Added a -f,--force option, which disables key signature verification.

[everhart]

Currently, the install script is failing because gpg is unable to verify signatures for the dlang-installer, and dmd. This is with fresh gpg keys downloaded by the install script. Seeing as I can't upload up-to-date keys myself, to remedy this I added a "-f,--force" option to the install script. If used, it warns the user signature verification is disabled, and does not perform signature verification.

I'm not overly concerned about a malicious actor bypassing my computer's security by giving me a malignant D installer, so I would like to have this option as a workaround when the D keyring is out of date.

This serves as a workaround for Issue #715. I didn't mark it as a fix, as it is merely a workaround, and not a fix.

[dlang-bot]

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[CyberShadow]

I'm not overly concerned about a malicious actor bypassing my computer's security by giving me a malignant D installer, so I would like to have this option as a workaround when the D keyring is out of date.

That doesn't accurately represent the danger - it could be any actor that can make your computer think it's connecting to dlang.org. This could be anyone who is capable of MITM (e.g. if they obtain a leaked trusted root certificate private key), or anyone who can access the website (e.g. by compromising the server, stealing credentials, or abusing granted privileges).

--force is almost never a good name due to inherent ambiguity, and it's especially not a good name in this situation. Consider instead --insecure-disable-integrity-check (with no short alias).