fix(proxy): stop hard bridge keys wedging on a leaked half-open probe and a rejected continuity anchor - #1857
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 7 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe HTTP bridge separates server continuity failures from upstream transport failures. Recovery releases half-open probes and disarms pending response attempts. Model-transition owner conflicts allow one account-neutral fork. Response-anchor cleanup preserves newer anchors. ChangesHTTP bridge continuity recovery
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The change improves recovery for wedged bridge sessions, but the current implementation still has race paths that can permit concurrent half-open probes or re-arm a retry lockout during teardown, causing continued client-visible stalls. Owner follow-up is needed before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Upstream
participant HTTPBridge
participant RetryCircuit
participant DurableRepository
Upstream->>HTTPBridge: previous_response_not_found
HTTPBridge->>HTTPBridge: identify rejected proxy-injected anchor
HTTPBridge->>DurableRepository: conditionally clear expected response ID
DurableRepository-->>HTTPBridge: preserve newer anchor when IDs differ
HTTPBridge->>RetryCircuit: release half-open lease
RetryCircuit-->>HTTPBridge: preserve continuity-failure state
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In `@app/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/retry_circuit.py`:
- Around line 500-524: Bind each half-open lease to the request that acquired it
by storing an owner or generation when the lease is created, and require
_release_http_bridge_retry_circuit_half_open to verify that identity before
clearing half_open_until. Update the lease-acquisition state and callers,
including the streaming and mixin paths, so only the owning probe can release
the lease; bypassed requests must not release another probe’s lease.
In `@app/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/streaming.py`:
- Around line 3645-3661: Move the pending-attempt disarm transition in the reset
flow before the first await, ahead of
_release_http_bridge_retry_circuit_half_open. Ensure attempt selection cannot
observe eligible attempts during this transition by using session.pending_lock,
and preserve the existing retry-circuit accounting while preventing teardown
from recording stream_incomplete for these settled attempts.
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app/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/mixin.pyapp/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/protocol.pyapp/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/retry_circuit.pyapp/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/streaming.pytests/unit/test_proxy_http_bridge.py
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| if account_neutral_recovery and selection.error_code == CONTINUITY_OWNER_UNAVAILABLE: | ||
| # Ownership loss is ours, so hand back any half-open probe | ||
| # this reattach consumed instead of suppressing the key. | ||
| await self._release_http_bridge_retry_circuit_half_open( | ||
| session, detail=CONTINUITY_OWNER_UNAVAILABLE | ||
| ) |
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In _reconnect_http_bridge_session, the new release is restricted to account-neutral recovery with CONTINUITY_OWNER_UNAVAILABLE, but a half-open request can also terminate with the same previous_response_owner_unavailable result when its required owner is usage-limited, becomes excluded during selection recovery, or a different account is returned (lines 2198–2202, 2223–2225, and 2248–2254). Those exits never settle or release the probe, so affected hard keys remain suppressed for the full 600-second lease—the lockout this change is intended to remove.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L103-L108
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| await self._release_http_bridge_retry_circuit_half_open( | ||
| session, | ||
| detail=server_continuity_loss_detail, | ||
| ) |
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If the request task is cancelled after this await clears the lease but before the following pending_lock acquisition and session detachment, the reset exits with the stale session still registered and its attempts not disarmed while the retry circuit accepts replacement work. Make releasing the probe part of a cancellation-safe finalization sequence after the reset has claimed/detached and settled the affected lifecycle.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L109-L113
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| await self._release_http_bridge_retry_circuit_half_open( | ||
| session, detail=CONTINUITY_OWNER_UNAVAILABLE | ||
| ) |
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This new await sits outside the surrounding BaseException cleanup used by the other reattach awaits. If cancellation is delivered while waiting for the retry-circuit lock, control skips complete_failed_handoff(), leaving session.handoff_in_progress and the inflight handoff future unresolved, so later requests for the key can wait indefinitely; wrap the release so handoff finalization still runs on cancellation.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L109-L113
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| async def _reset_for_continuity_loss(service: Any, session: Any, *, server_continuity_loss: bool) -> None: | ||
| cast(Any, service)._detach_http_bridge_session_locked = Mock(return_value=session) | ||
| cast(Any, service)._fail_pending_websocket_requests = AsyncMock(return_value=True) | ||
| cast(Any, service)._close_http_bridge_session = AsyncMock() |
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The regression helper replaces both _fail_pending_websocket_requests and _close_http_bridge_session with mocks, and the test then manually invokes retry-circuit accounting, so it never exercises the production interaction that caused the bug: closing the session wakes the actual upstream reader, which snapshots and classifies pending attempts through the retirement funnel. Add bridge-surface coverage using the real close/reader cleanup path, including partial cleanup failure, so ordering regressions are detectable.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L123-L126
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* fix(compact): absorb active recovery replay semantics * fix(proxy): reject mixed post-compact tool suffix replays (cherry picked from commit c597226)
) (cherry picked from commit 25d6374)
* fix(db): repair retired identity/warmup stamp * fix(db): repair partial file-account-pin migration (cherry picked from commit b6c217f)
A reattach that proved silent/wedged quarantines its session key, but the quarantine gate only cleared two booleans. `bridge_session_key` was still re-adopted from `durable_lookup.canonical_kind/canonical_key`, and the session was still created under that same poisoned key, so for the whole 600s `_HTTP_BRIDGE_QUARANTINE_TTL_SECONDS` window every request rebuilt a fresh wedged bridge on the key that was already known to be dead. Demote the key instead of only dropping the anchor. When a quarantined key carries a sealed durable full-resend proof that matches the payload, the request dispatches on a soft account-neutral replay key with the client's own full conversation, and the original key's continuity is advanced only after that recovery actually completes. - `quarantine.py`: entries carry a `generation`, and clearing takes a key plus an expected generation, so a late recovery cannot clear a quarantine that was re-armed underneath it. - `upstream_events.py`: on a completed response, rebind and renew the original durable row before clearing its quarantine, so continuity is not stranded on the throwaway recovery key. - `streaming.py`: the quarantine gate demotes the key; the recovery key is named after the body this dispatch actually sends. `durable_recovery_attempt_fingerprint` deliberately keeps hashing the unprojected body. It is the key of persisted `http_bridge_recovery_attempts` rows, so hashing the projected body instead would mint a different fingerprint, a row journalled before a restart would stop matching, and the one-shot replay fence would silently open once. Covered by `test_quarantined_full_resend_recovery_fence_survives_restart_fingerprint`. (cherry picked from commit 5e1f568)
An HTTP bridge model transition could return `continuity_owner_conflict` indefinitely when a durable model owner and a stale hard alias pointed at different accounts, even though the request was safe to start on a fresh child bridge. Add a narrowly gated account-neutral model-transition fork, limited to the exact `continuity_owner_conflict` error, local requests and an account-neutral effective Responses payload. Forwarded requests, previous-response continuations, resolved file owners, account-scoped hosted references, and post-compaction payloads whose compacted context is not carried in the request remain fail-closed. The forked child key is pinned `hard`, and the child request state drops the parent affinity policy, hard continuity anchor and reused parent turn state so the submit and clean-close paths do not classify it as the parent's owner-bound turn. (cherry picked from commit 52092bc)
…ures Suppressing a duplicate tool-call event synthesises a terminal error, and that synthetic failure must not count against account health -- the account did nothing wrong. The WebSocket path reset the penalty flag unconditionally, so a genuine `response.failed` or `error` arriving after a suppression was exempted too, and the balancer kept routing to an account that was actually failing. Direct SSE already scopes the exemption to the synthesised terminal; this makes the WebSocket path agree. Also assert the persisted terminal error code in the HTTP-bridge replay test, so a regression that emits the right SSE event while recording the wrong code is caught, and list the already-present direct-SSE coverage in the OpenSpec task list.
Quarantine recovery rebinds the durable session with `clear_continuity=True` and renews it, but nothing proved the row it wrote was still the row it looked up. Three ways that went wrong: A recovery started at quarantine generation N could complete after the same key was quarantined again at N+1, and would then rebind and renew the original durable row -- overwriting the newer continuity owner and anchor even though `_clear_http_bridge_quarantine_key` correctly refused to clear the newer quarantine. Thread the captured generation through and re-check it before any durable mutation. `renew_live_session` does not return `None` when ownership changed under it: `_execute_fenced_session_update` returns the current foreign-owner snapshot after the fenced update affects no row. Treating any non-`None` snapshot as success cleared quarantine for a response id that was never persisted. Validate the returned session id, owner instance, owner epoch, account and response id before reporting success. The normative responses-api-compat scenario still required quarantine to clear without a durable write, which this recovery contradicts. Add an OpenSpec delta for fenced durable recovery rather than leaving code and spec disagreeing.
…on replay The recovery fence claims the canonical parent row using `payload.model` before the code decides the turn will run as a fresh model-transition child. A same-account claim preserves the parent's old `latest_response_id`, so once the child finished and the origin lease was released the canonical row advertised the new model while still carrying an anchor produced by the old one. The next turn to reattach then continued from a response the advertised model never produced. Decide the model-transition fresh replay before the stale recovery claim, and when the claim belongs to such a child, leave the parent's stored model and `latest_response_id` as the matched pair they were.
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| async with session.pending_lock: | ||
| for pending_request_state in session.pending_requests: | ||
| pending_attempt = getattr(pending_request_state, "response_create_attempt", None) | ||
| if pending_attempt is not None: | ||
| pending_attempt.disarmed = True |
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When a submitter has passed the current-session check while holding session.lifecycle_lock but has not yet appended its request (request_submit.py:1890-1894), this loop can disarm the existing attempts and detach the session before that submitter appends and sends an undisarmed attempt. Because the reset never acquires lifecycle_lock, closing the socket can then classify the late attempt as eligible and record the manufactured stream_incomplete, recreating the cooldown this change is intended to prevent; make disarm/detach atomic with submit lifecycle ownership or recheck pending attempts after detachment.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L109-L113
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| ### Requirement: HTTP bridge retry circuit MUST gate hard-key half-open probes | ||
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| For hard HTTP bridge keys, the proxy MUST preserve one-probe exclusivity when a | ||
| server-side continuity failure returns an unused half-open retry-circuit probe. |
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Fresh evidence beyond the earlier missing-artifact finding is that the newly added delta specifies only half-open retry-probe behavior, while this same commit also introduces a new contract that conditionally deletes durable and in-memory anchors when upstream returns previous_response_not_found. The named-versus-anonymous matching rules, fence-miss behavior, and dependent-state clearing therefore remain undocumented despite being externally significant proxy behavior; add testable requirements for this invalidation path before treating the change as ready.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L92-L98
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| state.cooldown_until = now | ||
| state.half_open_until = 0.0 | ||
| state.half_open_owner_session_id = None |
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In a multi-replica deployment, returning the probe only changes this process-local state and never atomically updates or claims the durable circuit row. After replica A executes these assignments, its next reconnect can acquire the fresh local lease, while replica B loads the same elapsed durable cooldown as 0.0 and admits the same hard key without observing A's owner; additional requests on B also pass, so the new one-probe exclusivity guarantee is not enforced cluster-wide. Persist and atomically claim the returned probe state, or otherwise coordinate its ownership through the durable circuit.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L103-L108
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…nd a leaked half-open probe A hard bridge key that has any durable retry-circuit row can be refused for up to the full half-open lease (600s) while reporting `retry_after=1`, so a client reconnects in a tight loop and never makes progress. Two independent causes, both in the retry circuit: * `_load_http_bridge_retry_circuit` turned a durable cooldown that had already elapsed into `now_monotonic`, which is non-zero *and* in the past. That is precisely the state `_http_bridge_precreated_retry_allowed` reads as "a cooldown just ended", so it burned an exclusive half-open probe lease on a key that was never cooling down. Below-threshold rows hit this every time, because `persist_retry_circuit` writes `now_wall` for them. * The probe holding a lease releases it only by recording a failure or by clearing the circuit on success. A probe that dies of this proxy's own continuity-ownership loss does neither, so the lease leaked for its full duration and every other request on the key was refused for a server-side reason the upstream never caused. Server-side continuity-ownership loss now returns the probe lease instead of consuming it, and never charges `consecutive_failures`. Genuine upstream `stream_incomplete` / `stream_idle_timeout` / `clean_close` failures keep tripping the circuit unchanged. Ownership, reclaim, and takeover behavior are deliberately untouched. The half-open suppression branch was also completely silent; it now logs, so a key locked behind a lease is distinguishable from one admitted.
…uit strike The reset that escapes a stale continuity anchor closes the bridge session, tearing down a websocket that sibling turns are still pending on. The reader wakes on that teardown and reports the ordinary transport class, `stream_incomplete`, which the retry circuit counts. So the escape hatch re-arms the cooldown that forced the escape, and the loop sustains itself with no upstream input at all: cooldown -> reattach cannot reuse the durable session -> anchor replayed against an account that never had it -> `previous_response_not_found` -> local reset -> teardown counted as `stream_incomplete` -> cooldown. Disarm the physical sends this reset is already settling, reusing the existing `_HTTPBridgeResponseCreateAttempt.disarmed` marker that a failed send sets. The reader's attempt selection then classifies them `settled` rather than `eligible`, so the teardown is not charged. Scoped strictly to resets we initiate for our own continuity loss. A teardown with no such marker keeps the send eligible and still charges the circuit exactly as before -- covered by a negative control that reproduces the loop without the patch.
…elper `_reset_for_continuity_loss` already takes `service: Any`, so the three `cast(Any, service)` wrappers are no-ops. Repo-wide `uv run ty check`, which is what `make typecheck` runs, reports them as `redundant-cast` and exits non-zero.
…inal Every `surface=websocket_stream` continuity_fail_closed line in the 2026-08-20 outage carried `owner_lookup_source=unknown owner_lookup_outcome=unknown previous_response_age_seconds=unknown same_session=unknown`, while the http_bridge surface populated the same fields. The logger reads owner state off the request, and the HTTP-bridge terminal cleanup path reached it without seeding that state, so the one surface that was failing was also the one surface that could not say why. Seed the owner fields from the bridge-owned session before the websocket terminal is sanitized and logged. This is diagnostics only; no routing or continuity behaviour changes.
…d ones A session that received `previous_response_not_found` for a given response id kept that id and re-sent it on every following turn, because the drop path only recognised anchors codex-lb had injected itself. A client-supplied anchor that upstream had rejected stayed in both `http_bridge_sessions.latest_response_id` and `session.last_completed_response_id` and was replayed forever. Live evidence from 2026-08-20: one session spent an hour on a single rejected anchor, 25 operations from 19:48Z to 20:45Z, every one failing in 120-580 ms with `previous_response_not_found`. Across three hours, operations sharing an anchor with at least one sibling failed 94.8% of the time against 0.7% for uniquely anchored ones. `sticky_sessions.continuity_abandoned_at` had never been set on any row in the database's history, so nothing ever released a dead anchor. Widen the rejected-anchor match to any anchor this session actually sent, keep the existing fence so a newer owner's anchor is never cleared, and log each clear with the anchor id, reason and fence decision -- the path was previously silent, which is why an hour-long user-visible outage left no trace naming it.
A blue-green deploy keeps the retiring container running while the router already points at the replacement, so both are ring members and `/health/ready` reports `ring_size: 2`. A request for a session owned by the retiring instance reached the new one and got a bare 409 telling the client to "retry to reach the correct replica" -- with nothing anywhere doing that. A user watched a working session burn 20 reconnect attempts on it, and the container log shows six such rejections in one deploy window. Forward to the owner instead. Ownership transfer was the alternative and is unsafe: the retiring instance may still be streaming that very turn, and the durable owner/epoch/lease code already fences live ownership for that reason. Retained blue-green containers register without an advertised endpoint, so derive one from the container's instance id, and refuse to derive from an id containing path or authority separators. A member with no fresh heartbeat row now resolves to no endpoint at all rather than a derived hostname; forwarding to an instance that has stopped answering is worse than reporting no owner, and the existing stale-metadata guarantee depends on it.
Dropping an anchor upstream had rejected stopped the endless replay, but the clear happened after the turn had already failed closed, so a user still lost a turn per dead anchor -- twice per anchor in practice, once for the proxy injected copy and once for the client supplied one, four seconds apart in the live log. Upstream naming the response id it cannot find is a complete diagnosis with a purely local remedy, so once the fenced clear has actually succeeded, requeue the claimed terminal request and replay it fresh instead of surfacing the error. Retry only when the existing replay-safe body is present, nothing was streamed downstream, no other request is pending on the session, and the durable fence really cleared the anchor; a second rejection after that means something else is wrong and stays fail-closed. The retry is the proxy's own choice, so it does not charge the retry circuit. If retry setup fails the terminal state is restored rather than swallowed.
When the items compaction must preserve exceeded the upstream size budget on their own, compaction raised `responses_compact_input_too_large` and the session was finished: it could not compact, so it could not continue, and there was no way back without abandoning the conversation. A user hit exactly that. Refusing to compact is worse than compacting lossily, so demote the oldest generated goal and plan state anchors -- `create_goal`, `get_goal`, `update_goal`, `update_plan` and their generated marker messages -- when the required set does not fit. The newest anchor of each kind survives, as do structural developer/system state and the side-effecting tail, and call/output pairs are dropped whole so the transcript stays consistent. The cap is not raised. It is a local estimate (100k estimated tokens over a `len(json.dumps(...))/4` approximation) and this lane could not measure what upstream actually accepts, so moving it would be guessing. Current state that still cannot fit continues to fail closed; only recoverable history is given up. The other two raise sites, for an unusable `call_id` and for the final wire payload, are untouched -- they are different failures.
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The generation counter lived on the registry entry, so it died with it. A bridge request may run for two hours, while `_prune_http_bridge_quarantine_registry` drops an entry after ten minutes of quiet or under the 1,024-entry cap. A generation-1 completion could therefore still be in flight when its entry was evicted and the same session key was quarantined again as a fresh generation-1 entry -- and the stale completion then passed every generation check, rebound the durable row, and cleared a quarantine that had nothing to do with it. Issue generations from a counter on the service instead, seeded from the highest generation still in the registry so a restart cannot hand out a number that is already in flight. Eviction no longer resets anything. Reported in review of Soju06#1862.
`_retry_http_bridge_precreated_request` releases the request's account-scoped lease before reconnecting, with a comment saying a fresh hard replay may select a replacement account. It then asked `_reconnect_http_bridge_session` to require that same account anyway, and the reconnect re-imposed it a second time: an account-neutral replay key unconditionally overrode the caller and resolved the session's own account as a required continuity owner. So a replay whose account had gone silent was pinned to it. The integration test did not catch that, because its fake swapped the account in by hand instead of letting account selection run. An account-neutral replay key is server-namespaced; any account can serve it. Bind the opening account by default, since most reconnects resume account-scoped upstream state, but let a caller that has proven its request carries none -- no continuity anchor, no injected anchor, no account-scoped file, nothing streamed yet -- pass `allow_account_rebind` and land elsewhere. That decision stays with the caller: deriving it inside the reconnect from the key alone would silently loosen every other account-neutral recovery, which is what `test_reconnect_account_neutral_recovery_requires_typed_owner_without_callsite_flag` already forbids. `owner_bound` and `rebind_allowed` are returned as a pair rather than one boolean because they are not opposites: an ordinary account-bound session is neither, so allowing a rebind must not loosen its owner requirements. The reconnect now drives the account switch and the integration test exercises selection instead of manufacturing the result. Reported in review of Soju06#1862.
Session keys are frozen dataclasses. A plain attribute declaration on a Protocol asks for a writable member, so `ty` rejected `session.key` as incompatible with `_AccountNeutralReplayKey`.
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…r1857-preserve-live-head-20260822 # Conflicts: # app/modules/proxy/_service/http_bridge/mixin.py
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| require_same_account=( | ||
| (account_neutral_recovery or account_bound_replay) | ||
| and not fresh_hard_request_account_switch_allowed | ||
| ), |
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When a hard-key request has no explicit anchor or file but candidate_portable is false—for example, because it already carries a durable operation_id—the code sets account_bound_replay=True, yet fresh_hard_request_account_switch_allowed is also true. This condition consequently passes require_same_account=False, allowing selection to fall back to another account and resend account-scoped state or an ambiguously dispatched operation there. Apply the fresh-account exception only to portable/account-neutral requests; account-bound replays must retain the original owner.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L103-L108
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| if not generation_matches(): | ||
| return False | ||
| advanced = await service._durable_bridge.renew_live_session( | ||
| session_id=active_lookup.session_id, | ||
| api_key_id=api_key_id, |
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If generation N+1 is installed after this generation check but while renew_live_session is awaiting its database write, the stale generation-N recovery still persists its response ID and related continuity fields. The post-await check only returns False; it cannot undo the durable mutation, so the newer quarantine remains visible while its durable owner/anchor has already been overwritten, contrary to the recovery invariant. Include the generation/snapshot in an atomic durable CAS or serialize generation changes with this mutation.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L103-L108
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| if not hostname or any(separator in hostname for separator in ("/", "\\", ":", "@")): | ||
| return None |
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When an explicitly configured or persisted endpointless instance ID contains delimiters not covered by this four-character check, such as pod?x or pod#x, the function still returns a URL, but the suffix becomes a query or fragment and the request targets pod on the default port rather than port 2455. Whitespace and other non-hostname characters are accepted as well, contradicting the safe-hostname-token contract and potentially forwarding a live session to the wrong endpoint. Validate the complete instance ID as a hostname token before deriving the URL.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L103-L108
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Two independent ways a hard HTTP bridge key stops making progress on its own,
both observed on the same deployment, both ending in a client-visible failure
with no upstream fault: a retry-circuit half-open lease that is taken and never
returned, and a continuity anchor that upstream has rejected but the proxy keeps
replaying. They share the file and the recovery machinery, so they are fixed
together.
First defect: a leaked half-open probe
A hard bridge key that carries any durable retry-circuit row can be refused for
up to the full half-open lease (600s) while the client is told
retry_after=1.The client reconnects roughly once a second, is suppressed each time, and the
key makes no progress until the lease expires on its own.
Live evidence
Measured over a 3 hour window on a running deployment:
submit_retry_circuit_suppressedhttp_bridge_retry_circuit event=suppressedThe cooldown branch is the only branch that emits
event=suppressed, and itnever fired. All 103 suppressions came from the half-open branch, which reports
cooldown=0, so the client receivesretry_after=1while the key stays lockedfor the remainder of the lease.
Circuit transitions in the same window: 38
half_open, 5opened, 0reset.All 5
openedrecords readfailures=2 cooldown_seconds=60.0; the consecutivefailure counter never reached 3 during the container's lifetime, so the observed
lockout was not produced by a key crossing the open threshold.
Root causes
1. A cooldown that had already elapsed loads as a live one.
_load_http_bridge_retry_circuitcomputedpersisted_cooldown_until = now_monotonic + cooldown_remainingunconditionally. When the durable cooldownhad already elapsed,
cooldown_remainingis0.0and the deadline becomesnow_monotonic: non-zero and in the past at the same time. That is exactly thestate
_http_bridge_precreated_retry_allowedreads as "a cooldown just ended",so it takes the exclusive half-open probe lease on a key that was not cooling
down. Below-threshold rows reach this on every load, because
persist_retry_circuitwritesnow_wallascooldown_until_epochfor afailure count under the open threshold.
The deadline now loads as
0.0when nothing remains, which is the value therest of the circuit already uses for "not cooling down".
2. A probe lease is only ever released by settling the circuit.
A half-open lease admits one probe and suppresses every other request on the key
until that probe records a failure or clears the circuit on success. A probe
that ends in this proxy's own continuity-ownership loss does neither, so the
lease is held for its full duration while the upstream is healthy.
New
_release_http_bridge_retry_circuit_half_openhands the lease back withouttouching
consecutive_failuresor any live cooldown: the next request simplybecomes the probe. It is called from
_reset_http_bridge_session_after_local_terminal_errorand from theCONTINUITY_OWNER_UNAVAILABLEreattach path. The six server-continuity details(
continuity_owner_unavailable,previous_response_owner_unavailable,previous_response_not_found,bridge_previous_response_not_found,bridge_owner_unreachable,bridge_instance_mismatch) release the lease and nolonger charge the circuit, since they describe this proxy losing its anchor
rather than an upstream transport failure.
The half-open suppression branch had no log line of its own. It now logs
event=half_open_suppressedwith the remaining lease, so a key held behind alease is distinguishable in the logs from one that was admitted. Returning a
lease logs
event=half_open_releasedand increments the existinghttp_bridge_retry_circuit_totalcounter under a newhalf_open_releasedoutcome.
3. The reset that escapes a stale anchor produces the failure that re-arms the cooldown.
_reset_http_bridge_session_after_local_terminal_errorcloses the bridgesession, which tears down a websocket that sibling turns may still be pending
on. Those readers wake on the teardown and report the ordinary transport class
stream_incomplete, which the circuit charges. The sequence closes on itselfwith no upstream input:
When the reset is performed for our own continuity loss, it now marks the
physical sends it is already settling with the existing
_HTTPBridgeResponseCreateAttempt.disarmedflag, the same marker a failed sendsets. The reader's attempt selection then classifies them as
settledinsteadof
eligible, so the teardown is not charged. A teardown without that markerkeeps the send eligible and charges the circuit exactly as before.
Proof of oracle
Eight tests are added. Run against this branch's
app/tree they all pass. Rununchanged against
main'sapp/tree (52092bc9), four of them fail:Negative controls
The other four pass in both trees by design. They fail if this change
over-reaches:
test_http_bridge_upstream_teardown_without_continuity_loss_still_arms_cooldown— a teardown with no continuity-loss marker still arms the cooldown.
test_http_bridge_retry_circuit_still_trips_on_genuine_upstream_stream_incomplete— genuine upstream
stream_incompletestill trips the circuit.test_http_bridge_retry_circuit_suppressed_attempt_does_not_extend_cooldown— a suppressed attempt does not extend the cooldown.
test_http_bridge_live_durable_owner_is_not_reclaimable— ownership, reclaim, and takeover behavior are unchanged.
Second defect: a continuity anchor upstream has rejected is never dropped
The same hard bridge key has a second way to stop making progress, with no
cooldown involved.
previous_response_not_foundis upstream's definitive answerabout one response id. The bridge treats it as terminal for the request, but it
never invalidates its own copies of that id, so the next turn on the session
sends the same rejected anchor again.
Two carriers hold it, and both re-inject it:
http_bridge_sessions.latest_response_id, read by the fresh-reattach path(
fresh_reattach_anchor_injected), which addsprevious_response_idto apayload that arrived without one. It survives process restarts.
session.last_completed_response_id, read by the session-levelanchor path (
session_anchor_injected)._clear_durable_http_bridge_response_anchoralready exists and does exactly theright fenced write, but it is only reachable from the eventless
missing_response_created_timeoutpath.session.last_completed_response_idisonly cleared on an account rebind. Neither reacts to upstream saying the id does
not exist.
Injecting the anchor also enables store-context input trimming, so the damage is
larger than one lost anchor: a client payload carrying the whole conversation is
trimmed against a response upstream no longer has. A representative live line is
store_context_input_trimmed original_items=192 trimmed_to=4on a turn whoseanchor upstream had already rejected twice.
Live evidence
Measured on a deployment running
mainplus the first commit of this branch:continuity_fail_closed reason=previous_response_not_foundprevious_response_source=proxy_injectedprevious_response_idbehind all of themevent=fresh_reattach_anchor_injectedsession_anchor_injectedstore_context_input_trimmedevent=durable_anchor_invalidatedevent=terminal_error detail=stream_incompleteFour response ids account for every one of those failures, and the anchor
invalidation path never fired once. A read-only SQLite check against the same
deployment found those ids still sitting in
http_bridge_sessions.latest_response_idon
state=activerows minutes after upstream had rejected them. Clearing thatcolumn is what lets such a session continue, and no code path does it.
Fix
When upstream rejects an anchor this proxy injected, invalidate both carriers.
Three conditions keep the invalidation to exactly the id that is proven gone:
the anchor must be proxy-injected; it must be the id upstream named, when the
error message carries one; and the durable write, which reuses the existing
fenced clear, must still find that id on the row. So a concurrent turn that
already stored a newer anchor keeps it, and a differently anchored request that
merely matched the same anonymous error event keeps its own. The in-memory
anchor is cleared under the same equality check, and its dependent state (input
item count, prefix fingerprint, pending tool-call manifest) goes with it.
A client-supplied anchor is the client's own state and is left alone: it still
returns the standard error, and this proxy simply stops storing and replaying
it on the client's behalf.
ambiguous_continuation_recovery_modeis not the lever for this._HTTP_BRIDGE_AMBIGUOUS_RECOVERY_ERROR_CODEScovers outcomes where upstreamacceptance is genuinely unknown; this outcome is a definitive answer, and the
server_*modes replay from the anchor that was just rejected.client_full_history_oncecannot apply either, because it requires aclient-supplied
previous_response_id(request_submit.py).Proof of oracle
test_previous_response_not_found_drops_only_the_proxy_injected_anchordrives areal
previous_response_not_foundevent through_process_http_bridge_upstream_textfor a session holding the anchor in bothcarriers, and
test_durable_bridge_clear_response_anchor_keeps_a_newer_anchorexercises thefenced write directly. With the two production hunks reverted and the tests
unchanged:
The other two parameters are the negative controls, and both pass in either
tree by design:
[False-True]is a client-supplied anchor. No clear may happen and thesession must be untouched.
[True-False]is a proxy-injected anchor while upstream's message names adifferent response id. Removing only the named-id check makes this one fail
with
assert 1 == 0.Scope
On the retry circuit, only its accounting of server-side continuity loss
changes. Ownership, reclaim, takeover, quarantine, and the open threshold are
untouched. Genuine upstream
stream_incomplete,stream_idle_timeout, andclean_closefailures keep tripping the circuit as before.On the anchor, only
previous_response_not_foundagainst an anchor this proxyinjected triggers the invalidation. The eventless-timeout clear keeps its
existing behaviour, alias rows and
latest_turn_statestay in place so thedurable session remains reattachable, and the fenced write still refuses when
the row no longer holds the rejected id.
clear_latest_response_anchorand_execute_fenced_session_updategain an optional argument each and areunchanged for existing callers.
Not covered: the native WebSocket transport keeps its own
_WebSocketContinuityState.last_completed_response_id, which is likewise onlyrewritten on a completion and never invalidated by a rejection. Every failure
measured here is on the HTTP bridge, so that surface is left alone rather than
changed without evidence of the same wedge.
Why this is a separate PR
Checked against the open PRs that touch these files; none owns either surface:
_fail_pending_websocket_requests.On the retry circuit it moves the other way, adding
HTTP_BRIDGE_EVENTLESS_TIMEOUT_CODEas a fourth charged detail. It touches noanchor-invalidation code.
retry_circuitcode at all.session.last_completed_response_idas a liveness baselinebefore retiring a stale pending session. It reads that field and never clears
it, so it neither fixes nor conflicts with the anchor invalidation here.
neither the retry circuit nor the anchor carriers.
of all three.
Validation
http_bridge/mixin.pyends at 2434 lines andstreaming/mixin.pyat 1100,within the 2436 and 1100 ratchets in
scripts/check_proxy_architecture.py.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests