ci: Declare minimum permissions on semantic-commit workflow#51
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maks-m-mongo-leaf merged 1 commit intoMay 26, 2026
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Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Hi - just a gentle nudge for merge when you have a moment. @maks-m-mongo-leaf already approved. |
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Declares
permissions: contents: read, pull-requests: readat the workflow level on.github/workflows/semantic-commit.yaml.amannn/action-semantic-pull-requestreads the PR title via the pulls API to validate conventional-commit format and reports the result as the workflow's own check status. That needs read onpull-requestsand nothing else.Worth declaring explicitly even when the inherited default may already be reasonable: CVE-2025-30066 (the March 2025
tj-actions/changed-filescompromise) showed a tampered third-party action exfiltratingGITHUB_TOKENfrom workflow logs and the leaked token retaining whatever scope was issued at the workflow level. A per-workflow cap bounds the runtime authority of every action that runs inside it irrespective of repo or org default, gives drift protection if that default ever widens, and registers with OpenSSF Scorecard's Token-Permissions check.YAML validated locally with
yaml.safe_load.