fix: verify content checksum before trusting pack signature#17
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muhamedfazalps wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix: verify content checksum before trusting pack signature#17muhamedfazalps wants to merge 1 commit into
muhamedfazalps wants to merge 1 commit into
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…hay-codes07#9) verify_pack_signature() trusted the manifest's self-reported checksum and never recomputed content_checksum(pack.items). An attacker could swap pack.items for a malicious payload while leaving manifest.checksum untouched, and the signature would still verify. Now verifies that content_checksum(pack.items) matches manifest.checksum before trusting the signature, closing the bypass window.
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Fixes #9
Problem
verify_pack_signature()trusted the manifest's self-reportedchecksumfield and never recomputedcontent_checksum(pack.items). An attacker could:pack.itemsfor a malicious payloadmanifest.checksumuntouchedThe
volo pack verifycommand callsverify_pack_signaturewithoutvalidate_pack, so it prints-> VALIDon a swapped-payload pack.Solution
Before verifying the signature, recompute
content_checksum(pack.items)and reject the pack if it doesn't matchmanifest.checksum. This ensures the signature is bound to actual content, not just the self-reported checksum.Changes
packages/volo-packs/src/volo_packs/signing.py: Added content checksum verification inverify_pack_signature()packages/volo-packs/src/volo_packs/signing.py: Importedcontent_checksumfrom pack moduleSecurity Impact
This is a security fix — pack signature verification was bypassable by swapping content while keeping the manifest checksum unchanged.
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