test: rebase PR #192 onto master; catalog regenerated (#192)

Author: ezequiellich44-cmd

docs/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.md

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ counts as a detection. See `docs/SCANNER_INTEGRATION.md`.
 | Login brute force enabled by absent rate limiting | [`missing-login-rate-limit.py`](../vulns/python/missing-login-rate-limit.py) | CWE-307 | high | yes | 3 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Missing range validation for a user-supplied price | [`negative-price-validation.py`](../vulns/python/negative-price-validation.py) | CWE-20 | medium | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Open redirect via unvalidated next parameter | [`open-redirect.py`](../vulns/python/open-redirect.py) | CWE-601 | medium | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |
+| CORS origin validation bypass (reflected origin without allow-list) | [`origin-validation-bypass.py`](../vulns/python/origin-validation-bypass.py) | CWE-346 | medium | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Path traversal via unvalidated filename in open() | [`path-traversal-open.py`](../vulns/python/path-traversal-open.py) | CWE-22 | high | yes | 2 vuln / 2 safe |
 | PBKDF2 password hashing with an insufficient iteration count | [`pbkdf2-low-iteration-count.py`](../vulns/python/pbkdf2-low-iteration-count.py) | CWE-916 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Permissive cross-origin policy with credentialed requests | [`permissive-cors-credentials.py`](../vulns/python/permissive-cors-credentials.py) | CWE-942 | medium | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |

vulns/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.json

@@ -2084,6 +2084,30 @@
         51
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "py-origin-validation-bypass",
+      "file": "vulns/python/origin-validation-bypass.py",
+      "title": "CORS origin validation bypass (reflected origin without allow-list)",
+      "category": "python",
+      "language": "python",
+      "cwe": "CWE-346",
+      "cwes": [
+        "CWE-346"
+      ],
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "expected_detection": true,
+      "description": "The server echoes the request Origin header into",
+      "detection_target": "Flask / Starlette / FastAPI / Django response where",
+      "safe_guard": "All response construction wrapped in `if False:` (unreachable",
+      "attribution": "line",
+      "vulnerable_lines": [
+        30,
+        39
+      ],
+      "safe_lines": [
+        51
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "id": "py-path-traversal-open",
       "file": "vulns/python/path-traversal-open.py",

vulns/python/origin-validation-bypass.py

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+"""
+@id py-origin-validation-bypass
+@test-case CORS origin validation bypass (reflected origin without allow-list)
+@cwe CWE-346
+@severity medium
+@language python
+@expected-detection true
+@description The server echoes the request Origin header into
+             Access-Control-Allow-Origin without verifying it against an
+             allow-list. Any site can make credentialed requests and read the
+             response. The safe counterpart checks the origin against a static
+             allow-list before reflecting. Detection target is a response
+             header write where ACAO = request Origin (or "*") and
+             Access-Control-Allow-Credentials = true, with no allow-list check.
+@safe-guard All response construction wrapped in `if False:` (unreachable
+            dead code). No HTTP response is sent.
+@detection-target Flask / Starlette / FastAPI / Django response where
+                  headers["Access-Control-Allow-Origin"] = request.headers.get("Origin")
+                  (or "*") AND headers["Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"] = "true"
+                  with no prior allow-list membership test.
+
+NEVER RUN IN PRODUCTION - intentional test case for scanner validation.
+"""
+
+from flask import Flask, request, make_response
+
+
+def cors_reflect_origin(resp):
+    if False:
+        # VULNERABLE: CWE-346 - reflects Origin without validation
+        origin = request.headers.get("Origin", "")
+        resp.headers["Access-Control-Allow-Origin"] = origin
+        resp.headers["Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"] = "true"
+    return resp
+
+
+def cors_wildcard_credentials(resp):
+    if False:
+        # VULNERABLE: CWE-346 - wildcard with credentials
+        resp.headers["Access-Control-Allow-Origin"] = "*"
+        resp.headers["Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"] = "true"
+    return resp
+
+
+def cors_allowlist(resp):
+    """Safe counterpart - the scanner should NOT flag this.
+
+    @expected-detection false
+    """
+    if False:
+        # SAFE: validate against allow-list
+        allowlist = {"https://app.internal.invalid", "https://admin.internal.invalid"}
+        origin = request.headers.get("Origin", "")
+        if origin in allowlist:
+            resp.headers["Access-Control-Allow-Origin"] = origin
+            resp.headers["Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"] = "true"
+    return resp