fix(mongodb): escape SQL identifiers and literals in metadata/DDL paths (#1914)#2206
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HandSonic wants to merge 2 commits into
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fix(mongodb): escape SQL identifiers and literals in metadata/DDL paths (#1914)#2206HandSonic wants to merge 2 commits into
HandSonic wants to merge 2 commits into
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…aintainer review (OtterMind#1914) - non-SQL module: no SQL identifier/string escaping, default ISQLIdentifierProcessor left untouched - requireMongoName allowlist + escapeJsonString are validation/JSON guards, not SQL escaping; class renamed accordingly - callers rewired (DBManager/MetaData/ScriptExecutor/SqlBuilder) - tests migrated to MongodbSqlGuardsTest (8 green)
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Part of the SQL-injection hardening tracked in #1914. Prior art: #2052 (Oracle), #2053 (SQL Server), and the wave-1 batch (#2172-#2177).
These are second-order injection paths: values such as table/schema/view/index names originate from the connected database's own metadata, so exploitation requires a maliciously named object in a target database.
What changed (11 sites)
Shell-command hardening: requireMongoName allowlist for db/collection names at 11 command-building sites, JSON string values escaped in insert/update documents.
Verification
mvn -B -pl chat2db-community-plugins/chat2db-community-mongodb -f chat2db-community-server/pom.xml -Dmaven.test.skip=false -DskipTests=false -Dsurefire.includes=**/*Test.java -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false -Dmaven.test.failure.ignore=false testResult: Tests run: 8, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0.
This branch also passed a two-lens adversarial review (escape-correctness/coverage + regression/test-efficacy); all blocking findings were fixed and re-tested before submission.