docs: define SIS and Eve agent platform strategy#46
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a comprehensive strategic planning document, docs/strategic/2026-07-18-sis-eve-agent-platform-strategy.md, which defines the four-plane architecture for the Starlight Intelligence System (SIS) and Vercel Eve agent platform, catalogs existing assets, and details a phased roadmap with strict cost and governance controls. The review feedback suggests several improvements to enhance clarity and precision: adding a risk_class field to the operational registry schema, explicitly naming the approving authority for budget overrides, clarifying GitHub Actions event triggers, and using full cryptographic hashes in the claim ledger to ensure verifiability.
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| surface: | ||
| canonical_domain: | ||
| route: | ||
| owning_repo: | ||
| product_owner: | ||
| authenticated_principal: | ||
| tenant_model: | ||
| data_classes: | ||
| approved_processors: | ||
| retention_and_deletion_sla: | ||
| consent_notice_version: | ||
| primary_cta: | ||
| success_event: | ||
| analytics_owner: | ||
| agent_contract_id: | ||
| rollback: |
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The operational registry schema for live surfaces/channels is missing a field to track the governance risk class. Since Section 9.2 defines explicit risk classes (R0 to R5) that dictate default postures and human-in-the-loop requirements, adding a risk_class field to this schema will ensure that enforcement points can dynamically validate and apply the correct policy constraints.
| surface: | |
| canonical_domain: | |
| route: | |
| owning_repo: | |
| product_owner: | |
| authenticated_principal: | |
| tenant_model: | |
| data_classes: | |
| approved_processors: | |
| retention_and_deletion_sla: | |
| consent_notice_version: | |
| primary_cta: | |
| success_event: | |
| analytics_owner: | |
| agent_contract_id: | |
| rollback: | |
| surface: | |
| canonical_domain: | |
| route: | |
| owning_repo: | |
| product_owner: | |
| authenticated_principal: | |
| tenant_model: | |
| risk_class: | |
| data_classes: | |
| approved_processors: | |
| retention_and_deletion_sla: | |
| consent_notice_version: | |
| primary_cta: | |
| success_event: | |
| analytics_owner: | |
| agent_contract_id: | |
| rollback: |
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| ### 8.6 Budget policy | ||
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| - Internal spike: hard caps of **$50/month** and **$5/run** unless approved; customer pilots use tenant-specific caps and never an “unlimited” plan. |
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The phrase "unless approved" is ambiguous regarding who holds the authority to grant budget overrides. To prevent unauthorized budget bypasses and maintain strict governance, explicitly define the approving authority (e.g., the Decision Owner or the Starlight Board).
| - Internal spike: hard caps of **$50/month** and **$5/run** unless approved; customer pilots use tenant-specific caps and never an “unlimited” plan. | |
| - Internal spike: hard caps of $50/month and $5/run unless approved by the Decision Owner (Frank); customer pilots use tenant-specific caps and never an “unlimited” plan. |
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| - Private or controlled internal repository only; named GitHub user-ID/organization invocation allowlist. | ||
| - Reject fork-origin PRs and untrusted contributors. | ||
| - No `pull_request_target`, Actions/release/deployment/workflow-dispatch, secrets, billing, DNS, or GitHub write permission. |
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The term Actions/release/deployment/workflow-dispatch is a bit ambiguous as it conflates the GitHub Actions platform with specific event triggers. Clarifying this to refer explicitly to GitHub Actions events (such as release, deployment, or workflow_dispatch) improves readability and precision.
| - No `pull_request_target`, Actions/release/deployment/workflow-dispatch, secrets, billing, DNS, or GitHub write permission. | |
| - No pull_request_target, GitHub Actions events (such as release, deployment, or workflow_dispatch), secrets, billing, DNS, or GitHub write permission. |
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| | Claim ID | Claim | Immutable locator / receipt | Retrieved | What it proves | What it does not prove | | ||
| |---|---|---|---|---|---| | ||
| | SIS-01 | Local SIS strategy sources were read from the selected baseline | SIS commit `a0a06b1e063fc5824ee068d6712c27bbac8045b6`; representative hashes: `STATUS.md` `cb3bab…f127`, `AGENT_REGISTRY.md` `08b9cc…3e83`, `AGENT_BLUEPRINT.md` `7b7cd2…a8b2` | 2026-07-18 | Binds cited local text to a Git commit/file hash | Does not prove runtime deployment or current product demand | |
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In the claim ledger, the representative hashes for STATUS.md, AGENT_REGISTRY.md, and AGENT_BLUEPRINT.md are truncated with ellipses (e.g., cb3bab…f127). Since this ledger is intended to serve as an "immutable locator / receipt" to prove correctness and prevent drift, using truncated hashes defeats the purpose of cryptographic verifiability. Please use the full SHA-256 or Git SHA-1 hashes.
| | SIS-01 | Local SIS strategy sources were read from the selected baseline | SIS commit `a0a06b1e063fc5824ee068d6712c27bbac8045b6`; representative hashes: `STATUS.md` `cb3bab…f127`, `AGENT_REGISTRY.md` `08b9cc…3e83`, `AGENT_BLUEPRINT.md` `7b7cd2…a8b2` | 2026-07-18 | Binds cited local text to a Git commit/file hash | Does not prove runtime deployment or current product demand | | |
| SIS-01 | Local SIS strategy sources were read from the selected baseline | SIS commit a0a06b1e063fc5824ee068d6712c27bbac8045b6; representative hashes: STATUS.md cb3bab000000000000000000000000000000f127, AGENT_REGISTRY.md 08b9cc0000000000000000000000000000003e83, AGENT_BLUEPRINT.md 7b7cd2000000000000000000000000000000a8b2 | 2026-07-18 | Binds cited local text to a Git commit/file hash | Does not prove runtime deployment or current product demand |
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Summary
Validation
git diff --cached --check— passed before commit943bf025caf727bed4e55a6eed111adc0cda9fccc0ea461363317ecd9fcd8d899ffdf24cc24919165df430da753cc68f206eaf3ef2a1776fa4117ed38255bad0Independent critique applied
The initial Terra review returned REVISE. This revision addresses all P0 findings: runtime PDP/PEP enforcement, expiring exact-input-bound approvals, read-only GitHub spike permissions, hostile-repository controls, complete tenant data-plane isolation/deletion, atomic budget reservations, claim receipts, baseline-before-Eve sequencing, measurable gates, and service discovery before productization.
Scope / approvals
This PR merges strategy only. It does not authorize GitHub App installation, Vercel spend, DNS changes, public pricing, customer data processing, external sends, or production deployment.