hooker_precis.txt

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=         Precis of Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity
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Preface II

The first establishment of new discipline by Mr. Calvin’s industry in the 
Church of Geneva; and the beginning of strife about it amongst ourselves.

(1) Calvin came to Geneva and set up his discipline there.
(2) Calvin was banished from Geneva.
(3) Calvin returned to Geneva.
(4) Calvin set up a complete form of discipline in Geneva.
(5) The new discipline was attacked by the Senate of Geneva via the
    Bertelier incident.
(6) Calvin prevailed with the help of four Helvetian churches.
(7) The limitation of Calvin's teaching.
(8) The wide influence of Calvin.
(9) The disputation between Beza and Erastus concerning excommunication.
(10) The beginning of the strife amongst ourselves.


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Preface III

By what means so many of the people are trained unto the liking of that 
discipline.

(1) The first mean to judge good from evil is our own discretion.
(2) Some things are too intrincate to be understood by simple men.
(3) The reservation of some laity refuted.


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Book I.V. The law whereby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of
God.

1.5.1 All things except God (1) may be something which they are not yet; (2)
tend to be something else, (3) which is more perfect than they are now.

1.5.2 All things in the world are said in some sort to seek the highest
perfection, and to covet the participation of God. 

Man seeketh many kinds of internal perfections:
(1) continuance of being, via offspring and propagation;
(2) constancy and excellency of their operations.

1.5.3 Man aims at good, not only unconsciously, as other things do, but also
consciously.

External perfections man seeketh: (1) knowledge of truth (2) exercise of virtue.


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Book I.VI. Men's first beginning to grow to knowledge of that law which they are
to observe
(i.e. Law of Reason or Human Nature)

1.6.1 Men differ from angels in the matter of knowledge: angels have full and
complete knowledge in the highest degree, whereas men at the first are without
any understanding, but eventually may attain as much knowledge as angels.

1.6.2 Here we muest distinguish natural agents endued with sense and those which
are not. Beasts, though otherwise behind men, may in actions of sense and fancy
go beyond men.

1.6.3 The soul of man has the further ability of reaching higher than unto
sensible things.

Three stages of development:
(1) only sensible things
(2) natural reason, e.g. differences of time, affirmation, negations, and
contraditions in speech
(3) mature judgment with the right help of art and learning

1.6.4 Singular things of the new method advocated by Peter Ramus (1515-1576):
(1) it teacheth the way of speedy discourse
(2) it restraineth the mind that it may not wax over-wise

1.6.5 Education and instruction are the means to make our natural faculty of
reason able to judge between truth and error, good and evil. Common sense helps
to discern when a man may be said to have attained the use of reason.


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Book I.VII. 
Of man's Will, which is the first thing that laws of action are made to guide.

1.7.1 All action implies an end; so does all human action. 

Causes of human action:
(1) mere desire of action 
(2) desire of a further end

1.7.2 There are two principal foundations of human action: knowledge and will;
reason showing what is good, will choosing it.

1.7.3 Distinction between will and appetite; between conscious and tacit will.

1.7.4 Normal man (except children, innocents, and mad men) has the use of right
reason to discover in action what is good.

1.7.5 The Will will only do what reason teacheth to be good if the same also
teach it to be possible.

1.7.6 Situations wherein the Will may not do what is good:
(1) if what is good shows difficulty or unpleasant quality
(2) if evil shows some good quality
(3) if what is good is hidden
(4) if custom over-sways reason

1.7.7 This should not be an excuse for us to sin.
Reason is able to find out any good through diligence.

Ways of neglecting the goodness:
(1) the subtilty of Satan inveigles us to evil
(2) the hastiness of our Wills prevents us from taking that which reason
teacheth
(3) the custom of evil makes our heart obdurate

the difficulty of searching out knowledge discourages our will
by the weakness of our flesh, the conceit of painfulness bridles us from the
search of knowledge.


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Book I.VIII. 
Of the natural finding out of Laws by the light of Reason, to guide the Will
unto that which is good.

1.8.1 We return to the discovering of the natural way by which rules have been
found out concerning the goodness with which the will of man ought to be moved
in human actions.

There is no need to have different sets of rules to tell good from evil.

1.8.2 There are only two ways of discerning goodness: (1) the knowledge of the
causes by which it is made such; (2) the observation of those signs and tokens
always annexed unto goodness.

The former is the more sure way. But we are not going to go down that road due
to the common imbecility.

1.8.3 The most certain token of evident goodness is common consent by all.

1.8.4 A law generally taken is a directive rule unto the goodness of operation.
Different examples of this assertion.

1.8.5 The main principles of Reason are in themselves apparent, e.g. that the
greater good should be chosen before the less.

Those principles were at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of
the very bowels of heaven and earth.

1.8.6 The first law of Human Nature is, that the highest power of the mind
requireth general obedience at the hands of all the rest concurring with it unto
action.

1.8.7 Two grand mandates which must be obeyed by the will of man: (1) that there
is a God upon whom we depend, and whom we adore, love, and imitate; (2) to love
others as ourselves.

1.8.8 The sentence of Reason is either mandatory, showing what must be done; or
else permissive, declaring only what may be done; or thirdly admonitory, opening
what is the most convenient for us to do.

The nature of goodness being ample, a law is properly that which reason defineth
must be done.

And the law of Reason or Human Nature is that which men by discourse of natural
reason have rightly found out to be all for ever bound unto in their actions.

1.8.9 Marks of Laws of Reason:
(1) the works of those framed according to the laws of reason are behoveful,
beautiful, and without superfluity or defect;
(2) those laws are investigable by reason, without the help of revelation;
(3) the knowledge of them are general, the world hath always been acquainted
with them.

1.8.10 We restrain the law of reason to those only duties which all men by force
of natural wit either do or might understand to be such duties as concern all
men.

1.8.11 Lewd and wicked custom may be the reason why some men are ignorant of
principal moral duties.


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Book I.IX. Of the benefit of keeping that Law which Reason teacheth

1.9.1 Good or evil follows on the law of each nature being kept or broken. But
only to man is this good or evil, Reward or Punishment; because with man only
the power to break or keep the Law is in his will.

Distinction in the meaning of "voluntary":
(1) against will
(2) without will
(3) with difficulty
(4) degrees of difficulty

1.9.2 The sourse of Reward and Punishment is some superior authority:
(1) of men over mean (to be explored in I.X)
(2) of God over all moral agents


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Book I.XI. Wherefore God hath by Scripture further made known such supernatural
Laws as do serve for men's direction

1.11.1 Human action aims at perfection, i.e. the attainment of something
desirable simply for itself, and for no further end.

1.11.2 Man's desire is infinite towards that which he coveteth as good in
itself. The last good of all, which is desired altogether for itself, must be
infinite. No good is infinite but God, therefore he our felicity and bliss. And
this desire tendeth man unto union with God.

1.11.3 Happiness is the estate whereby we attain the highest degree of
perfection. Such perfection is unattainable in this life, because we are often
hindered by weariness. God however had made us capable of desiring what is Good
through understanding and will.

The soul being perfected by love of that infinite good, shall be also perfected
with those supernatural passions of joy, peace, and delight. All this endless
and everlasting.

Under man, no creature is capable of felicity and bliss.

1.11.4 Man's desire of happiness is natural, with highest earnestness, and is
attainable.

Man doth seek a triple perfection: (1) sensual, (2) intellectual, (3) spiritual.

1.11.5 The last and highest perfection is received as a reward. The natural
means to belssedness are our works, but if all natural works are condemned, then
salvation can only be attained supernaturally.

Natural path to perfection:
(1) ability and will of doing good
(2) obedience unto the will of God, and righteousness in actions
(3) God's just reward.

Starting from Adam, we failed in this natural path.

1.11.6 Men failing this natural path, God hath revealed a way mystical and
supernatural, which is grounded on man's sin and redemption.
The supernatural path is described by Faith, Hope, and Charity.
Laws concerning these things are supernatural: (1) in the manner of delivering
them, (2) in the matter delivered.