diff --git a/Discovery/adr_discovery/redact/__init__.py b/Discovery/adr_discovery/redact/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
diff --git a/Discovery/adr_discovery/redact/rules.py b/Discovery/adr_discovery/redact/rules.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8581ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Discovery/adr_discovery/redact/rules.py
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+"""C2 -- redaction, applied at collection.
+
+Imported by whoever touches risky text, never run as a pass at the end: a
+final filter is something a stage added tomorrow can be placed behind.
+
+Both directions are enforced here. Leaking a value is the obvious failure;
+dropping a *name* is the quiet one, because a lost flag name is a
+permission bypass nobody detects. Functions below therefore keep names and
+shapes deliberately, and remove only values.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
+
+#: Flags whose *operand* is secret. The flag name survives; the value does not.
+#: `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is deliberately absent -- it takes no
+#: operand and its presence is exactly the signal M6 needs.
+CREDENTIAL_FLAGS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        "--api-key", "--auth", "--header", "--input", "--message", "--password",
+        "--prompt", "--query", "--secret", "--system-prompt", "--token",
+        "-m", "-p", "-H",
+    }
+)
+
+#: Environment variable names whose presence implies a credential of a kind.
+CREDENTIAL_ENV_PREFIXES: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
+    ("ANTHROPIC_", "anthropic"),
+    ("OPENAI_", "openai"),
+    ("GOOGLE_", "google"),
+    ("GEMINI_", "google"),
+    ("AWS_", "aws"),
+    ("AZURE_", "azure"),
+    ("GITHUB_", "github"),
+    ("GITLAB_", "gitlab"),
+    ("HF_", "huggingface"),
+    ("MISTRAL_", "mistral"),
+    ("COHERE_", "cohere"),
+)
+
+#: Denied wherever access happens, so a stage added tomorrow inherits it
+#: without containing a rule of its own. Enforced in M1 on the *resolved*
+#: target, which is why a symlink into one of these is refused too.
+PERSONAL_PATH_SEGMENTS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "/.ssh/", "/.gnupg/", "/Documents/", "/Desktop/", "/Pictures/",
+    "/Music/", "/Movies/", "/Library/Mail/", "/Library/Messages/",
+    "/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Outlook/",
+)
+
+REDACTED = "<redacted>"
+
+
+def strip_url(url: str) -> str:
+    """Keep scheme, host, port and path. Drop userinfo, query and fragment.
+
+    A real parser, not a split: a URL split before the port loses the port,
+    and a URL split on '@' loses a host that contains one.
+    """
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(url)
+    except ValueError:
+        return REDACTED
+    host = parts.hostname or ""
+    if parts.port:
+        host = f"{host}:{parts.port}"
+    return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, host, parts.path, "", ""))
+
+
+def env_names(env: dict[str, object] | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Names survive, values never appear. Order is stable for identity."""
+    if not env:
+        return ()
+    return tuple(sorted(str(k) for k in env))
+
+
+def credential_kinds(names: tuple[str, ...]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Report *that* a credential is reachable, never which one it is."""
+    kinds: set[str] = set()
+    for name in names:
+        upper = name.upper()
+        for prefix, kind in CREDENTIAL_ENV_PREFIXES:
+            if upper.startswith(prefix) and (
+                "KEY" in upper or "TOKEN" in upper or "SECRET" in upper or "PASSWORD" in upper
+            ):
+                kinds.add(kind)
+    return tuple(sorted(kinds))
+
+
+def scrub_argv(argv: tuple[str, ...] | list[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Keep every flag name and every non-secret operand.
+
+    Values of credential-bearing flags are replaced, in both the separated
+    (`--token X`) and joined (`--token=X`) forms.
+    """
+    out: list[str] = []
+    expect_value = False
+    for arg in argv:
+        if expect_value:
+            out.append(REDACTED)
+            expect_value = False
+            continue
+        if "=" in arg and arg.startswith("-"):
+            flag, _, _ = arg.partition("=")
+            if flag in CREDENTIAL_FLAGS:
+                out.append(f"{flag}={REDACTED}")
+                continue
+            out.append(arg)
+            continue
+        out.append(arg)
+        if arg in CREDENTIAL_FLAGS:
+            expect_value = True
+    return tuple(out)
+
+
+def is_personal(resolved_path: str) -> bool:
+    """Decided on the resolved target, never on the path handed in."""
+    probe = resolved_path.replace("\\", "/")
+    if not probe.endswith("/"):
+        probe += "/"
+    return any(seg in probe for seg in PERSONAL_PATH_SEGMENTS)
+
+
+def explain() -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """What `--dry-run --explain` prints. An explain that under-reports is
+    worse than none, so this is generated from the same constants the
+    functions above use rather than written out separately."""
+    return (
+        "paths, metadata, hashes and allowlisted config keys -- never file contents",
+        f"environment variable names only ({len(CREDENTIAL_ENV_PREFIXES)} prefixes mapped to credential kinds)",
+        f"argv with the operands of {len(CREDENTIAL_FLAGS)} credential-bearing flags replaced",
+        "URLs with userinfo, query and fragment removed",
+        f"no access at all under {len(PERSONAL_PATH_SEGMENTS)} personal path segments",
+    )