This repository contains working notes and technical explorations from Sevryn Labs.
The goal of this repository is to document ideas, derivations, and experiments related to the design of decentralized economic systems.
These notes are not formal papers. They serve as a lab notebook for exploring mechanisms, market structures, and protocol architectures.
Current areas of investigation include:
Mathematical analysis of constant-function market makers and liquidity pricing.
Topics include:
- invariant functions
- slippage dynamics
- arbitrage equilibria
- liquidity efficiency
Relevant notes:
- amm-math/constant-product.md
Supply-driven pricing mechanisms for token issuance and protocol funding.
Topics include:
- linear pricing models
- curve parameterization
- issuance dynamics
- equilibrium behavior
Relevant notes:
- bonding-curves/linear-curve.md
Exploration of privacy-preserving trading mechanisms.
Topics include:
- encrypted orderbooks
- information leakage
- fair ordering
- batch auctions
Relevant notes:
- encrypted-markets/orderbook-model.md
Design of decentralized credit markets and collateralized lending protocols.
Topics include:
- collateral dynamics
- liquidation mechanisms
- oracle dependencies
- systemic risk
Relevant notes:
- lending-systems/collateral-dynamics.md
Incentive design for decentralized protocols.
Topics include:
- fee mechanisms
- liquidity incentives
- market stability
- protocol sustainability
Relevant notes:
- mechanism-design/fee-mechanisms.md
Our research typically follows a progression:
Research → Experiment → Protocol
Ideas explored here often inform experimental implementations and eventually production protocols.
These notes focus primarily on:
- market mechanisms
- liquidity systems
- decentralized credit
- cryptoeconomic incentives
The emphasis is on understanding how decentralized markets behave under strategic participation and adversarial conditions.
All content in this repository is released under the MIT License.