalid. + * + * **-EPERM** if no permission to send the *sig*. + * + * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. + */ +static long (*bpf_send_signal)(__u32 sig) = (void *) 109; + +/* + * bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie + * + * Try to issue a SYN cookie for the packet with corresponding + * IP/TCP headers, *iph* and *th*, on the listening socket in *sk*. + * + * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while + * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or + * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**). + * + * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len* + * contains the length of the TCP header. + * + * Returns + * On success, lower 32 bits hold the generated SYN cookie in + * followed by 16 bits which hold the MSS value for that cookie, + * and the top 16 bits are unused. + * + * On failure, the returned value is one of the following: + * + * **-EINVAL** SYN cookie cannot be issued due to error + * + * **-ENOENT** SYN cookie should not be issued (no SYN flood) + * + * **-EOPNOTSUPP** kernel configuration does not enable SYN cookies + * + * **-EPROTONOSUPPORT** IP packet version is not 4 or 6 + */ +static __s64 (*bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie)(void *sk, void *iph, __u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, __u32 th_len) = (void *) 110; + +/* + * bpf_skb_output + * + * Write raw *data* blob into a special BPF perf event held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. This perf + * event must have the following attributes: **PERF_SAMPLE_RAW** + * as **sample_type**, **PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE** as **type**, and + * **PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUTPUT** as **config**. + * + * The *flags* are used to indicate the index in *map* for which + * the value must be put, masked with **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. + * Alternatively, *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** + * to indicate that the index of the current CPU core should be + * used. + * + * The value to write, of *size*, is passed through eBPF stack and + * pointed by *data*. + * + * *ctx* is a pointer to in-kernel struct sk_buff. + * + * This helper is similar to **bpf_perf_event_output**\ () but + * restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_skb_output)(void *ctx, void *map, __u64 flags, void *data, __u64 size) = (void *) 111; + +/* + * bpf_probe_read_user + * + * Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from user space address + * *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_read_user)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) = (void *) 112; + +/* + * bpf_probe_read_kernel + * + * Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from kernel space address + * *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_read_kernel)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) = (void *) 113; + +/* + * bpf_probe_read_user_str + * + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe user address + * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the + * terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than + * *size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the + * string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are + * copied and the last byte is set to NUL. + * + * On success, returns the number of bytes that were written, + * including the terminal NUL. This makes this helper useful in + * tracing programs for reading strings, and more importantly to + * get its length at runtime. See the following snippet: + * + * :: + * + * SEC("kprobe/sys_open") + * void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) + * { + * char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256 + * int res = bpf_probe_read_user_str(buf, sizeof(buf), + * ctx->di); + * + * // Consume buf, for example push it to + * // userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we + * // can use res (the string length) as event + * // size, after checking its boundaries. + * } + * + * In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read_user**\ () helper here + * instead to read the string would require to estimate the length + * at compile time, and would often result in copying more memory + * than necessary. + * + * Another useful use case is when parsing individual process + * arguments or individual environment variables navigating + * *current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\ + * **->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value, + * one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area. + * + * Returns + * On success, the strictly positive length of the output string, + * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative + * value. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_read_user_str)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) = (void *) 114; + +/* + * bpf_probe_read_kernel_str + * + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address *unsafe_ptr* + * to *dst*. Same semantics as with **bpf_probe_read_user_str**\ () apply. + * + * Returns + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, including + * the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative value. + */ +static long (*bpf_probe_read_kernel_str)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) = (void *) 115; + +/* + * bpf_tcp_send_ack + * + * Send out a tcp-ack. *tp* is the in-kernel struct **tcp_sock**. + * *rcv_nxt* is the ack_seq to be sent out. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_tcp_send_ack)(void *tp, __u32 rcv_nxt) = (void *) 116; + +/* + * bpf_send_signal_thread + * + * Send signal *sig* to the thread corresponding to the current task. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success or successfully queued. + * + * **-EBUSY** if work queue under nmi is full. + * + * **-EINVAL** if *sig* is invalid. + * + * **-EPERM** if no permission to send the *sig*. + * + * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. + */ +static long (*bpf_send_signal_thread)(__u32 sig) = (void *) 117; + +/* + * bpf_jiffies64 + * + * Obtain the 64bit jiffies + * + * Returns + * The 64 bit jiffies + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_jiffies64)(void) = (void *) 118; + +/* + * bpf_read_branch_records + * + * For an eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the + * branch records (**struct perf_branch_entry**) associated to *ctx* + * and store it in the buffer pointed by *buf* up to size + * *size* bytes. + * + * Returns + * On success, number of bytes written to *buf*. On error, a + * negative value. + * + * The *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_GET_BRANCH_RECORDS_SIZE** to + * instead return the number of bytes required to store all the + * branch entries. If this flag is set, *buf* may be NULL. + * + * **-EINVAL** if arguments invalid or **size** not a multiple + * of **sizeof**\ (**struct perf_branch_entry**\ ). + * + * **-ENOENT** if architecture does not support branch records. + */ +static long (*bpf_read_branch_records)(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, void *buf, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 119; + +/* + * bpf_get_ns_current_pid_tgid + * + * Returns 0 on success, values for *pid* and *tgid* as seen from the current + * *namespace* will be returned in *nsdata*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or one of the following in case of failure: + * + * **-EINVAL** if dev and inum supplied don't match dev_t and inode number + * with nsfs of current task, or if dev conversion to dev_t lost high bits. + * + * **-ENOENT** if pidns does not exists for the current task. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_ns_current_pid_tgid)(__u64 dev, __u64 ino, struct bpf_pidns_info *nsdata, __u32 size) = (void *) 120; + +/* + * bpf_xdp_output + * + * Write raw *data* blob into a special BPF perf event held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. This perf + * event must have the following attributes: **PERF_SAMPLE_RAW** + * as **sample_type**, **PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE** as **type**, and + * **PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUTPUT** as **config**. + * + * The *flags* are used to indicate the index in *map* for which + * the value must be put, masked with **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. + * Alternatively, *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** + * to indicate that the index of the current CPU core should be + * used. + * + * The value to write, of *size*, is passed through eBPF stack and + * pointed by *data*. + * + * *ctx* is a pointer to in-kernel struct xdp_buff. + * + * This helper is similar to **bpf_perf_eventoutput**\ () but + * restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_xdp_output)(void *ctx, void *map, __u64 flags, void *data, __u64 size) = (void *) 121; + +/* + * bpf_get_netns_cookie + * + * Retrieve the cookie (generated by the kernel) of the network + * namespace the input *ctx* is associated with. The network + * namespace cookie remains stable for its lifetime and provides + * a global identifier that can be assumed unique. If *ctx* is + * NULL, then the helper returns the cookie for the initial + * network namespace. The cookie itself is very similar to that + * of **bpf_get_socket_cookie**\ () helper, but for network + * namespaces instead of sockets. + * + * Returns + * A 8-byte long opaque number. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_netns_cookie)(void *ctx) = (void *) 122; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_ancestor_cgroup_id + * + * Return id of cgroup v2 that is ancestor of the cgroup associated + * with the current task at the *ancestor_level*. The root cgroup + * is at *ancestor_level* zero and each step down the hierarchy + * increments the level. If *ancestor_level* == level of cgroup + * associated with the current task, then return value will be the + * same as that of **bpf_get_current_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * The helper is useful to implement policies based on cgroups + * that are upper in hierarchy than immediate cgroup associated + * with the current task. + * + * The format of returned id and helper limitations are same as in + * **bpf_get_current_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * Returns + * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_current_ancestor_cgroup_id)(int ancestor_level) = (void *) 123; + +/* + * bpf_sk_assign + * + * Helper is overloaded depending on BPF program type. This + * description applies to **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS** and + * **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT** programs. + * + * Assign the *sk* to the *skb*. When combined with appropriate + * routing configuration to receive the packet towards the socket, + * will cause *skb* to be delivered to the specified socket. + * Subsequent redirection of *skb* via **bpf_redirect**\ (), + * **bpf_clone_redirect**\ () or other methods outside of BPF may + * interfere with successful delivery to the socket. + * + * This operation is only valid from TC ingress path. + * + * The *flags* argument must be zero. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure: + * + * **-EINVAL** if specified *flags* are not supported. + * + * **-ENOENT** if the socket is unavailable for assignment. + * + * **-ENETUNREACH** if the socket is unreachable (wrong netns). + * + * **-EOPNOTSUPP** if the operation is not supported, for example + * a call from outside of TC ingress. + * + * **-ESOCKTNOSUPPORT** if the socket type is not supported + * (reuseport). + */ +static long (*bpf_sk_assign)(void *ctx, void *sk, __u64 flags) = (void *) 124; + +/* + * bpf_ktime_get_boot_ns + * + * Return the time elapsed since system boot, in nanoseconds. + * Does include the time the system was suspended. + * See: **clock_gettime**\ (**CLOCK_BOOTTIME**) + * + * Returns + * Current *ktime*. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_ktime_get_boot_ns)(void) = (void *) 125; + +/* + * bpf_seq_printf + * + * **bpf_seq_printf**\ () uses seq_file **seq_printf**\ () to print + * out the format string. + * The *m* represents the seq_file. The *fmt* and *fmt_size* are for + * the format string itself. The *data* and *data_len* are format string + * arguments. The *data* are a **u64** array and corresponding format string + * values are stored in the array. For strings and pointers where pointees + * are accessed, only the pointer values are stored in the *data* array. + * The *data_len* is the size of *data* in bytes - must be a multiple of 8. + * + * Formats **%s**, **%p{i,I}{4,6}** requires to read kernel memory. + * Reading kernel memory may fail due to either invalid address or + * valid address but requiring a major memory fault. If reading kernel memory + * fails, the string for **%s** will be an empty string, and the ip + * address for **%p{i,I}{4,6}** will be 0. Not returning error to + * bpf program is consistent with what **bpf_trace_printk**\ () does for now. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure: + * + * **-EBUSY** if per-CPU memory copy buffer is busy, can try again + * by returning 1 from bpf program. + * + * **-EINVAL** if arguments are invalid, or if *fmt* is invalid/unsupported. + * + * **-E2BIG** if *fmt* contains too many format specifiers. + * + * **-EOVERFLOW** if an overflow happened: The same object will be tried again. + */ +static long (*bpf_seq_printf)(struct seq_file *m, const char *fmt, __u32 fmt_size, const void *data, __u32 data_len) = (void *) 126; + +/* + * bpf_seq_write + * + * **bpf_seq_write**\ () uses seq_file **seq_write**\ () to write the data. + * The *m* represents the seq_file. The *data* and *len* represent the + * data to write in bytes. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure: + * + * **-EOVERFLOW** if an overflow happened: The same object will be tried again. + */ +static long (*bpf_seq_write)(struct seq_file *m, const void *data, __u32 len) = (void *) 127; + +/* + * bpf_sk_cgroup_id + * + * Return the cgroup v2 id of the socket *sk*. + * + * *sk* must be a non-**NULL** pointer to a socket, e.g. one + * returned from **bpf_sk_lookup_xxx**\ (), + * **bpf_sk_fullsock**\ (), etc. The format of returned id is + * same as in **bpf_skb_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA** configuration option. + * + * Returns + * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_sk_cgroup_id)(void *sk) = (void *) 128; + +/* + * bpf_sk_ancestor_cgroup_id + * + * Return id of cgroup v2 that is ancestor of cgroup associated + * with the *sk* at the *ancestor_level*. The root cgroup is at + * *ancestor_level* zero and each step down the hierarchy + * increments the level. If *ancestor_level* == level of cgroup + * associated with *sk*, then return value will be same as that + * of **bpf_sk_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * The helper is useful to implement policies based on cgroups + * that are upper in hierarchy than immediate cgroup associated + * with *sk*. + * + * The format of returned id and helper limitations are same as in + * **bpf_sk_cgroup_id**\ (). + * + * Returns + * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_sk_ancestor_cgroup_id)(void *sk, int ancestor_level) = (void *) 129; + +/* + * bpf_ringbuf_output + * + * Copy *size* bytes from *data* into a ring buffer *ringbuf*. + * If **BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP** is specified in *flags*, no notification + * of new data availability is sent. + * If **BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP** is specified in *flags*, notification + * of new data availability is sent unconditionally. + * If **0** is specified in *flags*, an adaptive notification + * of new data availability is sent. + * + * An adaptive notification is a notification sent whenever the user-space + * process has caught up and consumed all available payloads. In case the user-space + * process is still processing a previous payload, then no notification is needed + * as it will process the newly added payload automatically. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_ringbuf_output)(void *ringbuf, void *data, __u64 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 130; + +/* + * bpf_ringbuf_reserve + * + * Reserve *size* bytes of payload in a ring buffer *ringbuf*. + * *flags* must be 0. + * + * Returns + * Valid pointer with *size* bytes of memory available; NULL, + * otherwise. + */ +static void *(*bpf_ringbuf_reserve)(void *ringbuf, __u64 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 131; + +/* + * bpf_ringbuf_submit + * + * Submit reserved ring buffer sample, pointed to by *data*. + * If **BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP** is specified in *flags*, no notification + * of new data availability is sent. + * If **BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP** is specified in *flags*, notification + * of new data availability is sent unconditionally. + * If **0** is specified in *flags*, an adaptive notification + * of new data availability is sent. + * + * See 'bpf_ringbuf_output()' for the definition of adaptive notification. + * + * Returns + * Nothing. Always succeeds. + */ +static void (*bpf_ringbuf_submit)(void *data, __u64 flags) = (void *) 132; + +/* + * bpf_ringbuf_discard + * + * Discard reserved ring buffer sample, pointed to by *data*. + * If **BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP** is specified in *flags*, no notification + * of new data availability is sent. + * If **BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP** is specified in *flags*, notification + * of new data availability is sent unconditionally. + * If **0** is specified in *flags*, an adaptive notification + * of new data availability is sent. + * + * See 'bpf_ringbuf_output()' for the definition of adaptive notification. + * + * Returns + * Nothing. Always succeeds. + */ +static void (*bpf_ringbuf_discard)(void *data, __u64 flags) = (void *) 133; + +/* + * bpf_ringbuf_query + * + * Query various characteristics of provided ring buffer. What + * exactly is queries is determined by *flags*: + * + * * **BPF_RB_AVAIL_DATA**: Amount of data not yet consumed. + * * **BPF_RB_RING_SIZE**: The size of ring buffer. + * * **BPF_RB_CONS_POS**: Consumer position (can wrap around). + * * **BPF_RB_PROD_POS**: Producer(s) position (can wrap around). + * + * Data returned is just a momentary snapshot of actual values + * and could be inaccurate, so this facility should be used to + * power heuristics and for reporting, not to make 100% correct + * calculation. + * + * Returns + * Requested value, or 0, if *flags* are not recognized. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_ringbuf_query)(void *ringbuf, __u64 flags) = (void *) 134; + +/* + * bpf_csum_level + * + * Change the skbs checksum level by one layer up or down, or + * reset it entirely to none in order to have the stack perform + * checksum validation. The level is applicable to the following + * protocols: TCP, UDP, GRE, SCTP, FCOE. For example, a decap of + * | ETH | IP | UDP | GUE | IP | TCP | into | ETH | IP | TCP | + * through **bpf_skb_adjust_room**\ () helper with passing in + * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_NO_CSUM_RESET** flag would require one call + * to **bpf_csum_level**\ () with **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_DEC** since + * the UDP header is removed. Similarly, an encap of the latter + * into the former could be accompanied by a helper call to + * **bpf_csum_level**\ () with **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_INC** if the + * skb is still intended to be processed in higher layers of the + * stack instead of just egressing at tc. + * + * There are three supported level settings at this time: + * + * * **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_INC**: Increases skb->csum_level for skbs + * with CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. + * * **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_DEC**: Decreases skb->csum_level for skbs + * with CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. + * * **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_RESET**: Resets skb->csum_level to 0 and + * sets CHECKSUM_NONE to force checksum validation by the stack. + * * **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_QUERY**: No-op, returns the current + * skb->csum_level. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. In the + * case of **BPF_CSUM_LEVEL_QUERY**, the current skb->csum_level + * is returned or the error code -EACCES in case the skb is not + * subject to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. + */ +static long (*bpf_csum_level)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u64 level) = (void *) 135; + +/* + * bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock + * + * Dynamically cast a *sk* pointer to a *tcp6_sock* pointer. + * + * Returns + * *sk* if casting is valid, or **NULL** otherwise. + */ +static struct tcp6_sock *(*bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock)(void *sk) = (void *) 136; + +/* + * bpf_skc_to_tcp_sock + * + * Dynamically cast a *sk* pointer to a *tcp_sock* pointer. + * + * Returns + * *sk* if casting is valid, or **NULL** otherwise. + */ +static struct tcp_sock *(*bpf_skc_to_tcp_sock)(void *sk) = (void *) 137; + +/* + * bpf_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock + * + * Dynamically cast a *sk* pointer to a *tcp_timewait_sock* pointer. + * + * Returns + * *sk* if casting is valid, or **NULL** otherwise. + */ +static struct tcp_timewait_sock *(*bpf_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock)(void *sk) = (void *) 138; + +/* + * bpf_skc_to_tcp_request_sock + * + * Dynamically cast a *sk* pointer to a *tcp_request_sock* pointer. + * + * Returns + * *sk* if casting is valid, or **NULL** otherwise. + */ +static struct tcp_request_sock *(*bpf_skc_to_tcp_request_sock)(void *sk) = (void *) 139; + +/* + * bpf_skc_to_udp6_sock + * + * Dynamically cast a *sk* pointer to a *udp6_sock* pointer. + * + * Returns + * *sk* if casting is valid, or **NULL** otherwise. + */ +static struct udp6_sock *(*bpf_skc_to_udp6_sock)(void *sk) = (void *) 140; + +/* + * bpf_get_task_stack + * + * Return a user or a kernel stack in bpf program provided buffer. + * To achieve this, the helper needs *task*, which is a valid + * pointer to **struct task_struct**. To store the stacktrace, the + * bpf program provides *buf* with a nonnegative *size*. + * + * The last argument, *flags*, holds the number of stack frames to + * skip (from 0 to 255), masked with + * **BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK**. The next bits can be used to set + * the following flags: + * + * **BPF_F_USER_STACK** + * Collect a user space stack instead of a kernel stack. + * **BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID** + * Collect buildid+offset instead of ips for user stack, + * only valid if **BPF_F_USER_STACK** is also specified. + * + * **bpf_get_task_stack**\ () can collect up to + * **PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH** both kernel and user frames, subject + * to sufficient large buffer size. Note that + * this limit can be controlled with the **sysctl** program, and + * that it should be manually increased in order to profile long + * user stacks (such as stacks for Java programs). To do so, use: + * + * :: + * + * # sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_stack= + * + * Returns + * A non-negative value equal to or less than *size* on success, + * or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_task_stack)(struct task_struct *task, void *buf, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 141; + +/* + * bpf_load_hdr_opt + * + * Load header option. Support reading a particular TCP header + * option for bpf program (**BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS**). + * + * If *flags* is 0, it will search the option from the + * *skops*\ **->skb_data**. The comment in **struct bpf_sock_ops** + * has details on what skb_data contains under different + * *skops*\ **->op**. + * + * The first byte of the *searchby_res* specifies the + * kind that it wants to search. + * + * If the searching kind is an experimental kind + * (i.e. 253 or 254 according to RFC6994). It also + * needs to specify the "magic" which is either + * 2 bytes or 4 bytes. It then also needs to + * specify the size of the magic by using + * the 2nd byte which is "kind-length" of a TCP + * header option and the "kind-length" also + * includes the first 2 bytes "kind" and "kind-length" + * itself as a normal TCP header option also does. + * + * For example, to search experimental kind 254 with + * 2 byte magic 0xeB9F, the searchby_res should be + * [ 254, 4, 0xeB, 0x9F, 0, 0, .... 0 ]. + * + * To search for the standard window scale option (3), + * the *searchby_res* should be [ 3, 0, 0, .... 0 ]. + * Note, kind-length must be 0 for regular option. + * + * Searching for No-Op (0) and End-of-Option-List (1) are + * not supported. + * + * *len* must be at least 2 bytes which is the minimal size + * of a header option. + * + * Supported flags: + * + * * **BPF_LOAD_HDR_OPT_TCP_SYN** to search from the + * saved_syn packet or the just-received syn packet. + * + * + * Returns + * > 0 when found, the header option is copied to *searchby_res*. + * The return value is the total length copied. On failure, a + * negative error code is returned: + * + * **-EINVAL** if a parameter is invalid. + * + * **-ENOMSG** if the option is not found. + * + * **-ENOENT** if no syn packet is available when + * **BPF_LOAD_HDR_OPT_TCP_SYN** is used. + * + * **-ENOSPC** if there is not enough space. Only *len* number of + * bytes are copied. + * + * **-EFAULT** on failure to parse the header options in the + * packet. + * + * **-EPERM** if the helper cannot be used under the current + * *skops*\ **->op**. + */ +static long (*bpf_load_hdr_opt)(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops, void *searchby_res, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 142; + +/* + * bpf_store_hdr_opt + * + * Store header option. The data will be copied + * from buffer *from* with length *len* to the TCP header. + * + * The buffer *from* should have the whole option that + * includes the kind, kind-length, and the actual + * option data. The *len* must be at least kind-length + * long. The kind-length does not have to be 4 byte + * aligned. The kernel will take care of the padding + * and setting the 4 bytes aligned value to th->doff. + * + * This helper will check for duplicated option + * by searching the same option in the outgoing skb. + * + * This helper can only be called during + * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_WRITE_HDR_OPT_CB**. + * + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or negative error in case of failure: + * + * **-EINVAL** If param is invalid. + * + * **-ENOSPC** if there is not enough space in the header. + * Nothing has been written + * + * **-EEXIST** if the option already exists. + * + * **-EFAULT** on failrue to parse the existing header options. + * + * **-EPERM** if the helper cannot be used under the current + * *skops*\ **->op**. + */ +static long (*bpf_store_hdr_opt)(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops, const void *from, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 143; + +/* + * bpf_reserve_hdr_opt + * + * Reserve *len* bytes for the bpf header option. The + * space will be used by **bpf_store_hdr_opt**\ () later in + * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_WRITE_HDR_OPT_CB**. + * + * If **bpf_reserve_hdr_opt**\ () is called multiple times, + * the total number of bytes will be reserved. + * + * This helper can only be called during + * **BPF_SOCK_OPS_HDR_OPT_LEN_CB**. + * + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or negative error in case of failure: + * + * **-EINVAL** if a parameter is invalid. + * + * **-ENOSPC** if there is not enough space in the header. + * + * **-EPERM** if the helper cannot be used under the current + * *skops*\ **->op**. + */ +static long (*bpf_reserve_hdr_opt)(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops, __u32 len, __u64 flags) = (void *) 144; + +/* + * bpf_inode_storage_get + * + * Get a bpf_local_storage from an *inode*. + * + * Logically, it could be thought of as getting the value from + * a *map* with *inode* as the **key**. From this + * perspective, the usage is not much different from + * **bpf_map_lookup_elem**\ (*map*, **&**\ *inode*) except this + * helper enforces the key must be an inode and the map must also + * be a **BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE**. + * + * Underneath, the value is stored locally at *inode* instead of + * the *map*. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage + * "type". The bpf-local-storage "type" (i.e. the *map*) is + * searched against all bpf_local_storage residing at *inode*. + * + * An optional *flags* (**BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE**) can be + * used such that a new bpf_local_storage will be + * created if one does not exist. *value* can be used + * together with **BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE** to specify + * the initial value of a bpf_local_storage. If *value* is + * **NULL**, the new bpf_local_storage will be zero initialized. + * + * Returns + * A bpf_local_storage pointer is returned on success. + * + * **NULL** if not found or there was an error in adding + * a new bpf_local_storage. + */ +static void *(*bpf_inode_storage_get)(void *map, void *inode, void *value, __u64 flags) = (void *) 145; + +/* + * bpf_inode_storage_delete + * + * Delete a bpf_local_storage from an *inode*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * + * **-ENOENT** if the bpf_local_storage cannot be found. + */ +static int (*bpf_inode_storage_delete)(void *map, void *inode) = (void *) 146; + +/* + * bpf_d_path + * + * Return full path for given **struct path** object, which + * needs to be the kernel BTF *path* object. The path is + * returned in the provided buffer *buf* of size *sz* and + * is zero terminated. + * + * + * Returns + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, + * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative + * value. + */ +static long (*bpf_d_path)(struct path *path, char *buf, __u32 sz) = (void *) 147; + +/* + * bpf_copy_from_user + * + * Read *size* bytes from user space address *user_ptr* and store + * the data in *dst*. This is a wrapper of **copy_from_user**\ (). + * + * Returns + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_copy_from_user)(void *dst, __u32 size, const void *user_ptr) = (void *) 148; + +/* + * bpf_snprintf_btf + * + * Use BTF to store a string representation of *ptr*->ptr in *str*, + * using *ptr*->type_id. This value should specify the type + * that *ptr*->ptr points to. LLVM __builtin_btf_type_id(type, 1) + * can be used to look up vmlinux BTF type ids. Traversing the + * data structure using BTF, the type information and values are + * stored in the first *str_size* - 1 bytes of *str*. Safe copy of + * the pointer data is carried out to avoid kernel crashes during + * operation. Smaller types can use string space on the stack; + * larger programs can use map data to store the string + * representation. + * + * The string can be subsequently shared with userspace via + * bpf_perf_event_output() or ring buffer interfaces. + * bpf_trace_printk() is to be avoided as it places too small + * a limit on string size to be useful. + * + * *flags* is a combination of + * + * **BTF_F_COMPACT** + * no formatting around type information + * **BTF_F_NONAME** + * no struct/union member names/types + * **BTF_F_PTR_RAW** + * show raw (unobfuscated) pointer values; + * equivalent to printk specifier %px. + * **BTF_F_ZERO** + * show zero-valued struct/union members; they + * are not displayed by default + * + * + * Returns + * The number of bytes that were written (or would have been + * written if output had to be truncated due to string size), + * or a negative error in cases of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_snprintf_btf)(char *str, __u32 str_size, struct btf_ptr *ptr, __u32 btf_ptr_size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 149; + +/* + * bpf_seq_printf_btf + * + * Use BTF to write to seq_write a string representation of + * *ptr*->ptr, using *ptr*->type_id as per bpf_snprintf_btf(). + * *flags* are identical to those used for bpf_snprintf_btf. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success or a negative error in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_seq_printf_btf)(struct seq_file *m, struct btf_ptr *ptr, __u32 ptr_size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 150; + +/* + * bpf_skb_cgroup_classid + * + * See **bpf_get_cgroup_classid**\ () for the main description. + * This helper differs from **bpf_get_cgroup_classid**\ () in that + * the cgroup v1 net_cls class is retrieved only from the *skb*'s + * associated socket instead of the current process. + * + * Returns + * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_skb_cgroup_classid)(struct __sk_buff *skb) = (void *) 151; + +/* + * bpf_redirect_neigh + * + * Redirect the packet to another net device of index *ifindex* + * and fill in L2 addresses from neighboring subsystem. This helper + * is somewhat similar to **bpf_redirect**\ (), except that it + * populates L2 addresses as well, meaning, internally, the helper + * relies on the neighbor lookup for the L2 address of the nexthop. + * + * The helper will perform a FIB lookup based on the skb's + * networking header to get the address of the next hop, unless + * this is supplied by the caller in the *params* argument. The + * *plen* argument indicates the len of *params* and should be set + * to 0 if *params* is NULL. + * + * The *flags* argument is reserved and must be 0. The helper is + * currently only supported for tc BPF program types, and enabled + * for IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. + * + * Returns + * The helper returns **TC_ACT_REDIRECT** on success or + * **TC_ACT_SHOT** on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_redirect_neigh)(__u32 ifindex, struct bpf_redir_neigh *params, int plen, __u64 flags) = (void *) 152; + +/* + * bpf_per_cpu_ptr + * + * Take a pointer to a percpu ksym, *percpu_ptr*, and return a + * pointer to the percpu kernel variable on *cpu*. A ksym is an + * extern variable decorated with '__ksym'. For ksym, there is a + * global var (either static or global) defined of the same name + * in the kernel. The ksym is percpu if the global var is percpu. + * The returned pointer points to the global percpu var on *cpu*. + * + * bpf_per_cpu_ptr() has the same semantic as per_cpu_ptr() in the + * kernel, except that bpf_per_cpu_ptr() may return NULL. This + * happens if *cpu* is larger than nr_cpu_ids. The caller of + * bpf_per_cpu_ptr() must check the returned value. + * + * Returns + * A pointer pointing to the kernel percpu variable on *cpu*, or + * NULL, if *cpu* is invalid. + */ +static void *(*bpf_per_cpu_ptr)(const void *percpu_ptr, __u32 cpu) = (void *) 153; + +/* + * bpf_this_cpu_ptr + * + * Take a pointer to a percpu ksym, *percpu_ptr*, and return a + * pointer to the percpu kernel variable on this cpu. See the + * description of 'ksym' in **bpf_per_cpu_ptr**\ (). + * + * bpf_this_cpu_ptr() has the same semantic as this_cpu_ptr() in + * the kernel. Different from **bpf_per_cpu_ptr**\ (), it would + * never return NULL. + * + * Returns + * A pointer pointing to the kernel percpu variable on this cpu. + */ +static void *(*bpf_this_cpu_ptr)(const void *percpu_ptr) = (void *) 154; + +/* + * bpf_redirect_peer + * + * Redirect the packet to another net device of index *ifindex*. + * This helper is somewhat similar to **bpf_redirect**\ (), except + * that the redirection happens to the *ifindex*' peer device and + * the netns switch takes place from ingress to ingress without + * going through the CPU's backlog queue. + * + * The *flags* argument is reserved and must be 0. The helper is + * currently only supported for tc BPF program types at the ingress + * hook and for veth device types. The peer device must reside in a + * different network namespace. + * + * Returns + * The helper returns **TC_ACT_REDIRECT** on success or + * **TC_ACT_SHOT** on error. + */ +static long (*bpf_redirect_peer)(__u32 ifindex, __u64 flags) = (void *) 155; + +/* + * bpf_task_storage_get + * + * Get a bpf_local_storage from the *task*. + * + * Logically, it could be thought of as getting the value from + * a *map* with *task* as the **key**. From this + * perspective, the usage is not much different from + * **bpf_map_lookup_elem**\ (*map*, **&**\ *task*) except this + * helper enforces the key must be an task_struct and the map must also + * be a **BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE**. + * + * Underneath, the value is stored locally at *task* instead of + * the *map*. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage + * "type". The bpf-local-storage "type" (i.e. the *map*) is + * searched against all bpf_local_storage residing at *task*. + * + * An optional *flags* (**BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE**) can be + * used such that a new bpf_local_storage will be + * created if one does not exist. *value* can be used + * together with **BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE** to specify + * the initial value of a bpf_local_storage. If *value* is + * **NULL**, the new bpf_local_storage will be zero initialized. + * + * Returns + * A bpf_local_storage pointer is returned on success. + * + * **NULL** if not found or there was an error in adding + * a new bpf_local_storage. + */ +static void *(*bpf_task_storage_get)(void *map, struct task_struct *task, void *value, __u64 flags) = (void *) 156; + +/* + * bpf_task_storage_delete + * + * Delete a bpf_local_storage from a *task*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * + * **-ENOENT** if the bpf_local_storage cannot be found. + */ +static long (*bpf_task_storage_delete)(void *map, struct task_struct *task) = (void *) 157; + +/* + * bpf_get_current_task_btf + * + * Return a BTF pointer to the "current" task. + * This pointer can also be used in helpers that accept an + * *ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID* of type *task_struct*. + * + * Returns + * Pointer to the current task. + */ +static struct task_struct *(*bpf_get_current_task_btf)(void) = (void *) 158; + +/* + * bpf_bprm_opts_set + * + * Set or clear certain options on *bprm*: + * + * **BPF_F_BPRM_SECUREEXEC** Set the secureexec bit + * which sets the **AT_SECURE** auxv for glibc. The bit + * is cleared if the flag is not specified. + * + * Returns + * **-EINVAL** if invalid *flags* are passed, zero otherwise. + */ +static long (*bpf_bprm_opts_set)(struct linux_binprm *bprm, __u64 flags) = (void *) 159; + +/* + * bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns + * + * Return a coarse-grained version of the time elapsed since + * system boot, in nanoseconds. Does not include time the system + * was suspended. + * + * See: **clock_gettime**\ (**CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE**) + * + * Returns + * Current *ktime*. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns)(void) = (void *) 160; + +/* + * bpf_ima_inode_hash + * + * Returns the stored IMA hash of the *inode* (if it's avaialable). + * If the hash is larger than *size*, then only *size* + * bytes will be copied to *dst* + * + * Returns + * The **hash_algo** is returned on success, + * **-EOPNOTSUP** if IMA is disabled or **-EINVAL** if + * invalid arguments are passed. + */ +static long (*bpf_ima_inode_hash)(struct inode *inode, void *dst, __u32 size) = (void *) 161; + +/* + * bpf_sock_from_file + * + * If the given file represents a socket, returns the associated + * socket. + * + * Returns + * A pointer to a struct socket on success or NULL if the file is + * not a socket. + */ +static struct socket *(*bpf_sock_from_file)(struct file *file) = (void *) 162; + +/* + * bpf_check_mtu + * + * Check packet size against exceeding MTU of net device (based + * on *ifindex*). This helper will likely be used in combination + * with helpers that adjust/change the packet size. + * + * The argument *len_diff* can be used for querying with a planned + * size change. This allows to check MTU prior to changing packet + * ctx. Providing an *len_diff* adjustment that is larger than the + * actual packet size (resulting in negative packet size) will in + * principle not exceed the MTU, why it is not considered a + * failure. Other BPF-helpers are needed for performing the + * planned size change, why the responsibility for catch a negative + * packet size belong in those helpers. + * + * Specifying *ifindex* zero means the MTU check is performed + * against the current net device. This is practical if this isn't + * used prior to redirect. + * + * On input *mtu_len* must be a valid pointer, else verifier will + * reject BPF program. If the value *mtu_len* is initialized to + * zero then the ctx packet size is use. When value *mtu_len* is + * provided as input this specify the L3 length that the MTU check + * is done against. Remember XDP and TC length operate at L2, but + * this value is L3 as this correlate to MTU and IP-header tot_len + * values which are L3 (similar behavior as bpf_fib_lookup). + * + * The Linux kernel route table can configure MTUs on a more + * specific per route level, which is not provided by this helper. + * For route level MTU checks use the **bpf_fib_lookup**\ () + * helper. + * + * *ctx* is either **struct xdp_md** for XDP programs or + * **struct sk_buff** for tc cls_act programs. + * + * The *flags* argument can be a combination of one or more of the + * following values: + * + * **BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS** + * This flag will only works for *ctx* **struct sk_buff**. + * If packet context contains extra packet segment buffers + * (often knows as GSO skb), then MTU check is harder to + * check at this point, because in transmit path it is + * possible for the skb packet to get re-segmented + * (depending on net device features). This could still be + * a MTU violation, so this flag enables performing MTU + * check against segments, with a different violation + * return code to tell it apart. Check cannot use len_diff. + * + * On return *mtu_len* pointer contains the MTU value of the net + * device. Remember the net device configured MTU is the L3 size, + * which is returned here and XDP and TC length operate at L2. + * Helper take this into account for you, but remember when using + * MTU value in your BPF-code. + * + * + * Returns + * * 0 on success, and populate MTU value in *mtu_len* pointer. + * + * * < 0 if any input argument is invalid (*mtu_len* not updated) + * + * MTU violations return positive values, but also populate MTU + * value in *mtu_len* pointer, as this can be needed for + * implementing PMTU handing: + * + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED** + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG** + */ +static long (*bpf_check_mtu)(void *ctx, __u32 ifindex, __u32 *mtu_len, __s32 len_diff, __u64 flags) = (void *) 163; + +/* + * bpf_for_each_map_elem + * + * For each element in **map**, call **callback_fn** function with + * **map**, **callback_ctx** and other map-specific parameters. + * The **callback_fn** should be a static function and + * the **callback_ctx** should be a pointer to the stack. + * The **flags** is used to control certain aspects of the helper. + * Currently, the **flags** must be 0. + * + * The following are a list of supported map types and their + * respective expected callback signatures: + * + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH, + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH, BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH, + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY + * + * long (\*callback_fn)(struct bpf_map \*map, const void \*key, void \*value, void \*ctx); + * + * For per_cpu maps, the map_value is the value on the cpu where the + * bpf_prog is running. + * + * If **callback_fn** return 0, the helper will continue to the next + * element. If return value is 1, the helper will skip the rest of + * elements and return. Other return values are not used now. + * + * + * Returns + * The number of traversed map elements for success, **-EINVAL** for + * invalid **flags**. + */ +static long (*bpf_for_each_map_elem)(void *map, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, __u64 flags) = (void *) 164; + +/* + * bpf_snprintf + * + * Outputs a string into the **str** buffer of size **str_size** + * based on a format string stored in a read-only map pointed by + * **fmt**. + * + * Each format specifier in **fmt** corresponds to one u64 element + * in the **data** array. For strings and pointers where pointees + * are accessed, only the pointer values are stored in the *data* + * array. The *data_len* is the size of *data* in bytes - must be + * a multiple of 8. + * + * Formats **%s** and **%p{i,I}{4,6}** require to read kernel + * memory. Reading kernel memory may fail due to either invalid + * address or valid address but requiring a major memory fault. If + * reading kernel memory fails, the string for **%s** will be an + * empty string, and the ip address for **%p{i,I}{4,6}** will be 0. + * Not returning error to bpf program is consistent with what + * **bpf_trace_printk**\ () does for now. + * + * + * Returns + * The strictly positive length of the formatted string, including + * the trailing zero character. If the return value is greater than + * **str_size**, **str** contains a truncated string, guaranteed to + * be zero-terminated except when **str_size** is 0. + * + * Or **-EBUSY** if the per-CPU memory copy buffer is busy. + */ +static long (*bpf_snprintf)(char *str, __u32 str_size, const char *fmt, __u64 *data, __u32 data_len) = (void *) 165; + +/* + * bpf_sys_bpf + * + * Execute bpf syscall with given arguments. + * + * Returns + * A syscall result. + */ +static long (*bpf_sys_bpf)(__u32 cmd, void *attr, __u32 attr_size) = (void *) 166; + +/* + * bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind + * + * Find BTF type with given name and kind in vmlinux BTF or in module's BTFs. + * + * Returns + * Returns btf_id and btf_obj_fd in lower and upper 32 bits. + */ +static long (*bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind)(char *name, int name_sz, __u32 kind, int flags) = (void *) 167; + +/* + * bpf_sys_close + * + * Execute close syscall for given FD. + * + * Returns + * A syscall result. + */ +static long (*bpf_sys_close)(__u32 fd) = (void *) 168; + +/* + * bpf_timer_init + * + * Initialize the timer. + * First 4 bits of *flags* specify clockid. + * Only CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_BOOTTIME are allowed. + * All other bits of *flags* are reserved. + * The verifier will reject the program if *timer* is not from + * the same *map*. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * **-EBUSY** if *timer* is already initialized. + * **-EINVAL** if invalid *flags* are passed. + * **-EPERM** if *timer* is in a map that doesn't have any user references. + * The user space should either hold a file descriptor to a map with timers + * or pin such map in bpffs. When map is unpinned or file descriptor is + * closed all timers in the map will be cancelled and freed. + */ +static long (*bpf_timer_init)(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *map, __u64 flags) = (void *) 169; + +/* + * bpf_timer_set_callback + * + * Configure the timer to call *callback_fn* static function. + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * **-EINVAL** if *timer* was not initialized with bpf_timer_init() earlier. + * **-EPERM** if *timer* is in a map that doesn't have any user references. + * The user space should either hold a file descriptor to a map with timers + * or pin such map in bpffs. When map is unpinned or file descriptor is + * closed all timers in the map will be cancelled and freed. + */ +static long (*bpf_timer_set_callback)(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn) = (void *) 170; + +/* + * bpf_timer_start + * + * Set timer expiration N nanoseconds from the current time. The + * configured callback will be invoked in soft irq context on some cpu + * and will not repeat unless another bpf_timer_start() is made. + * In such case the next invocation can migrate to a different cpu. + * Since struct bpf_timer is a field inside map element the map + * owns the timer. The bpf_timer_set_callback() will increment refcnt + * of BPF program to make sure that callback_fn code stays valid. + * When user space reference to a map reaches zero all timers + * in a map are cancelled and corresponding program's refcnts are + * decremented. This is done to make sure that Ctrl-C of a user + * process doesn't leave any timers running. If map is pinned in + * bpffs the callback_fn can re-arm itself indefinitely. + * bpf_map_update/delete_elem() helpers and user space sys_bpf commands + * cancel and free the timer in the given map element. + * The map can contain timers that invoke callback_fn-s from different + * programs. The same callback_fn can serve different timers from + * different maps if key/value layout matches across maps. + * Every bpf_timer_set_callback() can have different callback_fn. + * + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * **-EINVAL** if *timer* was not initialized with bpf_timer_init() earlier + * or invalid *flags* are passed. + */ +static long (*bpf_timer_start)(struct bpf_timer *timer, __u64 nsecs, __u64 flags) = (void *) 171; + +/* + * bpf_timer_cancel + * + * Cancel the timer and wait for callback_fn to finish if it was running. + * + * Returns + * 0 if the timer was not active. + * 1 if the timer was active. + * **-EINVAL** if *timer* was not initialized with bpf_timer_init() earlier. + * **-EDEADLK** if callback_fn tried to call bpf_timer_cancel() on its + * own timer which would have led to a deadlock otherwise. + */ +static long (*bpf_timer_cancel)(struct bpf_timer *timer) = (void *) 172; + +/* + * bpf_get_func_ip + * + * Get address of the traced function (for tracing and kprobe programs). + * + * Returns + * Address of the traced function. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_func_ip)(void *ctx) = (void *) 173; + +/* + * bpf_get_attach_cookie + * + * Get bpf_cookie value provided (optionally) during the program + * attachment. It might be different for each individual + * attachment, even if BPF program itself is the same. + * Expects BPF program context *ctx* as a first argument. + * + * Supported for the following program types: + * - kprobe/uprobe; + * - tracepoint; + * - perf_event. + * + * Returns + * Value specified by user at BPF link creation/attachment time + * or 0, if it was not specified. + */ +static __u64 (*bpf_get_attach_cookie)(void *ctx) = (void *) 174; + +/* + * bpf_task_pt_regs + * + * Get the struct pt_regs associated with **task**. + * + * Returns + * A pointer to struct pt_regs. + */ +static long (*bpf_task_pt_regs)(struct task_struct *task) = (void *) 175; + +/* + * bpf_get_branch_snapshot + * + * Get branch trace from hardware engines like Intel LBR. The + * hardware engine is stopped shortly after the helper is + * called. Therefore, the user need to filter branch entries + * based on the actual use case. To capture branch trace + * before the trigger point of the BPF program, the helper + * should be called at the beginning of the BPF program. + * + * The data is stored as struct perf_branch_entry into output + * buffer *entries*. *size* is the size of *entries* in bytes. + * *flags* is reserved for now and must be zero. + * + * + * Returns + * On success, number of bytes written to *buf*. On error, a + * negative value. + * + * **-EINVAL** if *flags* is not zero. + * + * **-ENOENT** if architecture does not support branch records. + */ +static long (*bpf_get_branch_snapshot)(void *entries, __u32 size, __u64 flags) = (void *) 176; + +/* + * bpf_trace_vprintk + * + * Behaves like **bpf_trace_printk**\ () helper, but takes an array of u64 + * to format and can handle more format args as a result. + * + * Arguments are to be used as in **bpf_seq_printf**\ () helper. + * + * Returns + * The number of bytes written to the buffer, or a negative error + * in case of failure. + */ +static long (*bpf_trace_vprintk)(const char *fmt, __u32 fmt_size, const void *data, __u32 data_len) = (void *) 177; + +/* + * bpf_skc_to_unix_sock + * + * Dynamically cast a *sk* pointer to a *unix_sock* pointer. + * + * Returns + * *sk* if casting is valid, or **NULL** otherwise. + */ +static struct unix_sock *(*bpf_skc_to_unix_sock)(void *sk) = (void *) 178; + +/* + * bpf_kallsyms_lookup_name + * + * Get the address of a kernel symbol, returned in *res*. *res* is + * set to 0 if the symbol is not found. + * + * Returns + * On success, zero. On error, a negative value. + * + * **-EINVAL** if *flags* is not zero. + * + * **-EINVAL** if string *name* is not the same size as *name_sz*. + * + * **-ENOENT** if symbol is not found. + * + * **-EPERM** if caller does not have permission to obtain kernel address. + */ +static long (*bpf_kallsyms_lookup_name)(const char *name, int name_sz, int flags, __u64 *res) = (void *) 179; + +/* + * bpf_find_vma + * + * Find vma of *task* that contains *addr*, call *callback_fn* + * function with *task*, *vma*, and *callback_ctx*. + * The *callback_fn* should be a static function and + * the *callback_ctx* should be a pointer to the stack. + * The *flags* is used to control certain aspects of the helper. + * Currently, the *flags* must be 0. + * + * The expected callback signature is + * + * long (\*callback_fn)(struct task_struct \*task, struct vm_area_struct \*vma, void \*callback_ctx); + * + * + * Returns + * 0 on success. + * **-ENOENT** if *task->mm* is NULL, or no vma contains *addr*. + * **-EBUSY** if failed to try lock mmap_lock. + * **-EINVAL** for invalid **flags**. + */ +static long (*bpf_find_vma)(struct task_struct *task, __u64 addr, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, __u64 flags) = (void *) 180; + + diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_helpers.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..963b1060d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) */ +#ifndef __BPF_HELPERS__ +#define __BPF_HELPERS__ + +/* + * Note that bpf programs need to include either + * vmlinux.h (auto-generated from BTF) or linux/types.h + * in advance since bpf_helper_defs.h uses such types + * as __u64. + */ +#include "bpf_helper_defs.h" + +#define __uint(name, val) int (*name)[val] +#define __type(name, val) typeof(val) *name +#define __array(name, val) typeof(val) *name[] + +/* + * Helper macro to place programs, maps, license in + * different sections in elf_bpf file. Section names + * are interpreted by libbpf depending on the context (BPF programs, BPF maps, + * extern variables, etc). + * To allow use of SEC() with externs (e.g., for extern .maps declarations), + * make sure __attribute__((unused)) doesn't trigger compilation warning. + */ +#define SEC(name) \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wignored-attributes\"") \ + __attribute__((section(name), used)) \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ + +/* Avoid 'linux/stddef.h' definition of '__always_inline'. */ +#undef __always_inline +#define __always_inline inline __attribute__((always_inline)) + +#ifndef __noinline +#define __noinline __attribute__((noinline)) +#endif +#ifndef __weak +#define __weak __attribute__((weak)) +#endif + +/* + * Use __hidden attribute to mark a non-static BPF subprogram effectively + * static for BPF verifier's verification algorithm purposes, allowing more + * extensive and permissive BPF verification process, taking into account + * subprogram's caller context. + */ +#define __hidden __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))) + +/* When utilizing vmlinux.h with BPF CO-RE, user BPF programs can't include + * any system-level headers (such as stddef.h, linux/version.h, etc), and + * commonly-used macros like NULL and KERNEL_VERSION aren't available through + * vmlinux.h. This just adds unnecessary hurdles and forces users to re-define + * them on their own. So as a convenience, provide such definitions here. + */ +#ifndef NULL +#define NULL ((void *)0) +#endif + +#ifndef KERNEL_VERSION +#define KERNEL_VERSION(a, b, c) (((a) << 16) + ((b) << 8) + ((c) > 255 ? 255 : (c))) +#endif + +/* + * Helper macros to manipulate data structures + */ +#ifndef offsetof +#define offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ((unsigned long)&((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER) +#endif +#ifndef container_of +#define container_of(ptr, type, member) \ + ({ \ + void *__mptr = (void *)(ptr); \ + ((type *)(__mptr - offsetof(type, member))); \ + }) +#endif + +/* + * Helper macro to throw a compilation error if __bpf_unreachable() gets + * built into the resulting code. This works given BPF back end does not + * implement __builtin_trap(). This is useful to assert that certain paths + * of the program code are never used and hence eliminated by the compiler. + * + * For example, consider a switch statement that covers known cases used by + * the program. __bpf_unreachable() can then reside in the default case. If + * the program gets extended such that a case is not covered in the switch + * statement, then it will throw a build error due to the default case not + * being compiled out. + */ +#ifndef __bpf_unreachable +# define __bpf_unreachable() __builtin_trap() +#endif + +/* + * Helper function to perform a tail call with a constant/immediate map slot. + */ +#if __clang_major__ >= 8 && defined(__bpf__) +static __always_inline void +bpf_tail_call_static(void *ctx, const void *map, const __u32 slot) +{ + if (!__builtin_constant_p(slot)) + __bpf_unreachable(); + + /* + * Provide a hard guarantee that LLVM won't optimize setting r2 (map + * pointer) and r3 (constant map index) from _different paths_ ending + * up at the _same_ call insn as otherwise we won't be able to use the + * jmpq/nopl retpoline-free patching by the x86-64 JIT in the kernel + * given they mismatch. See also d2e4c1e6c294 ("bpf: Constant map key + * tracking for prog array pokes") for details on verifier tracking. + * + * Note on clobber list: we need to stay in-line with BPF calling + * convention, so even if we don't end up using r0, r4, r5, we need + * to mark them as clobber so that LLVM doesn't end up using them + * before / after the call. + */ + asm volatile("r1 = %[ctx]\n\t" + "r2 = %[map]\n\t" + "r3 = %[slot]\n\t" + "call 12" + :: [ctx]"r"(ctx), [map]"r"(map), [slot]"i"(slot) + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5"); +} +#endif + +/* + * Helper structure used by eBPF C program + * to describe BPF map attributes to libbpf loader + */ +struct bpf_map_def { + unsigned int type; + unsigned int key_size; + unsigned int value_size; + unsigned int max_entries; + unsigned int map_flags; +}; + +enum libbpf_pin_type { + LIBBPF_PIN_NONE, + /* PIN_BY_NAME: pin maps by name (in /sys/fs/bpf by default) */ + LIBBPF_PIN_BY_NAME, +}; + +enum libbpf_tristate { + TRI_NO = 0, + TRI_YES = 1, + TRI_MODULE = 2, +}; + +#define __kconfig __attribute__((section(".kconfig"))) +#define __ksym __attribute__((section(".ksyms"))) + +#ifndef ___bpf_concat +#define ___bpf_concat(a, b) a ## b +#endif +#ifndef ___bpf_apply +#define ___bpf_apply(fn, n) ___bpf_concat(fn, n) +#endif +#ifndef ___bpf_nth +#define ___bpf_nth(_, _1, _2, _3, _4, _5, _6, _7, _8, _9, _a, _b, _c, N, ...) N +#endif +#ifndef ___bpf_narg +#define ___bpf_narg(...) \ + ___bpf_nth(_, ##__VA_ARGS__, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) +#endif + +#define ___bpf_fill0(arr, p, x) do {} while (0) +#define ___bpf_fill1(arr, p, x) arr[p] = x +#define ___bpf_fill2(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill1(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill3(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill2(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill4(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill3(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill5(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill4(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill6(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill5(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill7(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill6(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill8(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill7(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill9(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill8(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill10(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill9(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill11(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill10(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill12(arr, p, x, args...) arr[p] = x; ___bpf_fill11(arr, p + 1, args) +#define ___bpf_fill(arr, args...) \ + ___bpf_apply(___bpf_fill, ___bpf_narg(args))(arr, 0, args) + +/* + * BPF_SEQ_PRINTF to wrap bpf_seq_printf to-be-printed values + * in a structure. + */ +#define BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, fmt, args...) \ +({ \ + static const char ___fmt[] = fmt; \ + unsigned long long ___param[___bpf_narg(args)]; \ + \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wint-conversion\"") \ + ___bpf_fill(___param, args); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ + \ + bpf_seq_printf(seq, ___fmt, sizeof(___fmt), \ + ___param, sizeof(___param)); \ +}) + +/* + * BPF_SNPRINTF wraps the bpf_snprintf helper with variadic arguments instead of + * an array of u64. + */ +#define BPF_SNPRINTF(out, out_size, fmt, args...) \ +({ \ + static const char ___fmt[] = fmt; \ + unsigned long long ___param[___bpf_narg(args)]; \ + \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wint-conversion\"") \ + ___bpf_fill(___param, args); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ + \ + bpf_snprintf(out, out_size, ___fmt, \ + ___param, sizeof(___param)); \ +}) + +#ifdef BPF_NO_GLOBAL_DATA +#define BPF_PRINTK_FMT_MOD +#else +#define BPF_PRINTK_FMT_MOD static const +#endif + +#define __bpf_printk(fmt, ...) \ +({ \ + BPF_PRINTK_FMT_MOD char ____fmt[] = fmt; \ + bpf_trace_printk(____fmt, sizeof(____fmt), \ + ##__VA_ARGS__); \ +}) + +/* + * __bpf_vprintk wraps the bpf_trace_vprintk helper with variadic arguments + * instead of an array of u64. + */ +#define __bpf_vprintk(fmt, args...) \ +({ \ + static const char ___fmt[] = fmt; \ + unsigned long long ___param[___bpf_narg(args)]; \ + \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wint-conversion\"") \ + ___bpf_fill(___param, args); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ + \ + bpf_trace_vprintk(___fmt, sizeof(___fmt), \ + ___param, sizeof(___param)); \ +}) + +/* Use __bpf_printk when bpf_printk call has 3 or fewer fmt args + * Otherwise use __bpf_vprintk + */ +#define ___bpf_pick_printk(...) \ + ___bpf_nth(_, ##__VA_ARGS__, __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_vprintk, \ + __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_vprintk, \ + __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_vprintk, __bpf_printk /*3*/, __bpf_printk /*2*/,\ + __bpf_printk /*1*/, __bpf_printk /*0*/) + +/* Helper macro to print out debug messages */ +#define bpf_printk(fmt, args...) ___bpf_pick_printk(args)(fmt, ##args) + +#endif diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_tracing.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_tracing.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..db05a5937 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/bpf_tracing.h @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) */ +#ifndef __BPF_TRACING_H__ +#define __BPF_TRACING_H__ + +/* Scan the ARCH passed in from ARCH env variable (see Makefile) */ +#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) + #define bpf_target_x86 + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_s390) + #define bpf_target_s390 + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm) + #define bpf_target_arm + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64) + #define bpf_target_arm64 + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_mips) + #define bpf_target_mips + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_powerpc) + #define bpf_target_powerpc + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_sparc) + #define bpf_target_sparc + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__TARGET_ARCH_riscv) + #define bpf_target_riscv + #define bpf_target_defined +#else + +/* Fall back to what the compiler says */ +#if defined(__x86_64__) + #define bpf_target_x86 + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__s390__) + #define bpf_target_s390 + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__arm__) + #define bpf_target_arm + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__aarch64__) + #define bpf_target_arm64 + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__mips__) + #define bpf_target_mips + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__powerpc__) + #define bpf_target_powerpc + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__sparc__) + #define bpf_target_sparc + #define bpf_target_defined +#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 + #define bpf_target_riscv + #define bpf_target_defined +#endif /* no compiler target */ + +#endif + +#ifndef __BPF_TARGET_MISSING +#define __BPF_TARGET_MISSING "GCC error \"Must specify a BPF target arch via __TARGET_ARCH_xxx\"" +#endif + +#if defined(bpf_target_x86) + +#if defined(__KERNEL__) || defined(__VMLINUX_H__) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->di) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->si) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->dx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ((x)->cx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ((x)->r8) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ((x)->sp) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) ((x)->bp) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->ax) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->ip) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), di) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), si) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), dx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), cx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), r8) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), sp) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), bp) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), ax) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), ip) + +#else + +#ifdef __i386__ +/* i386 kernel is built with -mregparm=3 */ +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->eax) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->edx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->ecx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) 0 +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) 0 +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ((x)->esp) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) ((x)->ebp) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->eax) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->esp) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->eip) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), eax) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), edx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), ecx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) 0 +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) 0 +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), esp) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), ebp) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), eax) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), esp) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), eip) + +#else + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->rdi) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->rsi) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->rdx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ((x)->rcx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ((x)->r8) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ((x)->rsp) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) ((x)->rbp) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->rax) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->rsp) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->rip) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rdi) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rsi) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rdx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rcx) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), r8) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rsp) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rbp) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rax) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rsp) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), rip) + +#endif +#endif + +#elif defined(bpf_target_s390) + +/* s390 provides user_pt_regs instead of struct pt_regs to userspace */ +struct pt_regs; +#define PT_REGS_S390 const volatile user_pt_regs +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[5]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[6]) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[14]) +/* Works only with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER */ +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[11]) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->gprs[15]) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) (((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x))->psw.addr) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[5]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[6]) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[14]) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[11]) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), gprs[15]) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_S390 *)(x), psw.addr) + +#elif defined(bpf_target_arm) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->uregs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->uregs[1]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->uregs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ((x)->uregs[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ((x)->uregs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ((x)->uregs[14]) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) ((x)->uregs[11]) /* Works only with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER */ +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->uregs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->uregs[13]) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->uregs[12]) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[1]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[14]) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[11]) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[13]) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), uregs[12]) + +#elif defined(bpf_target_arm64) + +/* arm64 provides struct user_pt_regs instead of struct pt_regs to userspace */ +struct pt_regs; +#define PT_REGS_ARM64 const volatile struct user_pt_regs +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[1]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[30]) +/* Works only with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER */ +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[29]) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->regs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) (((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x))->pc) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[1]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[30]) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[29]) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), regs[0]) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_ARM64 *)(x), pc) + +#elif defined(bpf_target_mips) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->regs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->regs[5]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->regs[6]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ((x)->regs[7]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ((x)->regs[8]) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ((x)->regs[31]) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) ((x)->regs[30]) /* Works only with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER */ +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->regs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->regs[29]) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->cp0_epc) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[4]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[5]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[6]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[7]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[8]) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[31]) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[30]) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[2]) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), regs[29]) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), cp0_epc) + +#elif defined(bpf_target_powerpc) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->gpr[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->gpr[4]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->gpr[5]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ((x)->gpr[6]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ((x)->gpr[7]) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->gpr[3]) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->nip) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), gpr[3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), gpr[4]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), gpr[5]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), gpr[6]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), gpr[7]) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), gpr[3]) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), nip) + +#elif defined(bpf_target_sparc) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I0]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I1]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I4]) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I7]) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_I0]) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ((x)->u_regs[UREG_FP]) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I0]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I1]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I2]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I3]) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I4]) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I7]) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_I0]) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), u_regs[UREG_FP]) + +/* Should this also be a bpf_target check for the sparc case? */ +#if defined(__arch64__) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->tpc) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), tpc) +#else +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ((x)->pc) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((x), pc) +#endif + +#elif defined(bpf_target_riscv) + +struct pt_regs; +#define PT_REGS_RV const volatile struct user_regs_struct +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->a0) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->a1) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->a2) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->a3) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->a4) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->ra) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->s5) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->a5) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) (((PT_REGS_RV *)(x))->epc) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), a0) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), a1) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), a2) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), a3) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), a4) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), ra) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), fp) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), a5) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), sp) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) BPF_CORE_READ((PT_REGS_RV *)(x), epc) + +#endif + +#if defined(bpf_target_powerpc) +#define BPF_KPROBE_READ_RET_IP(ip, ctx) ({ (ip) = (ctx)->link; }) +#define BPF_KRETPROBE_READ_RET_IP BPF_KPROBE_READ_RET_IP +#elif defined(bpf_target_sparc) +#define BPF_KPROBE_READ_RET_IP(ip, ctx) ({ (ip) = PT_REGS_RET(ctx); }) +#define BPF_KRETPROBE_READ_RET_IP BPF_KPROBE_READ_RET_IP +#elif defined(bpf_target_defined) +#define BPF_KPROBE_READ_RET_IP(ip, ctx) \ + ({ bpf_probe_read_kernel(&(ip), sizeof(ip), (void *)PT_REGS_RET(ctx)); }) +#define BPF_KRETPROBE_READ_RET_IP(ip, ctx) \ + ({ bpf_probe_read_kernel(&(ip), sizeof(ip), \ + (void *)(PT_REGS_FP(ctx) + sizeof(ip))); }) +#endif + +#if !defined(bpf_target_defined) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_RET(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_FP(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_RC(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_SP(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_IP(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) + +#define PT_REGS_PARM1_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM2_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM3_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM4_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_PARM5_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_RET_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_FP_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_RC_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_SP_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define PT_REGS_IP_CORE(x) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) + +#define BPF_KPROBE_READ_RET_IP(ip, ctx) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) +#define BPF_KRETPROBE_READ_RET_IP(ip, ctx) ({ _Pragma(__BPF_TARGET_MISSING); 0l; }) + +#endif /* !defined(bpf_target_defined) */ + +#ifndef ___bpf_concat +#define ___bpf_concat(a, b) a ## b +#endif +#ifndef ___bpf_apply +#define ___bpf_apply(fn, n) ___bpf_concat(fn, n) +#endif +#ifndef ___bpf_nth +#define ___bpf_nth(_, _1, _2, _3, _4, _5, _6, _7, _8, _9, _a, _b, _c, N, ...) N +#endif +#ifndef ___bpf_narg +#define ___bpf_narg(...) \ + ___bpf_nth(_, ##__VA_ARGS__, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) +#endif + +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast0() ctx +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast1(x) ___bpf_ctx_cast0(), (void *)ctx[0] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast2(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast1(args), (void *)ctx[1] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast3(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast2(args), (void *)ctx[2] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast4(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast3(args), (void *)ctx[3] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast5(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast4(args), (void *)ctx[4] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast6(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast5(args), (void *)ctx[5] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast7(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast6(args), (void *)ctx[6] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast8(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast7(args), (void *)ctx[7] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast9(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast8(args), (void *)ctx[8] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast10(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast9(args), (void *)ctx[9] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast11(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast10(args), (void *)ctx[10] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast12(x, args...) ___bpf_ctx_cast11(args), (void *)ctx[11] +#define ___bpf_ctx_cast(args...) \ + ___bpf_apply(___bpf_ctx_cast, ___bpf_narg(args))(args) + +/* + * BPF_PROG is a convenience wrapper for generic tp_btf/fentry/fexit and + * similar kinds of BPF programs, that accept input arguments as a single + * pointer to untyped u64 array, where each u64 can actually be a typed + * pointer or integer of different size. Instead of requring user to write + * manual casts and work with array elements by index, BPF_PROG macro + * allows user to declare a list of named and typed input arguments in the + * same syntax as for normal C function. All the casting is hidden and + * performed transparently, while user code can just assume working with + * function arguments of specified type and name. + * + * Original raw context argument is preserved as well as 'ctx' argument. + * This is useful when using BPF helpers that expect original context + * as one of the parameters (e.g., for bpf_perf_event_output()). + */ +#define BPF_PROG(name, args...) \ +name(unsigned long long *ctx); \ +static __attribute__((always_inline)) typeof(name(0)) \ +____##name(unsigned long long *ctx, ##args); \ +typeof(name(0)) name(unsigned long long *ctx) \ +{ \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wint-conversion\"") \ + return ____##name(___bpf_ctx_cast(args)); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ +} \ +static __attribute__((always_inline)) typeof(name(0)) \ +____##name(unsigned long long *ctx, ##args) + +struct pt_regs; + +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args0() ctx +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args1(x) \ + ___bpf_kprobe_args0(), (void *)PT_REGS_PARM1(ctx) +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args2(x, args...) \ + ___bpf_kprobe_args1(args), (void *)PT_REGS_PARM2(ctx) +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args3(x, args...) \ + ___bpf_kprobe_args2(args), (void *)PT_REGS_PARM3(ctx) +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args4(x, args...) \ + ___bpf_kprobe_args3(args), (void *)PT_REGS_PARM4(ctx) +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args5(x, args...) \ + ___bpf_kprobe_args4(args), (void *)PT_REGS_PARM5(ctx) +#define ___bpf_kprobe_args(args...) \ + ___bpf_apply(___bpf_kprobe_args, ___bpf_narg(args))(args) + +/* + * BPF_KPROBE serves the same purpose for kprobes as BPF_PROG for + * tp_btf/fentry/fexit BPF programs. It hides the underlying platform-specific + * low-level way of getting kprobe input arguments from struct pt_regs, and + * provides a familiar typed and named function arguments syntax and + * semantics of accessing kprobe input paremeters. + * + * Original struct pt_regs* context is preserved as 'ctx' argument. This might + * be necessary when using BPF helpers like bpf_perf_event_output(). + */ +#define BPF_KPROBE(name, args...) \ +name(struct pt_regs *ctx); \ +static __attribute__((always_inline)) typeof(name(0)) \ +____##name(struct pt_regs *ctx, ##args); \ +typeof(name(0)) name(struct pt_regs *ctx) \ +{ \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wint-conversion\"") \ + return ____##name(___bpf_kprobe_args(args)); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ +} \ +static __attribute__((always_inline)) typeof(name(0)) \ +____##name(struct pt_regs *ctx, ##args) + +#define ___bpf_kretprobe_args0() ctx +#define ___bpf_kretprobe_args1(x) \ + ___bpf_kretprobe_args0(), (void *)PT_REGS_RC(ctx) +#define ___bpf_kretprobe_args(args...) \ + ___bpf_apply(___bpf_kretprobe_args, ___bpf_narg(args))(args) + +/* + * BPF_KRETPROBE is similar to BPF_KPROBE, except, it only provides optional + * return value (in addition to `struct pt_regs *ctx`), but no input + * arguments, because they will be clobbered by the time probed function + * returns. + */ +#define BPF_KRETPROBE(name, args...) \ +name(struct pt_regs *ctx); \ +static __attribute__((always_inline)) typeof(name(0)) \ +____##name(struct pt_regs *ctx, ##args); \ +typeof(name(0)) name(struct pt_regs *ctx) \ +{ \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push") \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wint-conversion\"") \ + return ____##name(___bpf_kretprobe_args(args)); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop") \ +} \ +static __always_inline typeof(name(0)) ____##name(struct pt_regs *ctx, ##args) + +#endif diff --git a/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/common.h b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..55d4fe9d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/execd/pkg/ebpf/prog/bpf/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// This is a compact version of `vmlinux.h` to be used in the examples using C code. + +#pragma once + +typedef unsigned char __u8; +typedef short int __s16; +typedef short unsigned int __u16; +typedef int __s32; +typedef unsigned int __u32; +typedef long long int __s64; +typedef long long unsigned int __u64; +typedef __u8 u8; +typedef __s16 s16; +typedef __u16 u16; +typedef __s32 s32; +typedef __u32 u32; +typedef __s64 s64; +typedef __u64 u64; +typedef __u16 __le16; +typedef __u16 __be16; +typedef __u32 __be32; +typedef __u64 __be64; +typedef __u32 __wsum; + +#include "bpf_helpers.h" + +enum bpf_map_type { + BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC = 0, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH = 1, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY = 2, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY = 3, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY = 4, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH = 5, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY = 6, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE = 7, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY = 8, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH = 9, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH = 10, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE = 11, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS = 12, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS = 13, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP = 14, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP = 15, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP = 16, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP = 17, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH = 18, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE = 19, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY = 20, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE = 21, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE = 22, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK = 23, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE = 24, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH = 25, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS = 26, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF = 27, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE = 28, +}; + +enum xdp_action { + XDP_ABORTED = 0, + XDP_DROP = 1, + XDP_PASS = 2, + XDP_TX = 3, + XDP_REDIRECT = 4, +}; + +enum tc_action { + TC_ACT_UNSPEC = -1, + TC_ACT_OK = 0, + TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY = 1, + TC_ACT_SHOT = 2, + TC_ACT_PIPE = 3, + TC_ACT_STOLEN = 4, + TC_ACT_QUEUED = 5, + TC_ACT_REPEAT = 6, + TC_ACT_REDIRECT = 7, + TC_ACT_JUMP = 0x10000000 +}; + +struct xdp_md { + __u32 data; + __u32 data_end; + __u32 data_meta; + __u32 ingress_ifindex; + __u32 rx_queue_index; + __u32 egress_ifindex; +}; + +typedef __u16 __sum16; + +#define ETH_P_IP 0x0800 + +struct ethhdr { + unsigned char h_dest[6]; + unsigned char h_source[6]; + __be16 h_proto; +}; + +struct iphdr { + __u8 ihl: 4; + __u8 version: 4; + __u8 tos; + __be16 tot_len; + __be16 id; + __be16 frag_off; + __u8 ttl; + __u8 protocol; + __sum16 check; + __be32 saddr; + __be32 daddr; +}; + +enum { + BPF_ANY = 0, + BPF_NOEXIST = 1, + BPF_EXIST = 2, + BPF_F_LOCK = 4, +}; + +/* BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output, BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read and + * BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value flags. + */ +#define BPF_F_INDEX_MASK 0xffffffffULL +#define BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU BPF_F_INDEX_MASK + +#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) +struct pt_regs { + /* + * C ABI says these regs are callee-preserved. They aren't saved on kernel entry + * unless syscall needs a complete, fully filled "struct pt_regs". + */ + unsigned long r15; + unsigned long r14; + unsigned long r13; + unsigned long r12; + unsigned long rbp; + unsigned long rbx; + /* These regs are callee-clobbered. Always saved on kernel entry. */ + unsigned long r11; + unsigned long r10; + unsigned long r9; + unsigned long r8; + unsigned long rax; + unsigned long rcx; + unsigned long rdx; + unsigned long rsi; + unsigned long rdi; + /* + * On syscall entry, this is syscall#. On CPU exception, this is error code. + * On hw interrupt, it's IRQ number: + */ + unsigned long orig_rax; + /* Return frame for iretq */ + unsigned long rip; + unsigned long cs; + unsigned long eflags; + unsigned long rsp; + unsigned long ss; + /* top of stack page */ +}; +#endif /* __TARGET_ARCH_x86 */ diff --git a/oseps/0018-execd-as-sandbox-init.md b/oseps/0018-execd-as-sandbox-init.md index c8e0ec00c..a3ca7b452 100644 --- a/oseps/0018-execd-as-sandbox-init.md +++ b/oseps/0018-execd-as-sandbox-init.md @@ -36,74 +36,56 @@ status: implementing ## Implementation Status -> Updated 2026-08-18. Status: **implementing** — the phased rollout below is -> implemented on branch `feat/execd-init-mode` (Phases 1–5 plus the server -> switch); remaining items are the trusted stop channel (§3), kernel-5.10 -> empirical validation, cross-language e2e, and the default-on rollout (see -> the Remaining work table below). R-i (server-path hardening e2e, docker -> bridge) landed in PR #1554. - -| Phase | Scope | Status | -|---|---|---| -| 1 | execd `--init` mode: single reaper (only wait4 caller), managedProcess abstraction replacing `Cmd.Wait` on every launch path, signal forwarding (TERM/HUP/USR1/USR2/WINCH), entrypoint-owned container lifecycle, subreaper fallback, `PR_SET_DUMPABLE`, `bootstrap.sh` `EXECD_INIT` exec branch, hardening endpoint reporting | ✅ implemented | -| 2 | Pre-exec floor (`[hardening] enabled`): `opensandbox-launcher` native helper (env strip → KEEPCAPS → bounding trim → no_new_privs → identity drop → ambient caps → seccomp last → execve), `[seccomp] deny` reuse with `execve` reserved, `keep_capabilities`; fail-open per layer | ✅ implemented | -| 3 | Landlock (`[landlock] enabled`): allowlist policy (system paths + `/proc/self` + device files + `/tmp`/`/run`/`allowed_writable` + extras), ABI probe v1–v4 with access-bit trimming; ABI < 1 → `unsupported` | ✅ implemented | -| 4 | eBPF observation (`[ebpf] enabled`, `execd-ebpf` variant): exec/connect/privilege hooks (CO-RE), sandbox cgroup filter, rotating JSONL audit file; kernel ≥5.10 with BTF | ✅ implemented | -| 5 | Pool taskTemplate: with `execd_run_as_init`, tasks are no longer backgrounded — execd becomes the task process-tree root (subreaper + exit-code propagation); `kill 1` recycle contract confirmed compatible under current SIGTERM semantics | ✅ implemented (task level) | -| — | Server switch `runtime.execd_run_as_init` injects `EXECD_INIT=1` across Docker / K8s Batch/Agent / Pool paths — resolves Open Question 1 | ✅ implemented | - -**Open implementation questions — resolution:** - -1. **Single enable switch** — resolved: the server sets `EXECD_INIT` from the - single `runtime.execd_run_as_init` config (default `false`); `bootstrap.sh` - passes `--init` iff `EXECD_INIT` is truthy, so topology and flag stay in - lockstep by construction. -2. **External SIGTERM forwarding** — implemented: SIGTERM is forwarded to the - entrypoint and execd exits with the workload's status. Distinguishing - external vs in-namespace SIGTERM (the §3 trusted-stop mechanism) is still - open: today an in-namespace `kill 1` also stops the sandbox (same as the - pre-OSEP bootstrap behavior) — tracked as remaining work. -3. **Managed-process abstraction** — implemented (reaper delivers - `WaitStatus`; per-call-site pipes/teardown are owned by the abstraction). -4. **Landlock device files** — resolved: `null/zero/full/random/urandom/tty` - writable + `/dev/pts` subtree for the controlling terminal. -5. **Landlock `/proc/self` for descendants** — resolved by accepting the - limitation: only the initial workload keeps `/proc/self` access; forked - descendants get EACCES on their own procfs (documented in - `docs/components/execd.md`). +> Updated 2026-08-19. Status: **implementing**. Phases 1–5 + server switch + +> all test/validation items done. **Remaining:** +> +> - **R-e** — `execd-ebpf` server-side selection not wired (`components/execd/README.md` Known issue) +> - **R-g** — `OPENSANDBOX_ID` reserved-env override (deferred, low) +> - **R-f** — default-on rollout (operator decision) + +Completed: Phase 1 (execd `--init` mode: single reaper, managedProcess, +signal forwarding, entrypoint-owned lifecycle, subreaper fallback, +`PR_SET_DUMPABLE`, `bootstrap.sh` `EXECD_INIT`), Phase 2 (pre-exec floor via +`opensandbox-launcher`), Phase 3 (Landlock), Phase 4 (eBPF observation), +Phase 5 (Pool taskTemplate, task-level subreaper), server switch +`runtime.execd_run_as_init` — plus all remaining-work items below marked +Implemented. Declined/cancelled: R-a (trusted stop channel; `kill 1` +SIGTERM contract kept), R-b (pool pod PID 1), R-d (cross-language e2e), +R-p (`/code` e2e). + +**Open implementation questions — resolution:** all resolved during +implementation — single `runtime.execd_run_as_init` switch drives both +`EXECD_INIT` and the floor; external SIGTERM is forwarded to the entrypoint +(§3's in-namespace distinction is moot now that R-a is declined); the +managed-process abstraction owns pipes/teardown; Landlock device files and +the `/proc/self`-for-descendants limitation are documented in +`docs/components/execd.md`. **Remaining work** (status 2026-08-18, PR #1474 + #1546 + #1554): | # | Item | Status / plan | |---|---|---| -| R-a | Trusted out-of-band stop channel (§3, R2) | **Open — biggest remaining item, separate PR.** Any SIGTERM (incl. in-namespace `kill 1`) still stops the sandbox (same as pre-OSEP behavior); `kill -9 1` is inert. Target: authenticated channel unreachable from the workload; then point the K8s Restart recycle at it instead of `kill 1` (`restart_default.go`; current SIGTERM semantics confirmed compatible, comment added) | +| R-a | Trusted out-of-band stop channel (§3, R2) | **Declined follow-up.** Decision (2026-08-18): keep the current `kill 1` SIGTERM contract — in-namespace SIGTERM stops the sandbox exactly as in the pre-OSEP era (accepted exposure; no regression), and `kill -9 1` stays inert via the PID 1 signal shield, which is the property R2 is really about. No stop endpoint, no credential channel: the K8s Restart recycle keeps `DefaultRestartCommand = ["kill", "1"]` (`restart_default.go` comment stays accurate under the kept semantics). External (out-of-namespace) runtime SIGTERM still forwards to the entrypoint for graceful shutdown (§2/Open question 2). R2 is downgraded from a must-have to a documented non-goal for this revision | | R-b | Pool pod-level PID 1 | **Declined follow-up.** Pool sandboxes run execd as task-level subreaper (Phase 5): the per-child floor holds without PID 1; the lost signal shield is no regression (pool exposure equals the pre-OSEP era; task-executor owns pod reaping). Operators wanting full PID 1 configure the Pool template command manually (`bootstrap.sh` + keepalive + `EXECD_INIT=1`); server auto-injection out of scope | -| R-c | Kernel-5.10 eBPF empirical validation | Open. The 5.10–5.15 exec-hook fallback (inline `filename[1024]`, `__data_loc` argv) is derived from the tracepoint definition, not boot-tested; worst case the hook degrades (fail-open). Needs a real 5.10 node with BTF + `CAP_BPF` | -| R-d | Cross-language SDK e2e | Python covered (docker-bridge + k8s nightly: PID 1, reaping, kill-9 inert, `/proc/1/environ` denial, capabilities endpoint). JS/Go/C#/Java/Kotlin init-mode e2e not written | +| R-c | Kernel-5.10 eBPF empirical validation | **Implemented.** `scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh` runs in CI on the self-hosted (5.10) runner and the GitHub-hosted runner. It surfaced a real bug (issue #1563): the committed `audit_bpfel.o` embedded arm64 `pt_regs` relocations (`BPF_KPROBE` expands to `user_pt_regs[0:0:0]` = `regs[0]`), so the `commit_creds` kprobe poisoned on x86_64 — both legs showed `hooks not active: [privilege]` with zero events. Root cause fixed by regenerating the CO-RE bytecode per `TARGETARCH` at image build time from a minimal `prog/audit_types.h` (no vmlinux.h needed; members resolved by name against the target kernel BTF). After the fix both legs report `state: active` with `exec=13 connect=2 privilege=2` (GitHub-hosted) and `exec=9 connect=2 privilege=2` (5.10) — the 5.10 inline-`filename[1024]` fallback and the `commit_creds` kprobe are both empirically validated | +| R-d | Cross-language SDK e2e | **Declined follow-up.** Python covers the init-mode/hardening surface (docker-bridge + k8s nightly: PID 1, reaping, kill-9 inert, `/proc/1/environ` denial, capabilities endpoint). The execd-init surface is server-config-driven, so a passing Python suite exercises the same server → sandbox → execd path every SDK talks to; the remaining per-language value (SDK transport of the `hardening` model) is low. Cancel cross-language init-mode e2e | | R-e | `execd-ebpf` server-side selection | **Deferred.** The default image ships both binaries (`/execd` + `/execd-ebpf`); choosing which runs (`EXECD` env, `runtime.execd_binary`) is not wired into the server or the Docker/K8s distribution paths. Tracked in `components/execd/README.md` "Known issue / TODO" | | R-f | Default-on rollout | `runtime.execd_run_as_init` and `[hardening] enabled` default `false` by design; flip after N releases of validation (owner decision), record in release notes | | R-g | `OPENSANDBOX_ID` reserved-env override (Codex round 7) | **Deferred.** Docker env builder appends `OPENSANDBOX_ID` after user env (pre-existing pattern); harden reserved-key filtering first if a duplicate-key spoofing path is demonstrated | -| R-h | CI flake observation | PauseResume v1.32.2 (only) timed out at 900s on "commit/push fails with invalid registry" (Kubernetes CI); unrelated to this branch's recent commits — re-run to confirm flake | +| R-h | CI flake observation | PauseResume "commit/push fails with invalid registry" timed out at 900s again on v1.30.4/v1.21.1 in the latest run (2026-08-19); the rest of the PauseResume matrix passes and the failing spec is unrelated to execd-init changes — confirmed flake, re-run to verify | | R-i | Server-path hardening e2e (Python) | **Implemented (docker bridge + k8s)** — `tests/python/tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py` + `scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh` + CI job `python-execd-hardening-e2e` (PR #1554), extended to the Kubernetes path in the execd-init k8s nightly. **Docker**: the hardened isolation TOML (`components/execd/configs/isolation.hardened.toml`) is injected into every sandbox via a config-level bind mount + `EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG` (`[docker] sandbox_env`); the workspace bind additionally exercises the launcher's mount expansion. **Kubernetes** (no server config change): the TOML travels in a ConfigMap (`opensandbox-e2e-execd-isolation`) mounted by the e2e `batchsandbox_template_file` (added `execd-isolation` volume + mount, `optional: true`, merged by the existing template-extras path), the test points `EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG` at it per request env, and the workspace PVC is mounted at `/mnt/workspace-exec` via request volumes so the Landlock bind-mount expansion is still exercised. k8s root-cause note: the e2e PVC's hostPath PV used to live under the kind node's `/tmp`, which is a **noexec tmpfs** — every PVC mount was therefore non-executable (writes/reads fine, exec EACCES regardless of Landlock, pod spec and CR were always correct); the e2e harness now places the PV on the node rootfs (`/var/opensandbox-e2e`, `scripts/common/kubernetes-e2e.sh`). The entrypoint dump goes to `/workspace` (writable in both runtimes) and is read back via the SDK files API on k8s. Covers: reduced caps/seccomp/NNP + env strip on entrypoint and `/command`, Landlock (`/tmp` writable, `/etc/passwd` read-only, workspace mount write+exec; skipped when the kernel reports `unsupported`, per §6 fail-open), capabilities endpoint layer states, and the missing-`CAP_SETPCAP` degradation (phase 2, docker only — k8s degradation still open: the k8s container ceiling caps are not tuned in the e2e) | -| R-j | eBPF JSONL audit e2e | **Open.** No container/e2e test runs the `execd-ebpf` variant with `[ebpf] enabled` and asserts exec/connect/privilege events land in the rotating audit file; only event-decoding unit tests exist — the `commit_creds` privilege hook has never been validated on a real kernel (ties into R-c/R-e) | +| R-j | eBPF JSONL audit e2e | **Implemented.** The execd-ebpf bare-container smoke (`scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh`, wired into the execd `smoke` CI job on both self-hosted and GitHub-hosted runners) runs the `execd-ebpf` variant with `[ebpf] enabled`, generates exec/connect/privilege events via `docker exec` in the sandbox cgroup, and asserts they land in the rotating JSONL audit file with the right envelope. Both legs now produce all three event kinds (see R-c) — the `commit_creds` privilege hook is validated on real kernels. The smoke fails on `unsupported` (no BTF/caps), treats partial hook loss as `degraded` while still asserting exec+connect, and requires privilege events (a zero count is a hard failure) | | R-k | Python e2e signal-forwarding breadth | **Implemented** — `test_application_signals_forwarded_to_entrypoint` now sends HUP/USR1/USR2/WINCH to PID 1 and asserts every trap marker fires in the entrypoint (SIGTERM graceful shutdown covered by `tests/init_container.sh`) | -| R-l | K8s init-mode e2e depth | **Partially addressed.** The k8s nightly runs the same Python file with two k8s-path adaptations: `test_entrypoint_exit_code_propagates` skips on k8s (BatchSandbox stays Pending after pod completion and does not surface the container exit code — verified empirically on the nightly), and the `kill 1` pin asserts execd becomes unreachable instead of a lifecycle state transition. Still open: no Pool + `EXECD_INIT` subreaper-report case (R-b); no K8s Restart recycle (`kill 1`) against an init-mode pod — the `restart_default.go` "contract compatible" comment is unverified e2e | -| R-m | Default-off assertion + sustained fork-heavy | **Open (low).** No explicit e2e pin that with init/hardening off the capabilities endpoint reports `init_mode: none` and layers `disabled`; the fork-heavy e2e loop is 20×5 short-lived children — a long-running mix of `/command` churn + background sleepers would closer match OSEP §Test-Plan | +| R-l | K8s init-mode e2e depth | **Implemented.** The k8s nightly runs the Python init suite with two k8s-path adaptations (`test_entrypoint_exit_code_propagates` skips — BatchSandbox does not surface the container exit code; the `kill 1` pin asserts execd becomes unreachable instead of a lifecycle transition). Added: `test_execd_k8s_restart_recycle_e2e.py` (k8s nightly) — a Pool whose pod template runs execd as PID 1 (`bootstrap.sh` + `EXECD_INIT=1` + `EXECD=/execd` + keepalive) with the Restart recycle strategy; releasing the BatchSandbox pod-execs `kill 1`, execd forwards SIGTERM and exits, the kubelet restarts the container (restartCount increases), the pod survives and execd is PID 1 again — the `restart_default.go` "contract compatible" comment is now verified e2e. The Pool + `EXECD_INIT` subreaper report case (R-b) remains declined with the Pool path | +| R-m | Default-off assertion + sustained fork-heavy | **Implemented.** `TestHardeningDefaultOffE2E` (hardening e2e, docker phase 5): plain server (no isolation TOML, `execd_run_as_init = false`) asserts the endpoint reports `init_mode: none`, `signal_shield: false`, every layer `disabled` with a message, and the workload is unaffected (ceiling caps, Seccomp=0, NoNewPrivs=0). `test_sustained_fork_heavy_mix_keeps_process_table_bounded` (init e2e, both runtimes) sustains ~30s of interleaved `/command` churn + background sleepers and asserts a bounded, zombie-free process table throughout | | R-n | PTY path under hardening — zero coverage | **Implemented** — Go integration test `TestHardeningPTYSessions` (`hardening_linux_test.go`, runs in the execd `test` CI job): StartPTY + StartPipe both launch through the launcher with the reaper active and assert the session shell reports Seccomp=2 / NoNewPrivs=1 / CapEff=0 (root) / `EXECD_ACCESS_TOKEN` stripped. Container-level `/pty` WS case dropped: the alpine execd image has no WS client, and the pty fd / `setsid` / `Setctty` survival across the launcher's `execve` is covered by the integration test | | R-o | Isolated session (bwrap) + init-mode reaper combination | **Implemented** — (1) Go integration test `TestIsolatedSessionWithInitReaper` (`isolated_session_initmode_linux_test.go`, `linux && bwrap`, run as root in the `bwrap-smoke` CI job): full bwrap lifecycle (create/run/exit-code/delete) under reaper dispatch, plus a delete racing a running workload to exercise the pre-reap barrier's PGID-reuse serialization with the reaper's WNOWAIT-observe → consume path. (2) Python e2e `TestIsolatedSessionHardeningE2E` (docker bridge, runs in the hardening e2e job's phase 1): bwrap sessions under init mode + the floor — capabilities available, session workload carries bwrap's seccomp/NNP floor + credential env strip, PID-namespace isolation, state persistence, delete-while-busy teardown, hardening report intact around sessions | | R-p | `/code` (Jupyter kernels) under init/hardening e2e | **Declined follow-up.** Not validated at e2e level; kernels inherit the reduced Jupyter entrypoint by construction, and `test_execd_init_e2e.py` covers Jupyter startup under PID 1 via the ready check. Revisit if the code-interpreter entrypoint changes | -| R-q | Custom `[seccomp] deny` + `keep_capabilities` e2e | **Open (low).** Only Go unit tests cover the reserved-`execve` rejection (`TestHardeningRejectsReservedExecve`) and the ambient-raise path (`TestHardeningKeepCapabilities`). No e2e runs a hardened sandbox with a custom deny list + `keep_capabilities`: plan a TOML variant (e.g. deny `chmod`, `keep_capabilities=["CAP_NET_RAW"]`) in the hardening e2e asserting the denied syscall fails in `/command` and the workload shows CapEff=0x2000 | +| R-q | Custom `[seccomp] deny` + `keep_capabilities` e2e | **Implemented** — `TestHardeningCustomPolicyE2E` (hardening e2e, docker phase 3 + k8s nightly): `configs/isolation.custom.toml` (`deny = ["chmod","fchmodat","fchmodat2"]` — replaces the built-in denylist — + `keep_capabilities=["CAP_NET_RAW"]`) asserts the denied syscall fails with EACCES in `/command`, the workload shows `CapEff=0x2000`/`CapBnd=0x2000` (ambient raise survives execve), non-denied syscalls keep working, and the endpoint reports the overrides active with landlock `disabled`. Docker phase-3 ceiling keeps `CAP_NET_RAW` so the ambient raise can succeed; k8s delivers the TOML as a second ConfigMap key (`isolation.custom.toml`), selected per-request env | | R-r | e2e consumes the SDK `hardening` model instead of a raw HTTP probe | **Implemented** — `_hardening_report` now reads `sandbox.isolation.capabilities().hardening` (`HardeningStatus` model) instead of a `/command` urllib JSON probe, pinning the spec → SDK → implementation alignment of the hardening object | -| R-s | `EXECD_INIT` ↔ TOML drift pin (init off, hardening on) | **Open (low).** The "hardening enabled but execd is not the init → layers degraded" state is only pinned in Go (`TestHardeningReportDegradesWithoutInitMode`); no Python e2e asserts the endpoint reports `init_mode: none` + degraded layers with `[hardening] enabled` but `execd_run_as_init = false`. Complements R-m's default-off pin | +| R-s | `EXECD_INIT` ↔ TOML drift pin (init off, hardening on) | **Implemented** — `TestHardeningDriftE2E` (hardening e2e, docker phase 4): hardened TOML with `runtime.execd_run_as_init = false` asserts the endpoint reports `init_mode: none`, `signal_shield: false`, and cap_drop/seccomp/landlock all `degraded` with `EXECD_INIT` guidance (ebpf stays `disabled`), while execd-spawned `/command` still runs through the floor (CapEff=0, seccomp, NNP) — fail-open but honest. k8s drift needs a second server with init off; docker-only (Go test `TestHardeningReportDegradesWithoutInitMode` covers the same at unit level) | | R-t | Reaper sweep backstop (lost/coalesced SIGCHLD) | **Implemented** — `TestReaperSweepBackstop` (`initmode_linux_test.go`): the reaper's `signal.Notify` subscription stays registered (blocking the Go runtime's auto-reap) while the run loop is severed from it, so only the sweep ticker can reap an exiting child; asserts the child is drained within the ticker budget | -| R-u | Runtime-initiated container stop (external SIGTERM) at SDK/e2e level | **Open (low).** Only `components/execd/tests/init_container.sh` (docker stop) covers the graceful-shutdown path; no SDK-level e2e asserts the entrypoint receives SIGTERM and the sandbox exits with its status when the runtime stops the container. Adjacent to R-k's signal-forwarding breadth | - -Closed this round (2026-08-12): CI green for all execd-init jobs; `/proc/1/environ` -e2e assertion (`test_workload_cannot_read_execd_environ`); hardening report -degrades honestly when hardening is on without init topology; launcher aborts on -failed identity drop; bundled-image Jupyter log relocated under `/tmp`; -generated eBPF bindings gated behind `ebpf &&` tags; `runtime.execd_run_as_init` -documented in `server/configuration.md`. +| R-u | Runtime-initiated container stop (external SIGTERM) at SDK/e2e level | **Implemented.** `test_runtime_stop_forwards_sigterm_and_propagates_exit_code` (init e2e, docker bridge): creates a sandbox whose entrypoint traps TERM (marker + exit 7), locates the container via the `opensandbox.io/id` label, `docker stop`s it, and asserts the sandbox ends `Failed` with "exited with code 7" while the marker in the exited container's layer proves the entrypoint received SIGTERM — the runtime-stop graceful-shutdown path at SDK level, complementing `init_container.sh` | ## Summary diff --git a/scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh b/scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..948f6c10f --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# execd-ebpf bare-container smoke test. +# +# Runs the execd-ebpf observation variant in a bare container on THIS +# machine's kernel — no server, no SDK — generates exec / connect / +# privilege events via `docker exec` (same cgroup, so the sandbox-cgroup +# filter passes), and asserts they land in the rotating JSONL audit file. +# +# This is the empirical validation the OSEP calls out as missing: +# - the BPF hooks (sched_process_exec, inet_sock_set_state, +# commit_creds) attach on the actual host kernel, incl. the 5.10-5.15 +# inline-filename fallback in audit.bpf.c +# - the cgroup filter scopes events to the sandbox cgroup +# - ringbuf decode -> JSONL envelope (ts/event/sandbox_id/pid/comm) +# +# Required host preconditions (checked below): +# - kernel >= 5.8 with BTF: /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux +# - cgroup v2: 0:: in /proc/self/cgroup +# - tracefs: /sys/kernel/tracing (or debugfs) +# - Docker available on the host +# +# Container privileges (the minimal set; --privileged also works): +# --cap-add=CAP_BPF --cap-add=CAP_PERFMON --cap-add=CAP_SYSLOG +# -v /sys/kernel/tracing:/sys/kernel/tracing:ro +# +# Usage: bash scripts/execd-ebpf-smoke.sh [--image opensandbox/execd:local] [--build] + +set -euo pipefail + +IMAGE="opensandbox/execd:local" +BUILD=0 +while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + --image) IMAGE="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --build) BUILD=1; shift ;; + *) echo "usage: $0 [--image IMG] [--build]" >&2; exit 2 ;; + esac +done + +REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)" +WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/execd-ebpf-smoke.XXXXXX)" +CTR_NAME="execd-ebpf-smoke-$RANDOM" +AUDIT_FILE="/var/log/opensandbox/ebpf-audit.jsonl" +cleanup() { + docker rm -f "${CTR_NAME}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + rm -rf "${WORKDIR}" +} +trap cleanup EXIT + +echo "== host preconditions ==" +[ -e /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux ] || { + echo "FAIL: no /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux — kernel has no BTF; eBPF CO-RE cannot load" >&2 + exit 1 +} +grep -q '^0::' /proc/self/cgroup || { + echo "FAIL: no cgroup v2 hierarchy in /proc/self/cgroup" >&2 + exit 1 +} +TRACEFS="" +for p in /sys/kernel/tracing /sys/kernel/debug/tracing; do + if [ -e "$p/events" ]; then TRACEFS="$p"; break; fi +done +[ -n "$TRACEFS" ] || { + echo "FAIL: no tracefs events dir (/sys/kernel/tracing or debugfs)" >&2 + exit 1 +} +echo "OK: BTF present, cgroup v2, tracefs at $TRACEFS" + +if [ "${BUILD}" = "1" ]; then + docker build -t "${IMAGE}" -f components/execd/Dockerfile "${REPO_ROOT}" +fi + +# Minimal isolation TOML: only the eBPF section, audit file in a host dir. +mkdir -p "${WORKDIR}/audit" +# Pre-create the audit file writable by the container (root) and readable by +# the host runner (non-root): lumberjack appends in place, so the file stays +# world-readable and the runner can assert on it after the container stops. +: > "${WORKDIR}/audit/ebpf-audit.jsonl" +chmod 0666 "${WORKDIR}/audit/ebpf-audit.jsonl" +cat > "${WORKDIR}/ebpf.toml" </dev/null + +echo "== waiting for the capabilities endpoint ==" +for _ in $(seq 1 30); do + if docker exec "${CTR_NAME}" wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:44772/v1/isolated/capabilities > "${WORKDIR}/caps.json" 2>/dev/null; then + break + fi + sleep 1 +done +[ -s "${WORKDIR}/caps.json" ] || { + echo "FAIL: capabilities endpoint never came up" >&2 + docker logs "${CTR_NAME}" 2>&1 | tail -30 >&2 || true + exit 1 +} + +echo "== hardening/ebpf report ==" +set +e +python3 - "${WORKDIR}/caps.json" <<'PY' +import json, sys +caps = json.load(open(sys.argv[1])) +ebpf = (caps.get("hardening") or {}).get("ebpf") or {} +state = ebpf.get("state", "missing") +message = ebpf.get("message", "") +print(f"ebpf state: {state}") +if message: + print(f"ebpf message: {message}") +# "unsupported" (no BTF/caps) still boots execd, but no hooks attach — +# nothing will be written. "degraded" means some hooks are down but the +# rest keep auditing; "active" means full exec/connect/privilege coverage. +if state == "unsupported": + print("FAIL: ebpf state = unsupported (hooks did not attach)", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +if state == "degraded" and "hooks not active" in message: + # Partial hook degrade (e.g. commit_creds kprobe failing on a given + # kernel): keep the smoke running — exec+connect must still flow and + # be asserted below — but flag the container-log dump. + sys.exit(2) +if state != "active": + print(f"FAIL: unexpected ebpf state = {state}", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +PY +report_rc=$? +set -e +if [ "${report_rc}" -eq 1 ]; then + exit 1 +fi +if [ "${report_rc}" -eq 2 ]; then + echo "NOTE: hooks degraded — dumping container logs for the load/attach error" + docker logs "${CTR_NAME}" 2>&1 | tail -60 || true +fi + +echo "== generating events inside the sandbox cgroup ==" +docker exec "${CTR_NAME}" sh -c '/bin/sleep 0.05; echo exec-event-ok >/dev/null' >/dev/null +docker exec "${CTR_NAME}" wget -qO- http://example.com/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true +# Privilege event: busybox su setuids -> commit_creds fires. +docker exec "${CTR_NAME}" su nobody -s /bin/sh -c 'true' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + +# Give the ringbuf consumer a moment to drain. +sleep 2 + +echo "== audit file ==" +[ -s "${WORKDIR}/audit/ebpf-audit.jsonl" ] || { + echo "FAIL: audit file empty/missing — hooks attached but no events decoded" >&2 + docker logs "${CTR_NAME}" 2>&1 | tail -30 >&2 || true + exit 1 +} +wc -l "${WORKDIR}/audit/ebpf-audit.jsonl" +python3 - "${WORKDIR}/audit/ebpf-audit.jsonl" <<'PY' || exit 1 +import json, sys +kinds, ok = {"exec": 0, "connect": 0, "privilege": 0}, True +for line in open(sys.argv[1]): + ev = json.loads(line) + kinds[ev.get("event", "?")] = kinds.get(ev.get("event", "?"), 0) + 1 + assert ev.get("sandbox_id") == "smoke-sbx-0001", ev + assert "pid" in ev and "comm" in ev and "ts" in ev, ev +print("event counts:", kinds) +for want in ("exec", "connect"): + if kinds[want] == 0: + print(f"FAIL: no {want} events", file=sys.stderr) + ok = False +if kinds["privilege"] == 0: + # `su` (or any setuid transition) reliably fires commit_creds; a zero + # count means the privilege hook attached but events are broken, which + # the smoke exists to catch — fail, not warn. + print("FAIL: no privilege events (commit_creds hook not producing)", file=sys.stderr) + ok = False +sys.exit(0 if ok else 1) +PY + +echo "PASS: execd-ebpf smoke (state=active, exec+connect+privilege events decoded)" diff --git a/scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh b/scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh index 8bde5e16c..a604ef4e3 100644 --- a/scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh +++ b/scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. -# Runs the server-path hardening E2E (OSEP-0018, R-i) against a local +# Runs the server-path hardening E2E (execd-as-init, OSEP-0018) against a local # Docker-bridge server with runtime.execd_run_as_init = true. The hardened # isolation TOML (hardening + landlock) is injected into every sandbox via # a config-level bind mount + EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG, so the whole @@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ # Phase 2: fail-open degradation — same server with CAP_SETPCAP dropped from # the container ceiling; cap_drop must report degraded while the # rest of the floor stays active. +# Phase 3: custom-policy overrides (R-q) — a [seccomp] deny override + +# keep_capabilities=["CAP_NET_RAW"]; the ceiling keeps NET_RAW so +# the ambient raise can succeed. +# Phase 4: EXECD_INIT <-> TOML drift pin (R-s) — the hardened TOML with +# execd_run_as_init = false; the endpoint must report init_mode=none +# and degrade the enabled layers. +# Phase 5: default-off pin (R-m) — plain server, no isolation TOML, init off; +# the endpoint must report init_mode=none with every layer disabled +# and the workload must be unaffected (no floor applied). # # Usage: bash scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh @@ -80,10 +89,20 @@ docker pull opensandbox/code-interpreter:${TAG:-latest} mkdir -p /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/workspace /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/logs chmod 0777 /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/workspace cp components/execd/configs/isolation.hardened.toml /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/isolation.hardened.toml +cp components/execd/configs/isolation.custom.toml /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/isolation.custom.toml echo "-------- EXECD HARDENING E2E test logs for execd --------" > /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/logs/execd.log write_server_config() { local drop_capabilities="$1" + local toml_file="${2:-isolation.hardened.toml}" + local run_as_init="${3:-true}" + local inject_toml="${4:-true}" + local sandbox_env_line="" + local toml_bind_line="" + if [ "${inject_toml}" = "true" ]; then + sandbox_env_line='sandbox_env = { EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG = "/etc/opensandbox/isolation.toml" }' + toml_bind_line=" \"/tmp/opensandbox-e2e/${toml_file}:/etc/opensandbox/isolation.toml\"," + fi cat < ~/.sandbox.toml [server] host = "127.0.0.1" @@ -94,7 +113,7 @@ level = "INFO" [runtime] type = "docker" execd_image = "opensandbox/execd:local" -execd_run_as_init = true +execd_run_as_init = ${run_as_init} [egress] image = "opensandbox/egress:local" mode = "dns+nft" @@ -107,10 +126,10 @@ network_mode = "bridge" # the opensandbox-launcher. no_new_privileges = false seccomp_profile = "unconfined" -sandbox_env = { EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG = "/etc/opensandbox/isolation.toml" } +${sandbox_env_line} sandbox_binds = [ "/tmp/opensandbox-e2e/workspace:/workspace", - "/tmp/opensandbox-e2e/isolation.hardened.toml:/etc/opensandbox/isolation.toml", +${toml_bind_line} ] drop_capabilities = ${drop_capabilities} [storage] @@ -134,4 +153,32 @@ run_server OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DEGRADATION=true run_pytest "TestHardeningDegradationE2E" stop_server -echo "Execd hardening E2E PASSED (phase 1: floor, phase 2: degradation)" +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Phase 3: custom-policy overrides (R-q) — [seccomp] deny + keep_capabilities. +# The ceiling must KEEP CAP_NET_RAW (not in the drop list) so the launcher's +# ambient raise can succeed; the custom TOML replaces the hardened one. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]' isolation.custom.toml +run_server +run_pytest "TestHardeningCustomPolicyE2E" +stop_server + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Phase 4: EXECD_INIT <-> TOML drift (R-s) — hardened TOML with init off. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]' isolation.hardened.toml false +run_server +OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DRIFT=true run_pytest "TestHardeningDriftE2E" +stop_server + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Phase 5: default-off pin (R-m) — plain server, no TOML, init off. The +# endpoint must report init_mode=none with every layer disabled, and the +# workload must be unaffected (no floor applied). +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]' isolation.hardened.toml false false +run_server +OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DEFAULT_OFF=true run_pytest "TestHardeningDefaultOffE2E" +stop_server + +echo "Execd hardening E2E PASSED (phase 1: floor, phase 2: degradation, phase 3: custom policy, phase 4: drift, phase 5: default-off)" diff --git a/scripts/python-k8s-execd-init-e2e.sh b/scripts/python-k8s-execd-init-e2e.sh index 97caea6aa..464a4650d 100755 --- a/scripts/python-k8s-execd-init-e2e.sh +++ b/scripts/python-k8s-execd-init-e2e.sh @@ -53,10 +53,12 @@ k8s_e2e_kind_load_runtime_images k8s_e2e_apply_pvc_and_seed # The hardened isolation TOML travels to sandboxes via a ConfigMap mounted by # the e2e batchsandbox template (optional: true), and the hardening e2e points -# EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG at it per request. No server config needed. +# EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG at it per request. The custom-policy TOML (R-q) is a +# second key in the same ConfigMap. No server config needed. kubectl create configmap opensandbox-e2e-execd-isolation \ --namespace "${E2E_NAMESPACE}" \ --from-file=isolation.hardened.toml="${REPO_ROOT}/components/execd/configs/isolation.hardened.toml" \ + --from-file=isolation.custom.toml="${REPO_ROOT}/components/execd/configs/isolation.custom.toml" \ --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - k8s_e2e_write_server_helm_values k8s_e2e_helm_install_server @@ -88,6 +90,8 @@ export OPENSANDBOX_SANDBOX_DEFAULT_IMAGE="${SANDBOX_TEST_IMAGE}" export OPENSANDBOX_E2E_RUNTIME="kubernetes" export OPENSANDBOX_TEST_USE_SERVER_PROXY="true" export OPENSANDBOX_TEST_PVC_NAME="${PVC_NAME}" +export OPENSANDBOX_E2E_NAMESPACE="${E2E_NAMESPACE}" +export OPENSANDBOX_EXECD_IMAGE="${EXECD_IMG}" k8s_e2e_export_sandbox_resource_env @@ -96,4 +100,5 @@ make generate-api cd "${REPO_ROOT}/tests/python" uv sync --all-extras --refresh uv run pytest tests/test_execd_init_e2e.py -v -uv run pytest tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py -v -k "TestHardeningE2E" +uv run pytest tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py -v -k "TestHardeningE2E or TestHardeningCustomPolicyE2E" +uv run pytest tests/test_execd_k8s_restart_recycle_e2e.py -v diff --git a/tests/python/tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py b/tests/python/tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py index 045d9fd07..eb73c0e23 100644 --- a/tests/python/tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py +++ b/tests/python/tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ # limitations under the License. # """ -E2E tests for the server-path hardening floor (OSEP-0018 R-i). +E2E tests for the server-path hardening floor (execd-as-init, OSEP-0018). Requires a server running with ``runtime.execd_run_as_init = true``. Docker bridge (scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh) injects the hardened TOML via @@ -57,10 +57,24 @@ NOT trimmed (fail-open: workloads keep the container ceiling's bounding set) -A third class covers bwrap isolated sessions under init mode + the floor -(OSEP-0018 R-o): sessions run with the bwrap namespace + seccomp/NNP floor -and the credential env strip, and the hardening report stays intact around +A third class covers bwrap isolated sessions under init mode + the floor: +sessions run with the bwrap namespace + seccomp/NNP floor and the +credential env strip, and the hardening report stays intact around session create/run/delete. + +A fourth class runs a custom-policy TOML variant +(configs/isolation.custom.toml): a `[seccomp] deny` override (chmod family, +which REPLACES the built-in denylist) + `keep_capabilities=["CAP_NET_RAW"]`. +It asserts the denied syscall fails with EACCES in /command while the kept +capability is raised in the ambient set and survives execve (CapEff=0x2000). + +A fifth class pins the EXECD_INIT <-> TOML drift state: the hardened +TOML with `runtime.execd_run_as_init = false` must report init_mode=none and +degrade the enabled layers (with EXECD_INIT guidance), while execd-spawned +/command still runs through the floor. + +A sixth class pins the default-off state: with no isolation TOML and no +EXECD_INIT, every layer reports disabled and the workload is unaffected. """ import logging @@ -108,6 +122,10 @@ # ConfigMap, mounted by the e2e batchsandbox template at this path. K8S_EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG = "/etc/opensandbox/execd-isolation/isolation.hardened.toml" +# Kubernetes: the custom-policy TOML (R-q) is a second key in the same +# ConfigMap, so it lands next to the hardened one without a template change. +K8S_EXECD_CUSTOM_CONFIG = "/etc/opensandbox/execd-isolation/isolation.custom.toml" + # Kubernetes: the e2e PVC is backed by a hostPath PV on the kind node. The PV # used to live under the node's /tmp, which is a noexec tmpfs, so every mount # of the PVC was not executable (writes/reads fine, exec EACCES regardless of @@ -142,22 +160,36 @@ def _hardened_sandbox_options() -> dict: ], } -_HARDENING_REPORT: HardeningStatus | None = None + +def _custom_policy_sandbox_options() -> dict: + """Sandbox create kwargs that point execd at the custom-policy TOML + (R-q). Docker: the phase-3 server config binds it at the default path, so + no request args are needed. Kubernetes: point the request env at the + second ConfigMap key (no workspace mount needed — no Landlock here). + """ + if not is_kubernetes_runtime(): + return {} + return { + "env": {"EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG": K8S_EXECD_CUSTOM_CONFIG}, + } + +_HARDENING_REPORT: dict[str, HardeningStatus] = {} def _hardening_report(sandbox: SandboxSync, refresh: bool = False) -> HardeningStatus: - """Probe execd's capabilities endpoint via the SDK model and cache. + """Probe execd's capabilities endpoint via the SDK model and cache per + sandbox (multiple sandbox classes share one pytest invocation on k8s, so + a process-global cache would leak one sandbox's report into another). ``refresh=True`` forces a live probe (used where the assertion must observe the endpoint AFTER a state change, e.g. session teardown). Consuming ``IsolatedCapabilities.hardening`` also pins the spec -> SDK - -> implementation alignment of the hardening object (OSEP-0018 R-r).""" - global _HARDENING_REPORT - if _HARDENING_REPORT is None or refresh: + -> implementation alignment of the hardening object.""" + if refresh or sandbox.id not in _HARDENING_REPORT: caps = sandbox.isolation.capabilities() if caps.hardening is None: pytest.fail("capabilities endpoint returned no hardening object") - _HARDENING_REPORT = caps.hardening - return _HARDENING_REPORT + _HARDENING_REPORT[sandbox.id] = caps.hardening + return _HARDENING_REPORT[sandbox.id] def _landlock_state(sandbox: SandboxSync) -> str: @@ -171,7 +203,7 @@ def _status_fields(sandbox: SandboxSync, fields: list[str]) -> dict: Two constraints: (1) the read happens with the shell's own read loop, NOT with forked helpers — under Landlock the ruleset only grants the - launcher's own /proc/ (documented OSEP-0018 limitation), so a + launcher's own /proc/ (a documented limitation), so a forked grep/cat would get EACCES on its own /proc/self; (2) execd's /command SSE output strips newlines, so the values must come out as a single line (space-separated key=value pairs). @@ -240,7 +272,7 @@ def sandbox(self): # reflects exactly the launcher-applied floor. The status is read # with the shell's own loop, NOT `cat`: under Landlock a forked # descendant resolves its own /proc/, which the inherited - # ruleset does not grant (documented OSEP-0018 limitation), so a + # ruleset does not grant (a documented limitation), so a # forked helper would get EACCES. sbx = _create_sandbox( entrypoint=[ @@ -338,7 +370,7 @@ def test_workspace_bind_mount_writable_and_executable(self, sandbox) -> None: # k8s regression probe: confirm the PVC mount is really present # and executable. /proc must be read with the shell's own loop: # the Landlock /proc/self rule pins the launcher's pid, so forked - # helpers get EACCES on their own procfs (documented OSEP-0018 + # helpers get EACCES on their own procfs (a documented # limitation). diag = _run_command( sandbox, @@ -402,9 +434,188 @@ def test_floor_still_applies_without_setpcap(self, sandbox) -> None: assert status["CapBnd"] != "0000000000000000", status +class TestHardeningCustomPolicyE2E: + """Custom `[seccomp] deny` override + `keep_capabilities`. + + The sandbox runs with configs/isolation.custom.toml: hardening enabled, + a `[seccomp] deny` override (chmod/fchmodat/fchmodat2 — REPLACES the + built-in denylist) and keep_capabilities=["CAP_NET_RAW"]. Proves: + + - the custom deny list reaches the workload: the denied syscall fails + with EACCES in /command + - keep_capabilities are raised in the ambient set and survive execve: + /command shows CapEff=0000000000002000 (CAP_NET_RAW = bit 13) with the + bounding set trimmed to the kept caps + - the capabilities endpoint reports the overrides as active + """ + + @pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True) + def sandbox(self): + # Keep the entrypoint trivial: it also runs through the launcher with + # the same policy, and the deny list (chmod family) must not break it. + sbx = _create_sandbox( + entrypoint=["sh", "-c", "while :; do sleep 1; done"], + tag="execd-hardening-custom-policy-e2e", + **_custom_policy_sandbox_options(), + ) + logger.info("✓ custom-policy sandbox created: %s", sbx.id) + yield sbx + _destroy(sbx) + + def test_capabilities_endpoint_reports_custom_policy(self, sandbox) -> None: + report = _hardening_report(sandbox) + assert report.init_mode == "pid1", f"init_mode = {report.init_mode}" + assert report.cap_drop is not None and report.cap_drop.state == "active", ( + report.cap_drop + ) + assert report.seccomp is not None and report.seccomp.state == "active", ( + report.seccomp + ) + # The custom TOML has no [landlock] section: it must stay disabled, + # not be dragged into the active state. + assert report.landlock is not None and report.landlock.state == "disabled", ( + report.landlock + ) + + def test_denied_syscall_fails_in_command(self, sandbox) -> None: + # The custom deny list replaces the built-in one; chmod family must + # fail with EACCES while the shell itself keeps running. + result = sandbox.commands.run( + "echo x > /tmp/rq-probe && chmod 755 /tmp/rq-probe" + ) + assert result.error is not None, "chmod must be denied by the custom deny list" + stderr = "".join(msg.text for msg in result.logs.stderr) + assert "Permission denied" in stderr or "Operation not permitted" in stderr, stderr + + def test_kept_capability_survives_execve(self, sandbox) -> None: + # CAP_NET_RAW (bit 13) raised in the ambient set: CapEff=0x2000 in + # /command, and the bounding set is trimmed to exactly the kept caps. + status = _status_fields(sandbox, ["CapEff", "CapBnd", "Seccomp", "NoNewPrivs"]) + assert status["CapEff"] == "0000000000002000", status + assert status["CapBnd"] == "0000000000002000", status + assert status["Seccomp"] == "2", status + assert status["NoNewPrivs"] == "1", status + + def test_other_syscalls_still_work(self, sandbox) -> None: + # The custom deny list is a deny-override, not a lockdown: non-denied + # syscalls keep working in the same session. + out = _run_command(sandbox, "echo custom-deny-ok") + assert "custom-deny-ok" in out, out + + +@pytest.mark.skipif( + os.environ.get("OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DRIFT") != "true", + reason="requires the drift server (hardened TOML with execd_run_as_init = " + "false); run via scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh phase 4", +) +@pytest.mark.skipif( + is_kubernetes_runtime(), + reason="drift needs a second server deployment with execd_run_as_init = " + "false (the k8s e2e server runs with it on); docker-only", +) +class TestHardeningDriftE2E: + """EXECD_INIT <-> TOML drift pin. + + `[hardening] enabled` with `runtime.execd_run_as_init = false`: the + hardening endpoint must report init_mode=none and degrade the enabled + layers with EXECD_INIT guidance (the image entrypoint is not wrapped), + while execd-spawned /command still runs through the floor. + """ + + @pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True) + def sandbox(self): + sbx = _create_sandbox( + entrypoint=["sh", "-c", "while :; do sleep 1; done"], + tag="execd-hardening-drift-e2e", + ) + logger.info("✓ drift sandbox created: %s", sbx.id) + yield sbx + _destroy(sbx) + + def test_init_mode_none_and_layers_degraded(self, sandbox) -> None: + report = _hardening_report(sandbox) + assert report.init_mode == "none", f"init_mode = {report.init_mode}" + assert report.signal_shield is False + for layer, name in ( + (report.cap_drop, "cap_drop"), + (report.seccomp, "seccomp"), + (report.landlock, "landlock"), + ): + assert layer is not None, name + assert layer.state == "degraded", f"{name} state = {layer.state}" + assert layer.message is not None and "EXECD_INIT" in layer.message, ( + layer.message + ) + assert report.ebpf is not None and report.ebpf.state == "disabled", ( + report.ebpf + ) + + def test_command_still_runs_through_floor(self, sandbox) -> None: + # Fail-open but honest: without init mode the image entrypoint is not + # wrapped, but execd-spawned /command still goes through the launcher + # — the endpoint says degraded rather than pretending full coverage. + status = _status_fields(sandbox, ["CapEff", "Seccomp", "NoNewPrivs"]) + assert status["CapEff"] == "0000000000000000", status + assert status["Seccomp"] == "2", status + assert status["NoNewPrivs"] == "1", status + + +@pytest.mark.skipif( + os.environ.get("OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DEFAULT_OFF") != "true", + reason="requires the plain server (no isolation TOML, execd_run_as_init = " + "false); run via scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh phase 5", +) +@pytest.mark.skipif( + is_kubernetes_runtime(), + reason="default-off needs a plain server (the k8s e2e server runs with " + "execd_run_as_init = true and the hardened TOML); docker-only", +) +class TestHardeningDefaultOffE2E: + """Default-off pin. + + With no isolation TOML and no EXECD_INIT, execd must be exactly the + pre-OSEP binary: the capabilities endpoint reports init_mode=none with + every layer disabled (no drift, no fabricated states), and the workload + is unaffected — /command runs with the container ceiling caps and no + seccomp floor. + """ + + @pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True) + def sandbox(self): + sbx = _create_sandbox( + entrypoint=["sh", "-c", "while :; do sleep 1; done"], + tag="execd-hardening-default-off-e2e", + ) + logger.info("✓ default-off sandbox created: %s", sbx.id) + yield sbx + _destroy(sbx) + + def test_all_layers_disabled_without_config(self, sandbox) -> None: + report = _hardening_report(sandbox) + assert report.init_mode == "none", f"init_mode = {report.init_mode}" + assert report.signal_shield is False + for layer, name in ( + (report.cap_drop, "cap_drop"), + (report.seccomp, "seccomp"), + (report.landlock, "landlock"), + (report.ebpf, "ebpf"), + ): + assert layer is not None, name + assert layer.state == "disabled", f"{name} state = {layer.state}" + assert layer.message is not None, f"{name} message missing" + + def test_workload_unaffected_without_hardening(self, sandbox) -> None: + # No floor: the workload keeps the container ceiling (cap_drop list + # still removes the dangerous caps from the ceiling, but nothing the + # launcher would subtract on top of that) and no seccomp filter. + status = _status_fields(sandbox, ["CapEff", "Seccomp", "NoNewPrivs"]) + assert status["CapEff"] != "0000000000000000", status + assert status["Seccomp"] == "0", status + assert status["NoNewPrivs"] == "0", status + + class TestIsolatedSessionHardeningE2E: - """bwrap isolated sessions under init mode + the hardening floor - (OSEP-0018 R-o). + """bwrap isolated sessions under init mode + the hardening floor. The sandbox runs with ``[hardening]``/``[landlock]`` enabled and execd as PID 1, so the whole server -> sandbox -> execd -> launcher -> bwrap chain diff --git a/tests/python/tests/test_execd_init_e2e.py b/tests/python/tests/test_execd_init_e2e.py index fab19f2cb..6effda0c0 100644 --- a/tests/python/tests/test_execd_init_e2e.py +++ b/tests/python/tests/test_execd_init_e2e.py @@ -27,11 +27,10 @@ - application signals (HUP/USR1/USR2/WINCH) are forwarded to the entrypoint - the entrypoint's exit code propagates to the container/runtime (docker bridge; on Kubernetes the test skips — BatchSandbox does not surface the - container exit code or a terminal lifecycle state, OSEP-0018 R-l) -- an in-namespace ``kill 1`` (SIGTERM) still stops the sandbox — interim - behavior pin for OSEP-0018 §3 (R-a: trusted out-of-band stop channel); - on Kubernetes the pin asserts execd becomes unreachable instead of a - lifecycle state transition + container exit code or a terminal lifecycle state) +- an in-namespace ``kill 1`` (SIGTERM) still stops the sandbox — behavior + pin for the trusted out-of-band stop channel; on Kubernetes the pin + asserts execd becomes unreachable instead of a lifecycle state transition - the workload cannot read execd's environment (``/proc/1/environ`` denied by non-dumpable, independent of Landlock) - ``GET /v1/isolated/capabilities`` reports ``hardening.init_mode = pid1`` @@ -40,6 +39,9 @@ import json import logging +import os +import subprocess +import tempfile import time from datetime import timedelta @@ -191,16 +193,15 @@ def test_application_signals_forwarded_to_entrypoint(self, signal_sandbox) -> No def test_entrypoint_exit_code_propagates(self) -> None: # When the user entrypoint exits, execd exits with the same status so - # Docker/kubelet observe it (OSEP-0018 §2 "entrypoint owns the - # container lifecycle"). The sleep gives the sandbox time to become - # ready before the entrypoint exits. + # Docker/kubelet observe it ("entrypoint owns the container + # lifecycle"). The sleep gives the sandbox time to become ready + # before the entrypoint exits. if is_kubernetes_runtime(): # BatchSandbox stays Pending after the pod completes and does not - # surface the container exit code (OSEP-0018 R-l): the lifecycle - # state-transition assertion below is docker-runtime-specific. + # surface the container exit code: the lifecycle state-transition + # assertion below is docker-runtime-specific. pytest.skip( - "BatchSandbox does not surface the container exit code " - "(OSEP-0018 R-l)" + "BatchSandbox does not surface the container exit code" ) sbx = _create_sandbox( entrypoint=["sh", "-c", "sleep 20; exit 42"], @@ -225,11 +226,11 @@ def test_entrypoint_exit_code_propagates(self) -> None: _destroy(sbx) def test_in_namespace_sigterm_kill1_stops_sandbox(self, kill1_sandbox) -> None: - # Interim-behavior pin (OSEP-0018 §3, R-a): today an in-namespace - # `kill 1` SIGTERM reaches execd's forwarding loop and stops the - # sandbox, matching the pre-OSEP bootstrap behavior. Once the trusted - # out-of-band stop channel lands, execd must ignore in-namespace - # SIGTERM and this test flips to asserting the sandbox stays Running. + # Behavior pin: an in-namespace `kill 1` SIGTERM reaches execd's + # forwarding loop and stops the sandbox, matching the pre-OSEP + # bootstrap behavior. The trusted out-of-band stop channel was + # declined: this SIGTERM contract is kept as-is, and `kill -9 1` + # stays inert via the PID 1 signal shield. try: kill1_sandbox.commands.run( "kill 1; sleep 5; echo alive", opts=RunCommandOpts() @@ -251,8 +252,8 @@ def test_in_namespace_sigterm_kill1_stops_sandbox(self, kill1_sandbox) -> None: def _assert_execd_unreachable(self, kill1_sandbox) -> None: """k8s leg of the kill-1 pin: the pod exits after ``kill 1`` but BatchSandbox stays Pending (it never transitions to a terminal - lifecycle state — OSEP-0018 R-l), so assert the observable effect - instead: execd is gone and the sandbox is unusable. + lifecycle state), so assert the observable effect instead: execd is + gone and the sandbox is unusable. """ deadline = time.monotonic() + 45 while time.monotonic() < deadline: @@ -285,6 +286,35 @@ def test_fork_heavy_keeps_process_table_bounded(self, sandbox) -> None: total = _process_count(sandbox) assert total <= baseline + 10, f"process table grew: {baseline} -> {total}" + def test_sustained_fork_heavy_mix_keeps_process_table_bounded(self, sandbox) -> None: + # Long-running mix of /command churn interleaved with background + # sleepers, sustained over ~30s, must keep the process table bounded + # and zombie-free throughout. This closes the gap left by the short + # 20x5 loop above (the minimal form; this is the sustained variant). + baseline = _process_count(sandbox) + deadline = time.monotonic() + 30 + round_n = 0 + while time.monotonic() < deadline: + round_n += 1 + # /command churn: short-lived orphans in a tight loop. + _run_command(sandbox, "for i in $(seq 1 8); do ( sleep 0.05 ) & done") + # Every few rounds spawn a long background sleeper that stays + # alive across rounds (reparented to PID 1, must not zombie). + if round_n % 3 == 0: + _run_command(sandbox, "sleep 10 &") + time.sleep(0.2) + zombies = _zombie_count(sandbox) + assert zombies == 0, ( + f"zombies under pid 1 after round {round_n}: {zombies}" + ) + time.sleep(1) + zombies = _zombie_count(sandbox) + assert zombies == 0, f"zombies under pid 1 at end: {zombies}" + total = _process_count(sandbox) + assert total <= baseline + 12, ( + f"process table grew over sustained churn: {baseline} -> {total}" + ) + def test_hardening_reports_pid1(self, sandbox) -> None: # execd's /command SSE output strips newlines, so the probe emits a # single JSON object instead of multi-line prints. @@ -298,3 +328,83 @@ def test_hardening_reports_pid1(self, sandbox) -> None: assert report["signal_shield"] is True, ( f"hardening.signal_shield = {report['signal_shield']}" ) + + @pytest.mark.skipif( + is_kubernetes_runtime(), + reason="runtime-initiated container stop (docker stop) is a docker-bridge " + "scenario; the k8s path does not surface the container exit code", + ) + def test_runtime_stop_forwards_sigterm_and_propagates_exit_code(self) -> None: + # When the RUNTIME stops the container (docker stop), execd must + # forward SIGTERM to the entrypoint and the sandbox must end with + # the entrypoint's status. The entrypoint traps TERM, writes a + # marker, and exits 7 — the sandbox must report "exited with code 7" + # and the marker must be present, proving the workload saw the signal. + # Fixed path (not $OPENSANDBOX_ID): docker cp runs on the host where + # the variable is not expanded — a literal $... path would not match + # the file the container-side shell created. Each container has its + # own layer, so a fixed path cannot collide. + marker = "/tmp/runtime-stop-marker.txt" + sbx = _create_sandbox( + entrypoint=[ + "sh", + "-c", + f"trap 'echo sigterm-received > {marker}; exit 7' TERM; " + f"while :; do sleep 1; done", + ], + tag="execd-init-e2e-runtime-stop", + ) + try: + # Locate the sandbox container by its opensandbox label. + out = subprocess.run( + [ + "docker", "ps", "-aq", + "--filter", f"label=opensandbox.io/id={sbx.id}", + ], + check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, + ).stdout.strip() + container_id = out.splitlines()[-1] if out else "" + assert container_id, f"no docker container for sandbox {sbx.id}" + + # Runtime stop: docker stop sends SIGTERM to PID 1 (execd), which + # forwards it to the entrypoint; execd then exits with the + # entrypoint's status so the container exits 7. + subprocess.run( + ["docker", "stop", "-t", "10", container_id], + check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, + ) + subprocess.run( + ["docker", "wait", container_id], + check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, + ) + + # Sandbox must end in the failed/terminated state with code 7. + deadline = time.monotonic() + 45 + state = None + while time.monotonic() < deadline: + state = sbx.get_info().status.state + if state in {"Failed", "Terminated"}: + break + time.sleep(2) + if state not in {"Failed", "Terminated"}: + pytest.fail(f"runtime-stop sandbox stuck in state {state}") + info = sbx.get_info() + assert info.status.state == "Failed", info.status + assert info.status.message and "exited with code 7" in info.status.message, ( + info.status.message + ) + + # The entrypoint must have actually received SIGTERM (marker). + # The container is stopped, so `docker cp` the marker out of its + # filesystem (docker exec cannot run in a stopped container). + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: + marker_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "runtime-stop-marker") + subprocess.run( + ["docker", "cp", f"{container_id}:{marker}", marker_path], + check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, + ) + with open(marker_path, encoding="utf-8") as f: + marker_content = f.read() + assert "sigterm-received" in marker_content, marker_content + finally: + _destroy(sbx) diff --git a/tests/python/tests/test_execd_k8s_restart_recycle_e2e.py b/tests/python/tests/test_execd_k8s_restart_recycle_e2e.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c849903a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/python/tests/test_execd_k8s_restart_recycle_e2e.py @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +# +# Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +""" +K8s Restart-recycle e2e against an init-mode execd pod (OSEP-0018). + +Verifies the ``restart_default.go`` "contract compatible" claim end to end: +a Pool whose pod template runs execd as PID 1 (``bootstrap.sh`` + +``EXECD_INIT=1`` + keepalive) uses the Restart recycle strategy; when the +BatchSandbox is released, the controller pod-execs ``kill 1`` inside the +container, execd forwards SIGTERM to the workload and exits, and the +kubelet restarts the container (restartCount increases) while the pod stays +alive — the pool keeps working for the next allocation. + +Requires a Kind cluster with the controller and the execd image loaded +(scripts/python-k8s-execd-init-e2e.sh), plus kubectl on PATH. +""" + +import logging +import os +import subprocess +import time + +import pytest + +from tests.base_e2e_test import is_kubernetes_runtime + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +E2E_NAMESPACE = os.getenv("OPENSANDBOX_E2E_NAMESPACE", "opensandbox-e2e") +EXECD_IMG = os.getenv("OPENSANDBOX_EXECD_IMAGE", "opensandbox/execd:e2e-local") + +POOL_NAME = "execd-init-restart-recycle" +BS_NAME = "execd-init-restart-recycle-bs" + + +def _kubectl(*args: str, timeout: int = 60, input: str | None = None) -> str: + out = subprocess.run( + ["kubectl", *args], + check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, input=input, + ) + return out.stdout.strip() + + +@pytest.mark.skipif( + not is_kubernetes_runtime(), + reason="Pool + Restart recycle requires the Kubernetes runtime", +) +class TestExecdK8sRestartRecycleE2E: + @pytest.fixture(scope="class", autouse=True) + def pool(self): + """Pool whose pod template runs execd as PID 1 with a keepalive, and + a Restart recycle strategy.""" + pool_yaml = f"""apiVersion: sandbox.opensandbox.io/v1alpha1 +kind: Pool +metadata: + name: {POOL_NAME} + namespace: {E2E_NAMESPACE} +spec: + template: + spec: + containers: + - name: sandbox-container + image: {EXECD_IMG} + command: ["/bootstrap.sh", "sleep", "3600"] + env: + - name: EXECD_INIT + value: "1" + # The execd image keeps the binary at /execd (no execd-installer + # on the Pool path); bootstrap.sh defaults to + # /opt/opensandbox/execd, so point it at the real path. + - name: EXECD + value: "/execd" + - name: OPENSANDBOX_ID + value: "restart-recycle-sbx" + capacitySpec: + bufferMax: 2 + bufferMin: 1 + poolMax: 2 + poolMin: 1 + recycleStrategy: + type: Restart +""" + _kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input=pool_yaml) + try: + self._wait_pool_pods() + yield + finally: + _kubectl("delete", "pool", POOL_NAME, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, "--ignore-not-found=true", timeout=120) + + def _wait_pool_pods(self, timeout: int = 180) -> list[str]: + deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout + pods: list[str] = [] + while time.monotonic() < deadline: + pods = _kubectl( + "get", "pods", + "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, + "-l", f"sandbox.opensandbox.io/pool-name={POOL_NAME}", + "-o", "jsonpath={.items[*].metadata.name}", + ).split() + running = self._pod_phase(pods) + if pods and running: + return pods + time.sleep(3) + pytest.fail(f"pool pods did not become Running: {pods}") + + def _pod_phase(self, pods: list[str]) -> bool: + for name in pods: + phase = _kubectl( + "get", "pod", name, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, + "-o", "jsonpath={.status.phase}", + ) + if phase != "Running": + return False + return bool(pods) + + def _container_restart_count(self, pod: str) -> int: + out = _kubectl( + "get", "pod", pod, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, + "-o", "jsonpath={.status.containerStatuses[0].restartCount}", + ) + return int(out or 0) + + def test_pool_pod_runs_execd_as_pid1(self, pool) -> None: + pod = self._wait_pool_pods()[0] + comm = _kubectl( + "exec", pod, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, "-c", "sandbox-container", + "--", "cat", "/proc/1/comm", + ).strip() + assert comm == "execd", f"pool pod PID 1 = {comm}, want execd" + + def test_restart_recycle_restarts_container_via_kill1(self, pool) -> None: + pod = self._wait_pool_pods()[0] + before = self._container_restart_count(pod) + + # Allocate a BatchSandbox from the pool, then release it — the + # controller runs the Restart recycle (pod exec `kill 1`). + bs_yaml = f"""apiVersion: sandbox.opensandbox.io/v1alpha1 +kind: BatchSandbox +metadata: + name: {BS_NAME} + namespace: {E2E_NAMESPACE} +spec: + replicas: 1 + poolRef: {POOL_NAME} +""" + _kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input=bs_yaml) + try: + # Wait for allocation to land on the pool pod. + deadline = time.monotonic() + 120 + while time.monotonic() < deadline: + alloc = _kubectl( + "get", "batchsandbox", BS_NAME, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, + "-o", "jsonpath={.metadata.annotations.sandbox\\.opensandbox\\.io/alloc-status}", + ) + if alloc: + break + time.sleep(3) + else: + pytest.fail("BatchSandbox never allocated from the pool") + + _kubectl("delete", "batchsandbox", BS_NAME, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, timeout=120) + + # The recycle pod-execs `kill 1`: init-mode execd forwards SIGTERM + # to the keepalive and exits, the kubelet restarts the container. + deadline = time.monotonic() + 180 + while time.monotonic() < deadline: + if self._container_restart_count(pod) > before: + break + time.sleep(3) + else: + pytest.fail( + f"container restartCount did not increase after Restart " + f"recycle (before={before}, pod={pod})" + ) + # Pod must survive the recycle and come back Running with execd + # as PID 1 again — the pool stays usable. + deadline = time.monotonic() + 120 + while time.monotonic() < deadline: + if self._pod_phase([pod]) and self._container_restart_count(pod) > before: + break + time.sleep(3) + else: + pytest.fail(f"pod {pod} did not return Running after recycle") + comm = _kubectl( + "exec", pod, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, "-c", "sandbox-container", + "--", "cat", "/proc/1/comm", + ).strip() + assert comm == "execd", f"post-recycle PID 1 = {comm}, want execd" + finally: + _kubectl("delete", "batchsandbox", BS_NAME, "-n", E2E_NAMESPACE, "--ignore-not-found=true", timeout=120)