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🛡️ Sentinel: Zero out temporary raw key material in memory - #611
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🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: Intermediate byte arrays holding raw AES key material remained in heap memory after key derivation and wrapping.
🎯 Impact: Sensitive key material could linger in heap memory until garbage collection, potentially exposed via heap dumps.
🔧 Fix: Immediately zero out intermediate key byte arrays using Arrays.fill(..., (byte) 0) after passing them to SecretKeySpec or cipher operations.
✅ Verification: Ran full test suite across all modules with
mvn test(all 355+ tests pass).PR created automatically by Jules for task 5160574413391804948 started by @matteobaccan