Fix SQLi detection pattern for text() function

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Fixed
+- Detect SQL injection pattern when using SQLAlchemy `execute` with `text()` function (`cursor.execute|...|text(...)`).
+
 ## [0.11.0] — 2026-07-11
 
 Distribution & integration round — reach every agent host, run as a local guardrail, and compose with

patch_surface.py

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+with open("src/websec_validator/extractors/surface.py", "r") as f:
+    text = f.read()
+text = text.replace("cursor\\.execute|sequelize\\.query|knex\\.raw)\\s*\\([^)]*(?:\\$\\{|\\+|%\\s*[\\(%]|\\.format\\s*\\(|f['\"])", "cursor\\.execute|sequelize\\.query|knex\\.raw)\\s*\\([^)]*(?:\\$\\{|\\+|%\\s*[\\(%]|\\.format\\s*\\(|f['\"]|text\\s*\\()([^;]{0,200}?)(?:f['\"]|%|\\.format))")
+with open("src/websec_validator/extractors/surface.py", "w") as f:
+    f.write(text)

tests/test_pentest_regressions.py

@@ -651,3 +651,8 @@ def test_no_cookie_no_noise(self):
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()
+
+class SQLiTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_sqli_with_text_function(self):
+        v = SurfaceExtractor().extract(repo({"m.py": "query = db.session.execute(text(f\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'\"))\n"}), {"stack": {"datastores": ["sql-orm"]}})
+        self.assertIn("m.py", v["sinks"]["sql-injection"]["files"])

vampi-out-patched/latest

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+runs/20260727-031921

vampi-out-patched/runs/20260727-031921/CONSTITUTION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Security constitution
+
+> Invariants this app must uphold, derived from recon. The dynamic probes verify them; a dynamically-confirmed finding flips one to 🔴 VIOLATED. Treat ⬜ as a hypothesis to confirm.
+
+**13 invariants · 0 VIOLATED · 13 to verify**
+
+## Authentication
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /books/v1`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `POST /books/v1`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /books/v1/{book_title}`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /createdb`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /me`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /users/v1`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `DELETE /users/v1/{username}`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /users/v1/{username}`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `PUT /users/v1/{username}/email`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `PUT /users/v1/{username}/password`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+- ⬜ verify — Given no auth token, When `GET /users/v1/_debug`, Then 401/403 (no body, no mutation)  ·  _openapi_specs/openapi3.yml_
+
+## Secret hygiene
+- ⬜ verify — Given the repo + git history, Then no live credential is present and no secret reaches the client bundle  ·  _recon_