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Security: cyberchitta/nanoclaw

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

NanoClaw Security Model

Trust Model

Entity Trust Level Rationale
Main group Trusted Private self-chat, admin control
Non-main groups Untrusted Other users may be malicious
Container agents Sandboxed Isolated execution environment
WhatsApp messages User input Potential prompt injection

Security Boundaries

1. Container Isolation (Primary Boundary)

Agents execute in containers (lightweight Linux VMs), providing:

  • Process isolation - Container processes cannot affect the host
  • Filesystem isolation - Only explicitly mounted directories are visible
  • Non-root execution - Runs as unprivileged node user (uid 1000)
  • Ephemeral containers - Fresh environment per invocation (--rm)

This is the primary security boundary. Rather than relying on application-level permission checks, the attack surface is limited by what's mounted.

2. Mount Security

External Allowlist - Mount permissions stored at ~/.config/nanoclaw/mount-allowlist.json, which is:

  • Outside project root
  • Never mounted into containers
  • Cannot be modified by agents

Default Blocked Patterns:

.ssh, .gnupg, .aws, .azure, .gcloud, .kube, .docker,
credentials, .env, .netrc, .npmrc, id_rsa, id_ed25519,
private_key, .secret

Protections:

  • Symlink resolution before validation (prevents traversal attacks)
  • Container path validation (rejects .. and absolute paths)
  • nonMainReadOnly option forces read-only for non-main groups

Read-Only Project Root:

The main group's project root is mounted read-only. Writable paths the agent needs (group folder, IPC, .claude/) are mounted separately. This prevents the agent from modifying host application code (src/, dist/, package.json, etc.) which would bypass the sandbox entirely on next restart.

3. Session Isolation

Each group has isolated Claude sessions at data/sessions/{group}/.claude/:

  • Groups cannot see other groups' conversation history
  • Session data includes full message history and file contents read
  • Prevents cross-group information disclosure

4. IPC Authorization

Messages and task operations are verified against group identity:

Operation Main Group Non-Main Group
Send message to own chat ✓ ✓
Send message to other chats ✓ ✗
Schedule task for self ✓ ✓
Schedule task for others ✓ ✗
View all tasks ✓ Own only
Manage other groups ✓ ✗

5. Credential Isolation (Credential Proxy)

Real API credentials never enter containers. Instead, the host runs an HTTP credential proxy that injects authentication headers transparently.

How it works:

  1. Host starts a credential proxy on CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PORT (default: 3001)
  2. Containers receive ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:<port> and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=placeholder
  3. The SDK sends API requests to the proxy with the placeholder key
  4. The proxy strips placeholder auth, injects real credentials (x-api-key or Authorization: Bearer), and forwards to api.anthropic.com
  5. Agents cannot discover real credentials — not in environment, stdin, files, or /proc

NOT Mounted:

  • WhatsApp session (store/auth/) - host only
  • Mount allowlist - external, never mounted
  • Any credentials matching blocked patterns
  • .env is shadowed with /dev/null in the project root mount

Privilege Comparison

Capability Main Group Non-Main Group
Project root access /workspace/project (ro) None
Group folder /workspace/group (rw) /workspace/group (rw)
Global memory Implicit via project /workspace/global (ro)
Additional mounts Configurable Read-only unless allowed
Network access Unrestricted Unrestricted
MCP tools All All

Security Architecture Diagram

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        UNTRUSTED ZONE                             │
│  WhatsApp Messages (potentially malicious)                        │
└────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
                                 │
                                 ▼ Trigger check, input escaping
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                     HOST PROCESS (TRUSTED)                        │
│  • Message routing                                                │
│  • IPC authorization                                              │
│  • Mount validation (external allowlist)                          │
│  • Container lifecycle                                            │
│  • Credential proxy (injects auth headers)                       │
└────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
                                 │
                                 ▼ Explicit mounts only, no secrets
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                CONTAINER (ISOLATED/SANDBOXED)                     │
│  • Agent execution                                                │
│  • Bash commands (sandboxed)                                      │
│  • File operations (limited to mounts)                            │
│  • API calls routed through credential proxy                     │
│  • No real credentials in environment or filesystem              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

There aren’t any published security advisories