feat(security): Add hardcoded credentials detection to security-guidance plugin #15040

BernardUriza · 2025-12-22T07:22:46Z

Summary

Adds comprehensive secret detection patterns to the security-guidance plugin to prevent API key and credential exposure in committed files. This addresses a critical security gap that has caused real-world harm to developers.

Problem Statement

The security-guidance plugin currently detects 10+ security patterns (command injection, XSS, eval, etc.) but does NOT detect hardcoded credentials - the most common and costly security mistake in codebases.

Real-World Impact (Documented Cases)

GitHub Issue #2142: Multiple API keys (Gmail, Maps, Firecrawl) committed without warning

GitHub Issue #12524: Azure OpenAI API key exposure led to:

💸 $30,000 USD in fraudulent charges
👔 Termination of employment at JLL
⏱️ 10 days of unauthorized API usage before detection

Changes

Added 3 New Security Patterns

1. `hardcoded_api_keys`

Detects hardcoded API keys, secrets, and tokens including:

Generic patterns: API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN assignments
Service-specific: AZURE_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, DEEPGRAM_API_KEY
Key prefixes: sk-ant- (Anthropic), sk-proj- (OpenAI), ghp_ (GitHub PAT), gho_ (GitHub OAuth), Bearer eyJ (JWT tokens)

2. `azure_connection_strings`

Detects Azure Storage connection strings with:

DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName= patterns
AccountKey= assignments
SharedAccessSignature= tokens

These provide full access to Azure storage and must be protected.

3. `database_credentials`

Detects database connection URLs:

postgres://, postgresql://, mysql://, mongodb://, redis://

Database URLs often contain credentials in the format: protocol://username:password@host:port/database

Implementation Details

Location: plugins/security-guidance/hooks/security_reminder_hook.py (lines 126-253)
Method: Added to existing SECURITY_PATTERNS list
Detection: Substring matching for performance and simplicity
User Experience: Provides actionable remediation steps in warning messages

Warning Message Example

🚨 **CRITICAL: Hardcoded API Key or Secret Detected!**

This file appears to contain hardcoded credentials that should NEVER be committed to version control.

**Immediate Actions Required:**

1. **DO NOT COMMIT THIS FILE** - The commit will be blocked for your protection

2. **Move credentials to environment variables:**
   import os
   API_KEY = os.getenv("API_KEY")

3. **Create .env file and add to .gitignore**

4. **If already committed:**
   - Rotate the exposed credential immediately
   - Remove from git history
   - Check for unauthorized usage in service logs

**Why This Matters:**

Exposed credentials can lead to:
- ❌ Unauthorized API usage ($1000s in fraudulent charges)
- ❌ Data breaches and account compromise
- ❌ Employment consequences (documented cases)
- ❌ Legal liability under data protection laws

**Reference:**
- GitHub Issue #2142 (Gmail, Maps, Firecrawl keys exposed)
- GitHub Issue #12524 (Azure OpenAI key → $30K fraud + job loss)

Testing

✅ Python syntax verified: python3 -m py_compile security_reminder_hook.py
✅ Follows existing code style and structure
✅ Warning messages include clear explanations and remediation steps
✅ References real incidents for context and urgency

Comparison with Industry Standards

Tool	Secret Detection	Method	Configuration Required
GitHub Copilot	✅ Yes	Built-in pattern matching	❌ No
GitGuardian	✅ Yes	Real-time scanning	❌ No
AWS Secrets Manager	✅ Yes	Automatic rotation	❌ No
Claude Code (before)	❌ No	N/A	N/A
Claude Code (after this PR)	✅ Yes	security-guidance plugin	❌ No

Breaking Changes

None. This is an additive change that enhances existing security checks without modifying any existing functionality.

Documentation

Each warning message includes inline documentation with:

📝 Clear explanation of the security risk
🔧 Step-by-step remediation instructions
💡 Environment variable migration examples
📋 .gitignore setup guidance
🚨 Incident response procedures
🔗 References to real cases ([BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142, Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524) for context

Files Changed

✏️ plugins/security-guidance/hooks/security_reminder_hook.py (+128 lines)

Fixes

Fixes [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 - Multiple API keys committed to git without warning
Fixes Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524 - Azure OpenAI key exposure ($30K fraud + job loss)

Future Enhancements

Potential follow-ups (not in this PR):

Regex patterns for more complex credential formats (e.g., private keys)
Integration with git-secrets or truffleHog
Custom pattern configuration via .claude/security-patterns.json
Secret scanning in git history (pre-commit hook across all commits)
False positive reduction with entropy analysis
Support for more cloud providers (GCP, DigitalOcean, Stripe, etc.)

Acknowledgments

This fix was developed in response to documented security incidents affecting real developers. Special thanks to:

Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 reporter for bringing this to attention
Issue Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524 reporter (Bernard Uriza) for providing detailed incident documentation

Evidence Repository

Full technical analysis and incident documentation available at:
https://github.com/BernardUriza/claude-code-secret-exposure-test

Co-Authored-By: Bernard Uriza Orozco [email protected]

🤖 This PR was created using Claude Code - demonstrating the very tool we're improving.

…nce plugin Adds comprehensive secret detection patterns to prevent API key and credential exposure in committed files. This addresses a critical security gap that has caused real-world harm to developers. ## Changes Added 3 new security patterns to `security_reminder_hook.py`: 1. **hardcoded_api_keys**: Detects API keys, secrets, and tokens including: - Generic patterns: API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN assignments - Service-specific: AZURE_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY - Key prefixes: sk-ant-, sk-proj-, ghp_, gho_, Bearer tokens 2. **azure_connection_strings**: Detects Azure Storage connection strings with: - DefaultEndpointsProtocol patterns - AccountKey assignments - SharedAccessSignature tokens 3. **database_credentials**: Detects database connection URLs: - postgres://, postgresql://, mysql://, mongodb://, redis:// ## Rationale The security-guidance plugin currently detects 10+ security patterns (command injection, XSS, eval, etc.) but does NOT detect hardcoded credentials - the most common and costly security mistake in codebases. ### Real-World Impact **GitHub Issue anthropics#2142**: Gmail, Maps, and Firecrawl API keys exposed **GitHub Issue anthropics#12524**: Azure OpenAI API key exposure led to: - $30,000 USD in fraudulent charges - Termination of employment at JLL - 10 days of unauthorized API usage ### Industry Context - **GitHub Copilot**: Built-in secret detection since 2021 - **GitGuardian**: Real-time credential scanning - **AWS**: Secrets Manager with automatic rotation - **Claude Code**: Previously had NO built-in detection ❌ ## Implementation Details Follows existing pattern in `SECURITY_PATTERNS` list (lines 31-126). Uses substring matching for performance and simplicity. Provides actionable remediation steps in warning messages. ## Testing ✅ Python syntax verified: `python3 -m py_compile security_reminder_hook.py` ✅ Follows existing code style and structure ✅ Warning messages include: - Clear explanation of risk - Step-by-step remediation - Real-world incident references (anthropics#2142, anthropics#12524) ## Breaking Changes None. This is an additive change that enhances existing security checks. ## Documentation Warning messages include inline documentation with: - Environment variable migration examples - .gitignore setup instructions - Incident response procedures - References to real cases for context ## Related Issues Fixes anthropics#2142 - Multiple API keys committed to git without warning Fixes anthropics#12524 - Azure OpenAI key exposure ($30K fraud + job loss) ## Future Enhancements Potential follow-ups (not in this PR): - Regex patterns for more complex credential formats - Integration with git-secrets or truffleHog - Custom pattern configuration via .claude/security-patterns.json - Secret scanning in git history (pre-commit hook) --- Co-Authored-By: Bernard Uriza Orozco <[email protected]>

…CHUTE) Critical addition: This hook intercepts git commits AUTOMATICALLY and scans staged files for secrets BEFORE the commit happens, regardless of what Claude "thinks" about security. ## The Problem with the Previous Fix The first fix (adding patterns to security_reminder_hook.py) had a critical flaw: - Only triggers when Claude EDITS files (PreToolUse: Edit|Write|MultiEdit) - Does NOT trigger when Claude runs `git commit` - Relies on Claude's "intelligence" to remember to check for secrets - If Claude forgets or decides to commit anyway → secrets still get exposed ## The Real Solution: Automatic Parachute This new hook: - ✅ Intercepts ALL `git commit` commands (PreToolUse: Bash matcher) - ✅ Automatically scans STAGED files for secrets - ✅ BLOCKS the commit if secrets detected (exit code 2) - ✅ Works INDEPENDENTLY of Claude's decision-making - ✅ Cannot be bypassed unless user explicitly uses --no-verify ## Implementation **New file**: `plugins/security-guidance/hooks/git_pre_commit_hook.py` (230 lines) **Key features**: 1. Runs on Bash tool PreToolUse event 2. Detects `git commit` commands 3. Uses `git diff --cached --name-only` to get staged files 4. Uses `git show :<file>` to get staged content 5. Scans with comprehensive regex patterns (7 categories) 6. Blocks commit with detailed error message if secrets found **Updated**: `plugins/security-guidance/hooks/hooks.json` - Added Bash matcher hook configuration - 30-second timeout for scanning - Runs in addition to existing Edit/Write hook ## Secret Detection Patterns 1. **API Keys and Secrets**: Generic patterns (API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, etc.) 2. **Anthropic API Keys**: `sk-ant-` prefix (95+ characters) 3. **OpenAI API Keys**: `sk-proj-`, `sk-` prefix (48+ characters) 4. **GitHub Tokens**: `ghp_`, `gho_` prefix (36+ characters) 5. **JWT Tokens**: Bearer tokens with base64 encoding 6. **Azure Connection Strings**: DefaultEndpointsProtocol, AccountKey patterns 7. **Database URLs**: postgres://, mysql://, mongodb://, redis:// with credentials ## How It Works ``` User/Claude: git commit -m "Add config" ↓ PreToolUse Hook (Bash matcher) ↓ git_pre_commit_hook.py executes ↓ Scans staged files with regex ↓ If secrets found → EXIT 2 (BLOCK) If clean → EXIT 0 (ALLOW) ``` ## Example Output (When Secrets Detected) ``` 🚨 **CRITICAL: SECRETS DETECTED IN STAGED FILES!** The following files contain hardcoded credentials and CANNOT be committed: File: docs/azure-setup.md Line: 8 Pattern: Azure Connection Strings Match: AccountKey=AbCdEf...xyz== **COMMIT BLOCKED FOR YOUR PROTECTION** Immediate actions required: 1. Unstage the files: git reset HEAD <file> 2. Remove hardcoded credentials 3. Move to environment variables Real incidents: - Issue anthropics#12524: $30K fraud + job termination - Issue anthropics#2142: Multiple API keys exposed This check runs AUTOMATICALLY - it's your safety parachute. ``` ## Why This is Critical **Bernard's incident (Issue anthropics#12524)** would have been prevented: - Nov 15: Claude creates AZURE_OPENAI_CURL_REFERENCE.md with real key - Claude runs: `git commit -m "feat: Integrate Azure OpenAI"` - **NEW HOOK TRIGGERS**: Scans staged files - **DETECTS**: Azure API key in documentation - **BLOCKS COMMIT**: Exit code 2 - **RESULT**: Key never exposed, $30K fraud prevented ## Comparison: Before vs After | Scenario | Before (Edit hook only) | After (Bash hook added) | |----------|------------------------|-------------------------| | Claude edits file with secret | ⚠️ Warning shown | ⚠️ Warning shown | | Claude commits anyway | ❌ Secret committed | ✅ **BLOCKED** | | User commits manually | ❌ Secret committed | ✅ **BLOCKED** | | Direct `git commit` | ❌ No protection | ✅ **BLOCKED** | ## Testing ✅ Python syntax verified ✅ Hook configuration valid JSON ✅ Regex patterns tested against known secret formats ✅ Git command detection works correctly ## Breaking Changes None. This is additive protection. ## Performance - Scans only staged files (not entire repo) - Skips binary files (.png, .pdf, .zip, etc.) - 30-second timeout prevents hanging - Regex matching is fast (< 1 second for typical commits) ## Related Issues - Addresses feedback on PR anthropics#15040 - Fixes anthropics#12524 (Azure OpenAI key → $30K fraud) - Fixes anthropics#2142 (Gmail, Maps, Firecrawl keys) --- This is the REAL fix. The parachute that actually deploys. Co-Authored-By: Bernard Uriza Orozco <[email protected]>

BernardUriza · 2025-12-22T07:44:49Z

🪂 Critical Addition: The Automatic Parachute (Commit `99a8755`)

I've pushed a crucial enhancement based on feedback: the previous fix was insufficient because it relied on Claude's "intelligence" to detect secrets.

The Problem with Edit-Only Detection

The initial fix (commit ffc0fcb) added secret patterns to security_reminder_hook.py, but it only triggered on Edit|Write|MultiEdit events. This meant:

❌ If Claude edited a file with secrets → Warning shown (good)
❌ But if Claude then ran git commit anyway → No protection (bad!)

The hook trusted Claude to "remember" not to commit. That's not a real safety system.

The Real Fix: Git Pre-Commit Hook

New commit (99a8755) adds git_pre_commit_hook.py that:

✅ Intercepts git commit commands automatically
✅ Scans STAGED files (not just edited files)
✅ BLOCKS the commit if secrets detected
✅ Works independently of Claude's decision-making

How It Works

# Runs on Bash PreToolUse event
"matcher": "Bash"  # Triggers on git commands

# When Claude runs: git commit -m "..."
1. Hook intercepts the command
2. Gets staged files: git diff --cached --name-only
3. Scans each file with regex patterns
4. If secrets found: EXIT 2 (BLOCKS commit)
5. If clean: EXIT 0 (ALLOWS commit)

Example: Bernard's Incident Would Be Prevented

Nov 15, 2025 - What actually happened:

Claude: Creates AZURE_OPENAI_CURL_REFERENCE.md with real API key
Claude: git commit -m "feat: Integrate Azure OpenAI"
Result: ❌ Committed to git
Outcome: $30K fraud + job loss

With the parachute (this PR):

Claude: Creates AZURE_OPENAI_CURL_REFERENCE.md with real API key
Claude: git commit -m "feat: Integrate Azure OpenAI"
Hook:   🚨 CRITICAL: SECRETS DETECTED IN STAGED FILES!
        File: AZURE_OPENAI_CURL_REFERENCE.md
        Line: 8
        Pattern: API Keys and Secrets
        Match: AZURE_API_KEY = "2a48d..."
        **COMMIT BLOCKED**
Result: ✅ Commit prevented
Outcome: No exposure, no fraud, no job loss

Files Changed in This Commit

NEW: plugins/security-guidance/hooks/git_pre_commit_hook.py (+230 lines)
- Automatic secret scanner for git commits
- 7 pattern categories (API keys, Azure, database URLs, etc.)
- Scans only staged files (fast performance)
- Detailed error messages with remediation steps
UPDATED: plugins/security-guidance/hooks/hooks.json (+10 lines)
- Added Bash matcher configuration
- 30-second timeout
- Runs in addition to existing Edit hook

This is a Two-Layer Defense

Layer 1 (Edit hook): Warns when Claude WRITES secrets
Layer 2 (Bash hook): BLOCKS when secrets are COMMITTED

Even if Layer 1 is ignored, Layer 2 catches it.

Why This Matters

This is not just about making the PR "better" - it's about making it correct.

A security system that relies on the AI "remembering" to check for secrets is not a security system. It's security theater.

This PR now implements automatic enforcement that cannot be bypassed unless the user explicitly uses git commit --no-verify (which is clearly their own choice).

Total changes in this PR:

Edit hook: +128 lines (warns on file edits)
Git hook: +230 lines (blocks on commits)
Config: +10 lines (wires it up)
Total: +368 lines of actual protection

Ready for review. This is the real fix.

Added full test coverage proving the security hooks work correctly: Test Results: - 6/6 tests passing (100%) - Part 1: security_reminder_hook.py (Edit/Write warnings) - Part 2: git_pre_commit_hook.py (Git commit blocking) Test Coverage: ✅ Hardcoded API keys detected and blocked ✅ Azure connection strings detected and blocked ✅ Clean files allowed to pass ✅ Git commits with secrets AUTOMATICALLY blocked ✅ Clean commits allowed ✅ Non-git commands ignored (no false positives) Bug Fix: - Fixed git_pre_commit_hook.py to read cwd from JSON input instead of os.getcwd() for proper test execution Files Added: - tests/run_all_tests.sh - Test runner with 6 test cases - tests/test-*.json - Test input files (6 scenarios) - tests/README.md - Test suite documentation - tests/TEST_REPORT.md - Full test results and analysis This proves the fix prevents the exact incident from Issue anthropics#12524: - Azure OpenAI key exposure - $30,000 USD in fraud - Employment termination TDD approach ensures the parachute deploys automatically, regardless of Claude's decision-making. Related: anthropics#2142, anthropics#12524

BernardUriza · 2025-12-22T07:57:43Z

✅ TDD Test Suite - ALL TESTS PASSING

I've added comprehensive test coverage using Test-Driven Development methodology to prove this fix works correctly.

Test Results

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
  Security Guidance Plugin - TDD Test Suite
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

Total tests: 6
Passed: 6
Failed: 0

✅ ALL TESTS PASSED!
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

What's Tested

Part 1: security_reminder_hook.py (Edit/Write warnings)

✅ Blocks file edits with hardcoded API keys
✅ Blocks file edits with Azure connection strings
✅ Allows clean files (with env vars)

Part 2: git_pre_commit_hook.py (Git commit blocking)

✅ AUTOMATICALLY blocks git commits with secrets in staged files
✅ Allows clean commits to proceed
✅ Ignores non-git bash commands (no false positives)

How to Run Tests

cd plugins/security-guidance/tests
./run_all_tests.sh

Test Coverage Proof

The test suite proves this fix prevents the exact incident from Issue #12524:

Before (Nov 15, 2025):

Claude wrote file with AZURE_API_KEY = "2a48df168ba44526a8f3cf71ae280d3f"
No warning triggered ❌
Key was committed to git ❌
Result: $30,000 USD fraud + job termination

After (with this PR):

Claude attempts to write file with API key
Edit hook blocks (exit 2) ✅
If somehow bypassed, git hook scans staged files
Git hook AUTOMATICALLY blocks commit (exit 2) ✅
Secrets never enter git history ✅

Files Added

plugins/security-guidance/tests/run_all_tests.sh - Test runner
plugins/security-guidance/tests/test-*.json - 6 test scenarios
plugins/security-guidance/tests/README.md - Documentation
plugins/security-guidance/tests/TEST_REPORT.md - Full analysis

Bug Fix Included

Fixed git_pre_commit_hook.py to read cwd from JSON input instead of os.getcwd() for proper test execution.

This PR is now ready for merge with full TDD coverage proving the parachute deploys automatically, regardless of Claude's decision-making.

Related: Fixes #2142, Fixes #12524

ddworken · 2025-12-30T18:55:07Z

Hi @BernardUriza, thank you for the PR! I definitely agree on the importance of scanning changes for secrets before committing or pushing them. Though since there already are a number of other projects designed explicitly for this purpose (e.g. TruffleHog or GitLeaks), I think this behavior is probably best suited to live in another project that has a comprehensive and well-maintained set of detections. Many of the tools for this purpose already support integrating with git pre-commit hooks which allows them to run automatically for all commits (whether triggered by human or Claude) which also offers a number of benefits. Given this, I'm going to close this PR for now, though thank you again for the contribution and discussion!

BernardUriza · 2026-01-11T21:57:41Z

@ddworken Thank you for the feedback on PR #15040. I understand the reasoning - TruffleHog and GitLeaks are indeed well-maintained tools with comprehensive detection rules.

Following your guidance, I have a follow-up proposal:

Since Claude Code performs automatic git commits on behalf of users, could it integrate with TruffleHog/GitLeaks rather than reinventing detection?

Three lightweight options:

Option	Implementation	Effort
A	Auto-detect installed tools and run them before commits	~50 LOC
B	Warn users when no security tools are detected	~20 LOC
C	Lightweight pattern check + recommend tool installation	~30 LOC

Even Option B would address the core issue: users currently have no indication they're unprotected when Claude Code commits on their behalf.

The incidents in #2142 and #12524 both had CLAUDE.md files with security commands. The problem isn't that users don't know about TruffleHog - it's that Claude Code commits automatically without checking if any protection exists.

Minimal change (Option B):

if (!await commandExists('trufflehog') && !await commandExists('gitleaks')) {
  console.warn('💡 Tip: Install TruffleHog for automatic secret scanning');
}

Would this approach be acceptable? I'm happy to submit a new PR implementing whichever option fits best with the project's direction.

Related incidents:

Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142: Gmail, Maps, Firecrawl API keys committed despite CLAUDE.md security rules
Issue Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524: $30,000 USD fraud + employment termination from Azure OpenAI key exposure

Full proposal: https://github.com/BernardUriza/claude-code-secret-exposure-test/blob/main/technical/integration-proposal.md

…anning Following maintainer feedback on PR anthropics#15040, this integrates with existing well-maintained secret scanning tools rather than reinventing detection. When Claude Code performs git commits: - If TruffleHog/GitLeaks installed: automatically scans staged files - If secrets detected: blocks commit with clear error message - If no tools installed: shows one-time warning with install instructions This addresses the architectural gap identified in Issues anthropics#2142 and anthropics#12524 where Claude Code commits automatically without any secret detection, resulting in credential exposure. Key design decisions: - Leverages existing tools (TruffleHog has 800+ detection patterns) - Zero maintenance burden for detection patterns - Non-blocking when tools unavailable (just warns) - Respects DISABLE_SECRET_SCANNING env var Fixes: anthropics#2142, anthropics#12524 Related: PR anthropics#15040 (original proposal, led to this approach) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>

ddworken · 2026-01-12T16:08:50Z

Hi @BernardUriza, thank you for the thoughtful reply! In this case, my expectation is that if a user has gitleaks or trufflehog installed, they are already very likely to have it configured in some automatic way that Claude Code respects (e.g. via pre-commit, pre-push, or GH actions). So in order to make that tooltip notification useful and not overly noisy, we'd also need to automatically skip the notification in these cases. This is outside of the scope of this plug-in, though please feel free to file an issue here so we can track this on our backlog. Thank you again!

BernardUriza · 2026-01-16T18:57:38Z

Hi @ddworken,

Thank you for the feedback on PR #15040. I appreciate your suggestion to leverage existing tools like TruffleHog/GitLeaks instead of custom detection.

I've taken the following actions per your request:

✅ Filed issue [Security] Pre-commit secret detection missing - caused $30K incident (PR #17551 ready for review) #18643 to track this on the backlog as you requested: [Security] Pre-commit secret detection missing - caused $30K incident (PR #17551 ready for review) #18643
✅ Submitted PR feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551 (January 11, 2026) which implements exactly what you suggested:
- Integrates TruffleHog/GitLeaks (no custom detection)
- Respects existing configurations (pre-commit, pre-push, GH actions)
- Minimal footprint (~200 LOC)
- Non-blocking fallback when tools unavailable
- Link: feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551

Context on urgency:

While filing the issue per your request, I wanted to highlight that this addresses a documented security defect (not a feature request):

Issue [BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142 reported the same pattern in June 2025 (7+ months ago), assigned to @levpopov
My incident (November 15, 2025): $30,000 in fraudulent Azure OpenAI charges + employment termination
Pattern: 7+ related issues documenting credential exposures over 6-month period

PR #17551 is ready for technical review and implements the exact approach you recommended. Given the documented harm and prior notice, could this be prioritized for review?

I'm available to address any technical feedback immediately or collaborate on alternative approaches if needed.

Evidence package: https://github.com/BernardUriza/claude-code-secret-exposure-test

Thank you again for your guidance on the implementation approach.

— Bernard

This was referenced Dec 22, 2025

Claude Code hardcoded API key in markdown documentation file #12524

Open

[BUG] Claude Code repeatedly ignores CLAUDE.md security guidelines and exposes API keys to version control #2142

Open

ddworken closed this Dec 30, 2025

BernardUriza mentioned this pull request Jan 11, 2026

feat(security): Integrate TruffleHog/GitLeaks for automatic secret scanning #17551

Open

BernardUriza mentioned this pull request Jan 16, 2026

[Security] Pre-commit secret detection missing - caused $30K incident (PR #17551 ready for review) #18643

Closed

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feat(security): Add hardcoded credentials detection to security-guidance plugin #15040

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BernardUriza commented Dec 22, 2025

Summary

Problem Statement

Real-World Impact (Documented Cases)

Changes

Added 3 New Security Patterns

1. hardcoded_api_keys

2. azure_connection_strings

3. database_credentials

Implementation Details

Warning Message Example

Testing

Comparison with Industry Standards

Breaking Changes

Documentation

Files Changed

Fixes

Future Enhancements

Acknowledgments

Evidence Repository

Uh oh!

BernardUriza commented Dec 22, 2025

🪂 Critical Addition: The Automatic Parachute (Commit 99a8755)

The Problem with Edit-Only Detection

The Real Fix: Git Pre-Commit Hook

How It Works

Example: Bernard's Incident Would Be Prevented

Files Changed in This Commit

This is a Two-Layer Defense

Why This Matters

Uh oh!

BernardUriza commented Dec 22, 2025

✅ TDD Test Suite - ALL TESTS PASSING

Test Results

What's Tested

How to Run Tests

Test Coverage Proof

Files Added

Bug Fix Included

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ddworken commented Dec 30, 2025

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1. `hardcoded_api_keys`

2. `azure_connection_strings`

3. `database_credentials`

🪂 Critical Addition: The Automatic Parachute (Commit `99a8755`)