h-1-10-no-para.txt

X. That which hitherto we have set down is (I hope) sufficient to shew their
brutishness, which imagine that religion and virtue are only as men will account
of them; that we might make as much account, if we would, of the contrary,
without any harm unto ourselves, and that in nature they are as indifferent one
as the other. We see then how nature itself teacheth laws and statutes to live
by. The laws which have been hitherto mentioned do bind men absolutely even as
they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn
agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do. But forasmuch as we are
not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things
needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of
man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us living
single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and
fellowship with others. This was the cause of men’s uniting themselves at the
first in politic Societies, which societies could not be without Government, nor
Government without a distinct kind of Law from that which hath been already
declared. Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one, a
natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the
other, an order expressly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their
union in living together. The latter is that which we call the Law of a
Commonweal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law
animated, held together, and set on work in such actions, as the common good
requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men,
are never framed as they  should be, unless presuming the will of man to be
inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred
laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in regard of his
depraved mind little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide
notwithstanding so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto
the common good for which societies are instituted: unless they do this, they
are not perfect. It resteth therefore that we consider how nature findeth out
such laws of government as serve to direct even nature depraved to a right end.
All men desire to lead in this world a happy life. That life is led most
happily, wherein all virtue is exercised without impediment or let. The Apostle,
in exhorting men to contentment although they have in this world no more than
very bare food and raiment, giveth us thereby to understand that those are even
the lowest of things necessary; that if we should be stripped of all those
things without which we might possibly be, yet these must be left; that
destitution in these is such an impediment, as till it be removed suffereth not
the mind of man to admit any other care. For this cause, first God assigned Adam
maintenance of life, and then appointed him a law to observe. For this cause,
after men began to grow to a number, the first thing we read they gave
themselves unto was the tilling of the earth and the feeding of cattle. Having
by this mean whereon to live, the principal actions of their life afterward are
noted by the exercise of their religion. True it is, that the kingdom of God
must be the first thing in our purposes and desires. But inasmuch as righteous
life presupposeth life; inasmuch as to live virtuously it is impossible except
we live; therefore the first impediment, which naturally we endeavour to remove,
is penury and want of things without which we cannot live. Unto life many
implements are necessary; moe, if we seek (as all men naturally do) such a life
as hath in it joy, comfort, delight, and pleasure. To this end we see how
quickly sundry arts mechanical were found out, in the very prime of the world.
As things of greatest  necessity are always first provided for, so things of
greatest dignity are most accounted of by all such as judge rightly. Although
therefore riches be a thing which every man wisheth, yet no man of judgment can
esteem it better to be rich, than wise, virtuous, and religious. If we be both
or either of these, it is not because we are so born. For into the world we come
as empty of the one as of the other, as naked in mind as we are in body. Both
which necessities of man had at the first no other helps and supplies than only
domestical; such as that which the Prophet implieth, saying, “Can a mother
forget her child?” such as that which the Apostle mentioneth, saying, “He
that careth not for his own is worse than an infidel;” such as that concerning
Abraham, “Abraham will command his sons and his household after him, that they
keep the way of the Lord.” But neither that which we learn of ourselves nor
that which others teach us can prevail, where wickedness and malice have taken
deep root. If therefore when there was but as yet one only family in the world,
no means of instruction human or divine could prevent effusion of blood; how
could it be chosen but that when families were multiplied and increased upon
earth, after separation each providing for itself, envy, strife, contention and
violence must grow amongst them? For hath not Nature furnished man with wit and
valour, as it were with armour, which may be used as well unto extreme evil as
good? Yea, were they not used by the rest of the world unto evil; unto the
contrary only by Seth, Enoch, and those few the rest in that line? We all make
complaint of the iniquity of our times: not unjustly; for the days are evil. But
compare them with those times wherein there were no civil societies, with those
times wherein there was as yet no manner of public regiment established, with
those times wherein there were not above eight persons righteous living upon the
face of the earth; and we have surely good cause to think that God hath blessed
us exceedingly, and hath made us behold most happy days. To take away all such
mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way but only by growing
unto composition  and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of
government public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto; that unto whom
they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and
happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that when force and
injury was offered they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that
howsoever men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury
unto others it was not to be suffered, but by all men and by all good means to
be withstood; finally they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to
determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in
maintenance thereof, inasmuch as every man is towards himself and them whom he
greatly affecteth partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be
endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom
they should agree upon: without which consent there were no reason that one man
should take upon him to be lord or judge over another; because, although there
be according to the opinion of some very great and judicious men a kind of
natural right in the noble, wise, and virtuous, to govern them which are of
servile disposition; nevertheless for manifestation of this their right, and
men’s more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to
be governed seemeth necessary. To fathers within their private families Nature
hath given a supreme power; for which cause we see throughout the world even
from the foundation thereof, all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful
kings in their own houses. Howbeit over a whole grand multitude having no such
dependency upon any one, and consisting of so many families as every politic
society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have complete lawful
power, but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not
having the natural superiority of fathers, their power must needs be either
usurped, and then unlawful; or, if lawful, then either granted or consented unto
by them over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from
God, unto whom all the world is subject. It is no improbable opinion therefore
which the arch-philosopher was of, that as the chiefest person  in every
household was always as it were a king, so when numbers of households joined
themselves in civil society together, kings were the first kind of governors
amongst them,Which is also (as it seemeth) the reason why the name of Father
continued still in them, who of fathers were made rulers; as also the ancient
custom of governors to do as Melchisedec, and being kings to exercise the office
of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion.
Howbeit not this the only kind of regiment that hath been received in the world.
The inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry other to be devised. So that
in a word all public regiment of what kind soever seemeth evidently to have
risen from deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between men, judging
it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered
by itself, but that men might have lived without any public regiment. Howbeit,
the corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny but that the Law
of Nature doth now require of necessity some kind of regiment, so that to bring
things unto the first course they were in, and utterly to take away all kind of
public government in the world, were apparently to overturn the whole world. The
case of man’s nature standing therefore as it doth, some kind of regiment the
Law of Nature doth require; yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature tieth not
to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary. At the first when some
certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be that nothing was then
further thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their
wisdom and discretion which were to rule; till by experience they found this for
all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy
did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw that to
live by one man’s will became the cause of all men’s misery. This
constrained  them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duties
beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. If things be simply
good or evil, and withal universally so acknowledged, there needs no new law to
be made for such things,The first kind therefore of things appointed by laws
human containeth whatsoever being in itself naturally good or evil, is
notwithstanding more secret than that it can be discerned by every man’s
present conceit, without some deeper discourse and judgment. In which discourse
because there is difficulty and possibility many ways to err, unless such things
were set down by laws, many would be ignorant of their duties which now are not,
and many that know what they should do would nevertheless dissemble it, and to
excuse themselves pretend ignorance and simplicity, which now they cannot. And
because the greatest part of men are such as prefer their own private good
before all things, even that good which is sensual before whatsoever is most
divine; and for that the labour of doing good, together with the pleasure
arising from the contrary, doth make men for the most part slower to the one and
proner to the other, than that duty prescribed them by law can prevail
sufficiently with them: therefore unto laws that men do make for the benefit of
men it hath seemed always needful to add rewards, which may more allure unto
good than any hardness deterreth from it, and punishments, which may more deter
from evil than any sweetness thereto allureth. Wherein as the generality is
natural, virtue rewardable and vice punishable; so the particular determination
of the reward or punishment belongeth unto them by whom laws are made. Theft is
naturally punishable, but the kind of punishment is positive, and such lawful as
men shall think with discretion convenient by law to appoint. In laws, that
which is natural bindeth universally, that which is positive not so. To let go
those kind of positive  laws which men impose upon themselves, as by vow unto
God, contract with men, or such like; somewhat it will make unto our purpose, a
little more fully to consider what things are incident into the making of the
positive laws for the government of them that live united in public society.
Laws do not only teach what is good, but they enjoin it, they have in them a
certain constraining force. And to constrain men unto any thing inconvenient
doth seem unreasonable. Most requisite therefore it is that to devise laws which
all men shall be forced to obey none but wise men be admitted. Laws are matters
of principal consequence; men of common capacity and but ordinary judgment are
not able (for how should they?) to discern what things are fittest for each kind
and state of regiment. We cannot be ignorant how much our obedience unto laws
dependeth upon this point. Let a man though never so justly oppose himself unto
them that are disordered in their ways, and what one amongst them commonly doth
not stomach at such contradiction, storm at reproof, and hate such as would
reform them? Notwithstanding even they which brook it worst that men should tell
them of their duties, when they are told the same by a law, think very well and
reasonably of it. For why? They presume that the law doth speak with all
indifferency; that the law hath no side-respect to their persons; that the law
is as it were an oracle proceeded from wisdom and understanding. Howbeit laws do
not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them, but
from that power which doth give them the strength of laws. That which we spake
before concerning the power of government must here be applied unto the power of
making laws whereby to govern; which power God hath over all: and by the natural
law, whereunto he hath made all subject, the lawful power of making laws to
command whole politic societies of men belongeth so properly unto the same
entire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon
earth to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission
immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at
the first from  their consent upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no
better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation
hath not made so. But approbation not only they give who personally declare
their assent by voice sign or act, but also when others do it in their names by
right originally at the least derived from them. As in parliaments, councils,
and the like assemblies, although we be not personally ourselves present,
notwithstanding our assent is by reason of others agents there in our behalf.
And what we do by others, no reason but that it should stand as our deed, no
less effectually to bind us than if ourselves had done it in person. In many
things assent is given, they that give it not imagining they do so, because the
manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute
monarch commandeth his subjects that which seemeth good in his own discretion,
hath not his edict the force of a law whether they approve or dislike it? Again,
that which hath been received long sithence and is by custom now established, we
keep as a law which we may not transgress; yet what consent was ever thereunto
sought or required at our hands? Of this point therefore we are to note, that
sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic
multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort
be at no man’s commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when
that society whereof we are part hath at any time before consented, without
revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Wherefore as any
man’s deed past is good as long as himself continueth; so the act of a public
society of men done five hundred years sithence standeth as theirs who presently
are of the same societies, because corporations are immortal; we were then alive
in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still. Laws therefore
human, of what kind soever, are available by consent. If here it be demanded how
it cometh to pass that this being common unto all laws which are made, there
should be found even in good laws so great variety as there  is; we must note
the reason hereof to be the sundry particular ends, whereunto the different
disposition of that subject or matter, for which laws are provided, causeth them
to have especial respect in making laws. A law there is mentioned amongst the
Grecians whereof Pittacus is reported to have been author; and by that law it
was agreed, that he which being overcome with drink did then strike any man,
should suffer punishment double as much as if he had done the same being
sober,No man could ever have thought this reasonable, that had intended thereby
only to punish the injury committed according to the gravity of the fact: for
who knoweth not that harm advisedly done is naturally less pardonable, and
therefore worthy of the sharper punishment? But forasmuch as none did so usually
this way offend as men in that case, which they wittingly fell into, even
because they would be so much the more freely outrageous; it was for their
public good where such disorder was grown to frame a positive law for remedy
thereof accordingly. To this appertain those known laws of making laws; as that
law-makers must have an eye to the place where, and to the men amongst whom;
that one kind of laws cannot serve for all kinds of regiment; that where the
multitude beareth sway, laws that shall tend unto preservation of that state
must make common smaller offices to go by lot, for fear of strife and division
likely to arise; by reason that ordinary qualities sufficing for discharge of
such offices, they could not but by many be desired, and so with danger
contended for, and not missed without grudge and discontentment, whereas at an
uncertain lot none can find themselves grieved, on whomsoever it lighteth;
contrariwise the greatest, whereof but few are capable, to pass by popular
election, that neither the people may envy such as have those honours, inasmuch
as themselves bestow them, and that the chiefest may be kindled with desire to
exercise all parts of rare and beneficial virtue, knowing they shall not lose
their labour by growing in fame and estimation amongst the people: if the helm
of chief government be in the hands of a few of the wealthiest, that then laws
providing for continuance thereof must make the punishment of contumely and
wrong offered  unto any of the common sort sharp and grievous, that so the evil
may be prevented whereby the rich are most likely to bring themselves into
hatred with the people, who are not wont to take so great offence when they are
excluded from honours and offices, as when their persons are contumeliously
trodden upon. In other kinds of regiment the like is observed concerning the
difference of positive laws, which to be every where the same is impossible and
against their nature. Now as the learned in the laws of this land observe, that
our statutes sometimes are only the affirmation or ratification of that which by
common law was held before; so here it is not to be omitted that generally all
laws human, which are made for the ordering of politic societies, be either such
as establish some duty whereunto all men by the law of reason did before stand
bound; or else such as make that a duty now which before was none. The one sort
we may for distinction’s sake call “mixedly,” and the other
“merely” human. That which plain or necessary reason bindeth men unto may be
in sundry considerations expedient to be ratified by human law. For example, if
confusion of blood in marriage, the liberty of having many wives at once, or any
other the like corrupt and unreasonable custom doth happen to have prevailed
far, and to have gotten the upper hand of right reason with the greatest part;
so that no way is left to rectify such foul disorder without prescribing by law
the same things which reason necessarily doth enforce but is not perceived that
so it doth; or if many be grown unto that which the Apostle did lament in some,
concerning whom he writeth, saying, that “even what things they naturally
know, in those very things as beasts void of reason they corrupted
themselves;” or if there be no such special accident, yet forasmuch as the
common sort are led by the sway of their  sensual desires, and therefore do more
shun sin for the sensible evils which follow it amongst men, than for any kind
of sentence which reason doth pronounce against it: this very thing is cause
sufficient why duties belonging unto each kind of virtue, albeit the Law of
Reason teach them, should notwithstanding be prescribed even by human law. Which
law in this case we term mixed, because the matter whereunto it bindeth is the
same which reason necessarily doth require at our hands, and from the Law of
Reason it differeth in the manner of binding only. For whereas men before stood
bound in conscience to do as the Law of Reason teacheth, they are now by virtue
of human law become constrainable, and if they outwardly transgress, punishable.
As for laws which are merely human, the matter of them is any thing which reason
doth but probably teach to be fit and convenient; so that till such time as law
hath passed amongst men about it, of itself it bindeth no man. One example
whereof may be this. Lands are by human law in some places after the owner’s
decease divided unto all his children, in some all descendeth to the eldest son.
If the Law of Reason did necessarily require but the one of these two to be
done, they which by law have received the other should be subject to that heavy
sentence, which denounceth against all that decree wicked, unjust, and
unreasonable things, woe. Whereas now whichsoever be received there is no Law of
Reason transgressed; because there is probable reason why either of them may be
expedient, and for either of them more than probable reason there is not to be
found. Laws whether mixedly or merely human are made by politic societies: some,
only as those societies are civilly united; some, as they are spiritually joined
and make such a body as we call the Church. Of laws human in this latter kind we
are to speak in the third book following. Let it therefore suffice thus far to
have touched the force wherewith Almighty God hath graciously endued our nature,
and thereby enabled the same to find out both those laws which all men generally
are for ever bound to observe, and also such  as are most fit for their behoof,
who lead their lives in any ordered state of government. Now besides that law
which simply concerneth men as men, and that which belongeth unto them as they
are men linked with others in some form of politic society, there is a third
kind of law which toucheth all such several bodies politic, so far forth as one
of them hath public commerce with another. And this third is the Law of Nations.
Between men and beasts there is no possibility of sociable communion, because
the well-spring of that communion is a natural delight which man hath to
transfuse from himself into others, and to receive from others into himself
especially those things wherein the excellency of his kind doth most consist.
The chiefest instrument of human communion therefore is speech, because thereby
we impart mutually one to another the conceits of our reasonable
understanding,And for that cause seeing beasts are not hereof capable, forasmuch
as with them we can use no such conference, they being in degree, although above
other creatures on earth to whom nature hath denied sense, yet lower than to be
sociable companions of man to whom nature hath given reason; it is of Adam said
that amongst the beasts “he found not for himself any meet companion.” Civil
society doth more content the nature of man than any private kind of solitary
living, because in society this good of mutual participation is so much larger
than otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we covet (if
it might be) to have a kind of society and fellowship even with all mankind.
Which thing Socrates intending to signify professed himself a citizen, not of
this or that commonwealth, but of the world. And an effect of that very natural
desire in us (a manifest token that we wish after a sort an universal fellowship
with all men) appeareth by the wonderful delight men have, some to visit foreign
countries, some to discover nations not heard of in former ages, we all to know
the affairs and dealings of other people, yea to be in league of amity with
them: and this not only for traffick’s sake, or to the end that when many are
confederated each may make other the more strong, but  for such cause also as
moved the Queen of Saba to visit Salomon; and in a word, because nature doth
presume that how many men there are in the world, so many gods as it were there
are, or at leastwise such they should be towards men. Touching laws which are to
serve men in this behalf; even as those Laws of Reason, which (man retaining his
original integrity) had been sufficient to direct each particular person in all
his affairs and duties, are not sufficient but require the access of other laws,
now that man and his offspring are grown thus corrupt and sinful; again, as
those laws of polity and regiment, which would have served men living in public
society together with that harmless disposition which then they should have had,
are not able now to serve, when men’s iniquity is so hardly restrained within
any tolerable bounds: in like manner, the national laws of mutual commerce
between societies of that former and better quality might have been other than
now, when nations are so prone to offer violence, injury, and wrong. Hereupon
hath grown in every of these three kinds that distinction between Primary and
Secondary laws; the one grounded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved
nature. Primary laws of nations are such as concern embassage, such as belong to
the courteous entertainment of foreigners and strangers, such as serve for
commodious traffick, and the like. Secondary laws in the same kind are such as
this present unquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with; I mean laws of
arms, which yet are much better known than kept. But what matter the Law of
Nations doth contain I omit to search. The strength and virtue of that law is
such that no particular nation can lawfully prejudice the same by any their
several laws and ordinances, more than a man by his private resolutions the law
of the whole commonwealth or state wherein he liveth. For as civil law, being
the act of a whole body politic, doth therefore overrule each several part of
the same body; so there is no reason that any one commonwealth of itself should
to the prejudice of another  annihilate that whereupon the whole world hath
agreed. For which cause, the Lacedæmonians forbidding all access of strangers
into their coasts, are in that respect both by Josephus and Theodoret deservedly
blamed, as being enemies to that hospitality which for common humanity’s sake
all the nations on earth should embrace. Now as there is great cause of
communion, and consequently of laws for the maintenance of communion, amongst
nations; so amongst nations Christian the like in regard even of Christianity
hath been always judged needful. And in this kind of correspondence amongst
nations the force of general councils doth stand. For as one and the same law
divine, whereof in the next place we are to speak, is unto all Christian
churches a rule for the chiefest things; by means whereof they all in that
respect make one church, as having all but “one Lord, one faith, and one
baptism:” so the urgent necessity of mutual communion for preservation of our
unity in these things, as also for order in some other things convenient to be
every where uniformly kept, maketh it requisite that the Church of God here on
earth have her laws of spiritual commerce between Christian nations; laws by
virtue whereof all churches may enjoy freely the use of those reverend,
religious, and sacred consultations, which are termed Councils General. A thing
whereof God’s own blessed Spirit was the author; a thing practised by the holy
Apostles themselves; a thing always afterwards kept and observed throughout the
world; a thing never otherwise than most highly esteemed of, till pride,
ambition, and tyranny began by factious and vile endeavours to abuse that divine
invention unto the furtherance of wicked purposes. But as the just authority of
civil courts and parliaments is not therefore to be abolished, because sometime
there is cunning used to frame them according to the private intents of men over
potent in the commonwealth; so the grievous abuse which hath been of councils
should rather cause men to study how so gracious a thing may again be reduced to
that first perfection, than in regard of stains and blemishes sithence growing
be held for ever in extreme disgrace. To speak of this matter as the cause
requireth would require very long discourse. All I will presently say is this:
whether it be for the finding out of any thing whereunto divine law bindeth us,
but yet in such sort that men are not thereof on all sides resolved; or for the
setting down of some uniform judgment to stand touching such things, as being
neither way matters of necessity, are notwithstanding offensive and scandalous
when there is open opposition about them; be it for the ending of strifes,
touching matters of Christian belief, wherein the one part may seem to have
probable cause of dissenting from the other; or be it concerning matters of
polity, order, and regiment in the church; I nothing doubt but that Christian
men should much better frame themselves to those heavenly precepts, which our
Lord and Saviour with so great instancy gave as concerning peace and unity, if
we did all concur in desire to have the use of ancient councils again renewed,
rather than these proceedings continued, which either make all contentions
endless, or bring them to one only determination, and that of all other the
worst, which is by sword. It followeth therefore that a new foundation being
laid, we now adjoin hereunto that which cometh in the next place to be spoken
of; namely, wherefore God hath himself by Scripture made known such laws as
serve for direction of men.