fix(ci): derive the signing public key instead of configuring it twice - #2327
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COSIGN_PUBLIC_KEY and WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY held the same public key in two encodings -- raw PEM for cosign's verify steps, base64 of that PEM for the string baked into product.json. Two hand-set secrets for one value, and the consistency check compared them to each other. That check could not see the mismatch that matters. Both public secrets can agree perfectly and still belong to a different keypair than COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY, which is what actually signs; the in-run verify steps would pass too, because they verified against the same public secret. The failure would surface on users' machines after release, as every client rejecting every artifact. The public half is now derived from the signing key with cosign public-key --key env://COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY so the comparison is pinned-key vs the key that signs, and the verify steps check signatures against a key that provably belongs to the signing pair. Verified with two throwaway keypairs: correct config passes, a pinned key from the other pair is refused (the case the old check missed), and a non-base64 pinned value is refused. COSIGN_PUBLIC_KEY is no longer referenced anywhere and can be deleted from the repository secrets -- one fewer value to set and to keep in sync. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. WalkthroughBoth publishing workflows derive the signing public key from ChangesSigning key verification
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The workflows now derive and validate the signing public key from the configured private key before publishing, reducing mismatched-key release risk. No current merge-blocking issue is identified. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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In @.github/workflows/build.yml:
- Line 1603: In .github/workflows/build.yml lines 1603-1603, require
WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY in the publishing preflight and run the pinned-key DER
comparison unconditionally. Apply the same change in
.github/workflows/publish-components.yml lines 77-77 by adding
WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY to the required-secret check and removing the
comparison’s optional gating.
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WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY was optional, and its absence was silent in the worst direction: HAS_PINNED_KEY went false, the key comparison was skipped, and WSO2_UPDATE_REQUIRE_ARTIFACT_SIGNATURE computed to false — so a green release shipped clients that pin no key and accept unverified artifacts, then published a source document for them. Check it in resolve-versions rather than in Publish Update Source. build-macos and build-windows bake WSO2_UPDATE_URL and WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY into product.json well before that job runs, so a late check cannot stop a run from producing those installers — it can only decline to publish afterwards. The early gate costs seconds instead of a full build, and covers the bucket, the artifacts CDN base, the update URL and the signing key alongside it. With presence guaranteed, the pinned-key DER comparison is unconditional in both workflows, and publish-components.yml requires the same secret in its own preflight. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gate fired on publish_update_source alone, so a release with build_packed_installers off — or with no publish_tag — failed for missing publish secrets even though Publish Update Source skips itself in exactly those cases. Mirror that job's own conditions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
| # Checked here rather than in Publish Update Source, because build-macos and build-windows | ||
| # bake WSO2_UPDATE_URL and WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY into product.json long before that job | ||
| # runs. A late check cannot stop a run from shipping installers that pin no key and skip | ||
| # signature verification; this one can, and it costs seconds instead of a full build. | ||
| # Conditions mirror the Publish Update Source job's own `if:`, so a run that would not | ||
| # publish anyway is never failed for missing publish secrets. | ||
| - name: Check the publish path is configured | ||
| if: ${{ inputs.publish_update_source == true && inputs.build_packed_installers == true && inputs.publish_tag != '' }} |
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This step is new in this PR (confirmed absent from the base commit) and isn't mentioned anywhere in the PR description, which covers only the key derivation. It's ~28 of the 82 added lines and has the widest blast radius of anything here: it can now hard-fail a release at the very first job.
Please either document it in the description or split it into its own PR.
On blast radius, for the record: publish_update_source defaults to false in this workflow, and daily-build.yml, dev-build.yml and pr-ci.yml don't set it, so only release.yml (which defaults it to true) reaches this step. The if: conditions do mirror publish-update-source's input conditions exactly, as the comment claims.
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Fair — the description covered only the derivation. I've rewritten it: the preflight is now section 2, with why it sits in resolve-versions rather than publish-update-source, the exact secrets it requires, and an explicit note that dev-build.yml/daily-build.yml never reach it.
Keeping it here rather than splitting, because it isn't independent of the derivation. Removing COSIGN_PUBLIC_KEY makes WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY the only thing left that can disagree with the signing key, so the pinned-key comparison stops being one of two overlapping checks and becomes the check. Landing that without also making it mandatory would leave a window where the sole remaining guard is optional.
Thanks for confirming the reachability and the if: conditions independently.
…ilds run Checking only that WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY is non-empty left the failure this change is about — a pinned key from the wrong pair — to the late check in Publish Update Source, which runs after build-macos and build-windows have already baked that key into product.json. Nothing downstream would catch it either: the signing steps verify against the signing key itself, so they pass. Derive and compare in resolve-versions instead. cosign-installer plus one `cosign public-key` costs seconds, and it also exercises COSIGN_PASSWORD, which otherwise burns a full build before failing at the derive step. The late comparison is now redundant and removed; Publish Update Source still derives signing.pub for signature verification. Also guard the decode with `[ -s pinned.pem ]` in both workflows — `base64 -d` accepts the empty string, so an empty secret used to skip the friendly error and die at openssl — and drop a comment left describing a `cosign.pub` write that no longer exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A release with AWS_UPDATE_S3_BUCKET set but no credentials — or the reverse — would run the full macOS and Windows builds before anything noticed. The preflight already covers the bucket; the keys that write to it belong beside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Purpose
Two changes to how the update-signing keys are configured and checked. Both concern the same failure: CI signing with one key while released clients pin another.
1. Derive the signing public key instead of configuring it twice
COSIGN_PUBLIC_KEYwas a second secret holding the public half ofCOSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY. It can only agree or disagree with the private key, and when it disagreed the run still passed — every signature verified againstCOSIGN_PUBLIC_KEY, which is exactly the key that was wrong. The check could not see the mismatch that matters.Both workflows now derive it:
WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEYis compared against that derived key, so the comparison proves the pinned key matches the key that actually signs.COSIGN_PUBLIC_KEYis dropped from both workflows and can be deleted from the repository secrets once this merges.2. Check the publish path before the builds run, not after
WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEYwas optional, and its absence was silent in the worst direction: the comparison was skipped andWSO2_UPDATE_REQUIRE_ARTIFACT_SIGNATUREcomputed tofalse, so a green release shipped clients that pin no key and accept unverified artifacts, then published a source document for them.resolve-versionsnow gates the run. It is the right place becausebuild-macosandbuild-windowsbakeWSO2_UPDATE_URLandWSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEYintoproduct.jsonviaupdate-product.sh. A check inpublish-update-sourceruns after those installers exist; all it can do is decline to publish a document for them. Two steps, both gated on the same conditions aspublish-update-source's ownif:(publish_update_source && build_packed_installers && publish_tag != ''), so a run that would not publish is never failed for missing publish secrets:AWS_UPDATE_S3_BUCKET,WSO2_UPDATE_ARTIFACTS_URL,WSO2_UPDATE_URL,WSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY,COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEYare present.COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEYand compares in DER. Presence alone would leave the wrong-pair case to the late check; this also exercisesCOSIGN_PASSWORD, which otherwise burns a full build before failing at the derive step.The comparison in
publish-update-sourceis now redundant and removed. That job still derivessigning.pubfor signature verification.publish-components.ymlis a single job with no earlier phase, so its own preflight gainedWSO2_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEYand its comparison is likewise unconditional (still skipped ondry_run).Effect on existing builds
dev-build.ymlanddaily-build.ymlnever passpublish_update_source, so it defaults tofalseand both new steps are skipped — those builds still run with no update secrets at all. Onlyrelease.yml, which defaults it totrue, reaches them.Verification
Two throwaway cosign keypairs, against the real step scripts:
[ -s pinned.pem ]guard, rather than dying atopensslwith a parse errorThe derived PEM is DER-identical to the
cosign.pubthatcosign generate-key-pairwrites, so no re-keying is needed. Both workflows parse underYAML.safe_load, and the preflight exits 1 listing exactly the missing secret names and 0 when complete.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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