Create Wotan-Kernel #6

DerRomtester · 2013-10-25T16:04:19Z

Only Trying

commit ea3768b upstream. We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries around till the last reference to the port was dropped. This is actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour: 1. Open port in guest 2. Hot-unplug port 3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same name already exists (even though it was unplugged). This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted) Hardware name: KVM sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1' Call Trace: [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core layers. Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors, and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected. This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers, resulting in oopses: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- PID: 6162 TASK: ffff8801147ad500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cat" #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b noiphonehere#1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322 CyanogenMod#2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50 CyanogenMod#3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b CyanogenMod#4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2 CyanogenMod#5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5 [exception RIP: strlen+2] RIP: ffffffff81272ae2 RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880118901c18 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88011799982c RSI: 00000000000000d0 RDI: 3a303030302f3030 RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38 R8: 0000000000000006 R9: ffffffffa0134500 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff880117a1cc10 R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: 0000000000000017 R15: ffffffff81aff700 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 coolya#6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d coolya#7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551 coolya#8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb coolya#9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct itself. Reported-by: chayang <[email protected]> Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <[email protected]> Reported-by: FuXiangChun <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. [On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes, and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission is granted in policy. In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery console which has a legitimate need for it. The other potential vector is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard). However, the end result is only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG. This fix is queued for 3.14.] Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [coolya#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- [sds: commit message edited to note Android implications and to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit] Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413 Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. [On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes, and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission is granted in policy. In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery console which has a legitimate need for it. The other potential vector is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard). However, the end result is only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG. This fix is queued for 3.14.] Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [coolya#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec didhiy#1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- [sds: commit message edited to note Android implications and to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit] Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413 Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. [On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes, and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission is granted in policy. In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery console which has a legitimate need for it. The other potential vector is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard). However, the end result is only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG. This fix is queued for 3.14.] Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [coolya#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec CyanogenMod#1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- [sds: commit message edited to note Android implications and to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit] Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413 Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

commit 412d32e upstream. A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling off, never to be seen again. In the case where this occurred, an exiting thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex, bringing the box to its knees. PID: 18105 TASK: ffff8807fd412180 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kdmflush" #0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489 CyanogenMod#1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs] CyanogenMod#2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14 CyanogenMod#3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs] CyanogenMod#4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2 CyanogenMod#5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41 coolya#6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a coolya#7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88 coolya#8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850 coolya#9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f [exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper] RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0 RSP: ffff8808157e7f58 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8107af60 RDI: ffff8803ee491d18 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 8f294b5 upstream. The settimeofday01 test in the LTP testsuite effectively does gettimeofday(current time); settimeofday(Jan 1, 1970 + 100 seconds); settimeofday(current time); This test causes a stack trace to be displayed on the console during the setting of timeofday to Jan 1, 1970 + 100 seconds: [ 131.066751] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 131.096448] WARNING: at kernel/time/clockevents.c:209 clockevents_program_event+0x135/0x140() [ 131.104935] Hardware name: Dinar [ 131.108150] Modules linked in: sg nfsv3 nfs_acl nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs dns_resolver fscache lockd sunrpc nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables kvm_amd kvm sp5100_tco bnx2 i2c_piix4 crc32c_intel k10temp fam15h_power ghash_clmulni_intel amd64_edac_mod pcspkr serio_raw edac_mce_amd edac_core microcode xfs libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom ata_generic crc_t10dif pata_acpi radeon i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ttm drm ahci pata_atiixp libahci libata usb_storage i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 131.176784] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/28 Not tainted 3.8.0+ coolya#6 [ 131.182248] Call Trace: [ 131.184684] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810612af>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0xc0 [ 131.191312] [<ffffffff8106130a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [ 131.197131] [<ffffffff810b9fd5>] clockevents_program_event+0x135/0x140 [ 131.203721] [<ffffffff810bb584>] tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 131.209534] [<ffffffff81089ab1>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x131/0x230 [ 131.215437] [<ffffffff814b9600>] ? cpufreq_p4_target+0x130/0x130 [ 131.221509] [<ffffffff81619119>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x69/0x99 [ 131.227839] [<ffffffff8161805d>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 [ 131.233816] <EOI> [<ffffffff81099745>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc5/0x120 [ 131.240267] [<ffffffff814b9ff0>] ? cpuidle_wrap_enter+0x50/0xa0 [ 131.246252] [<ffffffff814b9fe9>] ? cpuidle_wrap_enter+0x49/0xa0 [ 131.252238] [<ffffffff814ba050>] cpuidle_enter_tk+0x10/0x20 [ 131.257877] [<ffffffff814b9c89>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa9/0x260 [ 131.263692] [<ffffffff8101c42f>] cpu_idle+0xaf/0x120 [ 131.268727] [<ffffffff815f8971>] start_secondary+0x255/0x257 [ 131.274449] ---[ end trace 1151a50552231615 ]--- When we change the system time to a low value like this, the value of timekeeper->offs_real will be a negative value. It seems that the WARN occurs because an hrtimer has been started in the time between the releasing of the timekeeper lock and the IPI call (via a call to on_each_cpu) in clock_was_set() in the do_settimeofday() code. The end result is that a REALTIME_CLOCK timer has been added with softexpires = expires = KTIME_MAX. The hrtimer_interrupt() fires/is called and the loop at kernel/hrtimer.c:1289 is executed. In this loop the code subtracts the clock base's offset (which was set to timekeeper->offs_real in do_settimeofday()) from the current hrtimer_cpu_base->expiry value (which was KTIME_MAX): KTIME_MAX - (a negative value) = overflow A simple check for an overflow can resolve this problem. Using KTIME_MAX instead of the overflow value will result in the hrtimer function being run, and the reprogramming of the timer after that. Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]> [jstultz: Tweaked commit subject] Signed-off-by: John Stultz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+ compilers. As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct" version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the "byteshift" implementation for both. Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis: Test case: int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } With the current ARM version: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, didhiy#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, didhiy#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov r3, r3, asl #16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r0, [r0, didhiy#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr r3, r3, r1, asl coolya#8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr r0, r3, r0, asl #24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, mov r2, #0 @ tmp184, ldrb r5, [r0, coolya#6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B] ldrb r4, [r0, CyanogenMod#5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B] ldrb ip, [r0, didhiy#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, didhiy#4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] mov r5, r5, asl #16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], ldrb r7, [r0, didhiy#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] orr r5, r5, r4, asl coolya#8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], ldrb r6, [r0, coolya#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B] orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov ip, ip, asl #16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r1, [r0, didhiy#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr ip, ip, r7, asl coolya#8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r5, r6, asl #24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr ip, ip, r1, asl #24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], mov r1, r3 @, orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194 ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc. Now with the asm-generic version: foo: ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x bx lr @ bar: mov r3, r0 @ x, x ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x ldr r1, [r3, didhiy#4] @ unaligned @, bx lr @ This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows: long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; } then the resulting code is: bar: ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,, bx lr @ So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above unaligned code results are not just an accident. Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an ARMv5 target: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r1, [r0, didhiy#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r2, [r0, didhiy#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r0, [r0, didhiy#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r3, r3, r1, asl coolya#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r2, asl #16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r0, r3, r0, asl #24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r7, [r0, didhiy#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r3, [r0, didhiy#4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149, ldrb r6, [r0, CyanogenMod#5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150, ldrb r5, [r0, didhiy#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r4, [r0, coolya#6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153, ldrb r1, [r0, coolya#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156, ldrb ip, [r0, didhiy#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r2, r2, r7, asl coolya#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r6, asl coolya#8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150, orr r2, r2, r5, asl #16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r3, r3, r4, asl #16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153, orr r0, r2, ip, asl #24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, orr r1, r3, r1, asl #24 @,, tmp155, tmp156, ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]> Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> modified for Mako from kernel.org reference Signed-off-by: faux123 <[email protected]> Conflicts: arch/arm/include/asm/unaligned.h Conflicts: arch/arm/include/asm/unaligned.h Conflicts: arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild

When running the LTP testsuite one may hit this kernel BUG() with the write06 testcase: kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:2023! CPU: 1 PID: 8614 Comm: writev01 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7-64bit-c3000+ coolya#6 IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000401e6e84 00000000401e6e88 IIR: 03ffe01f ISR: 0000000010340000 IOR: 000001fbe0380820 CPU: 1 CR30: 00000000bef80000 CR31: ffffffffffffffff ORIG_R28: 00000000bdc192c0 IAOQ[0]: iov_iter_advance+0x3c/0xc0 IAOQ[1]: iov_iter_advance+0x40/0xc0 RP(r2): generic_file_buffered_write+0x204/0x3f0 Backtrace: [<00000000401e764c>] generic_file_buffered_write+0x204/0x3f0 [<00000000401eab24>] __generic_file_aio_write+0x244/0x448 [<00000000401eadc0>] generic_file_aio_write+0x98/0x150 [<000000004024f460>] do_sync_readv_writev+0xc0/0x130 [<000000004025037c>] compat_do_readv_writev+0x12c/0x340 [<00000000402505f8>] compat_writev+0x68/0xa0 [<0000000040251d88>] compat_SyS_writev+0x98/0xf8 Reason for this crash is a gcc miscompilation in the fault handlers of pa_memcpy() which return the fault address instead of the copied bytes. Since this seems to be a generic problem with gcc-4.7.x (and below), it's better to simplify the fault handlers in pa_memcpy to avoid this problem. Here is a simple reproducer for the problem: int main(int argc, char **argv) { int fd, nbytes; struct iovec wr_iovec[] = { { "TEST STRING ",32}, { (char*)0x40005000,32} }; // random memory. fd = open(DATA_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666); nbytes = writev(fd, wr_iovec, 2); printf("return value = %d, errno %d (%s)\n", nbytes, errno, strerror(errno)); return 0; } In addition, John David Anglin wrote: There is no gcc PR as pa_memcpy is not legitimate C code. There is an implicit assumption that certain variables will contain correct values when an exception occurs and the code randomly jumps to one of the exception blocks. There is no guarantee of this. If a PR was filed, it would likely be marked as invalid. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.8+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

@fn

If the @fn call work_on_cpu() again, the lockdep will complain: > [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] > 3.11.0-rc1-lockdep-fix-a coolya#6 Not tainted > --------------------------------------------- > kworker/0:1/142 is trying to acquire lock: > ((&wfc.work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81077100>] flush_work+0x0/0xb0 > > but task is already holding lock: > ((&wfc.work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075dd9>] process_one_work+0x169/0x610 > > other info that might help us debug this: > Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > CPU0 > ---- > lock((&wfc.work)); > lock((&wfc.work)); > > *** DEADLOCK *** It is false-positive lockdep report. In this sutiation, the two "wfc"s of the two work_on_cpu() are different, they are both on stack. flush_work() can't be deadlock. To fix this, we need to avoid the lockdep checking in this case, thus we instroduce a internal __flush_work() which skip the lockdep. tj: Minor comment adjustment. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]> Reported-by: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

Commits 6a1c068 and 9356b53, respectively 'tty: Convert termios_mutex to termios_rwsem' and 'n_tty: Access termios values safely' introduced a circular lock dependency with console_lock and termios_rwsem. The lockdep report [1] shows that n_tty_write() will attempt to claim console_lock while holding the termios_rwsem, whereas tty_do_resize() may already hold the console_lock while claiming the termios_rwsem. Since n_tty_write() and tty_do_resize() do not contend over the same data -- the tty->winsize structure -- correct the lock dependency by introducing a new lock which specifically serializes access to tty->winsize only. [1] Lockdep report ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/277 is trying to acquire lock: (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 but task is already holding lock: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> CyanogenMod#2 ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}: [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8175b797>] down_read+0x47/0x5c [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (console_lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff810430a7>] console_lock+0x77/0x80 [<ffffffff8146b2a1>] con_flush_chars+0x31/0x50 [<ffffffff8145780c>] n_tty_write+0x1ec/0x4d0 [<ffffffff814541b9>] tty_write+0x159/0x2e0 [<ffffffff814543f5>] redirected_tty_write+0xb5/0xc0 [<ffffffff811ab9d5>] vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811abec5>] SyS_write+0x55/0xa0 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}: [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &tty->termios_rwsem --> console_lock --> (fb_notifier_list).rwsem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(console_lock); lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(&tty->termios_rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** 7 locks held by modprobe/277: #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b5b>] __driver_attach+0x5b/0xb0 #1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b69>] __driver_attach+0x69/0xb0 CyanogenMod#2: (drm_global_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa008a6dd>] drm_get_pci_dev+0xbd/0x2a0 [drm] CyanogenMod#3: (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d93f5>] register_framebuffer+0x25/0x320 CyanogenMod#4: (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d8116>] lock_fb_info+0x26/0x60 CyanogenMod#5: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d95a4>] register_framebuffer+0x1d4/0x320 coolya#6: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 277 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision WorkStation T5400 /0RW203, BIOS A11 04/30/2012 ffffffff8213e5e0 ffff8802aa2fb298 ffffffff81755f19 ffff8802aa2fb2e8 ffffffff8174f506 ffff8802aa2fa000 ffff8802aa2fb378 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 ffff8802aa2ea910 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 0000000000000006 0000000000000007 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81755f19>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff8174f506>] print_circular_bug+0x1fb/0x20c [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30 [<ffffffff810b775e>] ? mark_held_locks+0xae/0x120 [<ffffffff810b78d5>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x105/0x1d0 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffff8173cbcb>] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x5b/0xc0 [<ffffffff81198874>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x104/0x290 [<ffffffffa01035e1>] ? drm_fb_helper_single_add_all_connectors+0x81/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff8175f162>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x80 [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff81497b00>] ? driver_probe_device+0x3a0/0x3a0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff81399a50>] ? ddebug_proc_open+0xb0/0xb0 [<ffffffff813855ae>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries around till the last reference to the port was dropped. This is actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour: 1. Open port in guest 2. Hot-unplug port 3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same name already exists (even though it was unplugged). This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted) Hardware name: KVM sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1' Call Trace: [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core layers. Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors, and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected. This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers, resulting in oopses: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- PID: 6162 TASK: ffff8801147ad500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cat" #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b #1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322 CyanogenMod#2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50 CyanogenMod#3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b CyanogenMod#4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2 CyanogenMod#5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5 [exception RIP: strlen+2] RIP: ffffffff81272ae2 RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880118901c18 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88011799982c RSI: 00000000000000d0 RDI: 3a303030302f3030 RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38 R8: 0000000000000006 R9: ffffffffa0134500 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff880117a1cc10 R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: 0000000000000017 R15: ffffffff81aff700 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 coolya#6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d coolya#7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551 coolya#8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb coolya#9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct itself. CC: <[email protected]> Reported-by: chayang <[email protected]> Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <[email protected]> Reported-by: FuXiangChun <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>

In several places, this snippet is used when removing neigh entries: list_del(&neigh->list); ipoib_neigh_free(neigh); The list_del() removes neigh from the associated struct ipoib_path, while ipoib_neigh_free() removes neigh from the device's neigh entry lookup table. Both of these operations are protected by the priv->lock spinlock. The table however is also protected via RCU, and so naturally the lock is not held when doing reads. This leads to a race condition, in which a thread may successfully look up a neigh entry that has already been deleted from neigh->list. Since the previous deletion will have marked the entry with poison, a second list_del() on the object will cause a panic: CyanogenMod#5 [ffff8802338c3c70] general_protection at ffffffff815108c5 [exception RIP: list_del+16] RIP: ffffffff81289020 RSP: ffff8802338c3d20 RFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff880433e60c88 RCX: 0000000000009e6c RDX: 0000000000000246 RSI: ffff8806012ca298 RDI: ffff880433e60c88 RBP: ffff8802338c3d30 R8: ffff8806012ca2e8 R9: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8804346b2020 R13: ffff88032a3e7540 R14: ffff8804346b26e0 R15: 0000000000000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 coolya#6 [ffff8802338c3d38] ipoib_cm_tx_handler at ffffffffa066fe0a [ib_ipoib] coolya#7 [ffff8802338c3d98] cm_process_work at ffffffffa05149a7 [ib_cm] coolya#8 [ffff8802338c3de8] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa05161aa [ib_cm] coolya#9 [ffff8802338c3e38] worker_thread at ffffffff81090e10 coolya#10 [ffff8802338c3ee8] kthread at ffffffff81096c66 coolya#11 [ffff8802338c3f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c0ca We move the list_del() into ipoib_neigh_free(), so that deletion happens only once, after the entry has been successfully removed from the lookup table. This same behavior is already used in ipoib_del_neighs_by_gid() and __ipoib_reap_neigh(). Signed-off-by: Jim Foraker <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shlomo Pongratz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>

…ent() Vince Weaver reports an oops in the ARM perf event code while running his perf_fuzzer tool on a pandaboard running v3.11-rc4. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 73fd14cc pgd = eca6c000 [73fd14cc] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: snd_soc_omap_hdmi omapdss snd_soc_omap_abe_twl6040 snd_soc_twl6040 snd_soc_omap snd_soc_omap_hdmi_card snd_soc_omap_mcpdm snd_soc_omap_mcbsp snd_soc_core snd_compress regmap_spi snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_timer snd soundcore CPU: 1 PID: 2790 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.11.0-rc4 coolya#6 task: eddcab80 ti: ed892000 task.ti: ed892000 PC is at armpmu_map_event+0x20/0x88 LR is at armpmu_event_init+0x38/0x280 pc : [<c001c3e4>] lr : [<c001c17c>] psr: 60000013 sp : ed893e40 ip : ecececec fp : edfaec00 r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000000 r8 : ed8c3ac0 r7 : ed8c3b5c r6 : edfaec00 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 00000000 r3 : 000000ff r2 : c0496144 r1 : c049611c r0 : edfaec00 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c5387d Table: aca6c04a DAC: 00000015 Process perf_fuzzer (pid: 2790, stack limit = 0xed892240) Stack: (0xed893e40 to 0xed894000) 3e40: 00000800 c001c17c 00000002 c008a748 00000001 00000000 00000000 c00bf078 3e60: 00000000 edfaee50 00000000 00000000 00000000 edfaec00 ed8c3ac0 edfaec00 3e80: 00000000 c073ffac ed893f20 c00bf180 00000001 00000000 c00bf078 ed893f20 3ea0: 00000000 ed8c3ac0 00000000 00000000 00000000 c0cb0818 eddcab80 c00bf440 3ec0: ed893f20 00000000 eddcab80 eca76800 00000000 eca76800 00000000 00000000 3ee0: 00000000 ec984c80 eddcab80 c00bfe68 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000080 3f00: 00000000 ed892000 00000000 ed892030 00000004 ecc7e3c8 ecc7e3c8 00000000 3f20: 00000000 00000048 ecececec 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3f40: 00000000 00000000 00297810 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3f60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3f80: 00000002 00000002 000103a4 00000002 0000016c c00128e8 ed892000 00000000 3fa0: 00090998 c0012700 00000002 000103a4 00090ab8 00000000 00000000 0000000f 3fc0: 00000002 000103a4 00000002 0000016c 00090ab0 00090ab8 000107a0 00090998 3fe0: bed92be0 bed92bd0 0000b785 b6e8f6d0 40000010 00090ab8 00000000 00000000 [<c001c3e4>] (armpmu_map_event+0x20/0x88) from [<c001c17c>] (armpmu_event_init+0x38/0x280) [<c001c17c>] (armpmu_event_init+0x38/0x280) from [<c00bf180>] (perf_init_event+0x108/0x180) [<c00bf180>] (perf_init_event+0x108/0x180) from [<c00bf440>] (perf_event_alloc+0x248/0x40c) [<c00bf440>] (perf_event_alloc+0x248/0x40c) from [<c00bfe68>] (SyS_perf_event_open+0x4f4/0x8fc) [<c00bfe68>] (SyS_perf_event_open+0x4f4/0x8fc) from [<c0012700>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) Code: 0a000005 e3540004 0a000016 e3540000 (0791010c) This is because event->attr.config in armpmu_event_init() contains a very large number copied directly from userspace and is never checked against the size of the array indexed in armpmu_map_hw_event(). Fix the problem by checking the value of config before indexing the array and rejecting invalid config values. Reported-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]> Tested-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]> Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>

When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has been brought up. For example: [ 0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 CyanogenMod#2 CyanogenMod#3 CyanogenMod#4 CyanogenMod#5 OK [ 0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors coolya#6 coolya#7 coolya#8 coolya#9 coolya#10 coolya#11 OK [ 0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors coolya#12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 OK [ 0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all CPUs booted up. Signed-off-by: Libin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

When parsing lines from objdump a line containing source code starting with a numeric label is mistaken for a line of disassembly starting with a memory address. Current validation fails to recognise that the "memory address" is out of range and calculates an invalid offset which later causes this segfault: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 631 hits += h->addr[offset++]; (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 #1 0x00000000004d65e3 in annotate_browser__calc_percent (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:364 CyanogenMod#2 0x00000000004d7433 in annotate_browser__run (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:672 CyanogenMod#3 0x00000000004d80c9 in symbol__tui_annotate (sym=0xc989a0, map=0xa02660, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:962 CyanogenMod#4 0x00000000004d7aa0 in hist_entry__tui_annotate (he=0xdf73f0, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:823 CyanogenMod#5 0x00000000004dd648 in perf_evsel__hists_browse (evsel=0xa01da0, nr_events=1, helpline= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", ev_name=0xa02cd0 "cycles", left_exits=false, hbt= 0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1659 coolya#6 0x00000000004de372 in perf_evlist__tui_browse_hists (evlist=0xa01520, help= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", hbt=0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1950 coolya#7 0x000000000042cf6b in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fffffffd6c0) at builtin-report.c:581 coolya#8 0x000000000042e25d in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0, prefix=0x0) at builtin-report.c:965 coolya#9 0x000000000041a0e1 in run_builtin (p=0x801548, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:319 coolya#10 0x000000000041a319 in handle_internal_command (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:376 coolya#11 0x000000000041a465 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe38c, argv=0x7fffffffe380) at perf.c:420 coolya#12 0x000000000041a707 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:521 After the fix is applied the symbol can be annotated showing the problematic line "1: rep" copy_user_generic_string /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/3.9.10-100.fc17.x86_64/vmlinux */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) CFI_STARTPROC ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx and %edx,%edx jz 4f je 37 cmpl $8,%edx cmp $0x8,%edx jb 2f /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ jb 33 ALIGN_DESTINATION mov %edi,%ecx and $0x7,%ecx je 28 sub $0x8,%ecx neg %ecx sub %ecx,%edx 1a: mov (%rsi),%al mov %al,(%rdi) inc %rsi inc %rdi dec %ecx jne 1a movl %edx,%ecx 28: mov %edx,%ecx shrl $3,%ecx shr $0x3,%ecx andl $7,%edx and $0x7,%edx 1: rep 100.00 rep movsq %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsq 2: movl %edx,%ecx 33: mov %edx,%ecx 3: rep rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsb 4: xorl %eax,%eax 37: xor %eax,%eax data32 xchg %ax,%ax ASM_CLAC ret retq Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Bug 60815 - Interface hangs in mwifiex_usb https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60815 [ 2.883807] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048 [ 2.883813] IP: [<ffffffff815a65e0>] pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x90/0x90 [ 2.883834] CPU: 1 PID: 3220 Comm: kworker/u8:90 Not tainted 3.11.1-monotone-l0 coolya#6 [ 2.883834] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Surface with Windows 8 Pro/Surface with Windows 8 Pro, BIOS 1.03.0450 03/29/2013 On Surface Pro, suspend to ram gives a NULL pointer dereference in pfifo_fast_enqueue(). The stack trace reveals that the offending call is clearing carrier in mwifiex_usb suspend handler. Since commit 1499d9f "mwifiex: don't drop carrier flag over suspend" has removed the carrier flag handling over suspend/resume in SDIO and PCIe drivers, I'm removing it in USB driver too. This also fixes the bug for Surface Pro. Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.5+ Tested-by: Dmitry Khromov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bing Zhao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>

commit d16933b "i2c: s3c2410: Move location of clk_prepare_enable() call in probe function" refactored clk_enable and clk_disable calls yet neglected to remove the clk_disable_unprepare call in the module's remove(). It helps remove warnings on an arndale during unbind: echo 12c90000.i2c > /sys/bus/platform/devices/12c90000.i2c/driver/unbind ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 at drivers/clk/clk.c:842 clk_disable+0x18/0x24() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130916-00003-gf4bddbc coolya#6 [<c0014d48>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) from [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) from [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02c4a64>] (clk_disable+0x18/0x24) [<c02c4a64>] (clk_disable+0x18/0x24) from [<c028d0b0>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x28/0x70) [<c028d0b0>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x28/0x70) from [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) from [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) from [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) from [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) from [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) from [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) from [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) from [<c000e3e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) ---[ end trace 4c9f9403066f57a6 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 at drivers/clk/clk.c:751 clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 3.11.0-next-20130916-00003-gf4bddbc coolya#6 [<c0014d48>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) from [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) from [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02c5834>] (clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c) [<c02c5834>] (clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c) from [<c028d0b8>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x30/0x70) [<c028d0b8>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x30/0x70) from [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) from [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) from [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) from [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) from [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) from [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) from [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) from [<c000e3e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) ---[ end trace 4c9f9403066f57a7 ]--- Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 CyanogenMod#2 CyanogenMod#3 CyanogenMod#4 CyanogenMod#5 coolya#6 coolya#7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: coolya#8 coolya#9 coolya#10 coolya#11 coolya#12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 CyanogenMod#2 CyanogenMod#3 CyanogenMod#4 CyanogenMod#5 coolya#6 coolya#7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Libin <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ CyanogenMod#2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 CyanogenMod#2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 CyanogenMod#3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 CyanogenMod#4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f CyanogenMod#5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 coolya#6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>

Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 CyanogenMod#2 CyanogenMod#3 CyanogenMod#4 CyanogenMod#5 coolya#6 coolya#7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: coolya#8 coolya#9 coolya#10 coolya#11 coolya#12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node CyanogenMod#2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node CyanogenMod#3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node CyanogenMod#4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node CyanogenMod#5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node coolya#6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node coolya#7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node coolya#8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node coolya#9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node coolya#10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node coolya#11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node coolya#12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ CyanogenMod#2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 CyanogenMod#2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 CyanogenMod#3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 CyanogenMod#4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f CyanogenMod#5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 coolya#6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f112a04)

Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) CyanogenMod#2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) CyanogenMod#3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) CyanogenMod#4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) CyanogenMod#5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) coolya#6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) coolya#7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) coolya#8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) coolya#9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) coolya#10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) CyanogenMod#2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) CyanogenMod#3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) CyanogenMod#4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) CyanogenMod#5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) coolya#6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) coolya#7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) coolya#8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) coolya#9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) coolya#10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) coolya#11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) coolya#12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>

This work contains a lightweight BPF-based traffic classifier that can serve as a flexible alternative to ematch-based tree classification, i.e. now that BPF filter engine can also be JITed in the kernel. Naturally, tc actions and policies are supported as well with cls_bpf. Multiple BPF programs/filter can be attached for a class, or they can just as well be written within a single BPF program, that's really up to the user how he wishes to run/optimize the code, e.g. also for inversion of verdicts etc. The notion of a BPF program's return/exit codes is being kept as follows: 0: No match -1: Select classid given in "tc filter ..." command else: flowid, overwrite the default one As a minimal usage example with iproute2, we use a 3 band prio root qdisc on a router with sfq each as leave, and assign ssh and icmp bpf-based filters to band 1, http traffic to band 2 and the rest to band 3. For the first two bands we load the bytecode from a file, in the 2nd we load it inline as an example: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable tc qdisc del dev em1 root tc qdisc add dev em1 root handle 1: prio bands 3 priomap 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:1 sfq perturb 16 tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:2 sfq perturb 16 tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:3 sfq perturb 16 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/ssh.bpf flowid 1:1 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/icmp.bpf flowid 1:1 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/http.bpf flowid 1:2 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode "`bpfc -f tc -i misc.ops`" flowid 1:3 BPF programs can be easily created and passed to tc, either as inline 'bytecode' or 'bytecode-file'. There are a couple of front-ends that can compile opcodes, for example: 1) People familiar with tcpdump-like filters: tcpdump -iem1 -ddd port 22 | tr '\n' ',' > /etc/tc/ssh.bpf 2) People that want to low-level program their filters or use BPF extensions that lack support by libpcap's compiler: bpfc -f tc -i ssh.ops > /etc/tc/ssh.bpf ssh.ops example code: ldh [12] jne #0x800, drop ldb [23] jneq coolya#6, drop ldh [20] jset #0x1fff, drop ldxb 4 * ([14] & 0xf) ldh [%x + 14] jeq #0x16, pass ldh [%x + 16] jne #0x16, drop pass: ret #-1 drop: ret #0 It was chosen to load bytecode into tc, since the reverse operation, tc filter list dev em1, is then able to show the exact commands again. Possible follow-up work could also include a small expression compiler for iproute2. Tested with the help of bmon. This idea came up during the Netfilter Workshop 2013 in Copenhagen. Also thanks to feedback from Eric Dumazet! Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Graf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from: smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 CyanogenMod#2 CyanogenMod#3 OK smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors CyanogenMod#4 CyanogenMod#5 coolya#6 coolya#7 OK smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors coolya#8 coolya#9 coolya#10 coolya#11 OK smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors coolya#12 #13 #14 #15 OK Brought up 16 CPUs to something like: x86: Booting SMP configuration: .... node #0, CPUs: #1 CyanogenMod#2 CyanogenMod#3 .... node #1, CPUs: CyanogenMod#4 CyanogenMod#5 coolya#6 coolya#7 .... node CyanogenMod#2, CPUs: coolya#8 coolya#9 coolya#10 coolya#11 .... node CyanogenMod#3, CPUs: coolya#12 #13 #14 #15 x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table

…culation Currently mx53 (CortexA8) running at 1GHz reports: Calibrating delay loop... 663.55 BogoMIPS (lpj=3317760) Tom Evans verified that alignments of 0x0 and 0x8 run the two instructions of __loop_delay in one clock cycle (1 clock/loop), while alignments of 0x4 and 0xc take 3 clocks to run the loop twice. (1.5 clock/loop) The original object code looks like this: 00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>: 10: e3e01000 mvn r1, #0 14: e51f201c ldr r2, [pc, #-28] ; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8> 18: e5922000 ldr r2, [r2] 1c: e0800921 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #18 20: e1a00720 lsr r0, r0, #14 24: e0822b21 add r2, r2, r1, lsr #22 28: e1a02522 lsr r2, r2, coolya#10 2c: e0000092 mul r0, r2, r0 30: e0800d21 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #26 34: e1b00320 lsrs r0, r0, coolya#6 38: 01a0f00e moveq pc, lr 0000003c <__loop_delay>: 3c: e2500001 subs r0, r0, #1 40: 8afffffe bhi 3c <__loop_delay> 44: e1a0f00e mov pc, lr After adding the 'align 3' directive to __loop_delay (align to 8 bytes): 00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>: 10: e3e01000 mvn r1, #0 14: e51f201c ldr r2, [pc, #-28] ; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8> 18: e5922000 ldr r2, [r2] 1c: e0800921 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #18 20: e1a00720 lsr r0, r0, #14 24: e0822b21 add r2, r2, r1, lsr #22 28: e1a02522 lsr r2, r2, coolya#10 2c: e0000092 mul r0, r2, r0 30: e0800d21 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #26 34: e1b00320 lsrs r0, r0, coolya#6 38: 01a0f00e moveq pc, lr 3c: e320f000 nop {0} 00000040 <__loop_delay>: 40: e2500001 subs r0, r0, #1 44: 8afffffe bhi 40 <__loop_delay> 48: e1a0f00e mov pc, lr 4c: e320f000 nop {0} , which now reports: Calibrating delay loop... 996.14 BogoMIPS (lpj=4980736) Some more test results: On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz, before the patch: Calibrating delay loop... 351.43 BogoMIPS (lpj=1757184) On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz after the patch: Calibrating delay loop... 528.79 BogoMIPS (lpj=2643968) Also tested on mx6 (CortexA9) and on mx27 (ARM926), which shows the same BogoMIPS value before and after this patch. Reported-by: Tom Evans <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Tom Evans <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>

Hayes Wang says: ==================== support new chip Remove the trailing "/* CRC */" for patch CyanogenMod#3. Change the return value type of rtl_ops_init() from int to boolean for patch CyanogenMod#4. Replace VENDOR_ID_SAMSUNG with SAMSUNG_VENDOR_ID for patch coolya#6. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

When we pull a received packet from a link's 'deferred packets' queue for processing, its 'next' pointer is not cleared, and still refers to the next packet in that queue, if any. This is incorrect, but caused no harm before commit 40ba3cd ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain") was introduced. After that commit, it may sometimes lead to the following oops: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: tipc CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc2+ coolya#6 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 task: ffff880017af4880 ti: ffff880017aee000 task.ti: ffff880017aee000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81710694>] [<ffffffff81710694>] skb_try_coalesce+0x44/0x3d0 RSP: 0018:ffff880016603a78 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 6b6b6b6bd6d6d6d6 RBX: ffff880013106ac0 RCX: ffff880016603ad0 RDX: ffff880016603ad7 RSI: ffff88001223ed00 RDI: ffff880013106ac0 RBP: ffff880016603ab8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88001223ed00 R13: ffff880016603ad0 R14: 000000000000058c R15: ffff880012297650 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880016600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000805b000 CR3: 0000000011f5d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880016603a88 ffffffff810a38ed ffff880016603aa8 ffff88001223ed00 0000000000000001 ffff880012297648 ffff880016603b68 ffff880012297650 ffff880016603b08 ffffffffa0006c51 ffff880016603b08 00ffffffa00005fc Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff810a38ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffffa0006c51>] tipc_link_recv_fragment+0xd1/0x1b0 [tipc] [<ffffffffa0007214>] tipc_recv_msg+0x4e4/0x920 [tipc] [<ffffffffa00016f0>] ? tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x40/0x250 [tipc] [<ffffffffa000177c>] tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xcc/0x250 [tipc] [<ffffffffa00016f0>] ? tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x40/0x250 [tipc] [<ffffffff8171e65b>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80b/0xd00 [<ffffffff8171df94>] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x144/0xd00 [<ffffffff8171eb76>] __netif_receive_skb+0x26/0x70 [<ffffffff8171ed6d>] netif_receive_skb+0x2d/0x200 [<ffffffff8171fe70>] napi_gro_receive+0xb0/0x130 [<ffffffff815647c2>] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x2c2/0x530 [<ffffffff81565986>] e1000_clean+0x266/0x9c0 [<ffffffff81985f7b>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x160 [<ffffffff8171f971>] net_rx_action+0x141/0x310 [<ffffffff81051c1b>] __do_softirq+0xeb/0x480 [<ffffffff819817bb>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40 [<ffffffff810b8c42>] ? handle_fasteoi_irq+0x72/0x100 [<ffffffff81052346>] irq_exit+0x96/0xc0 [<ffffffff8198cbc3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0 [<ffffffff81981def>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f <EOI> This happens when the last fragment of a message has passed through the the receiving link's 'deferred packets' queue, and at least one other packet was added to that queue while it was there. After the fragment chain with the complete message has been successfully delivered to the receiving socket, it is released. Since 'next' pointer of the last fragment in the released chain now is non-NULL, we get the crash shown above. We fix this by clearing the 'next' pointer of all received packets, including those being pulled from the 'deferred' queue, before they undergo any further processing. Fixes: 40ba3cd ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain") Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <[email protected]> Reported-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

This patch should resolve the following bug. ========================================================= [ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ] 3.13.0-rc5.f2fs+ coolya#6 Not tainted --------------------------------------------------------- kswapd0/41 just changed the state of lock: (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffffa030503e>] f2fs_balance_fs+0xae/0xd0 [f2fs] but this lock took another, RECLAIM_FS-READ-unsafe lock in the past: (&sbi->cp_rwsem){++++.?} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &sbi->gc_mutex --> &sbi->cp_mutex --> &sbi->cp_rwsem Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sbi->cp_rwsem); local_irq_disable(); lock(&sbi->gc_mutex); lock(&sbi->cp_mutex); <Interrupt> lock(&sbi->gc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** This bug is due to the f2fs_balance_fs call in f2fs_write_data_page. If f2fs_write_data_page is triggered by wbc->for_reclaim via kswapd, it should not call f2fs_balance_fs which tries to get a mutex grabbed by original syscall flow. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [coolya#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

We don't otherwise need j_list_lock during the rest of commit phase coolya#7, so add the transaction to the checkpoint list at the very end of commit phase coolya#6. This allows us to drop j_list_lock earlier, which is a good thing since it is a super hot lock. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>

vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 CyanogenMod#2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 CyanogenMod#3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b CyanogenMod#4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 CyanogenMod#5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 coolya#6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 coolya#7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] coolya#8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] coolya#9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <[email protected]> CC: "VMware, Inc." <[email protected]> CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

With EXT4FS_DEBUG ext4_count_free_clusters() will call ext4_read_block_bitmap() without s_group_info initialized, so we need to initialize multi-block allocator before. And dependencies that must be solved, to allow this: - multi-block allocator needs in group descriptors - need to install s_op before initializing multi-block allocator, because in ext4_mb_init_backend() new inode is created. - initialize number of group desc blocks (s_gdb_count) otherwise number of clusters returned by ext4_free_clusters_after_init() is not correct. (see ext4_bg_num_gdb_nometa()) Here is the stack backtrace: (gdb) bt #0 ext4_get_group_info (group=0, sb=0xffff880079a10000) at ext4.h:2430 #1 ext4_validate_block_bitmap (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000, desc=desc@entry=0xffff880056510000, block_group=block_group@entry=0, bh=bh@entry=0xffff88007bf2b2d8) at balloc.c:358 CyanogenMod#2 0xffffffff81232202 in ext4_wait_block_bitmap (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000, block_group=block_group@entry=0, bh=bh@entry=0xffff88007bf2b2d8) at balloc.c:476 CyanogenMod#3 0xffffffff81232eaf in ext4_read_block_bitmap (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000, block_group=block_group@entry=0) at balloc.c:489 CyanogenMod#4 0xffffffff81232fc0 in ext4_count_free_clusters (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000) at balloc.c:665 CyanogenMod#5 0xffffffff81259ffa in ext4_check_descriptors (first_not_zeroed=<synthetic pointer>, sb=0xffff880079a10000) at super.c:2143 coolya#6 ext4_fill_super (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000, data=<optimized out>, data@entry=0x0 <irq_stack_union>, silent=silent@entry=0) at super.c:3851 ... Signed-off-by: Azat Khuzhin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. [On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes, and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission is granted in policy. In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery console which has a legitimate need for it. The other potential vector is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard). However, the end result is only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG. This fix is queued for 3.14.] Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [coolya#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- [sds: commit message edited to note Android implications and to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit] Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Change-Id: I427391b56afdc5807b525961f2c1254b6d28973c

Create Wotan-Kernel

85e0fc6

lgrootnoob added a commit to lgrootnoob/android_kernel_samsung_aries that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2015

previous commit works now. coolya#6

3a6d04c

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Create Wotan-Kernel #6

Create Wotan-Kernel #6

DerRomtester commented Oct 25, 2013

Create Wotan-Kernel #6

Are you sure you want to change the base?

Create Wotan-Kernel #6

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DerRomtester commented Oct 25, 2013