[camilb]

In a GitHub Actions job, the CLI can now sign in with a trust instead of a stored token. Backend: edkaio/edka#854.

permissions:
  contents: read
  id-token: write
env:
  EDKA_TRUST: <trust id>
steps:
  - run: edka apps publish ./edka
  - run: edka apps update jude --cluster orion --yes --wait

Change

• internal/auth/actions.go: with EDKA_TRUST or --trust set, the CLI requests an OIDC token from ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL with the API origin as audience, and exchanges it at POST /api/cli/github-actions/token for a 15-minute access token. It exchanges a new GitHub token two minutes before expiry, so a long --wait keeps working, and saves nothing. The runner's request token goes only to its own URL, over HTTPS (HTTP on loopback for a simulated runner), never through a redirect. A trust ID that is not a UUID, a job without id-token: write, and EDKA_TOKEN together with EDKA_TRUST fail before any request; edka login refuses while EDKA_TRUST is set.
• api.Error carries the trust, so a 401/403 hints at the trust in the console instead of edka login; a refused sign-in names what Edka compares (repository, ref, environment, workflow file).
• edka trusts list|get|create|delete. create resolves --clusters names to IDs, builds the grants from --app and --allow, and prints the job settings for the new trust.
• internal/catalog/operations.json regenerated from the backend branch with bin/cli-catalog.py. It adds the five /api/trusts routes, and also the routes that landed on the backend since the last regeneration (mobile devices and step-up, notification channels, node disk and local-disk routes, Postgres collation and image move).
• docs/security.md, and the agent skill via make skill.

Verification

• make test and make check pass.
• internal/auth/actions_test.go: the audience sent is the API origin, the exchange body names the trust and the GitHub token, a token is reused until two minutes before expiry and then exchanged with a fresh GitHub token, HTTP runner URLs off loopback are refused, a redirect does not carry the request token, a refusal shows Edka's message with the sign-in hint, and the audience matches URL.origin (case, default ports).
• internal/cli/trusts_test.go: apps update --cluster sinaia --yes --wait through a simulated runner and exchange: one exchange when the token outlasts the command, and a fresh exchange per request when every token is about to expire, with the newest token on the last request. Plus refusal messages, the id-token: write check, EDKA_TOKEN with EDKA_TRUST, login, and trusts create/delete.
• End to end, this binary against the backend branch on a local port with a simulated runner signing ID tokens: whoami, apps publish, apps update --wait, and refusals for another app's package, deployments list, trusts list and a job on another branch.
• Not run: a job on GitHub's real runners; that comes with the prezly/jude workflow once the backend ships.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

---

Note

Medium Risk
Introduces a new authentication path (OIDC token exchange and short-lived trust tokens) with broad CLI integration; behavior is heavily tested but misconfigured trusts or grants could block or over-limit CI deploys.

Overview
Adds GitHub Actions trust sign-in so CI jobs can call Edka without storing EDKA_TOKEN. With EDKA_TRUST or --trust, the CLI fetches a runner OIDC token (API origin as audience), exchanges it at POST /api/cli/github-actions/token for a 15-minute in-memory access token, and re-exchanges ~2 minutes before expiry so long --wait runs stay authenticated. Runner request tokens are sent only to the Actions URL over HTTPS (loopback HTTP for tests), with validation that blocks mixing EDKA_TOKEN and EDKA_TRUST and blocks edka login when a trust is set.

New edka trusts commands (list, get, create, delete) manage workflow trusts (repo, refs/environments, workflow file, publish/update grants) and print suggested job permissions / env after create. api.Client / api.Error carry trust context so 401/403 messages point at console trust settings instead of edka login, with richer hints on exchange refusal.

internal/catalog/operations.json is regenerated (trust routes plus other backend additions such as mobile, node disk, Postgres collation). Security docs and the agent skill document the trust flow and global --trust flag.

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