burke_note.txt

=============================================================
  Sentence analysis of Burke's Thoughts on the Cause of the 
Present Discontents
=============================================================

==============================
para. 1:

>> 1.1
It is an undertaking of some degree of delicacy to examine into the cause of
public disorders.

>> 1.2
    If a man happens not to succeed in such an inquiry, 
he will be thought weak and visionary;
    If he touches the true grievance, 
there is a danger 
    that he may come near to persons of weight and consequence,
        who will rather be exasperated at the discovery of their errors,
        than thankful for the occasion of correcting them;
    If he should be obliged to blame the favorites of the people, 
he will be considered as the tool of the power;
    If he censures those in power, 
he will be looked on as an instrument of the faction.

>> 1.3
But in all exertions of duty something is to be hazarded.

>> 1.4
    In case of tumult and disorder, 
our law has invested every man, 
    in some sort, 
with the authority of a magistrate.

>> 1.5
    When the affairs of the nation are distracted, 
private people are, 
    by the spirit of that law, 
justified in stepping a little out of their ordinary sphere.

>> 1.6
They enjoy a privilege, 
    of somewhat more dignity and effect, 
    than that of idle lamentation over the calamities of their country.

>> 1.7
They may look into them narrowly; 
they may reason upon them liberally; 
    and if they should be so fortunate as to discover the true source of the
    mischief, 
    and to suggest any probable method of removing it, 
        though they may displease the rulers of the day, 
they are certainly of service to the cause of the government.

>> 1.8
Government is deeply interest in everything 
    which,
        even through the medium of some temporary uneasiness,
    may tend finally to compose the minds of the subject,
    and to conciliate their affections.

>> 1.9
I have nothing to do here with the abstract value of the voice of the people.

>> 1.10
    But as long as reputation,
        the most precious possession of every individual,
    and as long as opinion,
        the great support of the state,
    depend entirely upon the voice, 
it can never be considered as a thing of little consequence either to 
individuals or to governments.

>> 1.11
Nations are not primarily ruled by laws: 
less by violence.

>> 1.12
    Whatever original energy may be supposed either in force or regulation, 
the operation of both is,
    in truth,
merely instrumental.

>> 1.13
Nations are governed by the same methods, and on the same principles, 
    by which an individual without authority is often able to govern those 
        who are his equals or his superiors; 
            by a knowledge of their temper, 
            and by a judicious management of it;
I mean, --- 
    when public affairs are steadily and quietly conducted;
    not when government is nothing but a continued scuffle between the 
    magistrate and the multitude;
        in which sometimes the one and some times the other is uppermost;
        in which they alternately yield and prevail;
        in a series of contemptible victories, and scandalous submissions.

>> 1.14
The temper of the people 
    amongst whom he presides
ought therefore to be the first study of a statesman.

>> 1.15
    And the knowledge of this temper 
it is by no means impossible for him to attain, 
    if he has not an interest in being ignorant 
        of what is his duty to learn.
   

==============================
para. 2:

>> 2.1
To complain of the age 
    we live in,
to murmur at the present possessors of power,
to lament the past,
to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, 
    are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind;
    indeed the necessary effects of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar.

>> 2.2
Such complaints and humors have existed in all times;
    yet as all times have not been alike,
true political sagacity manifests itself in distinguishing that complaint
    which only characterizes the general infirmity of human nature,
    from those 
        which are symptoms of the particular distemperature of our own air and 
        season.


==============================
para. 3:

>> 3.1
Nobody,
    I believe,
will consider it merely as the language of spleen or disappointment,
    if I say,
that there is something particularly alarming in the present conjuncture.

>> 3.2
There is hardly a man,
    in or out of power,
    who holds any other language.

>> 3.3
    That government is at once dreaded and contemned;
    that the laws are despoiled of all their respected and salutary terrors;
    that their inaction is a subject of ridicule, and their exertion of 
    adhorrence;
    that rank, and office and title, and all the solemn plausibilities of the
    world, have lost their reverence and effect;
    that our foreign politics are as much deranged as our domestic economy;
    that our dependencies are slackened in their affection, and loosened from
    their obedience;
    that we know neither how to yield nor how to enforce;
    that hardly anything above or below, abroad or at home, is sound and entire;
    but that disconnection and confusion, 
        in offices, in parties, in families, in Parliament, in the nation, 
    prevail beyond the disorders of any former time:
these are facts universally admitted and lamented.
   
==================
para. 4:

>> 4.1
This state of things is the more extraordinary,
    because the great parties 
        which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom 
    are known to be in a manner entirely dissolved.

>> 4.2
No great external calamity has visited the nation;
no pestilence or famine.

>> 4.3
We do not labor at present under any scheme of taxation new or oppressive in
the quantity or in the mode.

>> 4.4
Nor are we engaged in unsuccessful war; 
    in which, 
        our misfortunes might easily pervert our judgment;
        and our minds, 
            sore from the loss of national glory,
        might feel every blow of fortune as a crime in government.

===========================
para. 5:

>> 5.1
It is impossible 
    that the cause of this strange distemper should not sometimes become a 
    subject of discourse.

>> 5.2
It is a compliment due,
   and which I willingly pay,
to those who administer our affairs,
   to take notice in the first place of their speculation.

>> 5.3
Our ministers are of opinion, 
    that the increase of our trade and manufactures,
    that our growth by colonization, and by conquest,
        have concurred to accumulate immense wealth in the hands of some
        individuals;
    and this again 
        being dispersed among the people,
    has rendered them universally proud, ferocious, and ungovernable;
    that the insolence of some from their enormous wealth,
    and the boldness of others from a guilty poverty,
        have rendered them capable of the most atrocious attempts;
    so that 
        they have trampled upon all subordination,
        and violently borne down the unarmed laws of a free government;
            barriers too feeble against the fury of a populace so fierce and
            licentious as ours.

============================
para. 6:

>> 6.1
Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the present convulsions of this
country, 
    if the above account be a true one.

>> 6.2
I confess 
    I shall assent to it 
        with great reluctance, 
        and only on the compulsion of the clearest and firmest proofs; 
        because their account resolves itself into this short, but discouraging 
        proposition, 
            "That we have a very good ministry, but that we have a very bad 
            people"; 
            that we set ourselves to bite the hand that feed us;
            that 
                with a malignant insanity, 
            we oppose the measures, and ungratefully vilify the persons, 
                of those whose sole object is our own peace and prosperity.

>> 6.3
    If a few puny libellers,
       acting under a knot of factious politicians,
           without virtue, parts, or character,
           (such they are constantly represented by these gentlemen,)
    are sufficient to excite this disturbance, 
very perverse must be the disposition of that people,
    amongst whom such a disturbance can be excited by such means.

>> 6.4
It is besides no small aggravation of the public misfortune, 
   that the disease,
       on this hypothesis,
   appears to be without remedy.

>> 6.5
    If the wealth of the nation be the cause of this turbulence,
I imagine 
    it is not proposed to introduce poverty,
        as a constable to keep the peace.

>> 6.6
    If our dominions abroad are the roots 
        which feed all this rank luxuriance of sedition,
it is not intended to cut them off 
    in order to famish the fruit.

>> 6.7
    If our liberty has enfeebled the executive power,
there is no design,
    I hope,
to call in the aid of despotism,
to fill up the deficiencies of law.

>> 6.8
    Whatever may be intended,
these things are not yet professed.

>> 6.9
We seem therefore to be driven to absolute despair;
    for we have no other materials to work upon,
        but those 
            out of which God has been pleased to form the inhabitants of this 
            land.

>> 6.10
    If these be radically and essentially vicious, 
all that can be said is,
    that those men are very unhappy,
        to whose fortune or duty it falls to administer the affairs of this
        untoward people.

>> 6.11
I hear it indeed sometimes asserted,
    that a steady perseverance in the present measures, 
    and a rigorous punishment of those 
        who oppose them,
    will in course of time infallibly put an end to these disorders.

>> 6.12
But this, 
    in my opinion,
is said without much observation of our present disposition,
    and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind.

>> 6.13
    If the matter 
        of which this nation is composed
    be so very fermentable 
        as these gentlemen describe it,
leaven never will be wanting to work it up,
    as long as discontent, revenge, and ambition, have existence in the
    world.

>> 6.14
Particular punishments are the cure for accidental distempers in the state;
they inflame rather than allay those heats
    which arise from the settled mismanagement of the government,
        or from a natural indisposition in the people.

>> 6.15
It is of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in the use of strong measures;
and firmness is then only a virtue
    when it accompanies the most perfect wisdom.

>> 6.16
In truth, inconstancy is a sort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.

Outline of para. 6:
(1) Implication of the official explanation of the present discontent
(2) This explanation criticized.
(3) Proposed official action and its criticism.

==============================
para. 7:

>> 7.1
I am not one of those
    who think that the people are never in the wrong.

>> 7.2
They have been so,
    frequently and outrageously,
    both in other countries and in this.

>> 7.3
But I do say,
        that in all disputes between them and their rulers,
    the presumption is at least upon a par in favor of the people.

>> 7.4
Experience may perhaps justify me in going further.

>> 7.5
    When popular discontents have been very prevalent,
it may well be affirmed and supported,
    that there has been generally something found amiss 
        in the constitution,
        or in the conduct of the government.

>> 7.6
    When they do wrong,
it is their error, 
    and not their crime.

>> 7.7
But with the governing part of the state, it is otherwise.

>> 7.8
They certainly may act ill by design, as well as by mistake.

>> 7.9
“Les révolutions 
    qui arrivent dans les grands états 
ne sont point un effect du hazard, 
    ni du caprice des peuples. 
Rien ne révolte les grands d’un royaume comme un gouvernement foible et dérangé.
    Pour la populace,
ce n’est jamais par envie d’attaquer 
    qu’elle se soulève, 
    mais par impatience de souffrir.”

>> 7.10
These are the words of a great man;
    of a minister of state;
    and a zealous assertor of monarchy.

>> 7.11
They are applied to the system of favoritism
    which was adopted by Henry the Third of France,
and to the dreadful consequences it produces.

>> 7.12
What he says of revolution, is equally true of all great disturbances.

>> 7.13
    If this presumption in favor of the subjects against the trustees of power 
    be not the more probable,
I am sure 
    it is the more comfortable speculation;
        because it is more easy to change an administration,
            than to reform a people.

===========================
para. 8:

>> 8.1
    Upon a supposition, 
        therefore,
    that,
        in the opening of the cause,
    the presumptions stand equally balanced between the parties,
there seems sufficient ground to entitle any person to a fair hearing,
    who attempts some other scheme beside the easy one 
        which is fashionable in some fashionable companies,
    to account for the present discontents.

>> 8.2
It is not to be argued
    that we endure no grievance,
    because our grievances are not of the same sort with those
        under which we labored formerly;
    not precisely those 
        which we bore from the Tudors,
        or vindicated on the Stuarts.

>> 8.3
A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country.

>> 8.4
    For in the silent lapse of events 
as material alterations have been insensibly brought about 
    in policy and charactrer of governments and nations,
as those 
    which have been marked by the tumult of public revolutions.

===============================
para. 9:

>> 9.1
It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings 
    concerning public misconduct;
as rare to be right in their speculation upon the cause of it.

>> 9.2
I have constantly observed,
    that the generality of people are fifty years,
        at least,
    behindhand in their politics.

>> 9.3
There are but very few
    who are capable of comparing and digesting 
        what passes before their eyes
            at different times and occasions,
            so as to form the whole into a distinct system.

>> 9.4
But in books everything is settled for them,
    without the exertion of any considerable diligence or sagacity.

>> 9.5
    For which reason
men are wise with but little reflection,
and good with little self-denial,
    in the business of all times except their own.

>> 9.6
We are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlightened judges of the transactions of
past ages;
    where no passions deceive,
    and where the whole train of circumstances,
        from the trifling cause to the tragical event,
    is set in an orderly series before us.

>> 9.7
Few are the partisans of departed tyranny;
and to be a Whig on the business of an hundred years ago,
    is very consistent with every advantage of present servility.

>> 9.8
This retrospective wisdom, and historical patriotism,
are things of wonderful convenience,
and serve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between speculation and
practice.

>> 9.9
Many stern republican,
    after gorging himself with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian
    commonwealth and of our true Saxon constitution,
    and discharging all the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King
    John and King James,
sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and homeliest job of the
day he lived in.

>> 9.10
I believe 
    there was no professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments 
    of the last King James;
nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was there,
    I dare say,
to be found a single advocate for the favorites of Richard the Second.

==========================
para. 10:

>> 10.1
No complaisance to our court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be so
changed, 
but that public liberty will be 
    among us as among our ancestors,
obnoxious to some person or other;
and that opportunities will be furnished for attempting, 
    at least,
some alteration to the prejudice of our constitution.

>> 10.2
These attempts will naturally vary in their mode according to times and
circumstances.

>> 10.3
For ambition,
     though it has ever the same general views,
has not at all times the same means,
nor the same particular objects.

>> 10.4
A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags;
the rest is entirely out of fashion.

>> 10.5
    Besides,
there are few statesmen so very clumsy and awkward in their business, 
    as to fall into the identical snare 
        which has proved fatal to their predecessors.

>> 10.6
    When an arbitrary imposition is attempted upon the subject,
undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of Ship-money.

>> 10.7
There is no danger 
    that an extension of the Forest laws should be the chosen mode of oppression
    in this age.

>> 10.8
    And when we hear any instance of ministerial rapacity,
        to the prejudice of the rights of private life,
it will certainly not be the exaction of two hundred pullets,
    from a woman of fashion,
    for leave to lie with her own husband.

==============================
para. 11:

>> 11.1
Every age has its own manners, 
and its politics dependent upon them;
and the same attempts will not be made against a constitution fully formed
and matured,
    that were used to destroy it in the cradle,
    or to resist its growth during its infancy.

==============================
para. 12:

>> 12.1
Against the being of Parliament,
    I am satisfied,
no designs have ever been entertained since the revolution.

>> 12.2
Every one must perceive,
    that it is strongly the interest of the court, 
        to have some second cause interposed between the ministers and the 
        people.

>> 12.3
The gentlemen of the House of Commons have an interest equally strong in
sustaining the part of that intermediate cause.

>> 12.4
However they may hire out the usufruct of their voices,
they never will part with the fee and inheritance.

>> 12.5
Accordingly those
    who have been of the most known devotion to the will and pleasure of a court
have,
    at the same time,
been most forward in asserting a high authority in the House of Commons.

>> 12.6
    When they knew
        who were to use that authority,
        and how it was to be employed,
they thought it never could be carried too far.

>> 12.7
It must be always the wish of an unconstitutional statesman,
    that a House of Commons,
        who are entirely dependent upon him,
    should have every right of the people entirely dependent upon their
    pleasure.

>> 12.8
It was soon discovered,
    that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary government,
    were things not altogether incompatible.

==============================
para. 13:

>> 13.1
The power of the crown,
    almost dead and rotten as Prerogative,
has grown up anew,
    with much more strength,
    and far less odium,
    under the name of Influence.

>> 13.2
An influence,
    which operated without noise and without violence;
an influence,
    which converted the very antagonist into the instrument of power;
    which contained in itself a perpetual principle of growth and renovation;
    and which the distresses and the prosperity of the country equally tended to
    augment,
was an admirable substitute for a prerogative,
    that,
        being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices,
    had moulded in its original stamina 
    irresistible principles of decay and dissolution.

>> 13.3
The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary system;
the interest of active men in the state is a foundation perpetual and
infallible.

>> 13.4
However,
some circumstance,
    arising,
        it must be confessed,
    in a great degree from accident,
prevented the effects of this influence for a long time from breaking out 
    in a manner capable of exciting any serious apprehensions.

>> 13.5
    Although government was strong and flourished exceedingly,
the court had drawn far less advantage 
    than one would imagine from this great source of power.

==================
para. 14:

>> 14.1
    At the revolution,
the crown,
    deprived,
        for the ends of the revolution itself,
    of many prerogatives,
was found too weak to struggle against all the difficulties
    which pressed so new and unsettled a government.

>> 14.2
The court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers 
    to men of such interest as could support,
    and of such fidelity as would adhere to, its establishment.

>> 14.3
Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common
defence.

>> 14.4
This connection,
    necessary at first,
continued long after convenient;
and 
    properly conducted 
might indeed,
    in all situations,
be an useful instrument of government.

>> 14.5
    At the same time,
    through the intervention of men of popular weight and character,
the people possessed a security for their just proportion of importance in the
state.

>> 14.6
    But as the title to the crown grew stronger by long possession,
    and by the constant increase of its influence,
these helps have of late seemed to certain persons no better than incumbrances.

>> 14.7
The powerful managers for government were not sufficiently submissive to the
pleasure of the possessors of immediate and personal favor,
    sometimes from a confidence in their own strength, 
        natural and acquired;
    sometimes from a fear of offending their friends, 
        and weakening that lead in the country 
            which gave them a consideration independent of the court.

>> 14.8
Men acted 
    as if the court could receive,
        as well as confer,
    an obligation.

>> 14.9
The influence of government,
    thus divided in appearance between the court and the leaders of parties,
became in many cases an accession rather to the popular than to the royal scale;
and some part of that influence,
    which would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of mortmain and
    unalienable domain,
returned again to the great ocean
    from whence it arose,
and circulated among the people.

>> 14.10
This method,
    therefore,
    of governing by men of great natural interest or great acquired 
    consideration
was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of absolute monarchy.

>> 14.11
It is the nature of despotism 
    to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure;
    and to annihilate all intermediate situations 
        between boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the 
        part of the people.

=======================
para. 15:

>> 15.1
To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance,
and to secure to the court the unlimited and uncontrolled use of its own vast
influence,
    under the sole direction of its own private favour,
has for some years past been the great object of policy.

>> 15.2
    If this were compassed,
the influnece of the crown must of course produce all the effects 
    which the most sanguine partisans of the court could possibly desire.

>> 15.3
Government might then be carried on 
    without any concurrence on the part of the people;
    without any attention to the dignity of the greater, 
        or to the affections of the lower sort.

>> 15.4
A new project was therefore devised by a certain set of intriguing men,
    totally different from the system of administration
        which had prevailed since the accession of the House of Brunswick.

>> 15.5
This project, 
    I have heard,
was first conceived by some persons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.

======================
para. 16:

>> 16.1
The earliest attemp in the execution of this design was to set up for minister,
a person,
    in the rank indeed respectable,
    and very ample in fortune;
    but who,
        to the moment of this vast and sudden elevation,
    was little known or considered in the kingdom.

>> 16.2
To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit submission.

>> 16.3
    But whether it was from want of firmness to bear up against the first
    opposition;
    or that things were not yet fully ripened,
    or that this method was not found the most eligible;
that idea was soon abandoned.

>> 16.4
The instrumental part of the project was a little altered,
    to accommodate it to the time 
    and to bring things more gradually and more surely to the one great end 
    proposed.

=======================
para. 17:

>> 17.1
The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a line
    which should separate the court from the ministry.

>> 17.2
Hitherto these names had been looked upon as synonymous;
    but for the future,
court and administration were to be considered as things totally distinct.

>> 17.3
    By this operation,
two systems of administration were to be formed;
one which should be in the real secret and confidence;
the other merely ostensible to perform the official and executory duties of
government.

>> 17.4
The latter were alone to be responsible;
whilst the real advisers,
    who enjoyed all the power,
were effectually removed from the danger.

========================
para. 18:

>> 18.1
Secondly, a party under these leaders was to be formed in favor of the court
against the ministry;
this party was to have a large share in the emoluments of government,
    and to hold it totally separate from, and independent of, ostensible
    administration.

========================
para. 19:

>> 19.1
The third point,
    and that on which the success of the whole scheme ultimately depended,
was to bring Parliament to an acquiescence in this project.

>> 19.2
Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the
persons, rank, influence, abilities, connections, and character of the ministers
of the crown.

>> 19.3
    By means of a discipline,
        on which I shall say more hereafter,
that body was to be habituated to the most opposite interests, and the most
discordant politics.

>> 19.4
All connections and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely dissolved.

>> 19.5
    As,
        hitherto,
    business had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories,
        men of talents to conciliate the people,
        and to engage their confidence;
now the method was to be altered;
and the lead was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the
country.

>> 19.6
This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power.

>> 19.7
Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an insensiibility to pride as
well as to duty.

>> 19.8
Those high and haughty sentiments,
    which are the great support of independence,
were to be let down gradually.

>> 19.9 
Points of honor and precedence were no more to be regarded in Parliamentary
decorum than in a Turkish army.

>> 19.10
It was to be avowed,
    as a constitutional maxim,
    that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen for
    minister;
    and that he ought to be,
    and that he would be,
        as well followed as the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation.

==========================
para. 20

>> 20.1
    With such a degree of acquiescence,
any measure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly secure.

>> 20.2
The capital objects,
    and by much the most flattering characteristics of arbitrary power,
would be obtained.

>> 20.3
Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the personal favor
and inclination of the prince.

>> 20.4
This favor would be the sole introduction to power, and the only tenure 
    by which it was to be held;
so that no person looking towards another,
and all looking towards the court,
it was impossible but that the motive
    which solely influenced every man's hopes 
must come in time to govern every man's conduct;
till at last the servility became universal,
    in spite of the dead letter of any laws or institutions whatsoever.

=====================
para. 21

>> 21.1 
How it should happen
    that any man could be tempted to venture upon such a project of government,
may at first view appear surprising.

>> 21.2
But the fact is
    that opportunities very inviting to such an attempt have offered;
and the scheme itself was not destitute of some arguments,
    not wholly unplausible,
to recommend it.

>> 21.3
These opportunities and these arguments,
the use 
    that has been made 
of both,
the plan for carrying this new scheme of government into execution, 
and the effects 
    which it has produced,
are,
    in my opinion,
worthy of our serious consideration.

===================
para. 22

>> 22.1
His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages than any
of his predecessors since the revolution.

>> 22.2
    Fourth in descent,
    and third in succession of his royal family,
even the zealots of hereditary right,
    in him,
saw something to flatter their favorite prejudices;
    and to justify a transfer of their attachments,
        without a change in their principles.

>> 22.3
The person and cause of the Pretender were become contemptible;
his title disowned throughout Europe;
his party disbanded in England.

>> 22.4
His Majesty came,
    indeed,
to the inheritance of a mighty war;
but,
    victorious in every part of the globe,
peace was always in his power,
    not to negotiate,
    but to dictate.

>> 22.5
No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his
power at home.

>> 22.6
His revenue for the civil establishment,
    fixed
        (as it was then thought)
    at a large, but definite sum,
was ample without being invidious.

>> 22.7
His influence,
    by additions from conquest,
    by an augmentation of debt,
    by an increase of military and naval establishment,
much strengthened and extended.

>> 22.8
    And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigor of youth,
    as from affection there was a strong dislike,
    so from dread 
there seemed to be a general averseness,
    from giving anything like offence to a monarch,
        against whose resentment opposion could not look for a refuge in any 
        sort of reversionary hope.

=====================
para. 23

>> 23.1
These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with a more ardent desire to
preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom,
    to which he owed a situation so full of glory.

>> 23.2
    But to others
it suggested sentiments of a very different nature.

>> 23.3
They thought 
    they now beheld an opportunity
        (by a certain sort of statesmen never long undiscovered or unemployed)
    of drawing to themselves 
        by the aggrandizement of a court faction,
    a degree of power
        which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from
        honorable service;
        and which it was impossible
            they could hold with the least security,
                whilst the system of administration rested upon its former
                bottom.

>> 23.4
    In order to facilitate the execution of their design,
it was necessary
    to make many alterations in political arrangement,
    and a signal change in the opinions, habits, and connections of the greatest
    part of those
        who at that time acted in public.

==================
para. 24:

>> 24.1
In the first place,
they proceeded gradually, 
    but not slowly,
to destroy everything of strength 
    which did not derive its principal nourishment from the immediate pleasure
    of the court.

>> 24.2
The greatest weight of popular opinion and party connection were then with the
Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt.

>> 24.3
Neither of these held their importance by the new tenure of the court;
they were not therefore thought to be so proper as others for the service 
    which were required by that tenure.

>> 24.4
It happened very favorably for the new system,
    that 
        under a forced coalition 
    there rankled an incurable alienation and disgust between the parties 
        which composed the administration.

>> 24.5
Mr. Pitt was first attacked.

>> 24.6
    Not satisfied with removing him from power,
they endeavored by various artifices to ruin his character.

>> 24.7
The other party seemed rather pleased to get rid of so oppressive a support;
    not perceiving,
that their own fall was prepared by this, and involved in it.

>> 24.8
Many other reasons prevented them from daring to look their true situation in
the face.

>> 24.9
    To the great Whig families
it was extremely disagreeable,
and seemed almost unnatural,
    to oppose the administration of a prince of the House of Brunswick.

>> 24.10
    Day after day 
they hesitated, and doubted, and lingered,
    expecting that other counsels would take place;
and were slow to be persuaded,
    that all 
        which had been done by the cabal
    was the effect not of humor, but of system.

>> 24.11
It was more strongly and evidently the interest of the new court faction,
    to get rid of the great Whig connections,
    than to destroy Mr. Pitt.

>> 24.12
The power of that gentleman was vast indeed and merited;
but it was in a great degree personal, and therefore transient.

>> 24.13
Theirs was rooted in the country.

>> 24.14
For,
    with a good deal less of popularity,
they possessed a far more natural and fixed influence.

>> 24.15
Long possession of government;
vast property;
obligations of favors given and received;
connection of office;
ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship
    (things at that time supposed of some force);
the name of Whig, 
    dear to the majority of the people;
the zeal early begun and steadily continued to the royal family:
all these together formed a body of power in the nation,
    which was criminal and devoted.

>> 24.16
The great ruling principle of the cabal,
and that which animated and harmonized all their proceedings,
    how various soever they may have been,
was to signify to the world
    that the court would proceed upon its own proper forces only;
and that the pretence of bringing any other into its service 
    was an affront to it,
    and not a support.

>> 24.17
    Therefore when the chiefs were removed,
        in order to go to the root,
the whole party was put under a proscription,
    so general and severe,
    as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowest officers,
        in a manner 
            which had never been known before,
                even in general revolutions.

>> 24.18
But it was thought necessary effectually to destroy all dependencies but one;
and to show an example of the firmness and rigor 
    with which the new system was to be supported.

========================
para. 25:

>> 25.1
    Thus for the time 
were pulled down,
in the persons of the Whig leaders and of Mr. Pitt
    (in spite of the services of the one at the accession of the royal family,
    and the recent services of the other in the war),
    the two only securities for the importance of the people;
power arising from popularity;
and power arising from connection.

>> 25.2
Here and there indeed a few individuals were left standing,
    who gave security for their total estrangement from the odious principles of
    party connection and personal attachment;
and it must be confessed that most of them have religiously kept their faith.

>> 25.3
Such a change could not however be made without a mighty shock to government.

=======================
para. 26:

>> 26.1
    To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements,
principles correspendent to them had been preached up with great zeal.

>> 26.2
Every one must remember 
    that the cabal set out with the most astonishing prudery,
        both moral and political.

>> 26.3
Those,
    who in a few months after soused over head and ears into the deepest and
    dirtiest pits of corruption,
cried out violently against the indirect practices in the electing and managing
of Parliaments,
    which had formerly prevailed.

>> 26.4
This marvellous abhorrence
    which the court had suddenly taken to all influence,
was not only circulated in conversation through the kingdom,
but pompously announced to the public,
    with many other extraordinary things,
in a pamphlet 
    which had all the appearance of a manifesto preparatory to some
    considerable enterprise. 

>> 26.5
    Throughout 
it was a satire,
    though in terms managed and decent enough,
on the politics of the former resign.

>> 26.6
It was indeed written with no small art and address.

==============================
para. 27:

>> 27.1
In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new system:
    there first appeared the idea
        (then only in speculation)
    of separating the court from the administration;
    of arring everything from national connection to personal regards;
    and of forming a regular party for that purpose, under the name of king's 
    men.

==============================
para. 28:

>> 28.1
    To recommend this system to the people,
a perspective view of the court,
    gorgeously painted,
    and finely illuminated from within,
was exhibited to the gaping multitude.

>> 28.2
Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works.

>> 28.3
Corruption was to be cast down from court,
    as Ate was from heaven.

>> 28.4
Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence of public spirit;
and no one was to be supposed under any sinister influence,
    except those who had the misfortune to be in disgrace at court,
        which was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions.

>> 28.5
A scheme of perfection to be realized in a monarchy far beyond the visionary
republic of Plato.

>> 28.6
The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls,
    whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians.

>> 28.7 
Indeed there was wherewithal to charm everybody,
    except those few 
        who are not much pleased with professions of supernatural virtue,
        who know 
            of what stuff such professions are made,
            for what purposes they are designed,
            and in what they are sure constantly to end.

>> 28.8
Many innocent gentlemen,
    who had been talking prose all their lives without knowing anything of the
    matter,
began at last to open their eyes upon their own merits,
and to attribute their not having been lords of the treasury and lords of trade
many years before,
    merely to the prevalence of party,
    and to the ministerial power,
        which had frustrated the good intentions of the court in favor of their
        abilities.

>> 28.9
Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty,
    which had been infamously monopolized and huckstered,
and to let it flow at large upon the whole people.

>> 28.10
The time was come, to restore royalty to its original splendor.

>> 28.11
Mettre le Roy hors de page, became a sort of watchword.

>> 28.12
And it was constantly in the mouths of all the runners of the court,
    that nothing could preserve the balance of the constitution from being
    overturned by the rabble,
        or by a faction of the nobility,
    but to free the sovereign effectually from that ministerial tyranny 
        under which the royal dignity had been oppressed 
            in the person of his Majesty's grandfather.
       
=======================
para. 29

>> 29.1
These were some of the many artifices used to reconcile the people to the great
change
    which was made in the persons 
        who composed the ministry,
and the still greater
    which was made and avowed in its constitution.

>> 29.2
    As to individuals,
other methods were employed with them;
    in order so thoroughly to disunited every party,
    and even every family,
that no concert, order, or effect, might appear in any future opposition.

>> 29.3
And in this manner an administration without connection with the people, 
    or with one another, 
was put in possession of government.

>> 29.4
    What good consequences followed from it,
we have all seen;
    whether with regard to virtue, public or private;
    to the ease and happiness of the sovereign;
    or to the real strength of government.

>> 29.5
    But as so much stress was then laid on the necessity of this new project,
it will not be amiss to take a view of the effects of this royal servitude and
vile durance,
    which was so deplored in the reign of the last monarch,
    and was so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his successor.

>> 29.6
The effects were these.

========================
para. 30:

>> 30.1
    In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family,
George II. maintained the dignity of his crown connected with the liberty of his
people, 
    not only unimpaired, but improved,
    for the space of thirty-three years.

>> 30.2
He overcame a dangerous rebellion, 
    abetted by foreign force,
    and raging in the heart of his kingdoms;
and thereby destroyed the seeds of all future rebellion 
    that could arise upon the same principle.

>> 30.3
He carried the glory, the power, the commerce of England, to a height unknown 
even to this renowned nation in the times of its great prosperity:
and he left 
    his succession resting on the true and only true foundations of all 
    national and all regal greatness;
    affection at home, 
    reputation abroad, 
    trust in allies, 
    terror in rival nations.

>> 30.4
The most ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier
fate than to continue as she was then left.

>> 30.5
A people, 
    emulous as we are in affection to our present sovereign,
know not 
    how to form a prayer to heaven for a greater blessing upon his virtues,
        or a higher state of felicity and glory,
    than that he should live, and should reign,
        and when Providence ordains it,
    should die,
        exactly like his illustrious predecessor.

=====================
para. 31:

>> 31.1
A greater prince may be obliged
    (though such a thing cannot happen very often)
to sacrifice his private inclination to his public interest.

>> 31.2
A wise prince will not think
    that such a restraint implies a condition of servility;
and truly,
    if such was the condition of the last reign,
    and the effects were also such 
       as we have described,
we ought,
    no less for the sake of the sovereign 
        whom we love,
    than for our own,
to hear arguments convincing indeed,
    before we depart from the maxims of that reign,
    or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent experience.

===================
para. 32:

>> 32.1
One of the principal topics
    which was then,
    and has been since,
    much employed by that political school,
is an affected terror of the growth of an aristocratic power,
    prejudicial to the rights of the crown,
    and the balance of the constitution.

>> 32.2
Any new powers exercised in the House of Lords, 
    or in the House of Commons, 
    or by the crown, 
ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people.

>> 32.3
Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole legislature,
    without great and evident reason,
may be a subject of just uneasiness.

>> 32.4
I will not affirm,
    that there may not have lately appeared in the House of Lords, 
        a disposition to some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the 
        subject.

>> 32.5
If any such have really appeared,
they have risen,
    not from a power properly aristocratic,
    but from the same influence
        which is charged with having excited attemps of a similar nature in the
        House of Commons;
        which House, 
            if it should have been betrayed into an unfortunated quarrel with
            its constituents,
                and involved in a charge of the very same nature,
        could have neither power nor inclination to repel such attempts in
        others.

>> 32.6
Those attempts in the House of Lords can no more be called aristocratic
proceedings,
    than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of
    Commons can 
        with any sense 
    be called democratical.

====================
para. 33:

>> 33.1
It is true,
    that the peers have a great influence in the kingdowm
    and in every part of the public concerns.

>> 33.2
    While they are men of property,
it is impossible to prevent it,
    except by such means as must prevent all property from its natural operation:
        an event not easily to be compassed,
            while property is power;
        nor by any means to be wished,
            while the least notion exists of the method 
                by which the spirit of liberty acts,
            and of the means 
                by which it is preserved.

>> 33.3
    If any particular peers,
        by their uniform, upright, constitutional conduct,
        by their public and their private virtues,
    have acquired an influence in the country;
the people,
    on whose favor that influence depends,
    and from whom it arose,
will never be duped into an opinion,
    that such greatness in a peer is the despotism of an aristocracy,
    when they know and feel it to be the effect and pledge of their own 
    importance.

=====================
para. 34:

>> 34.1
I am no friend to aristocracy,
    in the sense at lease 
        in which that word is usually understood.

>> 34.2
    If it were not a bad habit to moot cases on the supposed ruin of the
    constitution,
I should be free to declare,
    that 
        if it must perish,
    I would rather by far see it resolved into any other form,
        than lost in that austere and insolent domination.

>> 34.3
But,
    whatever my dislikes may be,
my fears are not upon that quarter.

>> 34.4
The question,
    on the influence of a court, and of a peerage,
is not
    which of the two dangers is the more eligible,
    but which is the more imminent.

>> 34.5
He is but a poor observer,
   who has not seen,
       that the generality of peers,
           far from supporting themselves in a state of independent greatness,
       are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity,
       and to run headlong into an abject servitude.

>> 34.6
Would to God it were true,
    that the fault of our peers were too much spirit.

>> 34.7
It is worthy of some observation
    that these gentlemen,
        so jealous of aristocracy,
    make no complaints of the power of those peers
        (neither few nor inconsiderable)
        who are always in the train of a court,
        and whose whole weight must be considered as a portion of the settled
        influence of the crown.

>> 34.8
This is all safe and right;
but if some peers
    (I am very sorry they are not as many as they ought to be)
set themselves,
    in the great concern of peers and commons,
against a back-stairs influence and clandestine government,
then the alarm begins;
then the constitution is in danger of being forced into an aristocracy.

=======================
para. 35:

>> 35.1
I rest a little the longer on this court topic,
    because it was much insisted upon at the time of great change,
    and has been since frequently revived by many of the agents of that party;
    for, 
        whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of
        mob-governmment,
    they are by other managers attempting
        (though hitherto with little success)
    to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny in the nobles.

>> 35.2
All this is done upon their favorite principle of disunion,
    of sowing jealousies amongst the different orders of the state,
    and of disjointing the natural strength of the kingdom;
    that it may be rendered incapable of resisting the sinister designs of 
    wicked men,
        who have engrossed the royal power.

=================
para. 36:

>> 36.1
Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend their system;
it will be necessary to open a little more at large the nature of that party
    which was formed for its support.

>> 36.2
    Without this,
the whole would have been no better than a visionary amusement,
    like the scheme of Harrington's political club,
    and not a business 
        in which the nation had a real concern.

>> 36.3
    As a powerful party, and a party constructed on a new principle,
it is a very inviting object of curiosity.

====================
para. 37:

>> 37.1
It must be remembered,
    that 
        since the revolution,
        until the period we are speaking of,
    the influence of the crown had been always employed in supporting the
    ministers of the state,
        and in carrying on the public business according to their opinions.

>> 37.2
But the party now in question is formed upon a very different idea.

>> 37.3
It is to intercept the favor, protection, and confidence of the crown in the
passage to its ministers;
it is to come between them and their importance in Parliament;
it is to separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies;
it is intended as the control, not the support, of administration.

>> 37.4
The machinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, 
and false in its principle.

>> 37.5
It is formed on a supposition
    that the king is something external to his government;
    and that he may be honored and aggrandized,
        even by its debility and disgrace.

>> 37.6
The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory
power.

>> 37.7
It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court.

>> 37.8
The scheme depending entirely on distrust, on disconnection, on mutability by
principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member;
it is impossible 
    that the total result should be substantial strength of any kind.

==================
para. 38:

>> 38.1
    As a foundation of their scheme,
the cabal have established a sort of rota in the court.

>> 38.2
All sorts of parties, 
    by this means,
have been brought into administration;
from whence few have had the good fortune to escape without disgrace;
none at all without considerable losses.

>> 38.3
    In the beginning of each arrangement
no professions of confidence and support are wanting,
    to induce the leading men to engage.

>> 38.4
    But while the ministers of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power,
    while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind,
    and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor,
in a short time they find,
    they know not how,
a current,
    which sets directly against them:
    which prevents all progress;
    and even drives them backwards.
  
>> 38.5
They grow ashamed and mortified in a situation,
    which,
        by its vicinity to power,
    only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance.

>> 38.6
They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors,
or to see themselves opposed by the natuaral instruments of their office.

>> 38.7
    With the loss of their dignity
they lose their temper.

>> 38.8
    In their turn
they grow troublesome to that cabal
    which,
        whether it supports or opposes,
    equally disgraces and equally betrays them.

>> 38.9
It is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of the administration;
but it is of the heads only.

>> 38.10
   As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connections,
it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office without their leaders.

>> 38.11
    By this means
the party goes out much thinner than it came in;
and is only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power.
 
>> 38.12
Besides,
    if by accident,
    or in course of changes,
    that power should be recovered,
the junto have thrown up a retrenchment of these carcasses,
    which may serve to cover themselves in a day of danger.

>> 38.13
They conclude,
    not unwisely,
that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust and resentment
to their ancient connections.

===================
para. 39:

>> 39.1
They contrive to form in the outward administration two parties at the least;
which,
    whilst they are tearing one another to pieces,
are both competitors for the favor and protection of the cabal;
and,
    by their emulation,
contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands of the interior
managers.

=================
para. 40:

>> 40.1
A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from all his
colleagues;
will differ from them in their councils,
will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures.

>> 40.2
He will,
    however,
continue in his employment.

>> 40.3
    Instead of suffering any mark of displeasure,
he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court rewards and
caresses;
    because he does what is expected,
        and all that is expected,
    from men in office.

>> 40.4
He helps to keep some form of administration in being,
and keeps it at the same time as weak and divided as possible.

===============
para. 41:

>> 41.1
However, we must take care not to be mistaken,
or to imagine
   that such persons have any weight in their opposition.

>> 41.2
    When,
        by them,
    administration is convinced of its insignificancy,
they are soon to be convinced of their own.

>> 41.3
They never are suffered to succeed in their opposition.

>> 41.4
They and the world are to be satisfied,
    that neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence,
    counsel, skill, or union,
    are of the least importance;
    but that the mere influence of the court,
        naked of all support,
        and destitute of all management,
    is abundantly sufficient for all its purposes.

=================
para. 42:

>> 42.1
    When any adverse connection is to be destroyed,
the cabal seldom appear in the work themselves.

>> 42.2
They find out some person 
    of whom the party entertains a high opinion.

>> 42.3
Such a person they endeavor to delude with various pretences.

>> 42.4
They teach him first to distrust,
and then to quarrel with his friends;
    among whom,
        by the same arts,
    they excite a similar diffidence of him;
so that 
    in this mutual fear and distrust,
he may suffer himself to be employed as the instrument in the change
    which is brought about.

>> 42.5
Afterwards they are sure to destroy him in his turn,
    by setting up in his place some person 
        in whom he had himself reposed the greatest confidence,
        and who serves to carry off a considerable part of his adherents.

=================
para. 43:

>> 43.1
    When such a person has broke in this manner with his connections,
he is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous, personal
hostility against some of them
    (such as an attempt to strip a particular friend of his family estate),
    by which the cabal hope to render the parties utterly irreconcilable.

>> 43.2
    In truth,
they have so contrived matters,
    that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate instruments than to the
    principal movers.
   
===============
para. 44:

>> 44.1
    As in destroying their enemies
    they make use of instruments not immediately belonging to their corps,
so in advancing their own friends they persue exactly the same method.
     
>> 44.2
To promote any of them to considerable rank or emolument,
they commonly take care 
    that the recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible 
    ministry:
        such a recommendation might however appear to the world,
            as some proof of the credit of ministers,
            and some means of increasing their strength.

>> 44.3
To prevent this,
the persons so advanced are directed,
    in all companies,
industriously to declare,
    that they are under no obligations whatsoever to administration;
    that they have received their office from another quarter;
    that they are totally free and independent.

================
para. 45:

>> 45.1
    When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain,
    or of vengeance to perpetrate,
their way is, to select,
    for the execution,
those very persons 
    to whose habits, friendships, principles, and declarations, such proceedings
    are publicly known to be the most adverse;
at once to render the instruments the more odious,
and therefore the more dependent,
and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence in any appearance of
private friendship or public principle.
    
=================
para. 46:

>> 46.1
    If the administration seem now and then,
        from remissness,
        or from fear of making themselves disagreeable,
    to suffer any popular excesses to go unpunished,
the cabal immediately sets up some creature of theirs to raise a clamor against
the ministers,
    as having shamefully betrayed the dignity of government.

>> 46.2
Then they compel the ministry to become active in conferring rewards and honors
on the person
    who have been the instruments of their disgrace;
and,
    after having first vilified them with the higher orders for suffering the
    laws to sleep over the licentiousness of the populace,
they drive them
    (in order to make amends for their former inactivity)
to some act of atrocious violence,
    which renders them completely abhorred by the people.

>> 46.3
They,
    who remember the riots
        which attended 
            the Middlesex election,
            the opening of the present Parliament,
            and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields,
will not be at a loss for an application of these remarks.

=================
para. 47:

>> 47.1
That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its institution,
its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and responsible offices of
the state.

>> 47.2
They are distributed with art and judgment 
    throught all the secondary, but efficient, department of office,
    and through the households of all the branches of the royal family:
so as 
    on one hand 
to occupy all the avenues to the throne;
and 
    on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any measure,
        according to their own interests.

>> 47.3
For with the credit and support 
    which they are known to have,
    though for the greated part in places
        which are only a genteel excuse for salary,
they possess all the influence of the highest posts;
and they dictate publicly in almost everything,
    even with a parade of superiority.

>> 47.4
    Whenever they dissent
        (as it often happens)
    from their nominal leaders,
the trained part of the senate,
    instinctively in the secret,
is sure to follow them:
    provided the leaders,
        sensible of their situation,
    do not of themselves recede in the time from their most declared opinions.

>> 47.5
It will not be conceivable to any one
    who has not seen it,
what pleasure is taken by the cabal in rendering these heads of office
thoroughly contemptible and ridiculous.

>> 47.6
    And when they are become so,
they have then the best chance for being well supported.

=================
para. 48:

>> 48.1
The members of the court faction are fully indemnified for not holding places of
the slippery heights of the kingdom,
    not only by the lead in all affairs,
    but also by the perfect security 
        in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous situations.

>> 48.2
Their places are in express legal tenure, or, 
    in effect,
all of them for life.

>> 48.3
    Whilst the first and most respectable persons in the kingdom are tossed
    about like tennis-balls,
    the sport of a blind and insolent caprice,
no minister dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their body.

>> 48.4
    If an attempt be made upon one of this corps,
immediately he flies to sanctuary,
and pretends to the most inviolable of all promises.

>> 48.5
No conveniency of public arrangement is available to remove any one of them from
the specific situation he hold;
and the slightest attempt upon one of them,
    by the most powerful minister,
is a certain preliminary to his own destruction.

=================
para. 49:

>> 49.1
    Conscious of their independence,
they bear themselves with a lofty air to the exterior ministers.

>> 49.2
    Like janissaries,
they derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their servitude.

>> 49.3
They may act just as they please;
    provided they are true to the great ruling principle of their institutions.

>> 49.4
It is,
    therefore,
not at all wonderful,
    that people should be so desirous of adding themselves to that body,
        in which they may process and reconcile satisfactions the most alluring,
        and seemingly the most contradictory;
    enjoying at once all the spirited pleasure of independence,
    and all the gross lucre and fat emoluments of servitude.

=================
para. 50:

>> 50.1
Here is a sketch,
    though a slight one,
of the constitution, laws, and policy of this new court corporation.

>> 50.2
The name 
    by which they choose to distinguish themselves,
is that of king's men or the king's friends,
    by an invidious exclusion of the rest of his Majesty's most loyal and
    affectionate subjects.

>> 50.3
The whole system,
    comprehending the exerior and interior administrations,
is commonly called,
    in the technical language of the court,
double cabinet;
    in French or English,
    as you choose to pronounce it.

===============
para. 51:

>> 51.1
Whether all this be a vision of a distracted brain,
    or the invention of a malicious heart,
    or a real faction of the country,
must be judged by the appearences 
    which things have worn for eight years past.

>> 51.2
Thus far I am certain,
that there is not a single public man,
    in or out of office,
who has not,
    at some time or other,
borne testimony to the truth
    of what I have now related.

>> 51.3
    In particular,
no persons have been more strong in their assertions,
    and louder and more indecent in their complaints,
    than those 
        who compose all the exterior part of the present administration;
            in whose time that faction has arrived at such an height of power,
                and of boldness in the use of it,
            as may,
                in the end,
            perhaps bring about its total destruction.

====================
para. 52:

>> 52.1
It is true,
    that about four years ago,
    during the administration of the Marquis of Rockingham,
an attempt was mad to carry on government without their concurrence.

>> 52.2
    However,
this was only a transient cloud;
they were hid but for a moment;
and their cnstellation blazed out with greater brightness,
    and a far more vigorous influence,
    some time after it was blown over.

>> 52.3
An attempt was at that time made
    (but without any idea of proscription)
    to break their corps,
    to discountenance their doctrines,
    to revive connections of a different kind,
    to restore the principle and policy of the Whigs,
    to reanimate the cause of liberty by ministerial countenance;
and then for the first time were men seen attached in office to every principle
    they had maintained in opposition.

>> 52.4
No one will doubt,
    that such men were abhorred and violently opposed by the court faction,
    and that such a system could have but a short duration.

=================
para. 53:

>> 53.1
It may appear somewhat affected,
    that 
        in so much discourse upon this extraordinary party,
    I should say so little of the Earl of Bute,
        who is the supposed head of it.

>> 53.2
But this was neither owing to affectation nor inadvertence.

>> 53.3
I have carefully avoided the introduction of personal reflections of any kind.

>> 53.4
Much the greater part of the topics
    which have been used to blacken this nobleman
are either unjust or frivolous.

>> 53.5
    At best,
they have a tendency to give the resentment of this bitter calamity a wrong
direction,
and to turn a public grievance into a mean, personal, or a dangerous national
quarrel.

>> 53.6
    Where there is a regular scheme of operations carried on,
it is the system,
and not any individual person
    who acts in it,
that is truly dangerous.

>> 53.7
This system has not arisen solely from the ambition of Lord Bute,
but from the circumstances 
    which favored it,
and from an indifference to the constitution 
    which had been for some time growing among our gentry.

>> 53.8
We should have been tried with it,
    if the Earl of Bute had never existed;
and it will want neither a contriving head nor active members,
    when the Earl of Bute exists no longer.
 
================
para 54:

>> 54.1
Another motive induces me to put the personal consideration of Lord Bute wholly
out of the question.

>> 54.2
He communicates very little in a direct manner with the greater part of our men
of business.

>> 54.3
This has never been his custom.

>> 54.4
It is enough for him
    that he surrounds them with his creatures.

>> 54.5
Several imagine,
    therefore,
that they have a very good excuse for dong all the work of his faction
    when they have no personal connection with Lord Bute.

>> 54.6
But whoever becomes a party to an administration,
    composed of insulated individuals,
        without faith plighted, tie, or common principle;
an administration constitutionally impotent,
    because supported by no party in the nation;
he 
    who contributes to destroy the connections of men and their trust in one
    another,
    or in any sort to throw the dependence of public counsels upon private will 
    and favor,
possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute.

>> 54.7
It matters little 
    whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular person.

>> 54.8
    But let him be who or what he will,
he abets a faction
    that is driving hard to the ruin of his country.

>> 54.9
He is sapping the foundation of its liberty,
    disturbing the sources of its domestic tranquillity,
    weakening its government over its dependencies,
    degrading it from all its importance in the system of Europe.

================
para. 55:

>> 55.1
It is this unnatural infusion of a system of favorism into a government
    which in a great part of its constitution is popular,
that has raised the present ferment in the nation.

>> 55.2
The people,
    without entering deeply into its principles,
could plainly perceive its effects,
    in much violence,
    in a great spirit of innovation,
    and a general disorder in all the functions of government.

>> 55.3
I keep my eye solely on this system;
if I speak of those measures 
    which have arisen from it,
it will be so far only as they illustrate the general scheme.

>> 55.4
This is the foundation of all those bitter waters 
    of which,
        through an hundred different conduits,
    we have drunk 
        until we are ready to burst.

>> 55.5
The discretionary power of the crown in the formation of ministry,
    abused by bad or weak men,
has given risen to a system,
    which,
        without directly violating the letter of any law,
    operates against the spirit of the whole constitution.

=================
para. 56:

>> 56.1
A plan of favoritism for our executory government is essentially at variance
with the plan of our legislature.

>> 56.2
One great end undoubtedly of a mixed government like ours,
    composed of monarchy,
    and of controls,
    on the part of the higher people and the lower,
is that the prince shall not be able to violate the laws.

>> 56.3
This is useful indeed and fundamental.

>> 56.4
But this,
    even at first view,
is no more than a negative advantage;
an armor merely defensive.

>> 56.5
It is therefore next in order,
    and equal in importance,
that the discretionary powers 
    which are necessarily vested in the monarch,
    whether for the execution of the laws,
    or for the nomination to magistracy and office,
    or for conducting the affairs of peace and war,
    or for ordering the revenue,
should all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds,
and, not on the likings or prejudices,
    the intrigues or policies,
of a court.

>> 56.6
This,
    I said,
is equal in importance to the securing a government according to law.

>> 56.7
The laws reach but a very little way.

>> 56.8
    Constitute government 
        how you please,
infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the powers 
    which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of ministers of
    state.

>> 56.9 
Even all the use and potency of the laws depend on them.

>> 56.10
    Without them,
your commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper;
and not a living, active, effective constitution.

>> 56.11
It is possible 
    that 
        throught negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully conducted,
    ministers may suffer one part of government to languish,
    another to be perverted from its purposes,
    and every valuable interest of the country to fall into ruin and decay,
        without possibility of fixing any single act 
            on which a criminal prosecution can be justly grounded.

>> 56.12
The due arrangement of men in the active part of the state,
    far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government,
ought to be among its very first and dearest objects.

>> 56.13
     When,
         therefore,
     the abettors of the new system tell us,
         that 
             between them and their opposers 
         there is nothing but a struggle for power,
         and that therefore we are no ways concerned in it;
we must tell those
    who have the impudence to insult us in this manner,
that,
    of all things,
we ought to be the most concerned
    who, and what sort of men
        they are
    that hold the trust of everything that is dear to us.

>> 56.14
Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation,
but what must either render us totally desperate,
    or soothe us into the security of idiots.

>> 56.15
We must soften into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy to think all men
virtuous.

>> 56.16
We must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical to believe all the world to
be equally wicked and corrupt.

>> 56.17
Men are in public life as in private, some good, some evil.

>> 56.18
The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other,
are the first objects of all true policy.

>> 56.19
But that form of government,
    which,
        neither in its direct institutions,
        nor in their immediate tendency,
    has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy hands,
    but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the
    uncontrolled pleasure of any one man,
        however excellent or vituous,
is a plan of polity defective 
    not only in that member, 
    but consequentially erroreous in every part of it.

====================
para. 57:

>> 57.1
In arbitrary government,
the constitution of the ministry follows the constitution of the legislature.

>> 57.2
Both the law and the magistrate are the creatures of will.

>> 57.3
It must be so.

>> 57.4
Nothing, 
    indeed,
will appear more certain,
    on any tolerable consideration of this matter,
than that every sort of government ought to have its administration
correspondent to its legislature.

>> 57.5
    If it should be otherwise,
things must fall into an hideous disorder.

>> 57.6
The people of a free commonwealth,
    who have taken such care 
        that their laws should be the result of general consent,
cannot be so senseless as to suffer their executory system to be composed of
persons
    on whom they have no dependence,
    and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recommended to
    those powers, 
        upon the use of which the very being of the state depends.

==================
para. 58:

>> 58.1
The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of rewards and
honors, is one of the first advantages of a free state.

>> 58.2
    Without it, or something equivalent to it,
perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the substance of freedom;
certainly none of the vivifying energy of good government.

>> 58.3
The frame of our commonwealth did not admit of such an actual election:
but it provided as well,
and 
    (while the spirit of the constitution is preserved)
better for all the effects of it 
    than by the method of suffrage in any democratic state whatsoever.

>> 58.4
It had always,
    until of late,
been held the first duty of Parliament to refuse to support government,
    until power was in the hands of persons 
        who were acceptable to the people,
    or while factions predominated in the court 
        in which the nation had no confidence.

>> 58.5
Thus all the good effects of popular election were supposed to be secured to us,
    without the mischiefs attending on perpetual intrigue,
    and a distinct canvass for every particular office throughout the body of  
    the people.

>> 58.6
This was the most noble and refined part of our constitution.

>> 58.7
The people,
    by their representatives and grandees,
were entrusted with a deliberative power in making laws;
the king with the control of his negative.

>> 58.8
The king was entrusted with the deliberative choice and the election to office;
the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refusal to support.

>> 58.9
Formerly this power of control was what kept ministers in awe of Parliaments,
and Parliaments in reverence with the people.

>> 58.10
    If the use of this power of control on the system and persons of 
    administration is gone,
everything is lost,
    Parliament and all.

>> 58.11
We may assure ourselves,
    that if Parliament will tamely see evil men take possession of all the
    strongholds of their country,
    and allow them time and means to fortify themselves,
        under a pretence of giving them a fair trial,
        and upon a hope of discovering,
            whether they will not be reformed by power,
            and whether their measures will not be better than their morals;
such a Parliament will give countenance to their measures also,
    whatever that Parliament may pretend,
    and whatever those measures may be.
    
==================
para. 59:

>> 59.1
Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as well as a
remedial.

>> 59.2
It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from government,
and not to trust for the safety of the state to subsequent punishement alone;
    punishment,
        which has every been tardy and uncertain;
        and which,
            when power is suffered in bad hands,
        may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.

===============
para. 60

>> 60.1
    Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the state,
they ought 
    by their conduct 
to have obtained such a degree of estimation in their country,
    as may be some sort of pledge and security to the public,
        that they will not abuse those trusts.

>> 60.2
It is no mean security for a proper use of power,
    that a man has shown by the general tenor of his actions,
        that the affection, 
             the good opinion, 
             the confidence of his fellow-citizens
        have been among the principal objects of his life;
        and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to 
        a settled contempt, or occasional forfeiture of their esteem.

============
para. 61

>> 61.1
That man 
    who before he comes into power has no friends,
    or who coming into power is obliged to desert his friends,
    or who losing it has no friends to sympathize with him;
he 
    who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest,
    but whose whole importance has begun with his office,
        and is sure to end with it,
is a person 
    who ought never to be suffered by a controlling Parliament to continue in
    any of those situations
        which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs;
    because such a man has no connection with the interest of the people.

=============
para. 62

>> 62.1
Those knots or cabals of men
    who have got together,
        avowedly without any public principle,
        in order to sell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate,
    and are therefore universally odious,
ought never to be suffered to domineer in the state;
    because they have no connection with the sentiments and opinions of the
    people.

==============
para. 63

>> 63.1
These are considerations 
    which in my opinion enforce the necessity of having some better reason,
        in a free country, and a free Parliament,
    for supporting the ministers of the crown, than that short one,
        That the king has thought proper to appoint them.

>> 63.2
There is something very courtly in this.

>> 63.3
But it is a principle pregnant with all sorts of mischief,
    in a constitution like ours,
to turn the views of active men from the country to the court.

>> 63.4
    Whatever be the road to power,
that is the road 
    which will be trod.

>> 63.5
    If the opinion of the country be of no use as a means of power or 
    consideration,
the qualities 
    which usually procure that opinion
will be no longer cultivated.
        
>> 63.6
    And whether it will be right,
        in a state so popular in its constitution as ours,
    to leave ambition without popular motives,
    and to trust all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of kings, 
and minsters, and public men,
must be submitted to the judgment and good sense of the people of England.

==============
para. 64

>> 64.1
Cunning men are here apt to break in,
    and,
        without directly controverting the principle,
    to raise objections from the difficulty 
        under which the sovereign labours,
    to distinguish the genuine voice and sentiments of his people,
        from the clamour of a faction,
            by which it is so easily counterfeited.

>> 64.2
The nation,
    they say,
is generally divided into parties,
    with views and passions utterly irreconcilable.

>> 64.3
    If the king should put his affairs into the hands of any one of them,
he is sure to disgust the rest;
    if he select particular men from among them all,
it is a hazard that he disgusts them all.

>> 64.4
Those
    who are left out,
    however divided before,
will soon run into a body of opposition;
    which,
        being a collection of many discontents into one focus,
    will without doubt be hot and violent enough.

>> 64.5
Faction will make its cries resound through the nation,
    as if the whole were in an uproar,
    when by far the majority,
        and much the better part,
    will seem for a while as it were annihilated by the quiet 
        in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy the blessings
        of government.

>> 64.6
    Besides that 
the opinion of the mere vulgar is a miserable rule even with regard
to themselves,
    on account of their violence and instability.

>> 64.7
So that 
    if you were to gratify them in their humor today,
that very gratification would be a ground of their dissatisfaction on the next.

>> 64.8
    Now as all these rules of public opinion are to be collected with great
    difficulty,
        and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the effect,
what better can a king of England do,
    than to employ such men 
        as he finds to have views and inclinations most conformable to his own;
        who are least infected with pride and self-will;
       and who are least moved by such popular humors as are perpetually 
       traversing his designs, and disturbing his service;
trusting that,
    when he means no ill to his people,
he will be supported in his appointements,
whether he chooses to keep or to change,
as his private judgment or his pleasure leads him?

>> 64.9
He will find a sure resource in the real weight and influence of the crown,
    when it is not suffered to become an instrument in the hands of a faction.

==============
para. 65

>> 65.1
I will not pretend to say,
    that there is nothing at all in this mode of reasoning;
    because I will not assert 
        that there is no difficulty in the art of government.

>> 65.2
Undoubtedly the very best administration must encounter a great deal of
opposition;
and the very worst will find more support than it deserves.

>> 65.3
Sufficient appearances will never be wanting to those 
    who have a mind to deceive themselves.

>> 65.4
It is a fallacy in constant use with those
    who would level all things,
    and confound right with wrong,
to insist upon the inconveniences 
    which are attached to every choice,
    without taking into consideration the different weight and consequence of
    those inconveniences.

>> 65.5
The question is not concerning absolute discontent or perfect satisfaction in
government;
    neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any system.

>> 65.6
The controversey is about that degree of good humor in the people,
    which may possibly be attained,
    and ought certainly to be looked for.

>> 65.7
    While some politicians may be waiting to know
        whether the sense of every individual be against them,
    accurately distinguishing the vulgar from the better sort,
    drawing lines between the enterprises of a faction and the efforts of the
    people,
they may chance to see the government,
    which they are so nicely weighing, and dividing, and distinguishing,
tumble to the ground in the midst of their wise deliberation.

>> 65.8
Prudent men,
    when so great an object as the security of government, 
        or even its peace,
    is at stake,
will not run the risk of a decision 
    which may be fatal to it.

>> 65.9
They
    who can read the political sky 
will see a hurricane in a cloud no bigger than a hand at the very edge of the
horizon,
and will run into the first harbor.

>> 65.10
No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom.

>> 65.11
They are a matter incapable of exact definition.

>> 65.12
But,
    though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night,
yet light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distinguishable.

>> 65.13
Nor will it be impossible for a prince to find out such a mode of government,
    and such persons to administer it,
as will give a great degree of content to his people;
without any curious and anxious research for that abstract, universal, perfect
harmony,
    which 
        while he is seeking,
    he abandons those means of ordinary tranquillity 
        which are in his power without any research at all.

==============
para. 66

>> 66.1
It is not more the duty than it is the interest of a prince,
   to aim at giving tranquillity to his government.

>> 66.2
But those
    who advise him
may have an interest in disorder and confusion.

>> 66.3
    If the opinion of the people is against them,
they will naturally wish
    that it should have no prevalence.

>> 66.4
Here it is
    that the people must on their part show themselves sensible of their own
    value.

>> 66.5
Their whole importance,
    in the first instance,
and afterwards their whole freedom,
is at stake.

>> 66.6
Their freedom cannot long survive their importance.

>> 66.7
Here it is the natural strength of the kingdom,
    the great peers,
    the leading landed gentlemen,
    the opulent merchants and manufacturers,
    the substantial yeomanry,
must interpose, 
to rescue their prince, themselves, and their posterity.

==============
para. 67

>> 67.1
We are at present at issue upon this point.

>> 67.2
We are in the great crisis of this contention;
and the part
    which men take, one way or other,
will serve to discriminate their charactores and their principles.

>> 67.3
    Until the matter is decided, 
the country will reamin in its present confusion.

>> 67.4
    For while a system of administration is attempted,
        entirely repugant to the genius of the people,
        and not conformable to the plan of their government,
everything must necessarily be disordered for a time,
    until this system destroys the constitution, or the constitution gets the
    better of this system.