Add /api-portals CRUD resource to platform-api by dushaniw · Pull Request #3219 · wso2/api-platform

dushaniw · 2026-08-13T08:58:12Z

Summary

Adds /api-portals to platform-api: CRUD plus outbound authentication for API Portal instances scoped to an organization.

CRUD on /api-portals: register, list (paginated + workflow-status filter + handle search), get, update (partial), delete. Handle is unique per org.
Shared-key auth for platform-api's outbound publish calls. The row stores internal_auth_key (AES-GCM ciphertext of the caller-supplied sharedKey, encrypted via the InHouseVault). PUT with sharedKey rotates. AuthHeaderForPortal(handle, orgID) returns SharedKey <raw> for the publisher; a per-(org, handle) AuthProvider registry caches decrypted keys and invalidates on Update/Delete.
Schema: api_portals table + idx_api_portals_org across postgres/sqlite/sqlserver. UNIQUE(organization_uuid, handle). Org FK with ON DELETE CASCADE. metadata is a nullable JSON blob.
Errors: API_PORTAL_NOT_FOUND (404), API_PORTAL_EXISTS (409).
OpenAPI: 5 operations, 5 scopes (ap:api_portal:{read,create,update,delete,manage}). Response DTOs never surface the shared key.
Roles: ap_admin/ap_operator get :manage; ap_publisher/ap_viewer get :read.

Tested

Full go test ./internal/{repository,service,handler}/... green. New tests cover CRUD round-trips (all three DBs), cross-org isolation, race-on-unique-constraint, encrypt-in-DB (raw sharedKey absent from stored bytes), response-never-echoes-sharedKey (create/get/list/update), PUT-rotates-ciphertext, and the AuthProvider registry cache-fill race against a concurrent Invalidate.

If a portal was created as `oauth2` and a subsequent PUT changes `authType` to `local`, the stored `authConfig` retained the oauth2 keys (stsTokenUrl, clientId, clientSecret). The post-mutation `validateAPIPortalAuthConfig` then rejected the request because `local` requires an empty map, and no wire body could satisfy the transition (JSON can't distinguish "field absent" from "field explicitly null" for a map through the generated DTO). Fix: after applying all mutations, if the effective authType is `local`, drop portal.AuthConfig to nil before the re-validation. Regression test asserts the stored authConfig is cleared when an existing oauth2 portal is switched to local. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

dushaniw · 2026-08-17T17:54:48Z

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OSS registers a portal that's already running, so every OSS row is created as active from day one. Exposing workflowStatus as a mutable field over the wire suggested a lifecycle clients don't drive — remove it from the OpenAPI, keep the DB column for future extensibility. Concrete changes: - openapi.yaml: workflowStatus dropped from ApiPortalResponse, ApiPortalListItem, CreateApiPortalRequest, UpdateApiPortalRequest, the ListApiPortals query filter reference, and the parameter definition. `url` is now required on the create request (the "may be null while pending" story no longer applies to OSS). - api/generated.go: regenerated from the updated spec — none of the ApiPortal shapes carry WorkflowStatus anymore. - service/api_portal.go: dropped the workflowStatus validation, the "active requires URL" cross-field check, and the workflowStatus filter in ListAPIPortals. Server unconditionally sets WorkflowStatus = APIPortalWorkflowStatusActive on create; UPDATE can't touch it. URL is now required on create. - repository/api_portal.go + interfaces.go: ListPaginated and Count drop their workflowStatus filter parameter. - handler/api_portal.go: create/update/list stop reading or writing the field; response and list-item mappings no longer emit it. - constants/constants.go: retire ValidAPIPortalWorkflowStatuses and ValidAPIPortalCreateWorkflowStatuses. Keep the three status constants — the DB column still exists and future work may need them. - Tests: dropped workflowStatus-specific create/update/list cases (invalid-status, active-without-url, filter-by-status, activate-with-new-url). The happy-path create test now asserts the server always persists workflow_status=active. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Inline comments:
In `@platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go`:
- Around line 157-167: Harden newClientCredentialsAuthProvider and the
AuthorizationHeader token request by restricting stsTokenUrl to HTTPS,
validating resolved destination IPs at dial time to block private, loopback,
link-local, unspecified, and metadata ranges, and disabling automatic redirects.
Preserve caller-provided clients while applying equivalent validation where
needed, and replace raw STS response bodies in returned errors with an internal
log plus a generic failure reason.

Apply the same fix in `@platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go` around lines
125 - 137: The stored stsTokenUrl must be validated on create and update before
it reaches the outbound authentication client.

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📒 Files selected for processing (13)

platform-api/api/generated.go
platform-api/internal/constants/constants.go
platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal_integration_test.go
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal_test.go
platform-api/internal/repository/interfaces.go
platform-api/internal/server/server.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth_test.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_test.go
platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml

🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)

platform-api/internal/constants/constants.go

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Portal creation has no workflow of its own, so calling the lifecycle column "workflow_status" was misleading — plain "status" is what it actually holds. Rename everywhere the name reaches: - DB schema: workflow_status → status on the api_portals table in schema.postgres.sql, schema.sqlite.sql, schema.sqlserver.sql. - Model: APIPortal.WorkflowStatus → APIPortal.Status, with db tag "status" and json tag "status" (the json tag isn't marshalled directly by handlers, but keep it consistent). - Constants: APIPortalWorkflowStatus{Pending,Active,Failed} → APIPortalStatus{Pending,Active,Failed}. Doc comment updated to drop "workflow". - Repository: SELECT column list, INSERT column list, scan order, and the field's use in Create/Update all reference the new name. - Service: constant refs updated; the field is now .Status on the model. - Tests: fixture and assertion refs follow the renames; test comments no longer mention "workflow status". Wire surface is unchanged (the field was already removed from the OpenAPI in the previous commit). This is a pure internal rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Two narrow changes to the outbound `client_credentials` path so this PR doesn't ship the credential-bearing call without any handling for the obvious footguns, while leaving deeper egress work to the shared outbound HTTP client feature that's coming later. - validateAPIPortalSTSTokenURL runs at write time via validateAPIPortalAuthConfig: rejects empty, non-absolute, non-`https`, and unparseable values on `authConfig.stsTokenUrl`. Same shape rules the portal URL already uses. Host-based restrictions (loopback / private / metadata literal blocks, DNS resolve-and-recheck) are deliberately NOT added — a legitimate on-prem / local deployment can have its STS at https://localhost or a private-range address, so those controls need to be operator-aware and belong to the planned shared outbound HTTP client feature. - newClientCredentialsAuthProvider's default *http.Client is now built with CheckRedirect that returns http.ErrUseLastResponse. A 3xx from the STS on the token endpoint isn't a legitimate part of the client-credentials flow; following it would re-send client_id + client_secret to the redirect target. The provider now surfaces the 3xx as a non-2xx error. Tests: - Table-driven negative cases on stsTokenUrl (empty, http scheme, missing scheme, file/javascript schemes, scheme-only) and a positive control (valid https URL accepted). - TestClientCredentialsAuthProvider_DefaultClientRefusesRedirects stands up an httptest server that returns 302 and asserts AuthorizationHeader errors instead of following. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

The prior commit only set CheckRedirect when the caller passed nil for hc; a callsite (test or otherwise) that handed in its own client would bypass the policy. Copy the caller's client and set CheckRedirect on the copy so the token-endpoint call refuses 3xx regardless of what shell was passed in, without mutating the caller's shared instance. Test extended to cover both paths: default-client and caller-supplied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…tals-crud

Refactor APIPortalService to speak the OpenAPI-generated api.* types directly so it satisfies a new pdk.APIPortals interface by shape, matching the pattern used for Gateways and Projects. External plugins (specifically the cloud managed-portals plugin) can now consume portal CRUD via deps.APIPortals with no adapter code. - Move DTO<->model translation into internal/service/api_portal_translate.go - Service Create/Get/List/Update/Delete now take api.* types; internal request/response structs deleted - Handler shrinks to thin wrappers; httputil import path fixed - Add APIPortals interface + field on pdk.Deps - Wire deps.APIPortals = apiPortalService in StartPlatformAPIServer

coderabbitai · 2026-08-29T08:19:20Z

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Inline comments:
In `@platform-api/internal/server/server.go`:
- Line 329: Update the APIPortalAuthRegistry initialization to obtain the shared
SSRF-guarded client via utils.NewUpstreamFetchClient(0) and pass it instead of
nil to NewAPIPortalAuthRegistry, matching the existing JWKS setup.

In `@platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth_test.go`:
- Around line 78-80: In platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth_test.go at
lines 78-80, 117-119, 199-203, and 350-353, update the failed assertions to
report only the violated property or a masked value: do not print header, either
token, sts.lastForm, or any decrypted secret. Preserve each assertion’s existing
validation behavior while removing raw credential data from failure messages.
- Around line 70-88: Update localAuthProvider.AuthorizationHeader to use
ML-DSA-65 by default, retaining RS256 only behind an explicit legacy fallback.
Revise TestLocalAuthProvider_MintsVerifiableRS256 to validate the default
ML-DSA-65 signing and add coverage for the explicit RSA fallback, including
verification with the corresponding public keys and signing methods.

In `@platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go`:
- Around line 138-143: Update APIPortalAuthRegistry key construction in the Get
and invalidateCachedAuthProvider paths to include both OrganizationID and
portal.Handle. Ensure identical handles from different organizations resolve to
separate cached providers and invalidate only the matching organization-scoped
entry, using the same composite-key format consistently for lookup and
invalidation.

In `@platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml`:
- Around line 4462-4465: Update the CreateAPIPortal contract description for
CreateApiPortalRequest to describe registration against an existing URL only;
remove the claims that omitting url provisions a new portal or populates the URL
later, while preserving the existing required-url behavior.

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📒 Files selected for processing (22)

platform-api/api/generated.go
platform-api/internal/apperror/catalog.go
platform-api/internal/apperror/codes.go
platform-api/internal/constants/constants.go
platform-api/internal/database/schema.postgres.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlite.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql
platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal_integration_test.go
platform-api/internal/model/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal_test.go
platform-api/internal/repository/interfaces.go
platform-api/internal/server/server.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth_test.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_test.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_translate.go
platform-api/pdk/deps.go
platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml
platform-api/resources/role-to-scope-mapping.yaml

🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (10)

platform-api/internal/apperror/codes.go
platform-api/internal/model/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/apperror/catalog.go
platform-api/resources/role-to-scope-mapping.yaml
platform-api/internal/database/schema.postgres.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlite.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/repository/interfaces.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go

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…lane Cloud-only feature package + host registration. Adds a "Managed API Portals" entry to the api-control-plane organization sidebar, alongside Environments, Gateways, Pipelines. Talks to apip-platform- api's cloud-only `/managed-api-portals` resource (apim-saas PR wso2#2957) via the host port. Feature package (portals/cloud-plugins/apip-cloud-ui-managed-portals/) follows the pipelines/environments-new template: self-contained PortalPort abstraction (real BFF-backed and in-memory mock), a small hand-mirrored CloudHostPort type, and a list/create/detail flow gated by local state (no react-router dependency inside the plugin). Login-environment picker on Edit is sourced from the plugin's sibling /environments endpoint (populated via useOrgEnvironments) so operators can only select an env that actually exists on the data plane. Create form omits the field entirely — backend picks the preferred login env from environments.Service.List. Host wiring (apip-cloud-ui/src/hosts/api-control-plane.tsx): - Adds defineCloudPlugin entry against sidebar.organization slot at order 60 (after Pipelines at 50); Globe icon; org-level. - Deliberately separate from the OSS /api-portals REST added by api-platform PR wso2#3219 — per product decision, managed portals (SaaS lifecycle) and OSS api-portals (plain registry) stay two systems forever. package.json + tsconfig.json follow the same file:/paths pattern the other cloud plugins use for cross-package resolution. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…/authConfig) Adopts the shared-key auth model designed in the vault under Projects/DevPortal Publishing/Platform-API-Devportal-Design/SharedKey-Auth-Design.md. Platform-API now stores an encrypted raw shared key per portal and (in a follow-up) sends it as `Authorization: SharedKey <raw>` on outbound publishing calls. The devportal side of this landed on `feat/api-portal-role-scope-and-auth-fixes` (PR wso2#3243). - Schema (all 3 engines): drop `auth_type` + `auth_configuration`, add `internal_auth_key BYTEA NOT NULL`. `metadata` unchanged. - Model: drop `AuthType` + `AuthConfig`; add `InternalAuthKey []byte` (tagged `json:"-"` so it's never marshalled). - Constants: remove `APIPortalAuthType*` / `APIPortalAuthConfig*`; add `APIPortalSharedKeyAuthScheme = "SharedKey"` and `APIPortalSharedKeyHexLength = 64`. - Repository: scan/insert/update rewritten for the new column set. - Service: drop authType/authConfig validation + oauth2 secret encryption; add `validateAndEncryptSharedKey` (64-char hex format check + AES-GCM via the existing vault). Create requires `sharedKey`; Update treats it as optional rotation. - Translate: drop authConfig struct/map helpers; `ModelToAPIPortalResponse` and `modelToAPIPortalListItem` no longer emit `authType` / `authConfig`. - OpenAPI: drop `authType` / `authConfig` from all Portal schemas; delete `ApiPortalAuthConfig`; add `sharedKey` (writeOnly, `^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$`) to Create (required) + Update (optional). `api/generated.go` regenerated. - `api_portal_auth.go`: stubbed to a minimal `AuthProvider` interface + `APIPortalAuthRegistry` (Invalidate/Get). Real SharedKeyAuthProvider lands in a follow-up along with the rewritten tests. The four existing `_test.go` files (repository / service / handler integration / auth) were removed here; they were tightly coupled to the old shape (~1700 lines of assertions on `AuthType`/`AuthConfig` fields and `clientSecret` encryption) and will be rewritten in the follow-up alongside the SharedKey provider. Build + vet clean; unrelated package tests unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml (1)
8874-8877: 🎯 Functional Correctness | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win

Add HTTPS, absolute-URL, and host constraints to both API Portal URL schemas. CreateApiPortalRequest and UpdateApiPortalRequest expose url only as type: string with format: uri, while the reachable service calls validateAPIPortalURL, which rejects non-HTTPS, non-absolute, and hostless values. Generated clients can send such schema-valid values and receive a validation error from the API.
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In `@platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml` around lines 8874 - 8877, Update the url
schemas in CreateApiPortalRequest and UpdateApiPortalRequest to enforce HTTPS
absolute URLs with a required host, matching validateAPIPortalURL; apply the
same constraints to both request definitions.
platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal.go (1)
170-187: 🩺 Stability & Availability | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win

Limit API Portal request bodies before JSON decoding. CreateAPIPortal and UpdateAPIPortal pass r.Body directly to json.Decoder.Decode. The shared server chain has no byte limit, so an authenticated caller can send a very large metadata object and cause excessive allocation during decoding. Apply one shared http.MaxBytesReader-based wrapper in RegisterRoutes to both write handlers and reject bodies above the configured limit.
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In `@platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal.go` around lines 170 - 187, Update
RegisterRoutes to wrap request bodies for both CreateAPIPortal and
UpdateAPIPortal with a shared http.MaxBytesReader limit before JSON decoding,
using the configured request-body limit and preserving the existing handler
routing and rejection behavior for oversized payloads.

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Outside diff comments:
In `@platform-api/internal/handler/api_portal.go`:
- Around line 170-187: Update RegisterRoutes to wrap request bodies for both
CreateAPIPortal and UpdateAPIPortal with a shared http.MaxBytesReader limit
before JSON decoding, using the configured request-body limit and preserving the
existing handler routing and rejection behavior for oversized payloads.

In `@platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml`:
- Around line 8874-8877: Update the url schemas in CreateApiPortalRequest and
UpdateApiPortalRequest to enforce HTTPS absolute URLs with a required host,
matching validateAPIPortalURL; apply the same constraints to both request
definitions.

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platform-api/api/generated.go
platform-api/internal/constants/constants.go
platform-api/internal/database/schema.postgres.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlite.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql
platform-api/internal/model/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/server/server.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_translate.go
platform-api/resources/openapi.yaml

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platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal.go

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Implements the API Portal side of the shared-key mechanism designed in Projects/DevPortal Publishing/Platform-API-Devportal-Design/SharedKey-Auth-Design.md. Platform-API's outbound publishing calls (publish/update/delete an API, API content, MCP Server, MCP Server content, subscription plan) now authenticate with `Authorization: SharedKey <raw>` - a custom auth scheme (RFC 7235), not the OAuth 2.0 Bearer scheme. Devportal stores only sha256(raw) and constant-time compares against the value in the incoming header. Consumer login (portal UI) and existing OAuth REST callers are untouched, shared-key is a strictly additive path. Companion work on platform-api side lands on feat/api-portals-crud (PR wso2#3219). - New `[api_portal.internal_auth] hash` section in config.toml + config-template.toml; loaded via existing `{{ file "..." }}` interpolation into `config.internalAuth.hash`. - `configDefaults.js`: `internalAuth: { hash: '' }` as the DEFAULTS entry; empty means feature disabled and every SharedKey request 401s. - `configLoader.js`: fail-closed startup check enforcing the 64-char hex format when a hash is configured. Matches the existing pattern for `encryption_key` and `session_secret`. - New `src/middlewares/sharedKeyAuth.js`: scheme parser + `verifyHash` (sha256 + `crypto.timingSafeEqual`) + `synthesiseSharedKeyPrincipal` (expands `platform-api-system` role through `roleScopeMap.expandRoles`, yielding the five `dp:*:manage` scopes and nothing else). - `authMiddleware.js`: new case 0 in `authResolver` for SharedKey scheme, runs before session/bearer/mTLS. Verifies, resolves this portal's own org via `resolvePortalOrg`, sets `req.auth` with mode `'shared-key'`. Bad SharedKey values 401 immediately, no fall through. `OAuth2Security` now allows `mode === 'shared-key'` so its ordinary scope check runs against the synthesised scope list - this is what limits shared-key traffic to the 5 admin write operations without any hand-maintained per-handler wrap list. - `csrfProtection.js`: bypass CSRF for `Authorization: SharedKey` the same way it does for `Bearer`. Non-browser client, no cookies. - `portals/scripts/setup.sh`: new `--rotate-internal-key` flag + generation block after the session-secret block. First run creates a 256-bit raw key, writes sha256 hex to `resources/keys/api-portal-internal-key-hash` (container-readable) and raw to `resources/keys/api-portal-internal-key.raw` (mode 0600, host-owner only, one-time-read). Stdout emits only the file paths, never the raw value. Tests (20 total, node:test + child-spawn pattern to work around `configLoader.js`'s fail-closed module-load): - `src/config/internalAuthConfig.test.js` (7): fail-closed startup checks - empty hash boots (feature disabled), valid 64-char hex boots, malformed refuses to start with actionable error message. - `src/middlewares/sharedKeyAuth.test.js` (13): parseAuthorizationScheme, isSharedKeyRequest, verifyHash, synthesiseSharedKeyPrincipal, tryAuthenticate (all three tri-state outcomes plus the two "wrong scheme with hash-matching value" and "SharedKey with no configured hash" negative cases). All 20 tests pass. Full suite: 130/136 pass, 6 pre-existing better-sqlite3 native-binding failures unrelated to this change (confirmed by re-running with these changes stashed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

The metadata blob is an opaque plugin-owned pass-through. On the OSS side nothing populates it, so persisting an empty JSON object `{}` was just noise. Make the column nullable and let the DAO store SQL NULL when the caller supplies nothing. - Schema (all 3 engines): drop `NOT NULL` on `metadata`. - `marshalAPIPortalBlob`: return nil bytes for a nil or empty map (driver renders as SQL NULL) instead of `{}`. Non-empty maps still serialise as JSON. - `unmarshalAPIPortalBlob`: return a nil map for a NULL / empty-bytes read. The model's `json:"metadata,omitempty"` tag then elides the field on the response wire for portals that carry no metadata. Build + vet clean; repository and service test packages pass unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql (1)
455-455: 🗄️ Data Integrity & Integration | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win

Guard creation of dbo.api_portals.

Line 455 fails when the schema runs against a database where dbo.api_portals already exists. Use an OBJECT_ID guard around this CREATE TABLE statement so fresh and already-provisioned SQL Server databases can apply the schema safely.
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In `@platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql` at line 455, Guard the
dbo.api_portals CREATE TABLE statement with an OBJECT_ID existence check,
creating the table only when it is absent while preserving the existing
definition for fresh databases.
Source: Coding guidelines

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Outside diff comments:
In `@platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql`:
- Line 455: Guard the dbo.api_portals CREATE TABLE statement with an OBJECT_ID
existence check, creating the table only when it is absent while preserving the
existing definition for fresh databases.

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platform-api/internal/database/schema.postgres.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlite.sql
platform-api/internal/database/schema.sqlserver.sql
platform-api/internal/repository/api_portal.go

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Replaces the earlier stub that returned "not yet implemented" from APIPortalAuthRegistry.Get. Platform-API's outbound publisher now has a real path to obtain the Authorization header for a portal: hdr, err := apiPortalService.AuthHeaderForPortal(ctx, handle, orgID) // hdr == "SharedKey <raw>" Companion side of the shared-key mechanism landed on: - wso2#3243 devportal middleware + config + setup.sh (raw generation) - wso2-enterprise/apim-saas#2957 cloud plugin (raw generation on create + hash into OpenBao) - wso2-enterprise/wso2cloud#995 RT template (hash projected into portal pod) - internal/service/api_portal_auth.go — full rewrite - sharedKeyAuthProvider: decrypts the row's internal_auth_key ONCE at construction (via vault.SecretVault), holds the "SharedKey <raw>" header string, returns it on every AuthorizationHeader. No per-call decrypt cost, no per-provider mutex on the hot path. - NewSharedKeyAuthProvider(vault, encryptedKey) constructor with input validation (non-nil vault, non-empty ciphertext). - APIPortalAuthRegistry now takes portalRepo + vault. Get(handle, orgID) misses the cache -> loads row via portalRepo.GetByHandleAndOrgID -> constructs provider -> caches under registryKey(orgID, handle). Double-check pattern under mutex so concurrent Gets for the same key resolve to a single stored instance (a lost race just discards one just-constructed provider, no correctness impact). - registryKey = orgID + "/" + handle so the same handle in two orgs never cross-contaminates. - Invalidate(handle, orgID) drops the cached entry — idempotent, safe from Delete paths. - internal/service/api_portal.go - invalidateCachedAuthProvider now takes (handle, orgID); the two callers (Update + Delete) pass portal.OrganizationID. - AuthHeaderForPortal(ctx, handle, orgID) — the one-line surface the future publisher code calls. Wraps registry.Get + provider.AuthorizationHeader. Returns APIPortalNotFound for unknown portals, plain errors on decryption / config problems (permanent failures — callers should not retry). - internal/server/server.go - NewAPIPortalAuthRegistry() now takes apiPortalRepo + secretVault (the two deps already in scope on either side of the call). Build + vet + non-disabled tests all pass in both platform-api and the apim-saas plugin that symlinks into it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Inline comments:
In `@platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go`:
- Line 184: Update the Get cache-fill flow around providers[key] and coordinate
it with Invalidate using a per-key generation or equivalent synchronization, so
a provider read before invalidation cannot be stored afterward. Add a
concurrency test that pauses Get after the repository read, performs Update or
Delete and Invalidate, resumes Get, and verifies the stale provider is not
cached.

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platform-api/internal/server/server.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go

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platform-api/internal/server/server.go
platform-api/internal/service/api_portal.go

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…y auth The three api-portal test files were disabled during the OAuth2 → shared-key migration. Rewritten from the ground up against the new model: sharedKey inbound, InternalAuthKey (AES-GCM ciphertext) at rest, no AuthType / AuthConfig fields anywhere. - repository/api_portal_test.go: internal_auth_key round-trip (binary-safe), nullable metadata column, org isolation. - service/api_portal_test.go: sharedKey validation (hex + length), encrypt-on-write via InHouseVault, PUT-with-sharedKey rotation (invalidates the cached AuthProvider), never-echo-key contract, AuthHeaderForPortal returns "SharedKey <raw>". - handler/api_portal_integration_test.go: full route → handler → service → repo stack against SQLite; ciphertext-in-DB check, response bodies never leak the raw, PUT rotation flips the stored ciphertext.

Implements the API Portal side of the shared-key mechanism designed in Projects/DevPortal Publishing/Platform-API-Devportal-Design/SharedKey-Auth-Design.md. Platform-API's outbound publishing calls (publish/update/delete an API, API content, MCP Server, MCP Server content, subscription plan) now authenticate with `Authorization: SharedKey <raw>` - a custom auth scheme (RFC 7235), not the OAuth 2.0 Bearer scheme. Devportal stores only sha256(raw) and constant-time compares against the value in the incoming header. Consumer login (portal UI) and existing OAuth REST callers are untouched, shared-key is a strictly additive path. Companion work on platform-api side lands on feat/api-portals-crud (PR wso2#3219). - New `[api_portal.internal_auth] hash` section in config.toml + config-template.toml; loaded via existing `{{ file "..." }}` interpolation into `config.internalAuth.hash`. - `configDefaults.js`: `internalAuth: { hash: '' }` as the DEFAULTS entry; empty means feature disabled and every SharedKey request 401s. - `configLoader.js`: fail-closed startup check enforcing the 64-char hex format when a hash is configured. Matches the existing pattern for `encryption_key` and `session_secret`. - New `src/middlewares/sharedKeyAuth.js`: scheme parser + `verifyHash` (sha256 + `crypto.timingSafeEqual`) + `synthesiseSharedKeyPrincipal` (expands `platform-api-system` role through `roleScopeMap.expandRoles`, yielding the five `dp:*:manage` scopes and nothing else). - `authMiddleware.js`: new case 0 in `authResolver` for SharedKey scheme, runs before session/bearer/mTLS. Verifies, resolves this portal's own org via `resolvePortalOrg`, sets `req.auth` with mode `'shared-key'`. Bad SharedKey values 401 immediately, no fall through. `OAuth2Security` now allows `mode === 'shared-key'` so its ordinary scope check runs against the synthesised scope list - this is what limits shared-key traffic to the 5 admin write operations without any hand-maintained per-handler wrap list. - `csrfProtection.js`: bypass CSRF for `Authorization: SharedKey` the same way it does for `Bearer`. Non-browser client, no cookies. - `portals/scripts/setup.sh`: new `--rotate-internal-key` flag + generation block after the session-secret block. First run creates a 256-bit raw key, writes sha256 hex to `resources/keys/api-portal-internal-key-hash` (container-readable) and raw to `resources/keys/api-portal-internal-key.raw` (mode 0600, host-owner only, one-time-read). Stdout emits only the file paths, never the raw value. Tests (20 total, node:test + child-spawn pattern to work around `configLoader.js`'s fail-closed module-load): - `src/config/internalAuthConfig.test.js` (7): fail-closed startup checks - empty hash boots (feature disabled), valid 64-char hex boots, malformed refuses to start with actionable error message. - `src/middlewares/sharedKeyAuth.test.js` (13): parseAuthorizationScheme, isSharedKeyRequest, verifyHash, synthesiseSharedKeyPrincipal, tryAuthenticate (all three tri-state outcomes plus the two "wrong scheme with hash-matching value" and "SharedKey with no configured hash" negative cases). All 20 tests pass. Full suite: 130/136 pass, 6 pre-existing better-sqlite3 native-binding failures unrelated to this change (confirmed by re-running with these changes stashed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…lane Cloud-only feature package + host registration. Adds a "Managed API Portals" entry to the api-control-plane organization sidebar, alongside Environments, Gateways, Pipelines. Talks to apip-platform- api's cloud-only `/managed-api-portals` resource (apim-saas PR wso2#2957) via the host port. Feature package (portals/cloud-plugins/apip-cloud-ui-managed-portals/) follows the pipelines/environments-new template: self-contained PortalPort abstraction (real BFF-backed and in-memory mock), a small hand-mirrored CloudHostPort type, and a list/create/detail flow gated by local state (no react-router dependency inside the plugin). Login-environment picker on Edit is sourced from the plugin's sibling /environments endpoint (populated via useOrgEnvironments) so operators can only select an env that actually exists on the data plane. Create form omits the field entirely — backend picks the preferred login env from environments.Service.List. Host wiring (apip-cloud-ui/src/hosts/api-control-plane.tsx): - Adds defineCloudPlugin entry against sidebar.organization slot at order 60 (after Pipelines at 50); Globe icon; org-level. - Deliberately separate from the OSS /api-portals REST added by api-platform PR wso2#3219 — per product decision, managed portals (SaaS lifecycle) and OSS api-portals (plain registry) stay two systems forever. package.json + tsconfig.json follow the same file:/paths pattern the other cloud plugins use for cross-package resolution. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…race) - CreateApiPortal description no longer promises URL-less provisioning the schema does not support (url is required, empty string rejected). - APIPortalAuthRegistry.Get: fix cache-fill race with Invalidate. A Get in flight when Invalidate runs no longer repopulates the cache with the pre-invalidate provider; a per-key generation counter guards the fill and the just-built provider is returned to this caller without caching so the next Get rebuilds from the fresh row.

Comments reduced to short WHY-only lines against the current-base code. Long narrative history, plan-phase markers, PR/commit refs, and resource-footprint anecdotes removed. Net -164 lines across 9 files. No code, signature, control-flow, or test-logic changes.

dushaniw added 6 commits August 12, 2026 13:18

add api portal schema for postgres.

43fc09d

database schema.

d9aff4b

add dao models for devportal.

feb757a

remove data_version. add dao code.

ef9ce1d

add service and rest api implementation.

ebe5325

add integration tests at handler level.

88df843

Copilot AI lite review requested due to automatic review settings August 13, 2026 08:58

This was referenced Aug 17, 2026

Add platform-api-system role and wire login callback to configured JWKS #3243

Open

Add API Portal management console (built on #3220 with current backend shape) #3244

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dushaniw added 2 commits August 18, 2026 10:11

fix duplicate tag.

b1338ad

remove devportals tag.

86f1d2e

coderabbitai Bot mentioned this pull request Aug 19, 2026

Add multi-portal support per org #3260

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Comment thread platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go Outdated

dushaniw and others added 5 commits August 25, 2026 14:49

Merge branch 'main' of github.com:wso2/api-platform into feat/api-por…

cd6eac3

…tals-crud

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dushaniw mentioned this pull request Sep 9, 2026

Add Managed API Portals cloud plugin (api-control-plane host) #3409

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Comment thread platform-api/internal/service/api_portal_auth.go

dushaniw added 2 commits September 11, 2026 19:11

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Add /api-portals CRUD resource to platform-api - #3219

Add /api-portals CRUD resource to platform-api#3219
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dushaniw commented Aug 13, 2026 •

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