🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix execa framework secrets leakage via extendEnv - #425
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix execa framework secrets leakage via extendEnv#425google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 3 commits into
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Explicitly set `extendEnv: false` and explicitly pass the merged sanitized environment everywhere `execa` is used across the codebase, particularly in the core CLI capabilities and tool auth boundaries. This fixes a high-priority risk where unmodified process.env would be implicitly injected.
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Explicitly set `extendEnv: false` and explicitly pass the merged sanitized environment everywhere `execa` is used across the codebase, particularly in the core CLI capabilities and tool auth boundaries. This fixes a high-priority risk where unmodified process.env would be implicitly injected. Fixes ESLint import order errors preventing CI from passing.
Explicitly set `extendEnv: false` and explicitly pass the merged sanitized environment everywhere `execa` is used across the codebase, particularly in the core CLI capabilities and tool auth boundaries. This fixes a high-priority risk where unmodified process.env would be implicitly injected. Fixes ESLint import order errors preventing CI from passing by applying facade exports appropriately.
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability:
execadefaultsextendEnvtotrue, which re-injects the unfilteredprocess.enveven when asanitizeEnvironment()object is explicitly passed to theenvargument, leaking framework secrets (e.g. API keys).🎯 Impact: System secrets, API keys, and sensitive environment variables could be exposed via subprocess spawned context or command injection.
🔧 Fix: Explicitly merged
process.envandopts.env, ransanitizeEnvironment()on the result, and passed it toenvwhile settingextendEnv: falseonexecainrunner.tsandnon-interactive.ts.✅ Verification: Ran
npx oxfmt --writeand fullbun run test:fulllocally; confirmedexecain tools and capabilities no longer forwards unsanitized environment.PR created automatically by Jules for task 17946211858758838335 started by @YoungSx