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fix!: stop leaving the GKE control plane open to every address - #5

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fix/restrict-default-exposure
Oct 1, 2026
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fix/restrict-default-exposure

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@krisztian-gajdar krisztian-gajdar commented Sep 29, 2026 •

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Summary

This change decides who can reach the GKE Kubernetes API. It needs a security review before merge.

The module hardcoded private_cluster_config.enable_private_endpoint = false. It rendered master_authorized_networks_config only when authorized_networks was non-empty, and authorized_networks defaults to []. A cluster built with the defaults therefore served the control plane on a public IP with no network restriction.

Change

The module never leaves the control plane open to every address unless the operator opts in. The plan fails until one of three modes is chosen:

Variable Default Effect
authorized_networks (existing) [] Master authorized networks admit only these CIDRs on the public endpoint.
enable_private_endpoint (new) false The public endpoint is disabled; the API is served only on the private endpoint. Requires enable_private_nodes.
allow_public_api_server (new) false Explicit opt-in to accept any address. With an empty authorized_networks the module leaves master authorized networks unmanaged, as before.

Behaviour:

  • master_authorized_networks_config is always rendered except under the explicit opt-in with no networks, so an empty list admits no external address instead of every address. It sets gcp_public_cidrs_access_enabled = false, so public IP addresses of any Google Cloud customer are not admitted implicitly.
  • The private endpoint is reachable from the cluster's VPC network in the cluster's region. This module does not enable access from other regions.
  • Network restrictions are in addition to Kubernetes API authentication and authorization. Disabling Google Cloud public IP access can take GKE several hours to enforce, and the upgrade note says to verify the effective access.
  • The list restricts the private endpoint only in private-endpoint mode. There a non-empty authorized_networks also sets private_endpoint_enforcement_enabled = true, which needs GKE 1.28.10-gke.1058000 or later with Envoy enabled. Otherwise the attribute is left unmanaged, so the module never turns existing enforcement off.
  • kubectl_config_command adds --internal-ip in private-endpoint mode.

Validations on authorized_networks:

  • Entries must be IPv4 CIDR blocks, because the module creates an IPv4 cluster. This also rejects IPv6 ranges that contain the IPv4-mapped block.
  • At most 100 entries, the GKE limit.
  • With the public endpoint enabled, the entries together may cover at most 16,777,216 addresses (one /8) unless allow_public_api_server is set. This rejects 0.0.0.0/0, split halves, and many broad ranges alike. In private-endpoint mode the list holds internal ranges for the private endpoint and has no total limit, so all three RFC 1918 ranges are accepted without the opt-in.
  • Entries inside a documentation range (192.0.2.0/24, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24) are always rejected, so an unedited README placeholder fails at plan time. Broader entries that contain one need the opt-in.

The existing authorized_networks name and object shape (with display_name) are kept. The new variables are non-nullable. Both the endpoint mode and the authorized networks are updated in place by the provider, through the control-plane endpoints update, so no mode change replaces the cluster. The DNS-based control-plane endpoint is not enabled by this module.

Documented flow

This module installs nothing into the cluster, so terraform apply works in every mode, and correcting authorized_networks restores access after a lockout.

examples/dev-l4-spot now requires api_server_authorized_ip_ranges, which it maps to authorized_networks. The README placeholder is a documentation range and is rejected if copied unchanged. The example keeps its Registry source (source = "superlinked/sie/google"), so it can be copied and used on its own. The released 0.7.x module does not accept the new inputs, so the pinned version line carries an x-release-please-version marker, and release-please-config.json lists the example under extra-files. The release pull request for this change sets the pin to the new module version, as the release commits up to 0.7.2 did, so each tag's example names that tag's release. CI validates the example against the module code in this pull request: a workflow step rewrites the checked-out file to source = "../.." and drops the marked version line before init and validate. The rewrite is never committed. An override file cannot do this, because it cannot remove version, which Terraform rejects on a local path.

Service exposure is not changed here. The chart keeps its gateway and config Services as ClusterIP, and superlinked/sie#393 turns off the preset Ingress and requires authentication and TLS for gateway exposure.

Upgrade notes

Released as a breaking change.

  • authorized_networks already set: no action if the entries are IPv4, outside the documentation ranges, at most 100, and no broader than one /8 in total. Otherwise set allow_public_api_server = true. terraform plan shows gcp_public_cidrs_access_enabled = false only if it had been enabled outside Terraform.
  • authorized_networks empty: the plan fails with a message listing the three modes. Then:
    • Restrict (recommended): set authorized_networks. terraform plan shows an in-place update adding master_authorized_networks_config.
    • Private endpoint: set enable_private_endpoint = true. terraform plan shows an in-place update of private_cluster_config.enable_private_endpoint.
    • Keep the previous behaviour: set allow_public_api_server = true. terraform plan shows no change to the endpoint.

Tests

  • tests/api_access.tftest.hcl runs in CI with mock providers only (20 runs).
    • It covers the rejection of an unset mode, 0.0.0.0/0, a split /1 pair, two /8 blocks, ::/0, ::/16, a non-CIDR entry, the documentation placeholder (also under the opt-in), a range containing a documentation range, 101 entries, a private endpoint without private nodes, and the three RFC 1918 ranges on the public endpoint.
    • It asserts the rendered cluster: public mode with managed authorized networks and Google Cloud public access disabled; one /8 in total; private mode with an empty list and --internal-ip; enforcement on the private endpoint when networks are listed; all three RFC 1918 ranges accepted in private-endpoint mode without the opt-in; the opt-in leaving authorized networks unmanaged; and the opt-in accepting 0.0.0.0/0.
  • The cluster_ca_certificate output now uses try(), so mocked plans complete; without it no mocked plan could evaluate the outputs.
  • Hardcoding enable_private_endpoint = false, dropping gcp_public_cidrs_access_enabled, restoring the previous for_each, dropping enforcement, dropping --internal-ip, or weakening any validation each makes a test fail.
  • Local, with Terraform 1.14.9 and TFLint 0.64.0 as in CI: terraform fmt -check -recursive, tflint, terraform validate for the module and the example, and the mock tests (20 passed).

Security review

This changes a trust boundary: who can reach the Kubernetes control plane. It requests an independent security review before merge. Points worth checking: the condition that omits the authorized-networks block, the aggregate rule, and the in-place update path on existing clusters.

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • New Features
    • Configure Kubernetes API access with authorized IPv4 CIDR ranges, including limits on overly broad access.
    • Enable private-endpoint access with private nodes, or explicitly allow unrestricted public API access.
    • Generated kubectl commands use the internal IP when private-endpoint mode is enabled.
  • Bug Fixes
    • Cluster CA certificate output returns null if the certificate cannot be accessed.
  • Documentation
    • Updated setup guides with API access configuration, example CIDR cautions, and guidance for finding the operator’s public egress IP.

The public GKE endpoint was always enabled and master authorized networks
were only configured when authorized_networks was non-empty, so the
default cluster accepted any address. Master authorized networks are now
always managed with Google Cloud public IP access disabled. The API is
reachable only from authorized_networks, only on the private endpoint
with the new enable_private_endpoint, or from any address only with the
new allow_public_api_server opt-in. The plan fails until one mode is
chosen, and ranges broader than /8 (IPv4) or /16 (IPv6) need the opt-in.
In private-endpoint mode the kubectl_config_command output adds
--internal-ip.

The example takes the allowlist as a required input and uses the module
source from this repository. CI runs mock-provider tests for the new
rules and validates the example.

BREAKING CHANGE: a configuration with an empty authorized_networks no
longer plans. Set authorized_networks (an in-place update that adds
master_authorized_networks_config), set enable_private_endpoint = true
(an in-place update; requires enable_private_nodes), or set
allow_public_api_server = true to keep the previous behaviour with no
plan change. Configurations that already set authorized_networks keep
working; Google Cloud public IP access is now pinned to disabled.
@krisztian-gajdar
krisztian-gajdar requested a review from a team September 29, 2026 15:01
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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The module adds Kubernetes API access settings for authorized CIDRs, private endpoints, and explicitly unrestricted public access. It validates and applies these settings, adds Terraform tests, and updates the documentation and dev-l4-spot example.

Changes

Kubernetes API access

Layer / File(s) Summary
Access-mode contract
variables.tf, README.md
Variables validate authorized CIDRs and access-mode requirements. The README documents access options, restrictions, and upgrade behavior.
Cluster configuration and tests
main.tf, outputs.tf, tests/*
The cluster configuration applies the selected endpoint and authorized networks. The kubectl command adds --internal-ip for private endpoints. Tests cover invalid inputs and planned endpoint configurations.
Example wiring and CI validation
examples/dev-l4-spot/*, .github/workflows/ci.yml, release-please-config.json
The example maps its required CIDR input to authorized networks and updates its module version. Its documentation explains the input. CI runs the API-access tests and validates the example using the local module source. The release configuration includes the example Terraform file.

Suggested reviewers: dragosboca

Priority: ➖ Normal

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 548c2

The example and CI flow preserve the intended setup, with users instructed to provide their own authorized CIDR. No actionable merge blocker remains.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5
✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly summarizes the primary change: restricting GKE control-plane access instead of leaving it open to every address.
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0…
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @main.tf:
- Line 157: Update the GKE private-cluster configuration near
gcp_public_cidrs_access_enabled to enable private_endpoint_enforcement_enabled
only when var.enable_private_endpoint is true and var.authorized_networks is
non-empty. Preserve the empty-list private-endpoint behavior by leaving
enforcement disabled in that case.

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Comment thread main.tf Outdated
In private-endpoint mode, authorized_networks was not applied to the
private endpoint, so listed internal ranges did not restrict access. Set
private_endpoint_enforcement_enabled when the private endpoint is used
with a non-empty list, and leave it unmanaged otherwise so the module
never turns an existing enforcement off.

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @main.tf:
- Line 158: Guard private_endpoint_enforcement_enabled against the GKE
prerequisites: when private endpoint enforcement is requested, validate that
Envoy is enabled and the control plane is at least 1.28.10-gke.1058000, or
provide an upgrade path before enabling it. Keep the current null behavior when
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Comment thread main.tf
coderabbitai[bot]
coderabbitai Bot previously approved these changes Sep 29, 2026
…d cluster

The mock tests only covered the validations, because the
cluster_ca_certificate output indexed a master_auth block that mocks
cannot produce, so no mocked plan could complete. The output now uses
try(), and the CI tests assert what the module renders: the endpoint
mode, the managed authorized networks with Google Cloud public access
disabled, private-endpoint enforcement, the opt-in path, and the
--internal-ip kubectl command. The rendered-cluster runs move out of the
credentialed test file.

authorized_networks now accepts IPv4 CIDR blocks only, at most 100
entries (the GKE limit), no documentation ranges, and at most one /8 of
addresses in total unless allow_public_api_server is set. The new
variables are non-nullable. The documentation now states that the
private endpoint is reachable in-region from the VPC network and that
the list restricts it only in private-endpoint mode.

BREAKING CHANGE: authorized_networks rejects IPv6 entries, more than 100
entries, documentation ranges such as 203.0.113.0/24, and lists that
cover more than one /8 in total unless allow_public_api_server is set.

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Actionable comments posted: 2


  • 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
🤖 Prompt to fix review comments
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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
Review comments at @README.md:
- Line 177: Update the upgrade guidance for gcp_public_cidrs_access_enabled to
warn that disabling it may not immediately restrict previously allowed Google
Cloud external IPs because firewall changes can take several hours to propagate.
Tell operators to verify effective access before treating the endpoint as
restricted.

Review comments at @variables.tf:
- Line 162: Update the description for allow_public_api_server and its matching
statement in README.md to say that requests require Kubernetes API
authentication and authorization, not specifically Google authentication. Keep
the existing explanation of public endpoint exposure and authorized_networks
behavior unchanged.

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Comment thread README.md
Comment thread variables.tf Outdated
GKE can take several hours to enforce disabled Google Cloud public IP
access, so the upgrade note asks operators to verify effective access.
Requests are authenticated by the Kubernetes API (including ServiceAccount
tokens), not only by Google identities, so the wording now says so.
coderabbitai[bot]
coderabbitai Bot previously approved these changes Sep 29, 2026
The documentation-range guard only checked entries of /24 or narrower,
so a broader range that contains a documentation range passed. Entries
inside a documentation range are now always rejected, and broader
entries that contain one need allow_public_api_server, so an explicit
0.0.0.0/0 under the opt-in still works.
Kubernetes serves /healthz, /livez, /readyz and /version without
authentication, so the opt-in description and README now say that other
requests still need Kubernetes API authentication and authorization.
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coderabbitai[bot]
coderabbitai Bot previously approved these changes Sep 29, 2026
In private-endpoint mode authorized_networks restricts the private
endpoint and holds internal ranges, so a list with all three RFC 1918
ranges was rejected unless allow_public_api_server was set, and that
opt-in stayed set if private mode was later turned off. The one-/8 total
now applies only while the public endpoint is enabled. The per-entry
IPv4 and documentation-range checks apply in both modes. Tests cover the
RFC 1918 list in private mode (accepted) and in public mode (rejected).
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coderabbitai Bot previously approved these changes Sep 29, 2026
Comment thread examples/dev-l4-spot/main.tf Outdated
The example is meant to be copied and used on its own, so it pins
superlinked/sie/google from the Terraform Registry again instead of a
local path. Before the release-please setup, each release commit bumped
this pin to the version being released. release-please keeps doing that
through extra-files: the version line carries an
x-release-please-version marker, so the release pull request sets it to
the new module version and every tag names its own release.

CI still validates the example against the module code in the pull
request. A workflow step rewrites the checked-out example to source
"../.." and drops the marked version line before init and validate. The
rewrite is never committed, and the step fails if it did not apply. A
Terraform override file cannot do this, because it cannot remove the
version argument, and a version constraint is rejected for a local
module path.
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@mamayer19
mamayer19 merged commit d67581c into main Oct 1, 2026
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@mamayer19
mamayer19 deleted the fix/restrict-default-exposure branch October 1, 2026 08:10
@github-actions github-actions Bot mentioned this pull request Oct 1, 2026
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