spec: note the interaction of MAX_PROOF_BUNDLE_BYTES and chain depth (§5.1) - #56
Merged
Conversation
…(§5.1) Documentation only; no protocol, wire-format, or fixture change. alpha.16 raised MAX_DELEGATION_CHAIN_DEPTH to 8, which brings a deep chain's wire size close to MAX_PROOF_BUNDLE_BYTES. The two are independent ceilings that can bind near the same point: a chain within the depth limit can still exceed the byte limit when hops carry many scopes or several resource_path constraints, and the decoder then rejects it for size (reported as the existing invalid status) before depth is evaluated, not as chain_too_deep. Added a §5.1 guidance note so operators budget for worst-case per-certificate content, not depth alone, and updated the existing alpha.16 "Input bounds" changelog bullet to match. Signed-off-by: chuks <891251+chuks@users.noreply.github.com>
…vior The paragraph said "verification entry points report the violation using the existing invalid status," which over-generalizes: the Go, TypeScript, Python, and Rust wire decoders reject oversized input as a decode error, and their verifier APIs take an already-decoded bundle and never observe the wire size; only a wire-facing verification surface (the C ABI) maps the decode failure to an invalid result. Reworded to attribute the rejection to the wire decoder and scope the invalid-status statement to wire-facing verification surfaces. Also changed "worst-case per-certificate content" to "maximum expected per-certificate content," which is the operationally useful budget. Documentation only. Signed-off-by: chuks <891251+chuks@users.noreply.github.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Documentation only; no protocol, wire-format, or fixture change. Adds a short §5.1 guidance note and updates the existing alpha.16 "Input bounds" changelog bullet.
Why
alpha.16 raised
MAX_DELEGATION_CHAIN_DEPTHto 8, which brings a deep chain's wire size close toMAX_PROOF_BUNDLE_BYTES(128 KiB). The two are independent ceilings that can bind near the same point: a chain within the depth limit can still exceed the byte limit when hops carry many scopes or severalresource_pathconstraints. The decoder then rejects the bundle for size (reported via the existinginvalidstatus) before depth is evaluated, not aschain_too_deep— a confusing diagnostic for an operator reasoning about depth.Change
Verification
readme-syncokrelease-syncokmake test-allok