diff --git a/.trivyignore b/.trivyignore
index ca8090219..8067306df 100644
--- a/.trivyignore
+++ b/.trivyignore
@@ -35,3 +35,44 @@ CVE-2026-69152
 # it cannot regress below it — the same invariant the brace-expansion note describes, which is what
 # keeps an ID-level ignore honest. Drop this entry once npm ships a bundle with ip-address >= 10.3.1.
 CVE-2026-69192
+# CVE-2026-76033 / -76036 / -76037 / -76038 / -76039 / -76040 / -76041 / -76043 / -76044 / -76045 /
+# -76047: Chromium, arm64 image ONLY. Eleven ids, 33 findings.
+#
+# Each lands on `chromium`, `chromium-common` and `chromium-sandbox`, which is why eleven ids produce
+# thirty-three findings. They are arm64-only by construction: Chrome for Testing publishes no
+# linux-arm64 build, so amd64 uses CfT while arm64 installs Debian's chromium (Dockerfile, TARGETARCH
+# branch). Only the arm64 image carries the Debian package, and the amd64 scan is clean.
+#
+# THE FIX EXISTS UPSTREAM BUT NOT IN DEBIAN YET. The image has 151.0.7922.137-1~deb12u1 and Trivy
+# names 151.0.7922.169-1~deb12u1 as fixed. Checked against the security mirror's own package index at
+# the time of writing: bookworm-security still serves .137 for both arm64 and amd64. The release build
+# is not stale; it fetched from bookworm-security with no cached apt layer (`no-cache-filters:
+# production`) and installed the newest version that exists. Rebuilding today changes nothing.
+#
+# Exposure, stated honestly rather than talked down. Unlike the earlier chromium batch, where two of
+# the four were sandbox escapes that `--no-sandbox` made irrelevant, NONE of these are neutralised by
+# how the container runs:
+#  - Eight are arbitrary or remote code execution in the renderer: v8 type confusion (-76038, -76047),
+#    v8 miscalculation (-76043), Dawn (-76036), WebGL use-after-free (-76045), a use-after-free
+#    (-76040), a race condition (-76044) and link following (-76037).
+#  - One is a site isolation bypass (-76033) and two are information disclosure (-76039, -76041).
+# Chromium renders content the sender controls (message bodies, link previews, images), so a crafted
+# message is a plausible path to code execution as the `openwa` user inside the arm64 container. The
+# container is the confinement boundary (cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges, read_only rootfs), and that
+# is all that stands behind it. This is accepted deliberately so the release can ship while Debian has
+# no fixed build, NOT because it is harmless.
+#
+# Drop all eleven the moment bookworm ships chromium >= 151.0.7922.169 (watch
+# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/source-package/chromium) and re-run the release scan
+# with them removed before assuming they are gone.
+CVE-2026-76033
+CVE-2026-76036
+CVE-2026-76037
+CVE-2026-76038
+CVE-2026-76039
+CVE-2026-76040
+CVE-2026-76041
+CVE-2026-76043
+CVE-2026-76044
+CVE-2026-76045
+CVE-2026-76047