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fix(ci): support fork PRs in e2e-brev workflow #1860

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fix(ci): support fork PRs in e2e-brev workflow #1860

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4 changes: 3 additions & 1 deletion .github/workflows/e2e-brev.yaml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -115,11 +115,13 @@ jobs:
BRANCH=$(gh pr view ${{ inputs.pr_number }} --repo ${{ github.repository }} --json headRefName -q .headRefName)
echo "Resolved PR #${{ inputs.pr_number }} → branch: $BRANCH"
echo "RESOLVED_BRANCH=$BRANCH" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Use the PR head ref for checkout — works for both fork and non-fork PRs.
echo "PR_REF=refs/pull/${{ inputs.pr_number }}/head" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"

- name: Checkout target branch
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
ref: ${{ env.RESOLVED_BRANCH || inputs.branch || 'main' }}
ref: ${{ env.PR_REF || inputs.branch || 'main' }}
Comment on lines +118 to +124
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@coderabbitai coderabbitai bot Apr 14, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Block untrusted fork PR refs before secret-backed checkout.

Line 119 and Line 124 now enable running fork PR code (refs/pull/<N>/head) in a job that later exposes BREV_API_TOKEN and NVIDIA_API_KEY. That is a secret-exfiltration path unless you gate fork PRs by trust level (or explicit maintainer opt-in).

🔒 Suggested guard before setting PR_REF 
       - name: Resolve branch from PR number
         if: inputs.pr_number != ''
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
         run: |
           BRANCH=$(gh pr view ${{ inputs.pr_number }} --repo ${{ github.repository }} --json headRefName -q .headRefName)
+          IS_FORK=$(gh pr view ${{ inputs.pr_number }} --repo ${{ github.repository }} --json isCrossRepository -q .isCrossRepository)
+          AUTHOR_ASSOC=$(gh pr view ${{ inputs.pr_number }} --repo ${{ github.repository }} --json authorAssociation -q .authorAssociation)
+          if [ "$IS_FORK" = "true" ] && ! echo "$AUTHOR_ASSOC" | grep -Eq '^(OWNER|MEMBER|COLLABORATOR)$'; then
+            echo "::error::Refusing to run secret-backed e2e for untrusted fork PR #${{ inputs.pr_number }} (authorAssociation=$AUTHOR_ASSOC)."
+            exit 1
+          fi
           echo "Resolved PR #${{ inputs.pr_number }} → branch: $BRANCH"
           echo "RESOLVED_BRANCH=$BRANCH" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
           # Use the PR head ref for checkout — works for both fork and non-fork PRs.
           echo "PR_REF=refs/pull/${{ inputs.pr_number }}/head" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.github/workflows/e2e-brev.yaml around lines 118 - 124, The workflow is
currently unconditionally setting PR_REF to refs/pull/${{ inputs.pr_number
}}/head and then checking it out (actions/checkout@v6), which allows fork PRs to
run code in jobs that have secrets (BREV_API_TOKEN, NVIDIA_API_KEY); change the
logic that sets or uses PR_REF so fork PR refs are only used for
trusted/internal PRs or explicit maintainer opt-in: detect whether the PR head
repo matches the repository owner (e.g., compare
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name or head.repo.owner.login to
github.repository or github.repository_owner) and only set PR_REF / perform the
checkout of refs/pull/... when that check passes (otherwise fall back to
inputs.branch or 'main'), or gate the checkout behind an explicit input like
inputs.trust_pr_from_fork that must be true and approved by a maintainer before
exposing secrets. Ensure the checkout step (actions/checkout@v6) uses the
guarded PR_REF value so secrets are never exposed to untrusted fork refs.


- name: Create check run (pending)
if: inputs.pr_number != ''
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